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THE SOTERIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE
ṚṢI KAPILA IN THE *YUKTIDĪPIKĀ*:
THE PRODUCTION AND
TRANSMISSION OF LIBERATING
KNOWLEDGE IN CLASSICAL
SĀMḲHYA

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in the Study of
Religions

2011

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Declaration for PhD thesis

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ABSTRACT

The seventy-two verses of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (ca. 350-550 C.E.) form the core text of the classical school of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Of the classical commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the anonymous *Yuktidīpikā* (ca. 600-700 C.E.) provides the most extensive information on the ṛṣi Kapila, the legendary founder of the Sāṃkhya system, known as the *paramarṣi* or 'highest seer'.

In the *Yuktidīpikā*, the circumstances of Kapila's incarnation and the production of his knowledge are discussed in relation to the epistemological, psychological and phenomenological paradigms of Sāṃkhya. Often the text mentions Kapila in terms of a limit or exception to these paradigms, thereby providing much information on the defining limits of the paradigms, on the apparent connections between them, and on the distinctions between ordinary experience and that of Kapila.

For these reasons, the interpretative implications of the appearances of Kapila in the *Yuktidīpikā* deserve more consideration than they have generally been given in Sāṃkhya studies. In particular, the importance attributed by the *Yuktidīpikā* to Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the circumstances of its production and transmission provide a basis for a re-evaluation of the role of the epistemological notion of *āptavacana* or 'authoritative testimony' in the Sāṃkhya system. In addition, the evidence of the *Yuktidīpikā* suggests that the purpose behind Kapila's very incarnation was primarily soteriological.

In this study, my intention is to approach the figure of Kapila in the *Yuktidīpikā* as an interpretative link between various elements of the Sāṃkhya

system. I will thus take an integral approach to the various occurrences of Kapila in the text, in order to construct a comprehensive picture of the mechanics of the production and transmission of liberating knowledge, and to present a re-evaluation of the importance of doctrinal authority in classical Sāṃkhya.

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OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

CHAPTER I: Introduction. The short introductory chapter will outline the scope and methodology of the study. It will also formulate the interpretative questions to be explored in the study, with regard to the *Yuktidīpikā*'s portrayal of Kapila and his knowledge.

CHAPTER II: Basic Structure of the Classical Sāṃkhya System. The nature of Kapila and the significance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine present some interpretative difficulties when considered in the context of the systematised framework of classical Sāṃkhya. In order to provide the background necessary for a consideration of the evidence in the *Yuktidīpikā* with regard to these theoretical problems, the second chapter will outline the general features of the system as presented in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The various paradigms of Sāṃkhya will be outlined in five sections: ontology (§1), cosmology (§2), teleology/soteriology (§3), epistemology (§4), and psychology/phenomenology (§5). For the sake of simplicity, references to the commentaries and to secondary sources will be kept to a minimum here.

CHAPTER III: Literature Review. This will outline the history of interpretative contributions to the study of classical Sāṃkhya, insofar as they are relevant to the problems formulated in CHAPTER I. The objective of this chapter will be to identify the interpretative gaps in this area yet to be filled and the limits of prior scholarship on the *Yuktidīpikā*.

CHAPTER IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators' Views on Key Interpretative Issues. This chapter will look in more depth at the Sāṃkhya paradigms most relevant to the discussion of the role of Kapila and his knowledge in Sāṃkhya, namely: the epistemological paradigm of the *pramāṇas* (§1-5) and Sāṃkhya's two psychological/phenomenological paradigms, the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) (§6-10). These are also the aspects of Sāṃkhya on which there is the most divergence in the views of the classical commentators on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The primary objective of this chapter will be to identify evidence in the *Yuktidīpikā* that may be used to fill certain interpretative gaps apparent in the other commentaries.

CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the *Yuktidīpikā*. This chapter will present an interpretative analysis of the passages relevant to our understanding of the issues identified in the previous chapters. Of primary importance will be the commentator's understanding of the notion of *āptavacana* and his attitude to received knowledge in general (§1), and to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* in particular (§2). Links will be drawn between the role of Kapila's knowledge in the system and the notions of *āptavacana*, *jñāna*, and *siddhi*, as interpreted by the commentator. This chapter will also discuss references in the text to the Lord (*īśvara*) and to *yogins*, *devas* and *ṛṣis* in general (§3). The nature and origin of Kapila in particular and the apparent reasons behind his incarnation will be considered (§4). Ultimately, this discussion will construct a comprehensive picture of the text's treatment of the nature and origin of Kapila and his knowledge, and the significance of his authority to the individual's attainment of knowledge and consequent liberation. The relation of this portrayal of Kapila to the broader historical development of the figure and to our overall understanding of classical Sāṃkhya will then be considered (§5).

CHAPTER VI: Conclusion. The final chapter will summarise the main findings of the study and suggest possible avenues of further inquiry into the significance of the YD's views of Kapila and of the production and transmission of knowledge.

CHAPTER I: Introduction.

Since the time of its composition (ca. 350-550 C.E.)¹, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SK) has been regarded as the definitive formulation of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. Although the tradition testifies to earlier texts belonging to an established school or schools of Sāṃkhya, none of these texts are extant except in fragments found in later Sāṃkhya literature.² The system presented by the SK appears to have become the normative version of the Sāṃkhya doctrine from the time of its composition, and the philosophical content of this text is thus often referred to as 'classical Sāṃkhya'.³

Although the reasons for the normatisation of Sāṃkhya in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's text are unclear,⁴ the anonymous author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (YD), a commentary on the SK, goes to pains to defend the integrity of the system presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as the definitive expression of Sāṃkhya doctrine, and also to clarify Īśvarakṛṣṇa's differences of opinion from some of the earlier Sāṃkhya teachers. Motivated by these concerns, the YD-*kāra*⁵ presents quite detailed arguments in defense of the doctrines of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In this connection, an examination of the YD offers the

¹ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 15) have suggested the dates 350-450 C.E., but the more recent scholarship of HARZER (2006, pp. 107-109) has placed the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* at 'around 550 A.D.'

² LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 3-14) outline the occurrences of 'Proto-Sāṃkhya' ideas (in texts such as the *Arthaśāstra*, *Carakasamhitā*, *Suśrutasamhitā*, and the Upaniṣads) and the reconstruction of doctrines and texts, such as the *Śaṣṭitantra*, considered to represent 'Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya' (on the basis of quotations in the *Yuktidīpikā* and portions of the *Mokṣadharma* (a section of the *Mahābhārata*) and early Purāṇas) undertaken by scholars such as FRAUWALLNER (1973) and HACKER (1962). CHAKRAVARTI (1975) similarly presents an overview of the early development of Sāṃkhya ideas (pp. 4-110) and a reconstruction of the views of early Sāṃkhya teachers, largely based on the evidence of the YD (pp. 111-155). VAN BUITENEN (1956; 1957) also undertakes a reconstruction of the doctrines of Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya (primarily on the basis of passages from the *Mokṣadharma* and the Upaniṣads) and considers their relation to classical Sāṃkhya.

³ Cf. LARSON (1979)'s definition, p. 4.

⁴ Cf. the discussion in LARSON (1979), pp. 134-135.

⁵ I have used the suffix *-kāra* in the sense of an 'author' of a particular work, in order to refer to the anonymous author of the YD.

opportunity to clarify several major interpretative issues only touched upon by the other classical commentaries on the SK.

The present study is focused primarily on the problem of the role of doctrinal authority in classical Sāṃkhya. The SK calls the founder of Sāṃkhya philosophy the *paramarṣi* or ‘supreme seer’. According to all of the commentaries on the SK, this figure was named Kapila.⁶ SK 70-71 tell us that Kapila’s knowledge was passed down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa through a series of disciples.⁷ It is not clear, however, whether an individual might gain Sāṃkhya knowledge independently or must rely on the authoritative Sāṃkhya texts for this.

According to classical Sāṃkhya, the means to liberation (*mokṣa*, *kaivalya*) from the cycle of transmigration (*saṃsāra*), which is characterised by the experience of pain (*duḥkha*), is the discriminative realisation of the ultimate duality of Materiality (*prakṛti*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*)⁸ (see §II.1-3). In general, the Sāṃkhya texts demonstrate that this duality may be inferred by any individual. However, they also ascribe an extraordinary origin and extraordinary capabilities to Kapila, the first to discover this knowledge. They also tend to emphasize the conformity of the SK to Kapila’s original treatise.

⁶ It should be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that there ever was an actual historical figure named Kapila who was the founder of the Sāṃkhya system. LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 108) point out that ‘Kapila and [his disciple] Āsuri are only vague memories’ in the Sāṃkhya texts. As CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 111) judges, all early references to Kapila ‘clearly point to his mythological origin and he may not be taken as an historical personage’. BRONKHORST (2007, pp. 61-68) suggests that Kapila may even have originated as a deity associated with the ascetic traditions of the region of ‘Greater Magadha’. The issues surrounding the development of the figure of Kapila will be considered in more detail in §V.5.

⁷ SK 70-71: ‘The sage bestowed this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion. Āsuri likewise [bestowed this knowledge] to Pañcaśikha, and by him the philosophical system was expanded. It was transmitted through a succession of disciples, and it has been condensed by the noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa in *āryā* [verses], having completely discerned the established truth.’ (*etat pavitrām agryam munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau / āsurir api pañcaśikhāya tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantram // śiṣyaparamparayāgatam īśvarakṛṣṇena caitad āryābhiḥ / saṃkṣiptam āryamatinā samyag vijñāya siddhāntam //*).

⁸ I have capitalised ‘Consciousness’ for *puruṣa* in order to distinguish this term from ‘consciousness’ (*cetanā*) as the defining characteristic of *puruṣa*. Likewise, I have capitalised ‘Materiality’ for *prakṛti* as the other primary principle of Sāṃkhya. Although *prakṛti* is often translated as ‘Nature’, this term has too many connotations not present in the Sāṃkhya conception of *prakṛti*.

The central question of this study is: to what extent are individual seekers of liberation considered to be dependent upon Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the tradition initiated by it? In order to answer this question on the basis of an examination of the evidence of the YD, several related interpretative issues will be explored: 1. How is the Sāṃkhya tradition considered to be related to the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*)? 2. Does inference (*anumāna*), often used by the texts to establish the existence of Sāṃkhya principles, depend upon the authority of the Sāṃkhya texts for its efficacy, or may it be used independently by an individual to attain the same knowledge attained by Kapila? 3. What is the nature of Kapila and his knowledge, and what are the reasons behind his incarnation and the production of his knowledge?

Two secondary contributions to the study of Sāṃkhya will also be made by this study: 1. a detailed comparison of the classical commentators' views with regard to the major, as yet unresolved, interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya, and 2. a consideration of the place of the YD's views within the broader historical development of the figure of Kapila. The former will be presented in CHAPTER IV, while the latter will be presented in §V.5

Of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, the YD offers the most interpretative information with regard to Kapila and to the production and transmission of knowledge. Much of this information is found in connection with discussions of the epistemological paradigm of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the psychological/phenomenological paradigms of the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*). A discussion of these elements of the Sāṃkhya system and a comparison of the YD's views to those of the other commentators will provide the context for a holistic discussion of the YD's view of the role of Kapila and the tradition of knowledge initiated by him.

The classical commentaries on the SK agree, with slight variations, on the basic structure of the Sāṃkhya system. CHAPTER II of this study will be devoted to a presentation of this structure. This will provide the basic context for a consideration, in CHAPTER III, of the contributions of previous scholars to resolving the interpretative issues apparent in the system. CHAPTER IV will compare the views of the commentators on the SK with regard to the *pramāṇas*, the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*. In addition to the YD, this discussion will draw on material from the *Gauḍapādashāstra* (GBh), the *Māṇḍūkya* (MV), and the *Tattvakaumudī* (TK).

Although it has generally been difficult for scholars to determine the dates of these texts, I have adopted the basic chronology established by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987): GBh (ca. 500-600 C.E.), YD (ca. 600-700 C.E.), MV (ca. 800 C.E. or later), TK (ca. 850 or 975 C.E.).⁹

The work of SOLOMON (1974) has established the affinities between GBh, MV, *Suvarṇasaptati* (SVS) (translated by Paramārtha into Chinese, 557-569 C.E.)¹⁰, *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (SV) (ca. 500-600 C.E.)¹¹, and *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (SSV) (ca. 500-600 C.E.)¹². However, it is clear on the basis of the text's treatment of Kapila that the MV in its present form should be considered to be a relatively late text, as shown by the work of JACOBSEN (1998; 2008).¹³ In any case, it appears that GBh, MV, SVS, SV, and SSV all stem from the same text, which SOLOMON tentatively suggests to be SV.¹⁴

I will thus be taking the GBh as representative of the Sāṃkhya commentaries produced shortly before the YD, and the MV and TK as representative of those

⁹ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 16.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 15.

¹² Ibid., p. 16.

¹³ JACOBSEN (1998), pp. 77-78; JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 33-34.

¹⁴ SOLOMON (1974), p. vii; LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 179.

produced shortly after.¹⁵ The fact that MV differs from GBh largely in terms of its portrayal of Kapila, particularly in its association of Kapila with Viṣṇu, provides an index of the development of this figure within the Sāṃkhya tradition.

It is evident that by the time of the MV and TK, a new mythological view of Kapila had come to be accepted by Sāṃkhya commentators.¹⁶ In addition to Vācaspatimiśra's TK, his *Tattvavaiśārādī* (TV), a commentary on Vyāsa's *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, contains valuable information in this regard. CHAPTER V will examine the YD's references to Kapila, as well as to the Lord (*īśvara*), to gods (*deva*), to *ṛṣis* in general, and to *yogins*, and will then compare this evidence to that found in the GBh, MV, TK and TV, as well as to evidence with regard to Kapila found in earlier texts of the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition.

The primary objective of this study is to clarify the YD's views on the nature of Kapila and the importance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine with regard to the attainment of liberating knowledge by later individuals. The study will also consider the relation of these views to those of the other classical commentaries on the SK and their place in the broader historical development of the figure of Kapila, in order to construct a picture of the development of the role of Kapila's knowledge, and of doctrinal authority in general, in the Sāṃkhya texts of the classical period.

¹⁵ I have not had the opportunity to consult another apparently contemporaneous commentary, the *Jayamaṅgalā* (JM) (ca. 700 or later), but a summary provided in LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 271-287) shows general agreement with the other commentaries in terms of the basic structure of the system. With regard to the apparent date of this text, CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 166) suggests that 'the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā* seems to pre-suppose the existence of the *Yukti-dīpikā*'.

¹⁶ WEZLER (1970, p. 262) suggests that this was due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas; JACOBSEN (1998, p. 77-79; 2008, pp. 33-37) discusses this development in some detail.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The primary focus of this study is an interpretative problem: an examination of the YD's views on the nature and origin of Kapila and the role of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine in the attainment of liberating knowledge by later generations of Sāṃkhya seekers. Accordingly, the structure and composition of the YD are not direct concerns, although a brief outline of the structure of the text will be presented at the beginning of CHAPTER IV.

The YD is a very lengthy text, and my intention is not to present a treatment of the text in its entirety. Rather, the choice of passages for analysis will be based upon their relevance to the interpretative issues at hand, which will often mean bringing together references from disparate sections of the text. This approach can be characterised as 'holistic' insofar as it draws together relevant information from the contexts of all of the major Sāṃkhya paradigms treated by the YD. As a consequence, connections will be drawn between several Sāṃkhya paradigms—namely, the *pramāṇas*, the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*—which, as will be made clear in CHAPTER III, have not yet been fully understood by scholars of Sāṃkhya. These are also the Sāṃkhya paradigms upon which there is the most divergence in the views of the classical commentators on the SK. In itself, the detailed comparison of these views in CHAPTER IV will form a secondary contribution of the study, although these paradigms have been chosen for examination primarily due to their relevance to the main interpretative focus of the study.

Nor do I intend to approach the YD primarily from the point of view of the history of textual composition or of the history of Indian philosophy in general. The place of the text's views within the broader historical development of the figure of

Kapila and the relation of the text's views on the origination and transmission of knowledge to the evidence of sources beyond the classical Sāṃkhya texts are secondary concerns of the study. Suggestions in this regard will be introduced in CHAPTER V.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION

Unless otherwise specified, all translations and summaries are my own. The summaries of portions of the SK provided in CHAPTER II are based primarily on the text as attested by the GBh and reproduced in LARSON (1979).¹⁷ The text of the SK varies only slightly among the various commentaries, although the YD does not contain extant commentary on all of the verses.¹⁸ In translating the Sāṃkhya commentaries, Mainkar (*Gauḍapādhābhāṣya* (1972)), Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-92)), and Jha (*Tattvakaumudī* (2004)) have been useful as guides, but I have generally endeavoured to be more literal and to be consistent in my translation of technical Sāṃkhya terms. With regard to the YD, my translations and summaries follow the readings established in the critical edition (1998).

¹⁷ LARSON (1979), pp. 255-277.

¹⁸ SK 5c, 11-12, 60-63, 64a, 65-66, and 67a are absent from the text of the YD. Also, SK 73 is attested only by the MV.

CHAPTER II: Basic Structure of the Classical Sāṃkhya System.

§1. Ontology: the twenty-five *tattvas*.

The Sāṃkhya texts posit a basic duality between two existent principles (*tattva*), Materiality (*prakṛti*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*). These two principles are eternal and all-pervasive (SK 10-11). They are also eternally separate (SK 62); they do not interact, though they do exist in ‘proximity’ or ‘conjunction’ (*saṃyoga*: SK 20-21, 66) with one another.

Consciousness (*puruṣa*) is a passive witness to the activity of Materiality (*prakṛti*). While *prakṛti* is active but non-conscious, *puruṣa* is inactive but conscious (SK 10-11, 19).

Prakṛti is further distinguished as existing in two states, unmanifest (*avyakta*) and manifest (*vyakta*). Unmanifest *prakṛti* (also called *mūlaprakṛti* or *pradhāna*) is primordial Materiality, from which the whole of the created world evolves. In this sense, unmanifest *prakṛti* can be thought of as the raw matter for creation or the potential for creation. It is also the subtle substratum of manifest *prakṛti*.

When the subtle, inactive form of *prakṛti* comes into conjunction with *puruṣa*, the process of the manifestation of *prakṛti* is triggered. This process is governed by three constituent qualities (*guṇa*)¹⁹ inherent in *prakṛti*: goodness (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*), and inertia (*tamas*).²⁰ When *prakṛti* is in its unmanifest

¹⁹ I have chosen to translate *guṇa* as ‘constituent quality’ in order to capture two aspects of the concept. While the *guṇas* represent the ontological components of *prakṛti*, they are also observable as particular qualities apparent in objects at all levels of experience.

²⁰ In translating the names of the *guṇas* themselves, I have decided on the most abstract translations rather than those which would reflect certain qualities of the *guṇas* as manifested in various phenomena, such as ‘illumination’ or ‘buoyancy’ for *sattva*, ‘darkness’ for *tamas*, etc.

state, the three *guṇas* are in a state of equilibrium. This balance is upset by the presence of the *puruṣa*. When one *guṇa* becomes dominant over the others, new principles (*tattva*) evolve out of *prakṛti*. This activity leads to the emergence of twenty-three other principles, known collectively as manifest (*vyakta*) Materiality. The existence of unmanifest *prakṛti* as the source of these twenty-three principles, the fact that these principles emerge from *prakṛti* in a fixed order, and the fact that both unmanifest and manifest *prakṛti* are characterised by the *guṇas*, are supported by the ‘doctrine of the [pre-]existent effect’ (*satkāryavāda*), according to which every effect exists in its cause in a potential form (SK 9, 14-16).

Unmanifest Materiality gives rise to the intellect (*buddhi*, *mahat*)²¹. Intellect gives rise to the ego (*ahaṁkāra*), which is described as self-conceit (*abhimāna*) (SK 24). Ego is productive in two directions (SK 24-25). When characterised by goodness (*sattva*), ego gives rise to the eleven organs or faculties (*indriya*). These are mind (*manas*); the five faculties of apprehension (*buddhīndriya*): ears (*śrotra*), skin (*tvac*), eyes (*cakṣus*), tongue (*rasana*), nose (*ghrāṇa*); and the five faculties of action (*karmendriya*): voice (*vāc*), hands (*pāṇi*), feet (*pāda*), anus (*pāyu*), and genitals (*upastha*). Mind is considered to be both a faculty of apprehension and a faculty of action (SK 27), since it acts as a superintendent of the activities of both.

When ego is characterised by inertia (*tamas*), it gives rise to the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*), namely: sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparśa*), form or colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), and scent (*gandha*). These five subtle elements are described as *aviśeṣa* or non-specific (SK 38); in other words, they lack the particular qualities of matter

²¹ The intellect (*buddhi*) is also known as ‘the great [principle]’ (*mahat*), an appellation which might stem from the existence of a separate principle known as ‘the great self’ (*mahat ātman*) in proto-Sāṃkhya enumerations such as *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 6.7-9 (see LARSON (1979, p. 98)). The author of the YD (on SK 22a, p. 187, ll. 25-26) explains: ‘It is great because of being great in [terms of] space and because of being great in [terms of] time. It is great because of being possessed of a greater extent than all produced things.’ (*sa tu deśamahatvāt kālamahattvāc ca mahān / sarvotpādyebhyo mahāparimāṇayuktatvān mahāni* /).

perceivable in the everyday world, such as sweetness with regard to taste, redness with regard to colour, and so on.

The subtle elements, in turn, give rise to the five great elements (*mahābhūta*): ether (*ākāśa*), air (*vāyu*), fire (*tejas*), water (*ap*), and earth (*prthivī*). In contrast to the subtle elements, these are specific (*viśeṣa*) (SK 38); that is, they are characterised by particular qualities.

These twenty-five principles²² are treated as the common framework through which all individuals experience the world; that is, as the substratum of *prakṛti*'s activity as witnessed by the Consciousness (*puruṣa*) of an individual.

§2. Cosmology: transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and the phenomenal creation (*bhautika sarga*).

There is only one *prakṛti*, but there are countless *puruṣas*. While there is only one *prakṛti* active with regard to all individuals, there is a distinct *puruṣa* associated with each individual (SK 11, 18). This accounts for the variety of experience in the world (SK 18).

A *puruṣa*, due to conjunction (*saṃyoga*) with *prakṛti*, becomes associated with a subtle body (*līṅga*), consisting of intellect, ego, the eleven faculties, and the subtle elements (SK 40). This subtle body transmigrates (*saṃsr-*) from birth to birth (SK40), taking on various physical bodies composed of the five great elements (SK 39).

The phenomenal universe (*bhautika sarga*) is divided into three levels: the divine (*daiva*), the human (*mānuṣya*), and the animal (*tairyagyona*) (SK 53). These

²² For a chart showing the relationships among the twenty-five *tattvas*, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 52.

three levels are described as the upper (*ūrdhva*), middle (*madhya*), and lower (*mūlata*), respectively (SK 54). The upper level is characterised by a predominance of goodness (*sattva*), the middle by a predominance of activity (*rajas*), and the lower by a predominance of inertia (*tamas*) (SK 54).

The level of the cosmos in which one is born and the various circumstances of a particular birth are determined by the conditions (*bhāvas*) of the intellect (SK 40, 43-45, 52) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) (SK 46-51). These two paradigms and the relationship between them will be discussed below (§II.5, IV.6-10).

While the phenomenal circumstances of an individual's life change from birth to birth, the structure of the subtle body (*liṅga*) remains constant. The principles (*tattva*) which make up the subtle body are thus common to all individuals, while the phenomenal results of the activity of the subtle body vary according to the operation of the *bhāvas* and *pratyayasarga* with regard to each individual Consciousness (*puruṣa*).

The transmigration of the subtle body continues through the periodic dissolution and re-manifestation of *prakṛti*, during which the manifest principles (*buddhi*, etc.) are absorbed into the unmanifest and then re-emerge in the same pattern.²³ The subtle body resumes the process of transmigration after these periods of dissolution and continues to transmigrate until the liberation (*mokṣa*) and isolation (*kaivalya*) of the particular *puruṣa* (SK 65-66) with which it is associated. At this point the activity of Materiality (*prakṛti*) with regard to that *puruṣa* ceases (SK 59,

²³ E.g., GBh on SK 40, p. 146, ll. 8-10: 'The subtle body, from the intellect down to the subtle elements, possessing the instruments [of apprehension and action], dissolves into primordial Materiality at the time of dissolution. It remains unassociated with transmigration until the time of creation, being bound by the bonds of delusion in Materiality and incapable of actions such as transmigration; then the subtle body transmigrates again at the time of creation.' (*liṅgam iti / pralayakāle mahadādisūkṣmaparyantaṁ karaṇopetaṁ pradhāne līyate / asaṁsaraṇayuktaṁ sat āsargakālam atra vartate prakṛtimohabandhanabaddhaṁ sat saṁsaraṇādikriyāsvasamarthaṁ iti punaḥ sargakāle saṁsarati tasmāt liṅgaṁ sūkṣmaṁ //*).

61, 65, 66, 68). Although the body presently associated with that *puruṣa* continues to exist for some time (SK 67), no further incarnation will take place upon the death of that body (SK 66-67).

§3. Teleology/Soteriology: conjunction (*saṃyoga*), discrimination (*vijñāna*), and isolation (*kaivalya*).

Two reasons are given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa for the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of Materiality (*prakṛti*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*): the observation of Materiality's activity by Consciousness and the eventual isolation (*kaivalya*) of Consciousness (SK 21, 37). Creation (that is, the manifestation of *prakṛti*) occurs as a result of this conjunction (SK 21). Thereafter, the activity of *prakṛti*, as described by the functions of the three constituent qualities (*guṇa*), is directed entirely towards the dual purpose of the *puruṣa* (SK 13, 31, 36-37, 56-58, 60).

With regard to the first purpose of the *puruṣa*, the intellect (*buddhi*) is described as the locus of all knowledge processes. It is characterised by the determination (*adhyavasāya*: SK 23) of objects. The ego (*ahaṃkāra*), mind (*manas*) and ten faculties (*indriya*), present all sensory information to the intellect, which illuminates the objects of experience for the passive observation of the *puruṣa* (SK 31, 36).

The second purpose of the *puruṣa* is also fulfilled by this illuminative activity of the *buddhi* (SK 37). In this case, a specific form of knowledge is required for the liberation (*mokṣa*) or isolation (*kaivalya*) of the *puruṣa*. The Sāṃkhya texts reject perceptible (*drṣṭa*) and scriptural (*āmuśravika*) forms of knowledge (SK 1-2), prescribing instead the discrimination (*vijñāna*) between the manifest (*vyakta*), the

unmanifest (*avyakta*), and the knower (*jñā*; i.e. the *puruṣa*) (SK 2). The manner in which this discrimination is attained will be discussed below (§IV.5-10).

Due to the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, they appear to take on each other's characteristics. That is, the unconscious *prakṛti* appears to be conscious, and the inactive *puruṣa* appears to be active (SK 20). This relationship is compared to a partnership between a lame man and a blind man (SK 21). That is, just as the lame man provides the function of sight for the blind man, so does *puruṣa* lend its consciousness to *prakṛti*, while just as the blind man provides the function of movement for the lame man, so does *prakṛti* direct its activity to the needs of the *puruṣa*. Thus, both consciousness and activity characterise the experience of an incarnated individual.

Due to the illusion of activity on the part of the *puruṣa*, it is described as experiencing the suffering (*duḥkha*) which is considered to be the nature of worldly existence (SK 55). Suffering is also given as the reason for undertaking the Sāṃkhya inquiry into the means of liberation (SK 1).

However, due to its complete passivity (SK 60), the *puruṣa* is never actually bound to worldly existence; that is, it never transmigrates and is thus never in need of liberation (SK 62). Rather, it is *prakṛti* which, due to the illusion of its own consciousness (in the context of a particular *puruṣa*), transmigrates and attains liberation (SK 62).

Thus, liberation is attained by the production of the knowledge in *buddhi* that consciousness is not an attribute of *buddhi* itself (SK 64). Liberation then takes the form of the cessation of *prakṛti*'s activity (SK 59, 65, 66, 68) and the consequent isolation (*kaivalya*) of the *puruṣa*. This isolation consists in the fact that there is no longer any activity on the part of *prakṛti* for the *puruṣa* to witness (SK 65, 68).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa illustrates the conjunction and eventual separation of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* with several analogies. In addition to the analogy of the lame man and the blind man, mentioned above, *prakṛti* is compared to the milk which unconsciously functions for the benefit of a calf (SK 57). The relationship between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is also compared to that between a woman and a man. This analogy is facilitated by the fact that *prakṛti* is a feminine noun, while *puruṣa* literally means ‘man’. *Prakṛti* is portrayed as a modest woman who, having realised that she has been observed by a man, withdraws from sight (SK 61). She is also compared to a dancer who leaves the stage after the performance (SK 59), while *puruṣa* is likened to a member of the audience (SK 65).

These analogies serve to reinforce the fact that the cessation of the process of transmigration is entirely a function of *prakṛti*, while *puruṣa* is at all times merely a passive witness. The means by which the discrimination (*vijñāna*) leading to this cessation is produced within manifest *prakṛti* will be considered in detail in CHAPTER IV.

§4. Epistemology: the *pramāṇas*.

The epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) and its relation to the attainment of liberating knowledge in Sāṃkhya will be a major focus of the discussion of the YD in CHAPTERS IV and V. Of all the elements of the Sāṃkhya system, its epistemological framework is the locus of the most disagreement among the commentators on the SK. In order to provide sufficient background for a discussion of the relationship between *āptavacana* and the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, a detailed discussion of the commentator’s

views on Sāṃkhya epistemology will take up a large portion of CHAPTER IV (§1-5).

The current section will be limited mainly to testimony of the SK itself.

As mentioned above (§II.3), Īśvarakṛṣṇa treats the intellect (*buddhi*) as the locus of knowledge. The process of perception is explained in terms of the function of the principles (*tattva*) (SK 30-36). In ordinary perception, the great elements (*mahābhūta*) become the objects of the eleven faculties (*indriya*), which then present the sensory data to the intellect (SK 34-36).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa includes also non-specific (*aviśeṣa*) objects—i.e. the subtle elements (*tanmātra*)—as objects of the sense-faculties (*buddhīndriya*) (SK 34). The GBh and MV both explain that the sense-faculties of human beings apprehend specific (*viśeṣa*) objects, while those of gods (*deva*) apprehend non-specific objects.²⁴ The YD and TK mention both gods (in the TK, *ūrdhvasrotas*: literally, ‘those having an upward stream’²⁵) and *yogins* as those capable of perceiving the subtle elements.²⁶ This extraordinary form of perception will become relevant to the discussion of the commentators’ definition of the *pramāṇa* (means of valid knowledge) of perception (*drṣṭa*) in §IV.1, as well as to the broader discussion of the YD’s views on the attainment of suprasensuous (*atīndriya*) knowledge in CHAPTER V.

²⁴ *saviśeṣaviśayaṃ mānuṣyāṇāṃ śabdaspārśarūparasagandhān sukhaduḥkhamohayuktān buddhīndriyāṇi prakāśayanti / devānāṃ nirviśeṣān viśayān prakāśayanti* / (GBh on SK 34, p. 134, ll. 6-8); *atrocyate śabdaspārśarasarūpagandhāḥ pañca devānāṃ tanmātrasaṃjñitā nirviśeṣāḥ kevalasukhalakṣaṇatvāt / y tatasāmānā duḥkhamohau na staḥ tasmān nirviśeṣāste iti / tathā hi / viśiṣyante śāntghoramūḍhatvādineti viśeṣāḥ taiḥ saha saviśeṣāḥ, devalā nirviśeṣā iti tātparyam / evaṃ śabdādayaṃ mānuṣyāṇāṃ saviśeṣāḥ sukhaduḥkhamohayuktā ityarthāḥ / devānāṃ tu buddhīndriyāṇi nirviśeṣaṃ sukhātmakaṃ prakāśayanti* / (MV on SK 34, p. 50, ll. 14-21).

²⁵ See nn. 484, 488, 489 (§IV.9).

²⁶ *tatra devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api grhṇanti [prāg eva viśeṣāt] / yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇāṃ / asmadādīnāṃ tu viśeṣān eva tamasā parivṛtatvāt* / (YD on SK 34, p. 218, ll. 3-5); *tatrūrdhvasrotasāṃ yogināḥ ca śrotraṃ śabdatanmātraviśayaṃ sthūlaśabdaviśayaṃ cāsmadādīnāṃ tu sthūlaśabdaviśayaṃ eva / evaṃ teṣaṃ tvak sthūlasūkṣma-sparśaviśayaṃ asmadādīnāṃ tu sthūlasparśaviśayaiva / evaṃ ca kṣurādayo ’pi teṣāṃ asmadādīnāṃ ca rūpādīṣu sūkṣmasthanūleṣu draṣṭavyāḥ* // (TK on SK 34, p. 113, ll. 26-29).

The knowledge of perceived objects (whether specific or non-specific) is presented by the sense-faculties to the mind (*manas*), ego (*ahaṃkāra*), and intellect (*buddhi*). These latter three principles are common in functioning with regard to every object of knowledge (SK 35), while the sense-faculties function only with regard to particular elements (SK 28).

The relationship between the three-fold internal organ (*manas*, *ahaṃkāra*, and *buddhi*) and the external organs (the ten sense- and action-faculties) is compared to that between a door-keeper and doors (SK 35). In other words, the internal organs serve to process external information attained through the sense-faculties and to direct the action-faculties on the basis of that information, thus acting as superintendent of the interaction between the subtle body (*liṅga*) and the phenomenal world.

The knowledge produced in the intellect is then presented to Consciousness (*puruṣa*) for its passive observance (SK 36) and ultimate liberation (see §II.3).

In addition to direct perception (*dṛṣṭa*), thus explained in terms of the function of the principles of the subtle body (*liṅga*), Īśvarakṛṣṇa includes inference (*anumāna*) and authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in his list of accepted means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) (SK 4). The YD clarifies that although there is really only one means of knowledge—that is, the constituent quality of goodness (*sattva*) in the form of the intellect (*buddhi*)—the acquisition of knowledge takes on three different forms depending on the circumstances surrounding it.²⁷ Moreover, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that all other means of knowledge (accepted by other schools) can

²⁷ *anenaitad ācaṣṭe: ekam eva buddhilakṣaṇam sattvaṃ nimittāntarānugrahopajanitābhiḥ kārya-viśeṣaparicchinnarūpabhedābhiḥ śaktibhir upakārād bhinnam iva pratyavabhāsamānam dṛṣṭādi-śabdavācyaṃ bhavati / na tu yathā tantrāntarīyānām viśayopanipātibhir indriyair upajanitā bahvyo buddhayaḥ tatheha vidyante yāḥ parikalpyamānāḥ svatantrāṇi trīṇi pramāṇāni syuḥ* / (YD on SK 4c, p. 69, ll. 2-6)

be subsumed under these three headings (SK 4b), as demonstrated by the commentators in various ways.²⁸

The commentators' views on the respective spheres of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, and the applicability of these categories to the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, will be discussed in CHAPTER IV (§1-5). In addition to the *pramāṇas*, two other Sāṃkhya paradigms, to be introduced below, partly describe the process by which knowledge is produced and transmitted.

§5. Psychology/Phenomenology²⁹: the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*).

The SK presents two paradigms, the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), that describe the process by which the circumstances of the phenomenal incarnation and experience of an individual subtle body (*liṅga, sūkṣmaśarīra*) are determined. The relationship between these two paradigms is unclear from the text of the SK and has been much debated among scholars.³⁰ In §IV.10, it will be shown that the YD provides more evidence linking these two paradigms than do the other classical commentaries on the SK. The implications of this relationship will be discussed further in CHAPTER V.

²⁸ The commentators variously incorporate presumption (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), negation (*abhāva*), conceptualisation or intuition (*pratibhā*), folklore (*aitihya*), comparison (*upamāna*), and gesture (*ceṣṭa*) into the three *pramāṇas* accepted by the SK (see §IV.4).

²⁹ I do not intend here to suggest any parallels with the Western traditions of psychology and phenomenology. My usage of these terms merely reflects the fact that the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* describe the psychological make-up of the individual and the phenomenal experience of the individual. The respective spheres of these two paradigms and the relationship between them (and attempts by previous scholars to understand them) will be discussed in more detail in §IV.10.

³⁰ See especially the reviews in CHAPTER III of CHAKRAVARTI (1975), FRAUWALLNER (1973), OBERHAMMER (1961), KENGHE (1968), LARSON (1984), and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987).

The SK itself provides a good deal of information about the first of these paradigms and its relation to the other elements of the Sāṃkhya system. Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the intellect (*buddhi*) is invested (*adhivāsita*, literally ‘perfumed’) with conditions (*bhāva*) (SK 40) and specifies that there are eight of these conditions: merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), passion (*avairāgya*), lordliness (*aiśvarya*)³¹, and non-lordliness (*anaiśvarya*) (SK 44-45). Īśvarakṛṣṇa explains that merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness are the forms of intellect characterised by goodness (*sāttvika*), while demerit, ignorance, passion, and non-lordliness are the forms of intellect characterised by inertia (*tāmasa*) (SK 23).³² Merit is said to result in upward movement (interpreted by the commentators as transmigrational movement upward in the scale of beings), demerit in downward movement, knowledge in liberation (*apavarga*), ignorance in bondage (to the cycle of transmigration), dispassion in dissolution into Materiality (or into the eight sources or productive principles; see §IV.6) (*prakṛtilaya*), passion in transmigration (*saṃsāra*), lordliness in non-obstruction (of one’s will), and non-lordliness in obstruction (SK 44-45). In summary, these conditions determine the transmigratory path taken by the individual and the circumstances of a particular incarnation.

With regard to the relationship between these conditions (*bhāva*) and the subtle body (*liṅga*), the SK states that they are mutually dependent for their function (SK 52). Specifically, seven of the conditions (merit, demerit, ignorance, dispassion, passion, lordliness, and non-lordliness) serve to maintain the process of

³¹ I have translated *aiśvarya* as ‘lordliness’, rather than with the common translation ‘power’, in order to draw attention to the connection of this term with the figure of *īśvara*, the Lord (see §IV.6, V.3).

³² The fact that the constituent qualities (*guṇa*), which are responsible for the manifestation of the other principles (*tattva*) from the intellect, are thus also responsible for determining the various conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect, which themselves are not considered separate principles, presents an interpretative problem of its own. For an in-depth discussion of this problem, see MALINAR (2003).

transmigration, while one condition (knowledge) leads to the cessation of this process (SK 63, 65, 67-68). The condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) thus provides a link between the paradigm of the *bhāvas* and the epistemological and soteriological aspects of the system presented in the SK (see §II.3-4).

The SK applies a further threefold division to the conditions, stating that they are *sāmsiddhika*, *prākṛtika*, and *vaikṛta* (SK 43). These terms are usually translated as ‘innate’, ‘natural’, and ‘acquired’, respectively.³³ The interpretation of these three types varies slightly among the commentators, although they all take the labels to refer to the manner of the production of the conditions (see §IV.8). The evidence of the YD suggests the possibility of a novel, but more literal, interpretation of these three types: as ‘innate’ (*sāmsiddhika*), ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (*prākṛtika*), and ‘deriving from the products’ (*vaikṛta*) (see §IV.8). The implications of this interpretation will be discussed in further detail in CHAPTER V.

Immediately following the explanation of the conditions (*bhāva*) and their consequences (SK 43-45), Īśvarakṛṣṇa appears to provide a link between these conditions and the paradigm of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*): ‘This is the intellectual creation, called error (*viparyaya*), incapacity (*aśakti*), contentment (*tuṣṭi*), and attainment (*siddhi*); and because of suppression through imbalance of the constituent qualities (*guṇa*), it has fifty divisions.’³⁴ If we take the term *eṣas* (‘this’) in this verse to refer back to the substance of the preceding verses,³⁵ it is, however,

³³ E.g., LARSON (1979, p. 269); LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 266); and Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-92) on SK 43, pp. 307-310). Mainkar similarly translates ‘connate’, ‘natural’, and ‘acquired’ (GBh on SK 43, pp. 153-154).

³⁴ *eṣa pratyayasarga viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyākhyah / guṇavaiśamyavimardāt tasya ca bhedās tu pañcāśat //* (SK 46).

³⁵ SK 43-45: ‘The conditions—merit, etc.—are innate, deriving from primordial Materiality, and deriving from the products. They are seen to be located in the instrument, while the embryo, etc., are located in the effect. Merit results in upward movement; demerit results in downward movement. Knowledge results in liberation; from the opposite [of knowledge] bondage results. From dispassion is dissolution into the sources; from passion, characterised by activity, there is transmigration. From lordliness is non-obstruction; from the opposite [of lordliness] is the opposite [of non-obstruction].’ (*sāmsiddhikās ca bhāvāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtās ca dharmādyāḥ / dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇas*)

still unclear whether Īśvarakṛṣṇa sees the *pratyayasarga* as another classification of the conditions (*bhāva*) themselves or of their phenomenal consequences.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides an enumeration of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* but does not provide much information on their nature. He explains the further fifty-fold division of the four categories of error (*viparyaya*), incapacity (*aśakti*), contentment (*tuṣṭi*), and attainment (*siddhi*), by listing five varieties of error, twenty-eight of incapacity, nine of contentment, and eight of attainment (SK 47-51). Of these categories, the forms of error (*viparyaya*) also have further subdivisions; Īśvarakṛṣṇa tells us that there are eight varieties of ignorance (*tamas*)³⁶, eight varieties of delusion (*moha*), ten varieties of extreme delusion (*mahāmoha*), eighteen varieties of gloom (*tāmisra*)³⁷, and eighteen varieties of blind gloom (*andhatāmisra*) (SK 48). The twenty-eight varieties of incapacity (*aśakti*) include injuries to the eleven faculties and the opposites of the nine contentments and eight attainments (SK 49). The nine contentments (*tuṣṭi*) are divided into four internal contentments, including Materiality (*prakṛti*), means (*upādāna*), time (*kāla*) and fate (*bhāgya*), and five external contentments that arise from the abandonment of the objects of the senses (SK 50). The eight attainments (*siddhi*), which will become a major focus of the study of the YD's views in CHAPTERS IV and V, are listed as reflection (*ūha*), speech (*śabda*), study (*adhyayana*), the three removals of pain (*duḥkhavighāta*), attainment of/from friends (*suhṛtprāpti*)³⁸, and charity (*dāna*) (SK 51abc). Īśvarakṛṣṇa also states that error, incapacity, and contentment are hindrances to

ca kalalādyāḥ // dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvaṃ gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmeṇa / jñānena cāpavargo viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ // vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ saṃsāro bhavati rājāsād rāgāt / aiśvaryād avighāto viparyayāt tadviparyāsaḥ //.

³⁶ The interpretation of this form of error by the commentators is more precisely conveyed by the translation 'ignorance' than by 'inertia' (as used to translate *tamas* in its technical sense as one of the *guṇas*).

³⁷ I have adopted the translation of *tāmisra* used by Mainkar (*Gauḍapādashāstra* (1972)), Jha (*Tattvakaumudī* (2004)), and LARSON (1979).

³⁸ *suhṛtprāpti* is generally interpreted by the commentators as 'attainment from friends', but the TK explicitly interprets the compound as 'acquisition of friends' (see §IV.9, n. 521).

attainment (SK 51d). The nature of this relationship between the categories of the *pratyayasarga* will be considered in §IV.9-10.

Aside from this information, no further explanation of the nature of these categories of the *pratyayasarga*, or of their connection with the *bhāvas*, is given in the SK itself, and the views of the commentators vary in this respect (see §IV.9-10). However, it is clear from the SK that both the *bhāva* of *jñāna* and the *siddhi* category of the *pratyayasarga* are related to the process of the production of knowledge. Moreover, the condition of *jñāna* is specifically connected to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, which leads to liberation. It will be shown below (§IV.10) that the YD links the concepts of *jñāna* and *siddhi* to each other and to the figure of Kapila.

CHAPTER III: Literature Review.

From the late nineteenth century to the present, a great deal has been written on Sāṃkhya, particularly with regard to the early history of its development. The present study is concerned primarily with an interpretative rather than historical problem: the YD's understanding of the nature of the *ṛṣi* Kapila, and of the role of his knowledge in the Sāṃkhya system. The study will also consider the place of the YD's understanding of these issues in relation to the views presented in the other classical commentaries on the SK (§V.5). The historical focus of this study is thus upon the classical period of Sāṃkhya, rather than on the early development of the school.

LARSON (1979) aptly summarises the contributions of Sāṃkhya scholarship prior to the publication of the first edition of his work in 1969: 'Unfortunately, the great strides achieved in sorting out some of the complicated problems in the history of Sāṃkhya have not been matched on the side of the interpretation of the meaning of classical Sāṃkhya.'³⁹ Partly as a consequence of this, the present review will be limited mainly to more recent publications.⁴⁰

Another issue affecting the choice of material for review here is the fact that the text upon which this study is focused has only relatively recently been discovered. The YD was first edited, on the basis of a single manuscript, by Pulinbehari Chakravarti in 1938.⁴¹ By the time of the publication of the critical edition by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi in 1998, which makes use of five

³⁹ LARSON (1979), p. 73.

⁴⁰ For a review of earlier literature on Sāṃkhya, from GARBE (1897) to BHATTACHARYA, K.C. (1956), see LARSON (1979), pp. 15-74.

⁴¹ Wezler and Motegi, YD, p. IX.

manuscripts,⁴² the YD had come to be considered ‘the most important text for understanding the details of the Sāṃkhya system’.⁴³ Nevertheless, extended studies focused on the YD have so far been very few. In particular, the YD’s apparent understanding of the process of the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge deserves a full treatment, though several publications have touched on these issues in passing.

The following review will include not only publications dealing with the YD itself, but also relevant contributions to our understanding of the presentation of Kapila in Sāṃkhya more generally, particularly with regard to the classical commentators’ understanding of the nature and importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge. Attention will be given to the treatment of issues related to this problem, including the role of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*), the position of the Lord (*īśvara*)⁴⁴ in Sāṃkhya, and the relationship between the intellectual conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*). One of the aims of the present study is to bring these various contributions together in one place.

CHAKRAVARTI (1975)⁴⁵ was one of the first scholars to deal with the YD in depth, and his work remains one of the most satisfactory treatments of the evidence of the YD with regard to many of the major interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya doctrine.

⁴² See YD, pp. XII-XVII.

⁴³ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. xiii.

⁴⁴ I prefer to translate *īśvara* as ‘the Lord’ rather than ‘God’ (as BRONKHORST (1983), for instance) for two reasons: 1. ‘God’ has connotations (in the Judeo-Christian context) inappropriate to the Sāṃkhya conception of *īśvara*, who, although a sort of ‘supreme being’, is uninvolved in the creation of the world; 2. *īśvara* literally means ‘powerful’ or ‘masterful’ and as an adjective can refer to any powerful individual or ‘lord’ in the sense of ‘sovereign’.

⁴⁵ CHAKRAVARTI, P. (1975). *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*. Delhi. (2nd edition; 1st edition, 1951).

A large portion of CHAKRAVARTI's publication⁴⁶ deals with the origin and early development of Sāṃkhya, in which he makes extensive use of the evidence of the YD with regard to pre-classical Sāṃkhya texts and teachers. He also presents an overview of the major classical and post-classical Sāṃkhya texts⁴⁷ and an interpretative analysis of classical Sāṃkhya doctrine,⁴⁸ which makes particular use of the detailed discussions found in the YD.

CHAKRAVARTI characterises the YD as a 'unique commentary' and the style of the commentator as 'archaic and highly polemical'.⁴⁹ He observes that 'the main intention of the author was to refute the arguments of the opponents and thereby to establish the validity of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa'.⁵⁰ The implications of the YD-*kāra*'s view of the SK will be considered further in §V.2 of the present study. CHAKRAVARTI also notes that 'our author was not only a philosopher but also a grammarian'.⁵¹ The apparent influences of the grammarian tradition upon the YD-*kāra* will also be discussed in more detail in §V.2.

In the course of his treatment of Sāṃkhya doctrine, CHAKRAVARTI outlines the YD's interpretation of the SK's classification of the conditions (*bhāva*) into *sāṃsiddhika*, *prākṛtika*, and *vaikṛta* (see §II.5, §IV.8).⁵² With regard to the YD's attribution of innate knowledge (*sāṃsiddhika jñāna*) to Kapila,⁵³ he interprets the evidence of the text to mean that 'in the revered sage, there lies the highest degree of *sattva*. Thus owing to the absence of *rajas* and *tamas* there is no obstruction in him, and knowledge reveals itself automatically.'⁵⁴ This is contrasted to the *prākṛtika*

⁴⁶ CHAKRAVARTI (1975), pp. 1-155.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 155-171.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 171-325.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 160.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 150.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 161.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 183-185.

⁵³ See n. 460 (§IV.8).

⁵⁴ CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 184.

variety of the *bhāvas*, which ‘are those which exist potentially in the substratum, but reveal very quickly whenever there is an external stimulus’.⁵⁵ In the cases of both *sāṃsiddhika* and *prākṛtika bhāvas*, ‘the influx comes directly from the *prakṛti*’.⁵⁶ In the case of *vaikṛta bhāvas*, ‘ordinary individuals with predominance of *tamas* strive to dispel the inertia of the *buddhi* by dint of their own effort and thus *sattva* begins to flow by slow degrees’⁵⁷, in which case ‘the flow of *sattva* comes directly from the *buddhi*’⁵⁸ rather than from *prakṛti*. The YD-*kāra*’s interpretation of the varieties of the *bhāvas* will be used in §IV.8 to support a new translation of these varieties as ‘innate’ (*sāṃsiddhika*), ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (*prākṛtika*), and ‘deriving from the products’ (*vaikṛta*). The interpretative implications of the ascription of Kapila’s *jñāna* to an unimpeded flow of *sattva* from *prakṛti* will be considered further in CHAPTER V.

With regard to the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*; see §II.5), CHAKRAVARTI recognises that the YD presents the *pratyayasarga* as the result (*phala*) of the manifest (*vyakta*), the form (*rūpa*) and function (*pravṛtti*) of which are identified with the principles (*tattva*) and the conditions (*bhāva*) respectively.⁵⁹ In other words, as CHAKRAVARTI is the first scholar to note,⁶⁰ the evidence of the YD suggests that the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* are not alternative explanations of the same theory, but rather that the categories of the *pratyayasarga* represent the phenomenal results of the activity of the *tattvas* as described by the *bhāvas*. However, the present study will argue, in §IV.10, that further evidence found in the YD complicates this relationship between

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 184.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 184.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 185.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 185.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 302; see n. 545 (§IV.10).

⁶⁰ CHAKRAVARTI (1975, pp. 302-303) mentions the earlier view of KEITH (1949, pp. 96-97), who suggests that the verses of the SK dealing with the *pratyayasarga* were ‘a later interpolation’.

the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*, insofar as the categories of the *pratyayasarga* have the capacity to generate new *bhāvas*, and that the two paradigms thus represent two mutually determinative planes of experience. In the light of this evidence, CHAKRAVARTI's assumption that the *bhāva* of *jñāna* gives rise to *siddhi*⁶¹ cannot be supported.

CHAKRAVARTI treats the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in a single paragraph, offering a general summary of the commentators' classification of the sources of *āptavacana*.⁶² He does not consider the relation of this concept to the process of the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, which will form a major focus of the present study (§IV.3, V.1-2).

With regard to the nature and origin ascribed to Kapila in Sāṃkhya texts, CHAKRAVARTI notes that VBh 1.25 identifies Kapila with the Lord (*īśvara*), who assumes a transformation-mind (*nirmāṇacitta*) in order to transmit Sāṃkhya doctrine to Āsuri.⁶³ CHAKRAVARTI perhaps takes the implications of this passage too far when he writes: 'It shows that the teacher assumed a form by dint of his supernatural power and appeared before Āsuri to impart to him the knowledge of Sāṃkhya. This shows that Kapila had no physical body and thus he cannot be regarded as an historical person.'⁶⁴ Regardless of whether or not the figure of Kapila actually originated with an historical person, which seems unlikely but would be very difficult to determine with any certainty,⁶⁵ he was at least regarded within the tradition as having had a physical human body, despite his supernatural origins. In fact, the YD states that his innate knowledge arose at the same time as the production

⁶¹ CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 307: 'And finally it is wisdom which exclusively gives rise to achievement.'

⁶² Ibid., p. 196; see §IV.3.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 67; see n. 675 (§V.3). CHAKRAVARTI (pp. 84-85) points out the similarity of the concept of *nirmāṇacitta* to the Buddhist concept of *nirmāṇakāya* ('transformation-body').

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 111.

⁶⁵ Cf. the reviews of BRONKHORST (2007) and JACOBSEN (2008) below.

of his physical body and intellectual apparatus.⁶⁶ CHAKRAVARTI is justified, however, in his observation that Kapila's appearances in the Sāṃkhya texts and other sources all 'clearly point to his mythological origin'.⁶⁷ In his discussion of the nature and origin of Kapila and his relation to other mythological personalities, CHAKRAVARTI focuses on the evidence of the YD in particular.

CHAKRAVARTI notes that the term *māhātmyaśarīra* ('body of greatness'), occurring in the YD, 'is not found in any other available text of Sāṃkhya'.⁶⁸ He takes the term to refer to an entire category of mythological beings: 'The term speaks of those divine personalities who by dint of their strong power of will can give rise to various forms of creations. Brahman, or Hiraṇyagarbha, Maheśvara and such other divine beings fall under this category.'⁶⁹ He observes that of such beings, 'Brahman is held to be the foremost'.⁷⁰ However, the term *māhātmyaśarīra* does not occur in the plural in the text, and the present study will argue, in §V.3, that it refers to Brahmā alone, as the initiator of the process of the physical manifestation of beings.

CHAKRAVARTI observes that Kapila is put on a cosmological par with Brahmā (and, according to CHAKRAVARTI, other *māhātmyaśarīras*), insofar as they both 'emerge into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation'⁷¹, their bodies being produced directly from *prakṛti*,⁷² but that Kapila is in fact 'the first personality who immerses [*sic*] into existence at the beginning of creation'⁷³ and is 'distinguished from the rest by the fact that his activity proceeds from an abnormal flow of *sattva*, while in the case of the *māhātmyaśarīra* group, both *sattva* and *rajas*

⁶⁶ See n. 458, 460 (§IV.8).

⁶⁷ CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 111.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 222.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 222.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 224.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 222.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 225, 279.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 225.

become equally dominant'.⁷⁴ With regard to the apparent reasons behind the production of such figures out of *prakṛti*, CHAKRAVARTI writes:

The individuals of this order of creation are not born to enjoy the fruits of their previous activities. They are said to possess perfect wisdom, and so the potentiality of their activities is completely destroyed. Of these, some are born with an impersonal disinterested mission of their own in order to render selfless service to the individual selves that would come later on. The case of the revered sage Kapila may be furnished here as an illustration.⁷⁵

CHAKRAVARTI contrasts this 'mission' of Kapila with the roles of other divine figures, such as Brahmā, who is 'vested with the lordship of the universe', and Maheśvara (Śiva), who is 'associated with destruction'.⁷⁶ The unique soteriological purpose behind Kapila's embodiment, and its relation to the YD-*kāra*'s view of the initiation and maintenance of the Sāṃkhya tradition, will be discussed further in CHAPTER V of the present study.

The work of Erich Frauwallner contributed largely to our understanding of the early history of Sāṃkhya. Like CHAKRAVARTI (1975), Frauwallner made extensive use of the evidence found in the YD with regard to early Sāṃkhya teachers and texts. For a review of this contribution as a whole, see LARSON (1979).⁷⁷ In the context of the present interpretative study of the YD, a few remarks will suffice.

Concerning the role of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in the classical Sāṃkhya system, FRAUWALLNER (1973)⁷⁸ says, 'The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.'⁷⁹ While FRAUWALLNER's observation is partly valid, the present study will highlight, in

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 225.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 282-283.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 283.

⁷⁷ LARSON (1979), pp. 48-52.

⁷⁸ FRAUWALLNER, E. (1973). *History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I.* Trans. V.M. Bedekar. Delhi. (1st edition, 1953: *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Vol. I.* Salzburg.)

⁷⁹ FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274.

§V.1-2, the attempts by the author of the YD to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to make room in the notion of authoritative testimony for the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

With regard to the relationship between the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) and the conditions (*bhāva*) (see §II.5), FRAUWALLNER takes the *pratyayasarga* to be the older doctrine, attributing it, as part of the *Śaṣṭitantra*, to the Sāṃkhya teacher Vṛṣagaṇa.⁸⁰ He observes that the doctrine of the *bhāvas* ‘seeks to solve the same questions and takes the same place in the system as the theory of the fifty ideas’ but ‘represents a more advanced stage of development than the theory of fifty ideas’.⁸¹ Further, he suggests that the *bhāvas* were introduced due to the influence of the Vaiśeṣika school.⁸² He claims that the relationship between the two doctrines is never adequately explained by the commentaries on the SK: ‘The relation between the two theories remains naturally confused and unclear and the explanations which the commentaries give for their juxtaposition are unsatisfactory and forced.’⁸³ The present work, however, will demonstrate that a clear understanding of the relationship between the two paradigms can be reconstructed from the evidence in the YD (§IV.10).

FRAUWALLNER observes that the doctrines of Vṛṣagaṇa tend to use a ‘sectarian terminology’ and to be presented in ‘a drapery of myths’,⁸⁴ which is apparent in a passage quoted in the YD which relates the categories of the

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 252. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the possible authorship and date of the *Śaṣṭitantra*, as well as the question as to whether the term refers to a single text or group of texts, or just a general framework for the discussion of Sāṃkhya, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 125-128.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 268.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 270-271.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 269.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 260.

pratyayasarga to a series of four ‘streams’ (*srotas*) produced by Brahmā.⁸⁵ The extent to which the YD represents a continuation of this mythological orientation, particularly with regard to the role of deities in relation to the soteriological function of Materiality (*prakṛti*), will be considered in §V.3-4. One instance in which this orientation is apparent, for example, is the YD’s statement, also noted by FRAUWALLNER,⁸⁶ that both Brahmā and Kapila were born directly from primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*).⁸⁷ FRAUWALLNER’s work is thus useful, above all, when considering the relation of the YD’s views on these matters to previous Sāṃkhya thought.

MISHRA (1961)⁸⁸ offers a novel interpretation of the SK’s classification of the objects of Sāṃkhya’s three accepted means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)⁸⁹ and suggests that the classical commentators misinterpreted Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s intention in this regard. MISHRA’s interpretation hinges largely on the argument that Īśvarakṛṣṇa would only have included the means of knowledge necessary for establishing the three major categories—the manifest (*vyakta*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*) and the knower (*jñā*) (i.e., *puruṣa*)—laid out in SK 2 as the objects of the Sāṃkhya inquiry (see §II.3, IV.5).⁹⁰ He thus suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa included perception (*dṛṣṭa*) as a means of establishing the manifest, inference (*anumāna*) as a means of establishing the unmanifest, and authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) as a means of establishing

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 260-261. For a more detailed analysis of this passage (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-18), see the review of OBERHAMMER (1961) below.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 285.

⁸⁷ *śarīraṃ pradhānānugrahād yathā paramarṣer viriñcasya ca* (YD ad SK 39ab, p. 228, ll. 12-13).

⁸⁸ MISHRA, U. (1961). ‘Pramāṇas and their objects in Sāṃkhya.’ In: *Adyar Library Bulletin* (= *Brahmavidyā*) 25: 371-380.

⁸⁹ I.e., perception (*dṛṣṭa*), inference (*anumāna*), and authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) (SK 4); see §II.4.

⁹⁰ MISHRA (1961), pp. 412-413.

Consciousness.⁹¹ In connection with this classification, MISHRA suggests a reinterpretation of SK 6⁹². While the commentators take the term *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* as a particular type of inference, MISHRA takes the phrase *sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād* in this verse to mean that ‘the obvious, ordinary categories recognized by the system are cognized by *dṛṣṭa*’.⁹³ According to MISHRA, the verse can thus be read as a correlation between the three Sāṃkhya ontological categories and their respective *pramāṇas*.

Of particular relevance in the context of the present study is MISHRA’s reinterpretation of the original significance of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s system. It is true that the commentators usually mention objects peripheral to the concerns of Sāṃkhya (heaven, *apsarases*, etc.) as the objects of the *pramāṇa* of authoritative testimony (see §IV.3), as MISHRA illustrates with a discussion of the interpretations of the GBh, JM and TK.⁹⁴ (MISHRA also notes that the SVS translated by Paramārtha and the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā* (ca. 1680-1720 C.E.)⁹⁵ agree with the TK’s explanation.⁹⁶) However, it should be kept in mind that the possibility of rebirth in the realms of gods (*deva*) and other divine beings, through the cultivation of the condition of merit (*dharma*), is an integral part of the Sāṃkhya discussion (see §IV.6). Perhaps MISHRA is thus too hasty to dismiss these commentorial references as departures from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s intentions. Although his hypothesis is nevertheless somewhat attractive, since it might explain the apparent lack of conformity among the commentators in this regard, it does little, in the

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 411-413.

⁹² *sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇām prasiddhir anumānāt / tasmād api cāsiddham parokṣam āptāgamāt siddham //* (SK 6).

⁹³ MISHRA (1961), pp. 411.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 406-410.

⁹⁵ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 16.

⁹⁶ MISHRA (1961), p. 410.

context of the present study, to help our understanding of the YD's rather complex attitude towards the significance of *āptavacana*.

OBERHAMMER (1961)⁹⁷ identifies eleven prose quotations appearing in the YD, which the author of the YD attributes simply to a *śāstra*.⁹⁸ Based on the similarity in terminology and content in these passages, among other factors, OBERHAMMER concludes that they all belong to the same text.⁹⁹ OBERHAMMER identifies this *śāstra* as the *Śaṣṭitantra*,¹⁰⁰ which, following FRAUWALLNER (1973), he attributes to the Sāṃkhya teacher Vṛṣagaṇa,¹⁰¹ who is also often explicitly quoted in the YD, 'though he is not mentioned as the author of the *śāstra*'.¹⁰²

OBERHAMMER focuses on the analysis of one of these fragments¹⁰³ and a comparison of this text to several related passages in the *Mahābhārata* (MBh) and various Purāṇas,¹⁰⁴ 'in order to show the interlacing which connects this text with the past and the contemporary Purāṇic literature'.¹⁰⁵ In this respect, OBERHAMMER takes

⁹⁷ OBERHAMMER, G.R.F. (1961). 'On the "Śāstra" Quotations of the Yuktidīpikā.' In: *Adyar Library Bulletin* 25: 131-172.

⁹⁸ OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 165-170.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 133-134.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 135-138.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁰³ *mahadādiviśeṣāntaḥ sargo buddhipūrvakatvāt / utpannakāryakaraṇas tu mātmyaśarīra ekākinam ātmānam avekṣyābhidadhyau hantāhaṃ putrān sraṁṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti / ye māṃ paraṃ cāparaṃ ca jñāsyanti / tasyābhidhyāyataḥ pañca mukhyasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuh / teṣūtpanneṣu na tuṣṭiṃ lebhe / tato 'nye tiryaksrotaso 'ṣṭāviṃśatiḥ prajājñe / teṣv apy asya matir naiva tasthe, athāparena vordhvasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuh / teṣv apy utpanneṣu naiva kṛtārtham ātmānam mene / tato 'nye 'ṣṭāv arvāksrotaso utpeduh /* (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-18). OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 139, 168-169) quotes from Chakravarti's earlier (1938, p. 152, ll. 8-15) edition of the text, which contains only slight variations. OBERHAMMER (p. 168, n. 2) suggests that the first line should be read '*mahadādiviśeṣāntaḥ (tattvasargaḥ, pratyaya)sargo buddhipūrvakatvāt /*'; he thus reads the line (in its hypothetical original context in the *Śaṣṭitantra*) as a transition from a discussion of the *tattvas* to a discussion of the *pratyayasarga* (p. 164).

¹⁰⁴ MBh 12.310.16-25 (Critical Ed.: 12.298.16-25), 14.35.47 – 14.38.13 (Critical Ed.: 14.35.37 – 14.38.13), 14.39.6-8, 12.314.3-5 (Critical Ed.: 12.302.3-4); *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* 47.14-36; *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 1.5.3-26; *Padmapurāṇa* 5.3.52-75; *Vāyupurāṇa* 6.35-69; *Kūrmapurāṇa* 7.1-18; *Agnipurāṇa* 20.1-6; *Bhagavatapurāṇa* 3.10.13-28 (OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 140-165).

¹⁰⁵ OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 163.

up the reconstruction of Sāṃkhya's early development in the manner initiated by FRAUWALLNER (1973).¹⁰⁶

The fragment which forms the focus of OBERHAMMER's study relates the categories of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) to a series of four 'streams' (*srotas*) produced by the meditation of a *māhātmyaśarīra* ('body of greatness')¹⁰⁷, whom the author of the YD takes to be Brahmā.¹⁰⁸ In the MBh three of the four streams found in the *śāstra* fragment occur as part of a series of nine creations, which are not yet connected with the meditation of Brahmā or the *māhātmyaśarīra*.¹⁰⁹ OBERHAMMER concludes that the *srotas* doctrine found in the MBh was taken up by Vṛṣagaṇa in the *Śaṣṭitantra*, in which he connected the *srotases* with his classification of the fifty categories of the *pratyayasarga* into four groups (*viparyaya*, *aśakti*, *tuṣṭi*, *siddhi*) (see §II.5). OBERHAMMER also suggests that Vṛṣagaṇa 'might have introduced into the series of creations also the *anugrahasarga*',¹¹⁰ a particular creation found in some Purāṇas but absent from the SK.¹¹¹ 'On account of the great renown of the *Śaṣṭitantra*', OBERHAMMER says, this version of the series of creations and the *srotas* doctrine was introduced into the Purāṇas.¹¹²

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 132: 'Erich Frauwallner was the first to sketch tentatively a history of the old Sāṃkhya starting from an epic text.'

¹⁰⁷ On the interpretation of this term, see CHAKRAVARTI (1975), BRONKHORST (1983) and further discussion in §V.3.

¹⁰⁸ *evam tasmād brahmaṇo 'bhidhyānād utpannaḥ, tasmāt pratyayasargaḥ* / (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, ll.18-19).

¹⁰⁹ *ūrdhvaṃ srotas tathā tiryag utpadyati narādhipa / aṣṭamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakaṃ smṛtam // tiryaksrotas tv adhaḥsrota utpadyati narādhipa / navamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakaṃ budhāḥ* // (MBh 12.310.23-24, quoted in OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 144)

In the Critical Ed. this passage (12.298.23-24) reads:

ūrdhvasrotas tathā tiryag utpadyati narādhipa / aṣṭamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakaṃ budhāḥ // tiryaksrotas tv adhaḥsrota utpadyati narādhipa / navamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakaṃ budhāḥ //

¹¹⁰ OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 163. Cf. n. 719 and discussion of the notion of *anugraha* in §V.4.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 152-156.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 163.

Aside from this historical analysis, OBERHAMMER makes several interpretative suggestions of relevance to the present study. He suggests that the *viparyaya*, *tuṣṭi*, and possibly *siddhi* categories of the *pratyayasarga* ‘might have been elaborated in circles connected with Yoga’ as ‘meditative existential attitudes’, at the time of the composition of the MBh.¹¹³ With respect to *aśakti*, he cautions that not much can be known with regard to its development.¹¹⁴ Similarly, with regard to the addition to the *srotas* doctrine of the notion that these streams were caused by the meditation of Brahmā, he says that ‘little can be stated for the moment’¹¹⁵ but suggests that this must have occurred after composition of the MBh passage and prior to that of the *Śaṣṭitantra*.¹¹⁶ These points will be taken into account in §IV.9-10 of the present study, which will reconstruct a coherent picture of the YD-*kāra*’s interpretation of the nature of the *pratyayasarga*. CHAPTER V will discuss further the relation of this paradigm to figures of cosmological prominence and divine authority (*māhātmyaśarīra*, Brahmā, Kapila).

Of particular relevance to the present study of the YD is OBERHAMMER’S view of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect. Like FRAUWALLNER (1973), OBERHAMMER views the *bhāvas* as having the same basic function as the *pratyayasarga* and as having been introduced into the Sāṃkhya system after the *Śaṣṭitantra*’s exposition of the *pratyayasarga*.¹¹⁷ He further suggests that SK 52¹¹⁸ can be viewed as an attempt by Īśvarakṛṣṇa to replace the *Śaṣṭitantra*’s treatment of the *anugrahasarga* with that of the new doctrine of the

¹¹³ Ibid., pp. 162-163.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 148.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 151.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 163.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 155.

¹¹⁸ *na vinā bhāvair liṅgaṃ na vinā liṅgena bhāvasamsiddhiḥ/
liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyas tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ* // (SK 52)

bhāvas.¹¹⁹ With regard to the evidence in the YD concerning the relationship between the production of the *bhāvas* and that of the *pratyayasarga*, OBERHAMMER notes that the processes of the ‘inflow’ of both are described in a similar manner:

[W]e can suppose that the Pratyaya-s are, like the Bhāva-s, innate, i.e. conditioned by Karma, and thus condition the historical existence of beings. On the other hand, they are acquired as ‘habitus’, and thus they lead to salvation.¹²⁰

OBERHAMMER rightly observes that, according to the YD, the *bhāvas* partly determine phenomenal experience and are partly determined by it. However, as will be shown in §IV.10, a more precise picture of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* can be reconstructed on the basis of the evidence in the YD, according to which they represent two mutually determinative planes of experience.

OBERHAMMER (2007)¹²¹ deals mainly with the role of the Lord (*īśvara*) in the texts of the Yoga school but also touches on the YD’s portrayal of Kapila. OBERHAMMER notes the fact that the *Vyāsaśāstra* (VBh) on *Yogasūtra* (YS) 1.25¹²² refers to Kapila as an incarnation of *īśvara*.¹²³ He compares this to the YD’s presentation of Kapila as consisting entirely of the constituent quality of goodness (*sattva*),¹²⁴ suggesting that the Yoga school’s view of the nature of *īśvara* was influenced by the Sāṃkhya system in this regard.¹²⁵ The present study will consider the relationship between *īśvara* and Kapila in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts in more detail (§V.3-5).

¹¹⁹ OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 154-156.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 140, n. 1.

¹²¹ OBERHAMMER, G.R.F. (2007). ‘Gott, Urbild der emanzipierten Existenz im Yoga des Patañjali.’ In: *Ausgewählte kleine Schriften*. Vienna: pp. 59-73. (1st published 1964: *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 86(2): 197-207.)

¹²² See n. 675 (§V.3).

¹²³ OBERHAMMER (2007), p. 69.

¹²⁴ See n. 695 (§V.3).

¹²⁵ OBERHAMMER (2007), p. 69-70.

KENGHE (1968)¹²⁶ examines the place of the *pratyayasarga* in the classical Sāṃkhya system and the points of connection between the categories of the *pratyayasarga* (see §II.5) and the doctrines of the Yoga school as laid out in the YS and VBh. Throughout this discussion, KENGHE relies heavily on the YD, which tends to provide clearer or more satisfactory explanations of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* than do the other commentaries.

KENGHE demonstrates the relation of the five categories of error (*viparyaya*) in the *pratyayasarga* to the five ‘afflictions’ (*kleśa*) in Yoga (YS 2.3).¹²⁷ He compares the notion of contentment (*tuṣṭi*) as explained by the YD to the ‘state of not having attained a stage [of Yoga]’ (*alabdhabhūmatva*), which is mentioned in YS 1.30 as one of nine ‘distractions of thought’ (*cittavikṣepa*).¹²⁸ He further compares the first variety of *tuṣṭi*, called *prakṛti*, to the notion of *prakṛtilaya* (see §IV.6) as it occurs in YS 1.19.¹²⁹ With regard to the categories of attainment (*siddhi*) in the *pratyayasarga*, KENGHE notes that the term *siddhi* ‘has got a very much different significance in the Sāṃkhya than in the Yoga’ and that the *siddhis* of the Yoga school are included in the Sāṃkhya texts as forms of *aiśvarya* (‘lordliness’; see §IV.6).¹³⁰

KENGHE’s article shows that many of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* can be thought of (especially in the light of the YD) in terms of stages of mental development in the practice of *yoga* and hindrances to that development. This apparent connection to yogic practice can be compared to OBERHAMMER (1961)’s suggestion that these categories originated as ‘meditative existential attitudes’ in

¹²⁶ KENGHE, C.T. (1968). ‘The problem of the *pratyayasarga* in Sāṃkhya and its relation with Yoga.’ In: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute* 48-49: 365-373.

¹²⁷ KENGHE (1968), pp. 366-369.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 369.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 369.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 373.

‘circles connected with Yoga’¹³¹ (see above). The extent to which the YD accepts yogic practice as conducive to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and consequent liberation will be considered in more detail in §V.3-4.

KENGHE touches on another aspect of the YD’s presentation of the *pratyayasarga* of particular relevance to the present study. Like CHAKRAVARTI (1975), he observes that the YD presents the *pratyayasarga* as the result (*phala*) of the manifest (*vyakta*), the form (*rūpa*) and function (*pravṛtti*) of which are identified with the principles (*tattva*) and the conditions (*bhāva*) respectively.¹³² An understanding of the interpretative implications of this view of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* (see §IV.10) will be shown in §V.1-2 to be key to understanding the YD’s view of the process of the production and transmission of liberating knowledge.

LARSON (1979)¹³³ represents the first comprehensive interpretative study of classical Sāṃkhya. LARSON presents both an overview of the historical development of the Sāṃkhya system, drawing heavily on the work of earlier Sāṃkhya scholars, and a holistic interpretation of the classical Sāṃkhya system as embodied in the SK and its commentaries. In the course of this interpretation, LARSON makes occasional references to the YD but does not make full use of its evidence with regard to the major interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya.¹³⁴ He was familiar enough with

¹³¹ OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 162-163.

¹³² KENGHE (1968), p. 366, alluding to the following passage: *evam eṣa tattvasargo bhāvasargaś ca vyākhyātaḥ / etac ca vyaktasya rūpaṃ pravṛttiś ca parikalpyate / phalam idānīm vakṣyāmaḥ //* (YD on SK 45d, p. 237, ll. 26-27).

¹³³ LARSON, G.J. (1979). *Classical Sāṃkhya*. Delhi (2nd revised edition; 1st edition, 1969).

¹³⁴ This is apparent, for instance, in his treatment of Sāṃkhya epistemology, as HARZER (2006, p. 21) observes: ‘Larson did not refer to works which deal with inference in the Sāṃkhya tradition. He occasionally mentioned the *Yuktidīpikā*, he still did not point out that epistemology and logic are treated here more exhaustively than elsewhere.’

the text to recognise the apparent grammatical leanings of the YD-*kāra*,¹³⁵ but his assessment of the value of the YD with regard to interpretative issues seems ill-judged:

[T]his work is valuable historically in that it offers some information regarding other teachers and schools. Generally, however, the text is quite confusing and problematic. It does contain a number of polemics against various kinds of Buddhism, and may prove valuable as a source for further knowledge concerning various schools or traditions of Buddhism. As a source for understanding the difficult points of Sāṃkhya doctrine, however, it takes one little further than the other commentaries.¹³⁶

Granted that the YD tends to be confusing, perhaps even contradictory at points, the present study will demonstrate that a consideration of the text's evidence allows for the resolution of several major interpretative problems only touched upon by the other classical commentaries.

With regard to the relationship between the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), LARSON anticipates the interpretation he later develops in LARSON (1984) and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) (see below):

It could be the case that the eight *bhāvas* and the fifty *bhāvas* or components represent two dimensions or two aspects of the same phenomenon. Whereas the eight *bhāvas* are the deeper, causal predispositions that determine the future of the *linga*, the fifty *bhāvas* or components may be the phenomenal, manifest effects of the deeper causal predispositions in one's present life.¹³⁷

While this interpretation is partially apt, the present study will argue that the evidence of the YD further clarifies the nature of this relationship (§IV.10). Similarly, LARSON's neglect of the YD leads him to overlook the fact that this text holds the Lord (*īśvara*) to be a particular Consciousness (*puruṣa*),¹³⁸ mentioning only that 'the classical Sāṃkhya recognizes no conscious Absolute or Creator God. To be sure, the gods may exist, but they too are simply products of the interaction of

¹³⁵ LARSON (1979, p. 281) observes that 'one has the impression that the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* was a grammarian rather than a philosopher since many passages of the text deal with the analysis of Sanskrit compounds together with references to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*.'

¹³⁶ LARSON (1979), pp. 149-150.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 194.

¹³⁸ See §V.3 and the review of BRONKHORST (1983) below.

unconscious *mūlaprakṛti* and the conscious *puruṣa*.¹³⁹ With regard to the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*), LARSON notes only that this ‘is probably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers’.¹⁴⁰

WEZLER (1970)¹⁴¹ examines a passage of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* that refers to the fact that the ‘supporters of Kapila’ worship God in the form of the ‘accomplished first knower’ (*ādividvān siddhaḥ*).¹⁴² WEZLER argues that this phrase refers to Kapila, observing that ‘the deification of Kapila, adequately testified in epic and purāṇic sources, was also a prevalent mythological view of the Sāṃkhya authors’.¹⁴³ He also notes that both the VBh and the TK refer to Kapila as ‘the first knower’ (*ādividvas*)¹⁴⁴ and suggests that the VBh passage served as the source of the application of the term *ādividvas* to Kapila.¹⁴⁵ He recognises that the MV views Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu¹⁴⁶ and suggests that while Kapila had occasionally been identified with Viṣṇu since the time of the MBh, the Sāṃkhya acceptance of this view must have been due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas upon the school.¹⁴⁷ The significance of these references in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts will be considered further in §V.3-5 of the present study.

¹³⁹ LARSON (1979), p. 198.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁴¹ WEZLER, A. (1970). ‘Der Gott des Sāṃkhya: Zu Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.3.’ In: *Indo-Iranian Journal* 12: 255-262.

¹⁴² WEZLER (1970), p. 256.

¹⁴³ ‘die in epischen und puranischen Quellen hinlänglich bezeugte Deifizierung Kapila’s auch geltende mythologische Anschauung der Sāṃkhya-Autoren war’ (WEZLER (1970), p. 257).

¹⁴⁴ See n. 675 (§V.3) and nn. 805, 806 (§V.5).

¹⁴⁵ WEZLER (1970), p. 259-260.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 258.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 262.

SOLOMON (1974)¹⁴⁸ compares the GBh, MV, SVS, SV, and SSV in detail and argues that they all stem from the same text, which she tentatively suggests to be SV: '[M]y feeling is that it is the earliest of the commentaries and has the fairest claim to being regarded as the original of the Chinese Version of Paramārtha.'¹⁴⁹ She observes that in comparison to these five commentaries, the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries (YD, JM, and TK) 'do not bear much affinity to the former in point of thought or expression'.¹⁵⁰ In the course of the present study, the lack of connection between the YD and these other texts, with regard to several major interpretative issues, will become apparent.

On the basis of an examination of passages from a variety of texts, mainly from outside of the Sāṃkhya and Pātañjalayoga traditions, BRONKHORST (1981)¹⁵¹ argues that 'until a rather late date "Yoga" and *seśvara sāmkhya* did not refer to Patañjali's philosophy'.¹⁵² Rather, BRONKHORST suggests, the term *yoga* in early texts often refers to 'Nyāya and/or Vaiśeṣika',¹⁵³ and 'came to be applied to one form of the Sāṃkhya philosophy owing to Śaṅkara's incorrect understanding of some Brahmasūtras'.¹⁵⁴ BRONKHORST notes that the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and its commentary *Pañjika* ('both dating from the 8th century A.D.'¹⁵⁵) make a distinction between *nirīśvara* ('without the Lord') and *seśvara* ('with the Lord') Sāṃkhya, and suggests that their definition of *seśvara* Sāṃkhya corresponds to the Pañcarātra system,¹⁵⁶ while both Pātañjalayoga and the Sāṃkhya of the commentaries on the SK 'should

¹⁴⁸ SOLOMON, E.A. (1974). *The Commentaries on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā: A Study*. Ahmedabad.

¹⁴⁹ SOLOMON (1974), p. vii.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁵¹ BRONKHORST, J. (1981). 'Yoga and seśvara Sāṃkhya.' In: *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9: 309-320.

¹⁵² BRONKHORST (1981), p. 309.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 309.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 317.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 315-316.

be deemed *nirīśvara sāmkhya* “Sāmkhya without God” in the sense of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.¹⁵⁷ In support of this conclusion, he observes that Patañjali’s system ‘was on a par with the Sāmkhya of the commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* in that it accepted the existence of God, but did not consider Him Creator God’, directing the reader to his following publication, BRONKHORST (1983), for evidence of this view of *īśvara* in classical Sāmkhya.¹⁵⁸

BRONKHORST (1983)¹⁵⁹ provides a comprehensive discussion of the classical Sāmkhya commentators’ views on the nature of the Lord (*īśvara*), drawing heavily on the YD in particular. BRONKHORST points out that the YD accepts the existence of *īśvara* but views him as a particular Consciousness (*puruṣa*) and therefore passive.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, BRONKHORST observes, ‘no Sāmkhya texts of the first millennium deny God’s existence’, and ‘more often than not they give us the impression that they accept God’s existence as a matter of course, but do not accept His causal agency with respect to the world’.¹⁶¹

BRONKHORST notes that the author of the YD specifies that although *īśvara* is passive, he does incarnate in various forms, including the ‘body of greatness’ (*māhātmyaśarīra*), to which the characteristics of Śiva seem to be attributed.¹⁶² BRONKHORST argues that the evidence of the YD suggests that Kapila is also considered an incarnation of *īśvara*, primarily on the basis of the commentator’s use of the term *īśvaramaharṣi* in describing authoritative individuals (*āpta*).¹⁶³ He suggests that *īśvaramaharṣi* could mean either ‘God and the great seers’ or ‘the great seers who are [incorporations of] God’, and makes a case for the latter interpretation,

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 316.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 316.

¹⁵⁹ BRONKHORST, J. (1983). ‘God in Sāmkhya.’ In: *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 27: 149-164.

¹⁶⁰ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 153.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 152; see n. 661 (§V.3).

¹⁶³ Ibid., pp. 152-155; see n. 367 (§IV.3).

arguing that, given the YD's view of *īśvara* as passive consciousness, the term *īśvara* alone cannot refer to an authoritative figure, 'for pure awareness does not possess authoritativeness or opinions', while the term *īśvara* does not refer specifically to the *māhātmyaśarīra* elsewhere in the YD.¹⁶⁴ BRONKHORST assumes that Kapila, as 'the great seer *par excellence*', would be included among 'the great seers who are [incorporations of] God'.¹⁶⁵ He finds support for this interpretation in two passages of the MV, which appear to identify Kapila as an incarnation of *īśvara*.¹⁶⁶

While BRONKHORST's interpretation is plausible, it implies that other great *rṣis* than Kapila would also be considered incarnations of *īśvara*, which would be surprising, given Kapila's privileged position in the YD's interpretation of Sāṃkhya cosmology (see §V.3-4). In §V.3, we will examine the relevant passages in detail and consider two alternatives to BRONKHORST's interpretation of the term *īśvaramaharṣi*. It should be kept in mind that the YD does not explicitly refer to Kapila as an incarnation of *īśvara*. As pointed out by WEZLER (1970)¹⁶⁷ and JACOBSEN (2008)¹⁶⁸, the MV actually views Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in particular, while this Vaiṣṇava influence is not yet apparent in the YD (see §V.5). Moreover, it is not clear that the YD-*kāra* identifies the *māhātmyaśarīra* as Śiva in the passage quoted by BRONKHORST, while elsewhere he refers to the *māhātmyaśarīra* as Brahmā.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 156-157; see nn. 684, 686 (§V.3).

¹⁶⁷ WEZLER (1970), p. 258.

¹⁶⁸ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 33.

¹⁶⁹ See n. 484 (IV.9) and further discussion in §V.3.

LARSON (1984)¹⁷⁰ offers an interpretation of the YD's treatment of the paradigm of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) and its relationship to the conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect. With regard to the approach of previous scholars to this interpretative problem in classical Sāṃkhya, LARSON observes that 'there has been almost a total lack of comprehension of the structural significance of the *pratyayasarga* in the Sāṃkhya philosophical scheme of things'.¹⁷¹ On the basis of the evidence of the YD, LARSON argues (contrary to FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961), for instance) that the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhāvas* are 'not at all the same thing or alternative explanations of the same thing'.¹⁷² Like CHAKRAVARTI (1975) and KENGHE (1968), LARSON observes that the YD refers to the principles (*tattva*) as the forms of manifest Materiality, the *bhāvas* as descriptive of its activity, and the *pratyayasarga* as the result of this activity.¹⁷³ LARSON takes this to mean that the particular *bhāvas* that come to be associated with an individual's subtle body during one incarnation determine the configuration of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* encountered in the next incarnation:

The *bhāva*-s eschew, distort, and blur experience so that my knowledge is insufficiently discriminatory. At the moment of birth the *linga* is already disposed to a certain life-trajectory by reason of its past lives, and the particular constellation of *viparyaya*-s, *aśakti*-s, *tuṣṭi*-s, and *siddhi*-s represents the mediating field through which the organism experiences its present life.¹⁷⁴

On this basis of this structure, LARSON suggests that the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge is a progressive process, involving an engagement first with the categories of the *pratyayasarga*, then an understanding and cultivation of the *bhāvas* which are 'conducive to continuing discrimination', and finally an understanding of

¹⁷⁰ LARSON, G.J. (1984). 'The *pratyaya-sarga* or intellectual creation in classical Sāṃkhya as interpreted by the *Yuktidīpikā*.' In: *Religion and Society in Ancient India*. Sudhakar Chattopadhyaya Commemoration Volume. Calcutta.

¹⁷¹ LARSON (1984), p. 60.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 63-64; see n. 545 (§IV.10).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 70.

the *tattvas* and discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.¹⁷⁵ This interpretation seems to have become the basis for LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)'s treatment of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhāvas* in Sāṃkhya.

In §IV.10, we will examine further evidence in the YD that complicates this picture of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhāvas*. An alternative interpretation will be presented, according to which these two paradigms represent two mutually determinative planes of experience. The implications of this relationship with regard to the process of the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge will be considered in §V.1-2.

POLLOCK (1985)¹⁷⁶ provides an interpretative framework that helps us to understand the apparent assumptions of the author of the YD with regard to the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge. POLLOCK illustrates the widespread assumption, in the texts of the classical period of Indian *śāstra*, of the primordial existence of valid doctrine. He characterises the initial apprehension and articulation of a body of doctrine by a qualified individual as 'the necessary commencement of the tradition'.¹⁷⁷ Subsequently, the learning of this *śāstra* 'serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice' of which it treats.¹⁷⁸ Such a text is considered the ideal prototype for future treatments of its subject. Tradition thus takes the form of a perpetual appeal to this prototype, which is viewed as the vital substance of a particular system of knowledge.

POLLOCK suggests that this view of the nature of doctrine stems from the notion of the primordial existence of the Vedas:

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁷⁶ POLLOCK, S. (1985). 'The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History.' In: *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105(3): 499-519.

¹⁷⁷ POLLOCK (1985), p. 507.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 507.

The *veda*, the transcendent *śāstra*, subsumes all knowledge. It is itself eternal, infallible, the source of the *caturvarga* and thus the basis of all activity. Secular *śāstra* in general, consequently, as a portion of the corpus [...] comes to share the *veda*'s transcendent attributes.¹⁷⁹

As will be shown in §V.1-2, the author of the YD appears to similarly emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

POLLOCK further suggests, on the basis of a passage of the *Carakasamhitā*¹⁸⁰ dealing with the nature of *śāstra* in relation to causality, that this view of the primordial existence of knowledge may be related to the 'doctrine of the [pre-] existent effect' (*satkāryavāda*), an important doctrine in the Sāṃkhya system (see §II.1).¹⁸¹ With regard to this possibility, POLLOCK notes:

The epistemological implications of *satkāryavāda* [...] seem never to be clearly expressed in Indian philosophical literature, as far as I can tell. But that need not stop us from supposing they could have operated subliminally in the mythic representation of the transcendent provenance and authority of *śāstra*.¹⁸²

Similarly, in §V.2, I will present the possibility that the notion of *satkāryavāda*, though not explicitly connected with the formulation and transmission of knowledge in the YD, bears an implicit relation to the YD's conception of Sāṃkhya *śāstra*.

Like Vedic doctrine, the knowledge represented by any *śāstra*, according to POLLOCK, is 'permanently fixed in its dimensions',¹⁸³ and therefore, 'the improvement of any given practice lies, not in the future and the discovery of what has never been known before, but in the past and the more complete recovery of

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 519.

¹⁸⁰ *Carakasamhitā* (100-200 C.E.), a text on medicine (*āyurveda*), is a significant early source of what LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 3-15) call 'proto-Sāṃkhya' ideas.

¹⁸¹ POLLOCK (1985), p. 516-518.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 517-518.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 515.

what was known in full in the past.’¹⁸⁴ With regard to the relationship between the initial articulation of a *śāstra* and its future manifestations, POLLOCK explains:

Extant *śāstras*, consequently, come to view themselves as either the end-point of a slow process of abridgement from earlier, more complete, and divinely inspired prototypes; or as exact reproductions of the divine prototypes obtained through uncontaminated, unexpurgated descent from the original, whether through faithful intermediaries or by sudden revelation.¹⁸⁵

In §V.2, we will consider the applicability of this model to the YD’s conception of the relationship between Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the attainment of this doctrine by later generations.

LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)¹⁸⁶ is a comprehensive study of the history of the Sāṃkhya system and an interpretation of its meaning. It includes summaries of all of the major Sāṃkhya texts, including a summary of the YD¹⁸⁷ attributed to Dayanand Bhargava, Shiv Kumar, and Raghunatha Sharma.¹⁸⁸ Bhargava and Kumar would go on to publish their translation of the YD (1990-92),¹⁸⁹ which, though helpful in deciphering the text’s complex arguments, appears to be somewhat flawed. When Bhargava and Kumar encounter a difficult phrase or passage, they generally present an interpretative summary rather than a literal translation; I have noticed that they seem even to amend the text on at least one occasion, where it was

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁸⁶ LARSON, G.J.; BHATTACHARYA, R.S. (1987). *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. 4: Sāṃkhya: A dualist tradition in Indian philosophy*. Princeton (Reprint: Delhi, 2006).

¹⁸⁷ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 230-269.

¹⁸⁸ The production of this summary was actually a rather complicated collaborative process: ‘First, Pandit Raghunath Sharma of Saṃpūrṇānanda Sanskrit University in Varanasi prepared a general summary of the entire text in Sanskrit. Then, V.P. Bhatta, a Sanskrit language consultant at the University of California, Berkeley, prepared a rough English rendering of Sharma’s Sanskrit summary. Next, Dayanand Bhargava and S.K. Sharma put together a lengthy summary of the entire text based upon their forthcoming English translation of the text (to be published by Motilal Banarsidass). In addition, Edeltraud Harzer, a doctoral student at the University of Washington, Seattle, who is preparing a dissertation on Sāṃkhya epistemology, offered a number of helpful comments regarding epistemological issues in the text. Finally, Gerald J. Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya put together the final form of the summary.’ (LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 229.)

¹⁸⁹ *Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992). Two volumes. Translated by Dr. Shiv Kumar and Dr. D.N Bhargava. Delhi.

impossible to make sense of the passage otherwise.¹⁹⁰ In the summary appearing in LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA, this interpretative liberty is even more apparent.¹⁹¹ Both summary and translation might generally have benefitted from the readings later established by Wezler and Motegi in their critical edition of the text (1998).¹⁹² Although LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA make more use of the YD than many earlier Sāṃkhya scholars, one suspects that they may have relied too heavily upon the summary by Bhargava, Kumar, and Sharma, which would explain their apparent incomplete understanding and occasional misinterpretations¹⁹³ of the YD.¹⁹⁴

Compared to LARSON (1979) (see above), LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA give a much more favourable assessment of the value of the YD in the interpretation of Sāṃkhya doctrine: ‘The *Yuktidīpikā* [...] offers several intriguing interpretations that provide a larger view of the Sāṃkhya system as a whole, certainly more so than the *Kārikā* itself and all of its other commentaries.’¹⁹⁵ Perhaps the most significant set of interpretative conclusions drawn from the YD by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA is their interpretation of the nature of the paradigms of the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) and the relationship between them. Drawing largely upon LARSON (1984)’s interpretation of the evidence of the YD with regard to these paradigms, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA treat the *tattvas* as the

¹⁹⁰ See n. 734 (§V.4).

¹⁹¹ FRANCO (1991, pp. 133-136), in the course of his review of LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), points out a number of mistakes in the summary of the YD and (p. 132) suggests that this was due to the complex process of summarisation (see n. 188 above): ‘Obviously, a lot could go wrong on the way. And, unfortunately, a lot did go wrong. The fatal mistake was that while summarizing the summaries Larson and Bhattacharya did not take the trouble to check their own summary with the text again.’

¹⁹² *Yuktidīpikā* (1998). The most significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā. Critically edited by A. Wezler and S. Motegi. Stuttgart.

¹⁹³ See, for instance, their interpretation of the YD on SK 43d: n. 475 (§IV.8); and their interpretation of the YD’s opening verses: n. 607 (§V.2).

¹⁹⁴ HARZER (2006, pp. 21-22) gives a similar evaluation of LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)’s treatment of the YD: ‘In it the *Yuktidīpikā* receives more of its due. [...] But the virtues of philosophy that the *Yuktidīpikā* is so rich [*sic*] are not readily apparent.’ FRANCO (1991, p.134) makes a similar judgment: ‘The YD, as Larson rightly recognizes, contains important information about the early history of Sāṃkhya. Unfortunately, however, one cannot say that such information was given the attention it deserves.’

¹⁹⁵ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 46.

‘constitutive dimension’ of the Sāṃkhya system, the *bhāvas* as the ‘projective dimension’, and the *pratyayasarga* as the ‘consequent dimension’.¹⁹⁶ They compare these three dimensions, respectively, to the ‘hardware’ of a computer, the ‘software’, and the ‘printout of the functioning system’.¹⁹⁷ With regard to the relationship between the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*, a component of the second ‘dimension’) and the attainments (*siddhi*, a component of the third ‘dimension’), like CHAKRAVARTI (1975), they interpret the evidence of the YD to suggest that ‘the predisposition toward knowledge (*jñāna*) generates the spiritual attainments (*siddhi*) conducive to final discrimination and release’.¹⁹⁸ However, as I will argue in §IV.10, further evidence in the YD linking the concepts of *jñāna* and *siddhi* complicates this interpretation of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*. Although their classification of the Sāṃkhya paradigms into ‘three dimensions’ agrees with the evidence of the YD, their suggestion that *jñāna* generates *siddhi* is contrary to this evidence.

LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA downplay the role of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in Sāṃkhya,¹⁹⁹ and they do not discuss the YD’s views on this subject in any detail. Similarly, they do not discuss the YD’s portrayal of Kapila in much detail, but they do observe that Kapila is given a similar status to major deities in the YD:

From one point of view, the divine realm is the realm of the *māhātmyaśarīras*, Brahmā, Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, and so forth, who perform specific tasks (*adhikāra*) in the cosmos and who are able to generate their own bodies by a simple act of will. From another point of view, the divine realm is the realm of

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 64. LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (pp. 54-56; 64-65) also discuss the role of the sources of action (*karmayoni*) and vital breaths (*vāyu*) according to the YD and group them with the *bhāvas* as a part of the ‘projective dimension’ of the manifest.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 29: ‘Sāṃkhya had never denied reliable verbal testimony (*āptavacana* or *śruti*) as a legitimate and important means of knowing, but Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning, even in the area of *samyagdarśana* and *adhyātmavidyā* (that is to say, in the area of ultimate truth and the science of liberation).’

the great Sāṃkhya precursors, especially Kapila who emerges at the beginning of the world cycle fully endowed with the positive fundamental predispositions of meritorious behaviour, knowledge, renunciation, and power.²⁰⁰

Although, as will become apparent in §V.3-4, there is reason to believe that the YD's references to *māhātmyaśarīra*, Brahmā and Hiranyagarbha all refer to the same figure, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA do recognize the difference between the respective roles of this figure and Kapila in the YD (see §V.4).

LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA also offer a short survey of the textual evidence with regard to the role of Kapila in the history of Sāṃkhya and an interpretation of its significance:

[A]ll that can be said is that Kapila and Āsuri are linked with the beginning of the Sāṃkhya tradition. There is little reliable information about them apart from Kapila's linkage with ancient ascetic traditions and Āsuri's association with the brahmanical sacrificial system. That the later Sāṃkhya teachers unanimously refer to Kapila and Āsuri as the founders of the system probably reflects the Sāṃkhya tradition's attempts to appropriate traditions of ascetic speculation as its own and to relate that ascetic speculation to dissatisfaction with the older sacrificial religion. Moreover, what might be called the upgrading of Kapila to the status of Hiranyagarbha or one or another mythological figure (Agni, Rudra, Śiva, and so forth) together with efforts to list Kapila, Āsuri, and other Sāṃkhya teachers in enumerations of the 'great seers' in the epic and Purāṇic literature may be taken as further attempts to establish a proper lineage for the Sāṃkhya philosophy.²⁰¹

In §V.5, we will look in more detail at the ways in which Kapila is represented in the classical Sāṃkhya texts and earlier literature, and will compare the YD's portrayal of Kapila to these occurrences.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 59. This interpretation seems, however, to be partially based on a misunderstanding of YD on SK 52cd, p. 255, ll. 20-21, which states: 'These [creations] called the subtle body and the conditions arise after the time of the decay of the six attainments. But the [creation] defined as *adhikāra* [arises] immediately following the constituent qualities.' (so 'yaṃ līṅgākhyo bhāvākhyāś ca śāṣiddhikṣayakālād ūrdhvaṃ bhavati / guṇasamanantaram tv adhikāralakṣaṇaḥ /) The term *adhikāra* must refer to the inherent 'authority' or 'capacity' of the *guṇas* to manifest the *tattvas*, since later in this passage the commentator asks: 'If the *adhikāra* alone is sufficient for the manifestation of *pradhāna*, what [is the purpose] of *dharma* and *adharmā*?' (YD on SK 52, p. 256, ll. 2-3: *yadi tāvad adhikāra evāyaṃ pradhānapravṛttaye 'laṃ kiṃ dharmādharmābhyām /*) For the preceding portion of this passage, see n. 730 (§V.4). LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA's interpretation is very similar to CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 283)'s interpretation of *adhikāra* as 'administrative duties', as well as to Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-92, p. 359)'s interpretative translation: 'The body in the form of the *adhikāra* (office bearer like Brahma etc.) are [*sic*] produced just immediately after the cosmic matter.'

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 112.

PARROTT (1990a; 1990b)²⁰² offers an interpretative reassessment of the value of Materiality (*prakṛti*) in classical Sāṃkhya. PARROTT argues against ‘the commonly held notion that classical Sāṃkhya negatively values the world’²⁰³, emphasizing instead the soteriological role of *prakṛti*. He suggests that *prakṛti* is viewed by the Sāṃkhya texts as ‘a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means’.²⁰⁴

PARROTT argues that the verses of the SK should be read as progressive aids to a seeker on the path to liberation:

That is, the seeker to whom these teachings are declared must be viewed as evolving during the course of instruction contained in the text. A seeker, on first approach to a preceptor, would experience his reality [...] in one way, and in quite another after long years of practised discipline. Different perspectives would arise as his insight into the nature of things matures.²⁰⁵

Based on this interpretation, PARROTT suggests that SK 55-61 should be viewed as ‘emotion-filled poetry’ directed towards *prakṛti* by the mature seeker: ‘By expressing deeply felt love, praise and gratitude to Prakṛti, the seeker enters the realm of feeling. These feelings open the heart and bolster him for his death.’²⁰⁶ Accordingly, he emphasizes the tendency of these verses to personify *prakṛti*, although he admits: ‘Prakṛti is not a person; she is simply a world with a whole lot of personality.’²⁰⁷

Although PARROTT does not make much use of the YD or discuss the role of Kapila in relation to the soteriological aspect of *prakṛti*, his original interpretation accords with the YD’s apparent view of Kapila as a direct manifestation of *prakṛti*’s soteriological tendency in the form of a *guru* for all *puruṣas* (see §V.4).

²⁰² PARROTT, R.J. (1990a). ‘Soteriology of prakṛti: the world as guru in classical Sāṃkhya.’ In: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute* 70: 65-88; PARROTT, R.J. (1990b). ‘The worth of the world in classical Sāṃkhya.’ In: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute* 71: 83-108.

²⁰³ PARROTT (1990b), p. 84.

²⁰⁴ PARROTT (1990a), p. 82.

²⁰⁵ PARROTT (1990b), p. 86.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 103.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 105.

NAKADA (1992)'s²⁰⁸ very brief communication outlines the YD's defense of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) as a distinct means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), separate from inference (*anumāna*).²⁰⁹ NAKADA suggests that this argument is a response to the view of the Buddhist Dignāga, who denies the validity of *āptavacana* as a separate *pramāṇa*.²¹⁰

MOTEGI (1994)²¹¹ draws several conclusions regarding the YD-*kāra*'s apparent knowledge of his Vaiśeṣika opponents. Based on a discussion of the evidence in the YD, he suggests that the commentator refers to an unknown commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS), as well as to two *sūtras* from the VS that have been lost.²¹² He further identifies a possible original sense of the term *vyapadeśa* as it occurs in VS 9.1²¹³, as a form of inferential mark based on the function of an object.²¹⁴ Finally, based on the occurrence of the phrase *madhyamaka kāla* ('intermediate time') in a verse attributed to the Vaiśeṣika school by the author of the YD, he advances the possibility that this concept, not found in the extant Vaiśeṣika literature, was used by the Vaiśeṣikas to support the 'doctrine of the non-existent effect' (*asatkāryavāda*).²¹⁵ MOTEGI also draws attention to the YD's arguments with the Vaiśeṣika in regard to other matters, including the nature of the Lord (*īśvara*),²¹⁶ although he does not take

²⁰⁸ NAKADA, N. (1992). 'Word and inference in the Yuktidīpikā.' In: *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* Supplement 9: 485-486. (Also in: *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (=Indobukkyogaku Kenkyū) 36: 21-22.)

²⁰⁹ See nn. 370, 371 (§IV.3).

²¹⁰ NAKADA (1992), p. 485.

²¹¹ MOTEGI, S. (1994). 'Some Vaiśeṣika thoughts referred to in the Yuktidīpikā.' In: *Asiatische Studien* 48: 807-818.

²¹² MOTEGI (1994), pp. 810-813.

²¹³ *kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvāt prāg asat* // (VS 9.1).

²¹⁴ MOTEGI (1994), pp. 813-815.

²¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 815-816.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 807.

up the discussion of this subject, which will be discussed in §V.3 of the present study.

JACOBSEN (1998)²¹⁷ is a survey of the occurrences of Kapila in the Indian tradition and an interpretation of the development of this figure, from early occurrences in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (ŚU) and *Mahābhārata* (MBh),²¹⁸ through his portrayal as the founder of the Sāṃkhya system²¹⁹ and his later portrayal as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and late classical Sāṃkhya texts.²²⁰ JACOBSEN would later incorporate the bulk of the material in this article into his book, JACOBSEN (2008). We will look in more detail at JACOBSEN's contribution in the review of this book below, and the majority of references in the main body of this study will be to the later publication.

Like BRONKHORST (1981), HATTORI (1999)²²¹ argues that the term *seśvara* Sāṃkhya did not come to be applied to Pātañjalayoga until a rather late date. HATTORI observes that Mādhava, in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, refers to the followers of Patañjali as *seśvara sāmkhya* and the followers of Kapila as *nirīśvara sāmkhya*²²², while according to an earlier view (as identified by BRONKHORST (1981) on the basis of the *Tattvasamgraha*), *seśvara* Sāṃkhya referred to 'a certain group [of Sāṃkhyas who] admitted the existence of the *īśvara* as the creator of the world, and formed the

²¹⁷ JACOBSEN, K.A. (1998). 'Kapila: Founder of Sāṃkhya and Avatāra of Viṣṇu.' In: *Orientalia Suecana* 47: 69-85.

²¹⁸ JACOBSEN (1998), pp. 71-75.

²¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 75-79.

²²⁰ Ibid., pp. 78-85.

²²¹ HATTORI, M. (1999). 'On Seśvara-Sāṃkhya.' In *Asiatische Studien* 53: 609-618.

²²² HATTORI (1999), p. 609.

theory that explains the process of creation and destruction of the world by the cooperation of the *īśvara* with the three *guṇas* of *pradhāna*.²²³

HATTORI discusses the role of ‘devotion to the Lord’ (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*) in the YS and suggests that the term *praṇidhāna* was adopted from the Buddhists, for whom it signified ‘ “fixation of mind” or “taking a vow” ’.²²⁴ Accordingly, he suggests that *īśvarapraṇidhāna* is of a different nature from devotion (*bhakti*), consisting rather of a vow directed to *īśvara* or the concentration of the mind upon *īśvara*.²²⁵ HATTORI, citing BRONKHORST (1983), notes that the role of *īśvara* in classical Sāṃkhya is the same as that in Pātañjalayoga.²²⁶ HATTORI concludes that because in the classical Sāṃkhya texts *īśvara*, ‘who played not so important role from the beginning, came to be neglected’, while in the YS *īśvara* is ‘clearly mentioned in several *sūtras*’, the term *seśvara sāṃkhya* came to be applied to the latter school by the time of Mādhava.²²⁷ In summary, HATTORI’s article confirms that although *īśvara* does not play a prominent role in classical Sāṃkhya, his nature must be considered the same as in Pātañjalayoga.

MALINAR (1999)²²⁸ is a study of the concepts of generality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*) in classical Sāṃkhya. In this course of this study, MALINAR suggests that because *yogins* have attained an insight into the productive nature of the *tattvas* as principles common (*sāmānya*) to all particular (*viśeṣa*) aspects of the phenomenal world, they are able to influence the particular phenomenal configurations of reality:

²²³ Ibid., p. 616.

²²⁴ Ibid., pp. 611-612.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 612.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 612.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 616.

²²⁸ MALINAR, A. (1999). ‘Prakṛti as Sāmānya.’ In: *Asiatische Studien* 53: 619-644.

Insight into the productivity of *prakṛti* is only ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated as *aiśvarya*. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of ‘natural’, *prākṛtic* possibilities.²²⁹

In other words, yogic practice may lead to the ability to manifest particular physical effects directly out of the productive potential of *pradhāna*. This interpretation of the nature of yogic attainment will prove to be applicable to the evidence of the YD with regard to the abilities of *yogins* and *devas* (see §V.3-4).

WEZLER (2001)²³⁰ discusses the original significance of a passage of the *Nirukta* (NU) quoted by the YD in connection with the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the attainments (*siddhi*).²³¹ WEZLER interprets this passage as a description of the process by which knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic *mantras* is transmitted,²³² which ‘deals with the praise of those who know the meaning—of course of the Veda—and the censure of those who do not.’²³³ WEZLER’s insights will be drawn upon in §IV.9, where we will consider the implications of the YD’s quotation of this passage.

WEZLER notes in passing the lack of an extended study of the knowledge of *ṛṣis* and other supernatural forms of knowledge: ‘Typical of the state of Indological research there is no, at least comprehensive, study of the ideas concerning the manner of cognition of the *mantras*—or related to the *ṛṣi* [...] or the means of “supernatural” cognition in general.’²³⁴ AKLUJKAR (2009) (see below) represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the process of Vedic revelation. The present study aims to contribute likewise to our understanding of the knowledge of

²²⁹ MALINAR (1999), p. 641.

²³⁰ WEZLER, A. (2001). ‘Some remarks on Nirukta 1.20 *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmāṇa ṛṣayo*, etc.’ In: *The Pandit. Traditional Sanskrit Scholarship in India. Festschrift Parameshvara Aithal*. Edited by Axel Michaels. Delhi: 215-248.

²³¹ See nn. 510, 518 (§IV.9).

²³² WEZLER (2001), p. 232-233; see nn. 515, 519, 520 (§IV.9)

²³³ Ibid., p. 217.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 226, n. 57.

r̥sis and their role in the dissemination of doctrine more generally, at least as understood by the Sāṃkhya school.

HARZER (2006)²³⁵ is an extended study of Sāṃkhya epistemology as interpreted by the YD. HARZER makes extensive use the works of the Buddhist logician Dignāga (480-540 C.E.)²³⁶, an opponent of the Sāṃkhya school: ‘In his critique of the various philosophical schools, Dignāga paid a good deal of attention to the Sāṃkhya.’²³⁷ HARZER argues that, in the SK, the Sāṃkhya school ‘formulated anew its epistemological theories as a direct response’ to Dignāga.²³⁸ Accordingly, she suggests a new date for the SK, placing it at ‘around 550 A.D.’²³⁹

HARZER examines the YD’s views on perception (*pratyakṣa*, *dṛṣṭa*) and inference (*anumāna*) but does not deal with authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*), the third means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) according to Sāṃkhya, as she explains:

There are two reasons for this: first, since Dignāga’s system has only two instruments of knowledge, he focuses in his criticism of Sāṃkhya on these two, perception and inference. In his opinion, verbal testimony is a part of inference. The second reason is that verbal testimony belongs to two areas of philosophy: epistemology and philosophy of language. The philosophy of language is a distinct discipline of philosophy, not considered for scrutiny in the present volume and therefore verbal testimony is excluded from this study.²⁴⁰

The present study aims to fill, to some extent, this apparent gap in the study of the YD’s views on epistemology. HARZER’s study, nevertheless, provides several points of clarification that will be drawn upon in the discussion of perception and inference in §IV.1-2. Most notably, HARZER discusses the YD’s classification of inference

²³⁵ HARZER, E. (2006). *The Yuktidīpikā: A Reconstruction of Sāṃkhya Methods of Knowing*. *Indologica Halensis* 8. Aachen.

²³⁶ HARZER (2006), pp. 16-17.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

²³⁹ Ibid., pp. 107-109.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

into direct (*vīta*) and indirect (*avīta*) inference,²⁴¹ as well as the ten members (*avayava*) of formal inference.²⁴² She observes that the author of the YD treats the verses of the SK as ‘arguments in accordance with the rules of forming an inference’.²⁴³ The implications of this view of the SK will be used to suggest a possible interpretation of the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony in §V.2.

MOTEGI (2006)²⁴⁴ examines the YD’s discussions of *śabda* from two major perspectives: that of sound (*śabda*) as an object of perception manifested by Materiality (*prakṛti*), and that of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*, *śabda*) as a means of correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*). With regard to the first topic, he discusses the YD’s arguments against the Vaiśeṣika school regarding the attribution of the qualities of pleasure and pain to sound (as a product of *prakṛti* characterised by the three *guṇas*) rather than to the self (*ātman*) as held by the Vaiśeṣikas.²⁴⁵ In the context of this discussion, MOTEGI points out that ‘whenever the objects of direct perception are at issue, sound is often cited in the *Yuktidīpikā* as an example of the objects of direct perception’.²⁴⁶

This usage of *śabda* is distinct from its use to refer to authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*), one of the three means of correct knowledge according to Sāṃkhya. With regard to this latter usage, MOTEGI focuses on the YD’s treatment of the Vedas as sources of authoritative testimony.²⁴⁷ He points out that the author of the YD supports the SK’s rejection of Vedic sacrifice as a means to liberation (SK 2) yet

²⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 93-97.

²⁴² Ibid., pp. 98-102.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁴⁴ MOTEGI, S. (2006). ‘Śabda in the Yuktidīpikā.’ In: *Acta Asiatica* 90: 39-54.

²⁴⁵ MOTEGI (2006), pp. 40-47.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 47-54.

also maintains ‘that liberation by means of knowledge is supported by the Vedic scriptures.’²⁴⁸ In the context of this discussion in the YD, MOTEGI observes, the proponent of the Sāṃkhya viewpoint makes use of grammatical arguments taken from the *Mahābhāṣya*, while the opponent employs exegetical methods borrowed from Mīmāṃsā.²⁴⁹ It is indeed clear throughout the YD that the commentator is largely concerned with reconciling Sāṃkhya ideas with aspects of the greater Brāhmanical tradition, particularly with the authority of the Vedas, as MOTEGI suggests:

Especially in the context of its theory of liberation, Sāṃkhya thought is compelled to take a negative view of the Vedas, but the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* attempts nonetheless to find some way of recognizing their authority. Viewed historically, it could be said that originally Sāṃkhya rejected Vedic ritual and propounded ideas not found in Vedic literature, but later, rather than pitting itself against the Vedas, it made attempts to reconcile its ideas with the Vedas.²⁵⁰

This impulse to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas, MOTEGI suggests, is shown in the YD’s definition of *āptavacana* under SK 5d (see §IV.3), which accords a special status to the Vedas as being ‘exceptional in their reliability’.²⁵¹

With regard to the YD’s description of authoritative individuals (*āpta*; see §IV.3), MOTEGI notes the occurrence of the term *īśvaramaharṣi*, which he translates as ‘great seers of lord-like power’.²⁵² As has been made clear by BRONKHORST (1983) (see above), the interpretation of this term is not a straightforward matter. MOTEGI’s translation is potentially problematic, since, as pointed out by BRONKHORST,²⁵³ the YD treats *īśvara* as a particular *puruṣa* and therefore passive (without power as such). However, MOTEGI’s suggestion that ‘this usage of *īśvara* is

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 50.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 53.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 53.

²⁵² Ibid., p. 53, n. 27.

²⁵³ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 153.

similar to that found in the *Yogasūtra* 1.24²⁵⁴ may be apt. Based upon the role of *īśvara* in the Yoga school, and further upon the usage of the term *aiśvarya* in the Sāṃkhya texts, I will outline (in §V.3) the possibility that the term *īśvaramaharṣi* refers to those *ṛṣis* who, though the practice of *yoga*, have become similar to *īśvara*, who is considered omniscient (YS 1.25).

MOTEGI does not directly address the role of the *ṛṣi* Kapila with regard to the notion of *āptavacana* in the YD. As will be shown in §V.1-2, the author of the YD appears to model Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine upon the Vedic model, perhaps as a result of the same desire, identified by MOTEGI, to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedic tradition.

BRONKHORST (2007)²⁵⁵ argues for the origination of several traditions of asceticism, outside of the Vedic milieu, in the region of 'Greater Magadha', drawing on a variety of textual evidence.²⁵⁶ He further suggests that Kapila was originally a deity associated with these ascetic traditions.²⁵⁷ In support of this theory, he cites a passage of the *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* (BDhS) in which Kapila is presented as a demon (*asura*) and an opponent of Vedic orthodoxy.²⁵⁸ He takes as further evidence of the demonic nature of Kapila an episode in the MBh in which a wrathful Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara.²⁵⁹ He further observes that Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the MBh, including Viṣṇu, Śiva, Prajāpati and Viriñca,²⁶⁰ while 'Kapila's divine nature may [...] be taken as established for classical

²⁵⁴ MOTEGI (2006), p. 53, n. 27.

²⁵⁵ BRONKHORST, J. (2007). *Greater Magadha*. Studies in the culture of early India. Boston.

²⁵⁶ BRONKHORST (2007), p. 28: 'There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Brahmanical texts examined here describe forms of asceticism which are based on some shared assumptions. These assumptions were not part of the Brahmanical heritage. No, they should be considered as having been current in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, before they came to exert an influence on texts that present themselves as belonging to the Brahmanical tradition.'

²⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 61-68.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 61-62; see n. 766 (§V.5).

²⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 64-65.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 63.

Sāṃkhya'.²⁶¹ He suggests that the fact that Kapila was originally considered a deity would clear up some scholarly confusion regarding a passage of the ŚU,²⁶² identified by BRONKHORST as 'perhaps the earliest reference to "the seer Kapila"':²⁶³

Modern interpreters have not infrequently preferred the translation 'tawny, red' to 'Kapila', because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-12) shows that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiranyagarbha and linked to Rudra. This identity poses no problem the moment we abandon the idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.²⁶⁴

Although BRONKHORST's interpretation of the origin of Kapila may be at least partially correct, the development of this figure appears to be more complicated than he allows. Kapila is presented not only as a non-Vedic ascetic and demon in the early texts, but is also associated with elements of Vedic-style asceticism and Vedic orthodoxy, and is even portrayed as a Vedic ṛṣi (see §V.5).

JACOBSEN (2008)²⁶⁵, incorporating the material covered in JACOBSEN (1998), deals with the occurrences of figures known as Kapila throughout the history of Sanskrit literature. This publication also includes a translation of the *Kapilāsurisaṃvāda*, a late addition to the MBh ('probably C.E. 1400-1500'²⁶⁶),²⁶⁷ and a treatment of the association of Kapila with various places of pilgrimage (*tīrtha*) in India and of the forms of worship associated with him.²⁶⁸

JACOBSEN observes that the earliest text to refer extensively to a ṛṣi (or ṛṣis) called Kapila is the MBh.²⁶⁹ He argues that 'several Kapilas' are mentioned in the

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 62.

²⁶² See n. 771 (§V.5).

²⁶³ BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁶⁵ JACOBSEN, K.A. (2008). *Kapila: Founder of Sāṃkhya and Avatāra of Viṣṇu*. Delhi.

²⁶⁶ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 71.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 71-148.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 149-211.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

MBh,²⁷⁰ and identifies two distinct Kapila figures in particular, representing two different forms of ascetic tradition. He cites an episode in which Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara (MBh 3.3.104-8),²⁷¹ and suggests that this Kapila is a representative of the Vedic tradition of asceticism ‘associated with *tapas*; with the acquisition of powers and immense feats of asceticism’.²⁷² In contrast, he suggests that the Kapila who converses with Syūmaraśmi in the form of a cow in MBh 12.260-62²⁷³ represents a tradition that ‘belonged to a different world-view, a world-view that emphasised *karma*, *saṃsāra*, *punarbhava*, and *mokṣa*’.²⁷⁴ JACOBSEN suggests that these passages testify to the existence of two different Kapilas or of two stages in the development of the figure:

The contradictory natures of these two Kapilas may be considered evidence of the existence of two different Kapila figures, one a Vedic ascetic and one influenced by Śramaṇa ideas, or they may represent two stages in the history of Kapila, beginning as a Vedic ascetic and thereafter being appropriated by ascetics who had adopted Śramaṇa values. If any of these should be thought of as the Sāṃkhya Kapila is not clear.²⁷⁵

The contradictory nature of these two aspects of Kapila in the MBh will be discussed in relation to the Sāṃkhya conception of Kapila in §V.5.

JACOBSEN also notes the non-Vedic, anti-ritual nature of Kapila in the passage of the BDhS discussed by BRONKHORST (2007) (see above).²⁷⁶ Also like BRONKHORST, he observes that Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the MBh.²⁷⁷ In contrast to BRONKHORST’s view that Kapila originated as a deity associated with *śramaṇa* traditions, JACOBSEN suggests that the early association of Kapila with Rudra and Hiranyagarbha in the ŚU ‘may perhaps have contributed to

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

²⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 13-16.

²⁷² Ibid., pp. 22-23.

²⁷³ Ibid., pp. 16-18.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

the later divinization of Kapila and to the Sāṃkhya perception of him having been created at the beginning of each cycle of creation'.²⁷⁸ With regard to the portrayal of Kapila as a Vedic-style *ṛṣi*, JACOBSEN observes that Kapila does not usually appear in the traditional lists of seven *ṛṣis*, although he does appear in such a list in the MBh.²⁷⁹

With regard to the classical Sāṃkhya texts' views on the nature and origin of Kapila, JACOBSEN observes:

Most commentaries agree that Kapila passed his teaching on to Āsuri, but they offer different versions of Kapila's origin and nature. One gets the impression that each commentary had to add a new detail or an original interpretation to the body of knowledge regarding the nature and origin of Kapila as part of its general interpretative contribution. There is, in fact, a remarkable variety in the speculations about Kapila in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* commentaries.²⁸⁰

In his discussion of the YD's views on Kapila, JACOBSEN notes that the text holds that both Kapila and Brahmā were produced directly out of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*) after the production of the *tattvas*, and that Kapila 'was born naturally endowed with the means of liberation because of the predominance of *sattva* in him',²⁸¹ while Brahmā (i.e., the 'body of greatness' (*māhātmyaśarīra*)) was born with an excess of *rajas*.²⁸² With regard to the relative roles of Kapila and Brahmā according to the YD, JACOBSEN concludes: 'Here the salvific function—the revelation of knowledge that leads to release—and the world creating function are separated. The first function belongs to Kapila, the second to the body of greatness.'²⁸³ He argues that this distinction is justified by the structure of the Sāṃkhya system itself: 'Since the Sāṃkhya system is a dualist system—that it believes in two ultimate principles—and since it also believes in a plurality of selves

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 18; see n. 776 (§V.5).

²⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 32-33.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 33; see nn. 693, 695, 696 (§V.3); 730 (§V.4).

²⁸² Ibid., p. 45; see n. 695 (§V.3).

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 45.

and a plurality of real manifestations of the material principle, it is not forced by the principle of monism to identify these as one and the same principle.’²⁸⁴ This apparent distinction between the roles of the two figures will be discussed further in §V.4.

JACOBSEN contrasts the YD’s division in labour between Kapila and Brahmā to the Vaiṣṇava view of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu: ‘Making Kapila an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu is a development in the direction of monotheism. The idea of *avatāra* is an elegant way of keeping the divine functions apart and at the same time unifying them.’²⁸⁵ He observes that the MV’s identification of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu²⁸⁶ is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK: ‘The fact that Kapila was considered the son of Devahūti and Kardama is in accordance with the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* but this is not stated in the early Sāṃkhya commentaries.’²⁸⁷ JACOBSEN takes this fact, along with a reference by Māṭhara to Viṣṇu’s incarnation as Kalki,²⁸⁸ as evidence of the text’s late date,²⁸⁹ citing the dates for the text proposed by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) as ‘anywhere from the ninth century onward’.²⁹⁰ JACOBSEN also notes that Vācaspatimiśra’s TV, also a late text, similarly refers to Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in its commentary on VBh 1.25.²⁹¹ With regard to the reason for this development, JACOBSEN suggests: ‘The fact that Kapila was accepted as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu in these texts probably means that the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth century.’²⁹² He cites the work of WEZLER (1970) in support of this conclusion.²⁹³

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁸⁶ See nn. 684, 686 (§V.3).

²⁸⁷ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.

²⁸⁸ *kalkī bhaviṣyati bhāvivastugrāhiṇī* / (MV on SK 33, p. 50, l. 4).

²⁸⁹ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.

²⁹⁰ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 33; LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 291.

²⁹¹ JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 35-36; see n. 803 (§V.5).

²⁹² Ibid., p. 36.

The acceptance by the Vaiṣṇavas of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, JACOBSEN suggests, ‘served the interests of the Vaiṣṇavas in their attempts to make Vaiṣṇavism an all-inclusive religion’.²⁹⁴ The relation of the YD’s view of the nature of Kapila to this later view of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu will be considered further in §V.5.

Like WEZLER (2001), AKLUJKAR (2009)²⁹⁵ is primarily useful, in the context of the present study, as an aid in understanding the significance of the YD’s quotation of a passage of NU 1.20 in the context of the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the attainments (*siddhi*).²⁹⁶ AKLUJKAR’s article deals with the grammarian Bhartṛhari’s view of the process of Vedic revelation and transmission. He bases his interpretation of the NU passage primarily upon the context of Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* (VPV), in which it is quoted.²⁹⁷ He justifies this interpretative strategy as follows: ‘As there is no other theoretician between Yāska and BH known to us at present who echoes Yāska’s words, it is also commonsense to proceed on the assumption that BH would help us in recovering a part of Yāska’s world.’²⁹⁸

AKLUJKAR’s interpretation of the NU passage will be utilised in §IV.9 to clarify the YD’s interpretation of the *siddhis*. The assumptions behind this interpretation with regard to the process of the attainment and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge will be considered further in §V.1-2. Most significantly, AKLUJKAR offers an interpretation of the phrase *ṛṣayaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ* (‘seers who had discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things’²⁹⁹), which

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 37: ‘Wezler has suggested that final acceptance of the idea that Kapila was an incarnation of Viṣṇu marked the take-over of Sāṃkhya by the Vaiṣṇavas.’

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 37.

²⁹⁵ AKLUJKAR, A. (2009). ‘Veda Revelation according to Bhartṛhari.’ In: *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*. Edited by Mithilesh Chaturvedi. Delhi.

²⁹⁶ See nn. 510, 518 (§IV.9).

²⁹⁷ VPV 1.5, p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1.

²⁹⁸ AKLUJKAR (2009), p. 8.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

occurs in the NU passage: ‘The *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* of the seers means direct, undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of those properties and actions or processes which make the world what it is.’³⁰⁰ The possibility that the *YD-kāra* holds a similar view of those *ṛṣis* who have independently attained Sāṃkhya knowledge will be considered in §V.1.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

CHAPTER IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators' Views on Key Interpretative Issues.

As has become evident in the course of the reviews in CHAPTER III, two major interpretative issues in classical Sāṃkhya have not been adequately dealt with in previous scholarship. The first of these issues is the role of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in relation to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and consequent liberation. The first part of this chapter (§1-5) will examine the classical Sāṃkhya commentators' views on authoritative testimony and the other two means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), perception (*pratyakṣa*, *drṣṭa*) and inference (*anumāna*). This discussion will be directed towards a clearer understanding of the nature of authoritative testimony in relation to the other *pramāṇas*, and the respective roles of the three *pramāṇas* in the attainment and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.

The second major issue requiring clarification is the relationship between the paradigms of the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*). Although CHAKRAVARTI (1975), LARSON (1984) and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) have made strides in understanding the nature of the relationship between these two paradigms, the evidence of the YD suggests a more precise interpretation of this relationship. The second part of this chapter (§6-10) will examine the commentators' views on the nature and function of these paradigms and the relationship between them.

The presentation of the views of the GBh, MV, and TK on the issues considered in this chapter will serve to aid us in understanding the views of the YD, and to provide an historical context for these views. The conclusions drawn in this

chapter with regard to the YD's views on the significance of *āptavacana* and the categories of the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* will be drawn upon in CHAPTER V, which will explore the interpretative implications of these views with regard to the process of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the nature and origin of the ṛṣi Kapila.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS:

The structure of the *Yuktidīpikā* and its relation to the other classical commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

Like the other classical commentaries on the SK, the YD is structured around the verses of the SK in their standard numerical order (although the YD does not contain extant commentary on all of the verses³⁰¹). This makes it fairly easy to compare the views of the various commentators with regard to any point of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

To give an idea of the basic contents of the SK, as well as the basic structure of the commentaries, an outline of the subject matter of the verses may be useful:

SK 1-2 deal with the reasons for initiating the Sāṃkhya inquiry (the experience of pain and inability to dispel this pain by other means) and the goal of the inquiry (knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower; see §II.1).

SK 3 summarises the nature of the three categories of manifest, unmanifest and knower.

³⁰¹ See n. 18 (CHAPTER I).

SK 4-7 deal with the epistemology of the system, specifically the three means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*; see §II.4), their definitions and spheres of applicability.

SK 8-11 deal with the relation between manifest and unmanifest; the doctrine of the (pre-)existent effect (*satkāryavāda*; see §II.1); the characteristics of the three categories of manifest, unmanifest and knower; and the differences between them.

SK 12-16 discuss the nature and function of the constituent qualities (*guṇa*), their inherence in manifest and unmanifest Materiality (*prakṛti*), and reasons for the existence of the unmanifest.

SK 17-21 give reasons for the existence and plurality of Consciousness (*puruṣa*), list its characteristics, and describe its relationship with *prakṛti*.

SK 22-38 describe the manner and order of the emergence of the manifest principles (*tattva*) from unmanifest *prakṛti*, describe their functions and characteristics (including the conditions (*bhāva*; see §II.5) as forms of the intellect (*buddhi*) (SK 23)), and describe the motivation of their activity as being for the sake of the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* (see §II.3).

SK 39-42 deal with the subtle body (*līṅga*) and its relation to the manifest *tattvas* and the physical body (see §II.2).

SK 43-45 list the varieties of the *bhāvas* (*sāṃsiddhika*, *prākṛtika*, *vaikṛta*) and the results of the *bhāvas* (see §II.5).

SK 46-51 list the categories of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*; see §II.5).

SK 52 describes the relationship between the *liṅga* and the *bhāvas*.

SK 53-54 describe the phenomenal creation (*bhautika sarga*; see §II.2).

SK 55-68 deal with the relationship between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and explain the nature of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and liberation (*mokṣa*, *kaivalya*) (see §II.3).

SK 69-73 explain that the supreme *ṛṣi* (Kapila) expounded the Sāṃkhya system and describe the manner in which this knowledge was transmitted through a series of disciples to Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

The discussions in the present chapter will focus mainly on the commentaries on the portions of the SK dealing with the *pramāṇas* (SK 4-7), the *bhāvas* (SK 23, 43-45), and the *pratyayasarga* (SK 46-51), although passages from other portions of the commentaries will be introduced where relevant.

Despite the common framework around which all of the classical commentaries are structured, the YD is unique among the commentaries in its

division of the text of the SK. The YD-*kāra* applies a form of chapterisation which bears little relation to the structure or content of the SK. The text of the YD is divided into four books (*prakaraṇa*) and further into eleven chapters (*āhnikā*), which CHAKRAVARTI (1975) characterises as ‘an old-fashioned division’.³⁰² The YD also divides the verses of the SK themselves into fragments and treats them as *sūtras* (prose aphorisms) rather than *kārikās* (verses) (see §V.2).

The YD also contains a long introduction, which deals largely with the commentator’s view of the history and continuity of the Sāṃkhya tradition. This portion of the YD, as well as the commentary on SK 69-72, will be utilized in the discussions in CHAPTER V of the commentator’s view of the importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the continuity of the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers.

The YD differs from the other commentaries in another important respect. While the other commentaries generally offer short and simple interpretations of the verses of the SK, the YD’s explanations are generally much longer and much more involved. CHAKRAVARTI (1975) has aptly described the YD-*kāra*’s style of exegesis:

The style of the author is archaic and highly polemical. He first of all puts in a nut-shell what he has to say, and then expands the same. In doing so he attacks the view of the opponent who also in his turn re-attacks that of the defendent. In this way attacking, re-attacking and counter-attacking go on continually until the accepted conclusion is reached. This method has sometimes rendered it difficult to trace the place where the version of the opponent begins and that of the defendent ends.³⁰³

This type of involved dialectic is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK. In the course of these meandering exchanges, the YD-*kāra* often refers to verses of the SK (or their subject matter) from outside the immediate context of the verse at hand. This means that in the interpretative analysis undertaken in the present

³⁰² CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 161.

³⁰³ Ibid., pp. 160-161.

chapter, references from widely disparate sections of the YD have sometimes been brought together for the sake of clarifying a particular aspect of the commentator's views.

Although the YD-*kāra* does not explicitly engage with the views of the earlier classical commentaries on the SK, and it is thus not clear whether he was familiar with any of these commentaries, his views are often compatible with the views of the other commentators. In general, the evidence of the YD can be used to clarify statements found in the other commentaries and points of doctrine which remain largely obscure in the other commentaries, as will become apparent in the course of the present chapter. The commentators' views on relevant interpretative issues will be compared point by point in this chapter, in order to establish the YD's views, and the points of agreement and departure with the views of the other commentaries, with as much clarity as possible. This comparison will be undertaken primarily in preparation for a consideration of the interpretative implications of these views in CHAPTER V. In addition, the overall relation between the YD's views to those of the other classical commentaries, and their implications with regard to the historical development of the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, will be considered in §V.5.

§1. The commentators' views on the *pramāṇa* of perception (*dṛṣṭa*).

The first sections of this chapter (§1-5) will be directed towards a clearer understanding of the means by which a seeker of liberation is held to attain knowledge of the principles (*tattva*) according to the classical Sāṃkhya texts. These sections will thus focus upon the commentators' views on the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) accepted by Sāṃkhya, especially with regard to their

applicability to the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*. It is generally assumed that inference (*anumāna*) is held as the most important *pramāṇa* for the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge.³⁰⁴ However, the evidence of the commentaries, particularly of the YD, calls this assumption into question.

The first *pramāṇa* accepted by the Sāṃkhya system is perception (*dṛṣṭa*). Although the sphere of perception is usually confined to the everyday objects of experience comprised of the gross elements (*mahābhūta*), the commentators, as mentioned in §II.4, also allow for the perception of the subtle elements (*tanmātra*) by gods and *yogins*. Of the commentaries, the YD provides the most information about how this extraordinary form of perception works.

Perception is defined by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as *prativīṣayādhyavasāya* (SK 5). As mentioned above (§II.3), the intellect (*buddhi*) is characterised by determination (*adhyavasāya*) (SK 23). The interpretation of the term *prativīṣaya* varies among the commentators. GBh interprets it as ‘with regard to each particular object’, referring to sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparsa*), form (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), and scent (*gandha*), as apprehended by their corresponding sense-faculties (ears (*śrotra*), skin (*tvak*), eyes (*cakṣus*), tongue (*jihvā*), and nose (*ghrāṇa*), respectively).³⁰⁵ Presumably, this includes both the specific (*viśeṣa*; *mahābhūta*) and non-specific (*aviśeṣa*; *tanmātra*) forms of these sense-objects (see §II.1).

³⁰⁴ E.g., CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 191: ‘Its *prakṛti*, its *puruṣa*, nay even its theory of causation are established by sheer reasoning and this shows that “inference” played a very important part in the building up of the Sāṃkhya as a system.’ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 29) observe that ‘Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning’.

³⁰⁵ *dṛṣṭam yathā śrotram tvak cakṣuḥ jihvā ghrāṇam iti pañca buddhīndriyāṇi / śabdasparśa-rūparasagandhā eṣāṃ pañcānāṃ pañcaiva viśayā yathāsāṃkhyam / śabdam śrotram grhṇāti tvak sparśam cakṣu rūpam jihvā rasam ghrāṇam gandham iti /* (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 22-24); *prativīṣayeṣu śrotrādīnāṃ śabdādivīṣayeṣu adhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ /* (GBh on SK 5, p. 51, l. 28).

MV gives a similar explanation for the term *prativīṣayādhyavasāya* as referring to the apprehension of each particular sense-object by its corresponding sense-faculty.³⁰⁶

TK interprets *prativīṣaya* as a synonym for the faculties (*indriya*)—that is, as that which functions with regard to each (*prati*) object (*viśaya*).³⁰⁷ The term *prativīṣayādhyavasāya* can thus be understood as ‘determination by appropriate the sense-faculties’. TK includes the great elements (*mahābhūta*), as well as things like pleasure (*sukha*), etc., as the objects (*viśaya*) of perception for ordinary people. Vācaspati also mentions in this context the fact that *yogins* and gods (*ūrdhvasrotas*)³⁰⁸ are able to perceive the subtle elements (*tanmātra*).³⁰⁹ It is not clear from the TK, however, in what way things like pleasure and the subtle elements are also considered objects of the sense-faculties.

The YD also mentions in this context the fact that *yogins* and gods (*deva*) are able to perceive the subtle elements.³¹⁰ Under SK 34, the YD clarifies how this suprasensuous perception works. The commentator specifies that gods, having had their faculties (*indriya*) purified by an abundance of merit (*dharma*), are able to perceive the subtle elements even prior to perceiving the gross elements, while *yogins* can perceive the subtle elements only after they have ‘completely attained’ the gross elements.³¹¹ The YD interprets the term *prativīṣayādhyavasāya* as an *ekaśeṣa* (literally, ‘single remainder’), an interpretative technique according to which one word denotes two or more different but identical words. According to this

³⁰⁶ *viśayaṃ viśayaṃ prati yo 'dhyavasāyo netrādīnām indriyāṇām pañcānām rūpādiṣu pañcasu tat pratyakṣaṃ pratipattirūpaṃ dṛṣṭākhyam* / (MV on SK 5, p. 12, ll. 12-14).

³⁰⁷ *viśayaṃ viśayaṃ prati vartate iti prativīṣayam indriyam* / (TK on SK 5, p. 19, ll. 20-21).

³⁰⁸ See n. 488 (§IV.9).

³⁰⁹ *viśayāḥ pṛthivyādayaḥ sukhādayaś cāsmadādīnām aviśayāḥ tanmātralakṣaṇāḥ yoginām ūrdhvasrotasāṃ ca viśayāḥ* / (TK on SK 5, p. 19, ll. 18-20). Cf. nn. 24, 26 (§II.4).

³¹⁰ *viśiṣṭāḥ pṛthivyādilakṣaṇā asmadādigamyāḥ / aviśiṣṭāś ca tanmātralakṣaṇā yoginām ūrdhvasrotasāṃ ca gamyāḥ* / (YD on SK 5, p. 76, l. 27 – p. 77, l. 1).

³¹¹ *tatra devānām yānindriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api grhṇanti [prāg eva viśeṣāt] / yoginām ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇām* / (YD on SK 34ab, p. 218, ll. 3-5).

interpretation, *pratiṣayādhyavasāya* signifies 1. ‘determination by the sense-faculties’ and 2. ‘determination of each particular object’. The second meaning provides for the inclusion of internal forms of perception (including the perception of *yogins* and the perception of emotional states).³¹²

The YD, like the other commentaries,³¹³ thus makes room for the direct perception of things beyond ordinary sensory experience. The YD also suggests that this suprasensuous perception is a progressive process in the case of *yogins* and the result of accumulated merit (*dharma*) in the case of gods. This suggests that through yogic practice or the accumulation of *dharma* one may begin to develop knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* (beginning with the subtle elements) through the medium of direct perception. This evidence will be taken into account in the broader context of the discussion of the process of the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* in CHAPTER V.³¹⁴

§2. The commentators’ views on the *pramāṇa* of inference (*anumāna*).

Inference (*anumāna*) is held to make possible the apprehension of objects of knowledge beyond the sphere of perception (see §IV.5) and is generally accorded a privileged place in the Sāṃkhya texts with regard to the establishment of knowledge of the *tattvas*.

³¹² *ucyate: astu tarhīndriyāṇāṃ pratiṣayagrahaṇaṃ viśeṣaṇam / yat tūktam (82.6) rāgādīnām upasāṃkhyānaṃ kartavyam iti tatra brūmaḥ ekaśeṣanirdeśāt (cf. MBhāṣya I.88.25 et passim) siddham / evaṃ tarhi pratiṣayādhyavasāyaś ca pratiṣayādhyavasāyaś ca pratiṣayādhyavasāya iti sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣaḥ (cf. Pāṇ. 1.2.64) kariṣyate / tatraikena bahiraṅgasyendriyasya pariagrahaḥ / dvitīyenāntaraṅgasya prātibhasyeti rāgādiviṣayaṃ yoginām ca yad vijñānaṃ tat saṅgrhītaṃ bhavatīti vyākhyātaṃ pratyakṣam / (YD on SK 5a, p. 82, ll. 20-26).*

³¹³ Cf. nn. 24, 26 (§II.4).

³¹⁴ See also the discussion below of the commentators’ views on the production of knowledge leading to discrimination (§IV.5).

There are several forms of inference with different spheres of applicability. The commentators vary in their classification and interpretation of the forms of inference. The YD provides a good deal of information on the ways in which inference is used to establish the primary objects of the Sāṃkhya enquiry. The YD is also unique among the commentaries in providing a link between inference and the explanation of philosophical texts (*śāstra*), which are classed as authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*; see §IV.3). The present section will compare the commentators' views on the nature of inference in general and on the particular forms of inference, in order to provide some context for a discussion of the YD's views on the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony.

Inference in general is said to be dependent upon prior knowledge of a characteristic mark (*liṅga*) and that which bears the characteristic mark (*liṅgin*) (SK 5). For instance, TK gives the common example of the inference of fire from smoke, in which fire is considered the *liṅgin* and smoke the *liṅga*.³¹⁵

GBh's interpretation of the term *liṅgaliṅgipūrvaka* ('preceded by a characteristic mark and that which bears the mark'; SK 5) is somewhat different. Gauḍapāda explains that inference can be preceded by either a characteristic mark (*liṅga*) or that which bears the mark (*liṅgin*). He gives as examples the inference of a mendicant (*yati*), the *liṅgin*, from his staff (*daṇḍa*), the *liṅga*; and the inference of his staff, again the *liṅga*, from the sight of the mendicant, the *liṅgin*.³¹⁶ MV also uses the example of the mendicant and his staff, but only offers the first possibility, that a mendicant, the *liṅgin*, can be inferred from the sight of his staff, the *liṅga*.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ *dhūmādir vyāpyo vahnyādir vyāpaka iti yaḥ pratyayas tatpūrvakam* / (TK on SK 5, p. 22, ll. 35).

³¹⁶ *tad anumānam liṅgapūrvakam yatra liṅgena liṅgi anumīyate yathā daṇḍena yatiḥ / liṅgipūrvakam ca yatra liṅginā liṅgam anumīyate yathā dṛṣṭvā yatiṃ asyedaṃ tridaṇḍam iti* / (GBh on SK 5, p. 52, ll. 4-6).

³¹⁷ *liṅgena tridaṇḍādidarśanenādr̥ṣṭo 'pi liṅgi sādhyate nūnam asau parivrā[jo 'sti] yasyedaṃ tridaṇḍam iti* / (MV on SK 13, ll. 9-11; *parivrādāsti* must be a corrupt reading).

MV's interpretation is thus closer to that of TK. YD does not comment on the phrase *tal liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*. In summary, the commentators hold that inferential knowledge is dependent upon prior direct knowledge of the relation between two objects or characteristics.

With regard to the forms of inference, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states simply that inference is threefold (SK 5). The commentators are unanimous in identifying the three forms of inference as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*,³¹⁸ although the interpretation of these terms varies from text to text.

GBh interprets *pūrvavat* as the inference of an effect from the perception of a cause, based on precedent (*pūrva*), and gives the example of the inference of rain from clouds, based on the prior perception of rain as a result of the accumulation of clouds. As an example of *śeṣavat*, Gauḍapāda gives the inference that the remainder (*śeṣa*) of the ocean's water is salty, based on the perception that a portion of it is salty. He interprets *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as inference based on a generally perceived correlation, giving two examples: the inference of the movement of the moon and stars from their change in position, based on the perception of the movement of a man from place to place; and the inference of blossoming mango trees in other places from the perception that they have blossomed in one place.³¹⁹

MV begins with an alternative explanation of the SK's statement that inference is threefold, taking this to refer to three members (*avayava*) of a formal

³¹⁸ *trividham anumānam ākhyātam / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ceti* / (GBh on SK 5, p. 51, l. 29); *tac ca trividham / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca* / (MV on SK 5, p. 13, l. 2); *anumānam triprakāram ācāryair ākhyātam / pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca* / (YD on SK 5b, p. 83, ll. 1-2); *tat sāmānyatoviśeṣalakṣaṁ traividhyam nulakṣitam anumānam viśeṣatas trividham pūrvavatśeṣavatsāmānyato pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyato dṛṣṭam ceti* / (TK on SK 5, p. 23, ll. 34-36).

³¹⁹ *pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavad yathā—meghonnatyā vrṣṭim sādhayati pūrvadṛṣṭatvāt / śeṣavad yathā—samudrād ekaṁ jalapalaṁ lavaṇam āśādyā śeṣasyāpy asti lavaṇabhāva iti / sāmānyato dṛṣṭam—deśād deśāntaram prāptam dṛṣṭam gatimac candratārakam, caitravat / yathā caitranāmānam deśād deśāntaram prāptam avalokya gatimān ayam iti, tadvac candratārakam iti / tathā puṣpitāmradarśanād anyatra puṣpitā āmrā iti sāmānyato dṛṣṭena sādhayati / etat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* / (GBh on SK 5, p. 51, l. 30 – p. 52, l. 3).

inferential argument: thesis (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*), and example (*dṛṣṭānta*). Māṭhara also states that there are nine fallacies (*ābhāsa*) of thesis, fourteen of reason, and ten of example. An objection is then offered that others hold there to be five members of an inference: thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*apadeśa*), example (*nidarśana*), application (*anusaṃdhāna*), and conclusion (*pratyāmnāya*). The first three of these correspond to the three previously mentioned (*pakṣa*, *hetu*, and *dṛṣṭānta*), but the application and conclusion are not explained by Māṭhara. Māṭhara accepts these five members of inference, which he then defines as ‘the explanation for the sake of others by one who has determined a view himself’. He then explains that this five-membered inference is threefold, giving the same forms of inference attested by the GBh (*pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), and interpreting them in basically the same fashion. Māṭhara gives the same example of *pūrvavat* inference given by Gauḍapāda (of rain from the accumulation of clouds), as well as the additional example of the inference that it has rained from the sight of a swollen river. The latter example illustrates that, according to Māṭhara, *pūrvavat* inference includes not only the inference of an effect from a perceived cause, but also the inference of a cause from a perceived effect. Māṭhara’s example of *śeṣavat* is the same as Gauḍapāda’s (of the saltiness of the ocean), while for *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* he gives Gauḍapāda’s inference of flowering mangoes, as well as the somewhat dissimilar inference that the moon has risen based on the general observation of this fact by others.³²⁰

³²⁰ *anumānam trividham / trisādhanaṃ tryavayavam pañcāvayavam ity apare / tadākhyātam kathitam / pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntā iti tryavayavam / pakṣaḥ pratijñāpadam / yathā—vahnimān ayam pradeśaḥ / sādhyavastūpanyāsaḥ pakṣaḥ / itare pakṣābhāsāḥ prayakṣaviruddhādayo nava / trirūpo hetuḥ / trairūpyam punaḥ pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe cāsattvam iti / atrodāharaṇam yathā dhūmavattvād iti / anye hetvābhāsāḥ caturdaśa / asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhādayaḥ / sādharma-vaidharmyābhyāṃ dvidvidham nidarśanam / yathā mahānasam / itare nidarśanābhāsā daśa / evaṃ trayastriṃśadābhāsarahitam tryavayavam anumānam / pañcāvayavam ity apare / tad āha—avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijñāpadeśanidarśanānusandhānapraty-āmnāyāḥ / evaṃ pañcāvayavena vākyena svanīścītārthapratipādanaṃ parārtham anumānam / tac ca trividham / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca / tatra viśiṣṭameghonnatidarśanāt bhavitṛiṃ vṛṣṭim sambhāvayati / pūrvam iyaṃ dṛṣṭeti pūrvavat / nadīpūradarśanād upari vṛṣṭo deva iti vā pratītiḥ / śeṣavad yathā—*

The five members (*avayava*) of inference accepted by the MV correspond to five of the ten members of inference given by the YD.³²¹ The first five members of inference according to the YD—desire to know (*jijñāsā*), uncertainty (*saṁśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), determination of what is possible (*śakyaprāpti*), and removal of uncertainty (*saṁśayavyudāsa*)—are described as the ‘members of explanation’ (*vyākhyāṅga*).³²² These five members are illustrated by a dialogue between a student and a Sāṃkhya teacher whom he approaches for knowledge. The example of inference illustrated by this dialogue is that of the existence of Consciousness (*puruṣa*).³²³ The latter five members according to the YD—thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*dṛṣṭānta*), application (*upasaṃhāra*), and conclusion (*nigamana*)—which correspond to the five members attested by MV, are described as the ‘members of teaching to others’ (*parapratipādanāṅga*).³²⁴ These latter five members are not illustrated by the commentator; HARZER (2006) suggests that this is

samudrodakabinduṃ prāśya śeṣasya lavaṇabhāvo ’numīyate iti śeṣavat / sāmānyato dṛṣṭam—puspītāmradarśanāt anyatra puspitā āmrā iti / punar yathā—bahir udyota iti kenāpy uktam tatrapareṇāpy uktam / candra uditō bhaviṣyatīty arthasaṅgatiḥ / (MV on SK 5, p. 12, l. 14 – p. 13, l. 9).

³²¹ SOLOMON (1974, p. 13) has also noted this discrepancy in the number of members of inference between the two texts.

³²² *tasya punar avayavā jijñāsāsaṁśayaprajayanaśakyaprāptisaṁśayavyudāsalakṣaṇāś ca vyākhyāṅgam /* (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 16-17).

³²³ *tatra jñātum icchā jijñāsā / kaścit kaṃcid upasadyāha—puruṣaṃ jñātum icchāmi kim asti nāstīti / kutaḥ saṁśaya iti paryanuyuktaḥ pratyāha—anupalabhyamānasyobhayathādṛṣṭatvāt / ihānupalabhyamānam ubhayathādṛṣṭam sadbhūtam asadbhūtam ceti / sadbhūtam ca arkendumaṇḍalāparabhāgādi / asadbhūtam ca śaśaviṣāṇādi / ayam api cātmā nopalabhyate ’taḥ saṁśayaḥ kim astināstīti / kim asyāś cintāyāḥ prayojanam iti prṣṭo vyācaṣṭe—śāstrasatattvādhigamaḥ tataś ca mokṣāvāptiḥ / katham iti / yadi tāvadāyam ātmāsti tato ’syāprakṛtitvaudāsīnya-vibhutvādhivāhinīti / yad uktam vyaktāvyaktajñāvijñānān mokṣo ’vāpyate (cf. SK2d) iti tac chāstram arthavad bhavati / atha nāstīti niścīyatetena sāmānyatodṛṣṭād anumānāt tadvad anye ’pi padārthā na santīti vipralambhabhūyiṣṭham ārṣaṃ arśanam apahāyātmagrahadṛṣṭivigamāl lokottaram anavalambana<ṃ> śūnyaṃ dhyānaviṣayam upasaṃprāptas traidhātukakleśanīrodhalakṣaṇam ātyantikam nirvāṇam avāpsyāmīti / śakyas cāyam artho niścetum pramāṇatrayaparigrahād iti vyavasthite vyudāsa saṁśayam /* (YD on SK 6, p. 89, l. 19 – p. 90, l. 12). For an analysis of this conversation, see HARZER (2006), p. 100.

³²⁴ *pratijñāhetudṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāranigamanāni parapratipādanāṅgam iti /* (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 17-18).

‘perhaps because these latter five are shared with other schools and are common knowledge’.³²⁵

Although the names of these latter five members of inference in the YD are different from those cited by the MV, the correspondence shows that the two texts may have been influenced by the same tradition of interpretation in this regard, which would explain the MV’s departure from Gauḍapāda’s interpretation of inference, with which it otherwise generally agrees.

HARZER (2006) has pointed out that the list given by the YD corresponds to a list given in the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (NSBh) (ca. 450 C.E.) on *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) 1.32, in which the first five members are rejected ‘as a psychological process unnecessary in an inference’.³²⁶ NS 1.32 gives five members of inference corresponding to the list accepted by the MV and the second group of five in the YD (the members for teaching to others), although the names given in the NS are not all identical to those in either the MV or the YD.³²⁷ The author of the NSBh, Pakṣilasvāmin, mentions that other Naiyāyikas accept ten members of inference, the names of the first five of which are the same as those given in the YD, although the order of the third and fourth members (*śakyaprāpti* and *prayojana*) is reversed.³²⁸ HARZER observes that the ten-membered inference is also mentioned in Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* (ca. 2nd cent. B.C.E.) on Pāṇini 5.2.42.³²⁹ It is thus evident that the ten-fold division held by the YD was relatively old and had gone out of fashion by the time of its composition, as perhaps also evidenced by the MV’s acceptance of only five members of inference. HARZER suggests that the YD applied the two-fold division, into members

³²⁵ HARZER (2006), p. 100.

³²⁶ HARZER (2006), p. 98.

³²⁷ *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ* // (NS 1.32, p. 36, l. 2).

³²⁸ *daśāvayavān eke naiyāyikā vākye sañcakṣate / jijñāṣā saṁśayaḥ śakyaprāptiḥ prayojanaṁ saṁśayavyudāsa iti* / (NSBh on NS 1.32, p. 36, ll. 3-4).

³²⁹ HARZER (2006), p. 131, n.108.

for acquiring knowledge (for oneself from a teacher) and members for explaining knowledge to others, to this older ten-fold division of inference under the influence of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, who held a similar two-fold division.³³⁰

The YD argues that the first five members of the ten-fold formal inference are necessary, despite the fact that they are not considered part of the self-ascertainment (*svanīścaya*) of knowledge, since this formal inference is meant for the benefit of those lacking the intellect of the wise men who have initially ascertained such knowledge for themselves. The commentator explains that this assistance to those lacking in insight is in fact the reason for the explanation (*vyākhyāna*) of a treatise (*śāstra*) and points out that this is why these members are referred to as ‘members of explanation’ (*vyākhyāṅga*).³³¹ In this passage, the word used for the ‘assistance’ or ‘favour’ of those who are ‘confused, mistaken and having an inferior intellect’ is *anugraha*, a term which will become important in the discussion of doctrinal authority in the YD in CHAPTER V.

Although the first five members of inference (‘members of explanation’) are useful from the perspective of the student, while the second five members (‘members of teaching to others’) pertain to the perspective of the teacher, all ten members thus relate to the explanation to another of inferred knowledge. The reason given by the commentator for this formulation of an inference in ten members is that the object of an inference cannot be communicated to another without the use of a statement (*vākya*).³³² Moreover, the fact that the first five members are illustrated by a

³³⁰ HARZER (2006), pp. 101-102.

³³¹ *yad ucyate (91.15f.) svanīścaye 'naṅgabhāvagamanāt parapratyāyanārthaṃ jijñāsādy-anabhidhānam ity atra brūmaḥ: na uktatvāt / uktam (89.16ff.) etat purastād vyākhyāṅgam jijñāsādayaḥ <iti> / sarvasya cānugrahaḥ kartavya ity evamarthaṃ śāstravyākhyānaṃ vipāścīdbhiḥ pratāyate na svārthaṃ svasadṛśabuddhyarthaṃ vā / tatraivaṃ kalpyamāne ye vyutpāddyās tān prati <naīṣam ānarthakyaṃ(?)> / athaitad aniṣṭaṃ yad uktam sandigdhaḥ viparyastāvyutpannabuddhy-anugrahārtho hi satāṃ viniśayaḥ eṣāṃ āvaśyakam abhidhānam ācakṣmahe /* (YD on SK 6, p. 93, l. 12 – p. 94, l. 3).

³³² *vākyaṃ antareṇārthasya buddhyantare saṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt* (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 14-15).

situation involving the teaching of Sāṃkhya knowledge in particular, shows the importance of the formal inference in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. This interpretation of inference, as a tool for the exposition of *śāstra*, will be brought to bear upon the discussion in CHAPTER V of the YD's conception of the role of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) and its relation to inference.

According to the YD, the ten-membered inference constitutes the direct (*vīta*) form of inference,³³³ as contrasted to the indirect (*avīta*) form of inference. The direct inference is defined as the employment of a reason (*hetu*) to prove a thesis (*sādhya*), without eliminating other positions (*pakṣa*). The indirect inference uses the elimination of other possibilities in order to establish the thesis. As an example of indirect inference, the commentator gives the inference that the universe arises from primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*), based on the elimination of atoms (*paramāṇu*), Consciousness (*puruṣa*), the Lord (*īśvara*), [previous] actions (*karma*), fate (*daiva*), time (*kāla*), innate nature (*svabhāva*), and chance (*yadṛcchā*), as possible sources of the universe.³³⁴ As will be shown below, in the discussion of the YD's definition of *śeṣavat* inference (under which the above example can be classified), it is evident that, according to the YD, the indirect inference may be used as an aid to establish the thesis of a direct inference. With regard to the example of primordial Materiality, under SK 8 the commentator illustrates the joint use of direct

³³³ *tatra yadā vīto hetuḥ svabuddhāv avahitavijñānasvarūpaṃ vijñānāntaram ādadhānena vaktrā pratipādyādau vākyabhāvam upanīyate—vākyam antareṇārthasya buddhyantare samkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt—tadāvayavivākyam parikalpyate* / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 12-15).

³³⁴ *tatra yadā hetuḥ parapakṣam <an>apekṣya yathārthena svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate tadā vītākhyo bhavati / yadā tu svasādhyād arthāntarabhūtānām prasaṅginām kṣepam apoham kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate tadāvītākhyo bhavati tadyathā na cet paramāṇupuruṣeśvara-karmadaivakālasvabhāvayadṛcchābhyo jagadutpattiḥ sambhavati pariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti tadā punar avītākhyo bhavati* / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 7-12).

and indirect inference in establishing that the non-perception of *pradhāna* is due to its subtlety rather than non-existence.³³⁵

The YD also accepts the threefold classification of inference into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. The commentator interprets *pūrvavat* inference as the inference of an effect from the perception of its cause (or causes),³³⁶ *śeṣavat* as the inference of a cause from its effect,³³⁷ and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as inference based on the general perception of the association of two related characteristics.³³⁸ The YD's interpretation of *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is thus essentially the same as that of GBh and MV, although its interpretation of *śeṣavat* is somewhat different; the YD takes the term *śeṣa* to refer to an effect rather than a remainder.

The YD offers several examples of the *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* forms of inference, several of which are dismissed on the basis of an opponent's objections. For *pūrvavat*, the commentator first offers the example, also given by GBh and MV, of the inference of rain from the perception of clouds. This is rejected by an opponent, since rain does not invariably result from the presence of clouds. A revised definition of *pūrvavat* inference is then accepted, according to which the causal power (*kāraṇaśakti*) must be accompanied by the instrumental or

³³⁵ *āha: evam api pratijñān<ya> tarānarthakyam ekena kṛtatvāt / sauṣmyāt tadanupalabdhir ity ukte gamyata etan nābhāvād iti / tasmāt tadvacanam anarthakam iti / ucyate: na vītāvītāparigrahārthatvāt / evaṃ siddhe yat pratijñādvayaṃ karoti taj jñāpaty ācāryo (cf. MBhāṣya I.33.17, I.35.9 et passim) vītāvītābhyām abhipretārthasiddhiḥ <iti> / prāk ca sauṣmyātīśayāt tadanupalabdhir ity ācakṣāṇaḥ pratipādayati purastād vītaḥ prayoktavya iti / ekasmiṃś ca viśaye dvau prayuñjānaḥ samuccayena siddhiṃ dyotayati / kiṃ siddham bhavati / yad uktaṃ tantrāntarīyāiḥ na prthakpratipattihetū vītāvītau iti tad iṣṭam eva saṅgrhītaṃ bhavati / tatra vītasya pratijñā sauṣmyāt tadanupalabdhīḥ tatra cāvītasya prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttirūpeṇa nābhāvāt / hetur ubhayayogī / katham / yasya pratyakṣato 'nupalabdhīḥ (SK8a) dṛṣṭā tadyathendriyāṇām / yadi punar asyābhāvād anupalabdhīḥ syāt, kāryato 'nupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ / asti ceyam kāryata upalabdhīḥ / tasmāt nābhāvāt (SK8b) / na ced abhāvāt pariśeṣataḥ sauṣmyāt tadanupalabdhīḥ (SK 8a) iti / (YD on SK 8ab, p. 106, l. 14 – p. 107, l. 10).*

³³⁶ *tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditam dṛṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvaṃ kāryasya pratipadyate* (YD on SK 5, p. 83, ll. 6-8).

³³⁷ *śeṣavat yadā kāryani<r>vṛttiṃ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇasadbhāvaṃ pratipadyate* (YD on SK 5, p. 84, ll. 2-3).

³³⁸ *sāmānyatodṛṣṭam nāma yatraikadārthay<o>r avyabhicāram upalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca tajjātīyayor avyabhicāram pratipadyate* (YD on SK 5, p. 85, ll. 4-6).

assisting powers (*kāriśakti*) necessary for bringing about the effect and free from obstructions to the production of the effect. The example given for this is the inference of the production of a pot from the perception of clay possessed by a potter who is working and in possession of a wheel, water, an irod rod and other instruments.³³⁹ The YD thus offers a more sophisticated definition of *pūrvavat* inference than GBh or MV. According to this definition, causality depends upon the fulfillment of certain necessary conditions.

The YD offers three examples of *śeṣavat* inference, interpreted as the inference of a cause from the perception of its effect, that are successively rejected by an opponent. These are the inference of the union of a couple from the perception of a child, the inference that the sun or moon has risen from the perception of a red sky, and lastly the inference, included by Māṭhara under his definition of *pūrvavat* inference, that it has rained from the perception of a flooded river. The opponent objects in each of these cases that the effect does not invariably arise from the particular cause mentioned. The final example offered by the proponent is the inference of a root from the perception of a leaf or the inference of a seed from the perception of a sprout. He then suggests that the three previously rejected examples can be considered valid examples of *śeṣavat* inference if made in conjunction with indirect (*avīta*) inference, through which other possible causes are eliminated by taking into account particularities of place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), or characteristic marks (*liṅga*).³⁴⁰

³³⁹ *tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvaṃ kāryasya pratipadyate yathā meghodaye bhavitavya<tā> vr̥ṣṭeḥ / āha: naitad asty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi meghodayo 'vaśyaṃ vr̥ṣṭeḥ kāraṇam bhavati vāyvādinimittapratibandhasambhavāt / ucyate: yadi tarhi kāraṇaśaktiṃ saha-kāriśaktiyantarānugr̥hītām apratīyoginīm dr̥ṣṭvā kāryasya vyaktiṃ pratipadyate tadyathā yadā <cakrodakadaṇḍādīsādhanaśāntāna> vyāpāravatā kumbhakāreṇādhiṣṭhitām mṛdam upalabhya ghaṭasya tadā pūrvavat / (YD on SK 5, p. 83, l. 6 – p. 84, l. 2).*

³⁴⁰ *śeṣavat yadā kāryani<r>vrttiṃ dr̥ṣṭvā kāraṇasadbhāvaṃ pratipadyate tadyathā kumārakaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā dvayasamāpattim / āha: naitad apy asty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi dvayasamāpatti-pūrvaka eva prāṇabhṛtām prādurbhāvo droṇādīnām anyathotpattiviśeṣaśravaṇāt / ucyate: yadā tarhi*

The YD begins by defining *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as an inference based on the perception of an invariable association between two objects, offering the stock example of the inference of fire from the perception of smoke, based on their invariable association. An opponent objects that this definition would apply also to inference from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*) and from effect to cause (*śeṣavat*), to which the proponent replies that *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* functions with regard to objects existing simultaneously, giving the example, similar to that given by GBh and MV of the flowering mango trees, of the inference that the fruits of other trees are ripe from the observation of ripe fruit in one tree. The opponent objects that the fruits of all trees do not ripen simultaneously. The proponent then offers a definition of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* equivalent to the definition of *śeṣavat* given by GBh and MV, citing the example of the inference of the saltiness of the ocean based on the taste of one drop, as well as the additional example of the inference that all the rice in a pot has been cooked after tasting one grain. The opponent objects that according to this definition, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference would not serve as a source of knowledge of Consciousness (*puruṣa*), since there is no object similar to it, thus contradicting the statement in SK 6 that knowledge of suprasensuous things (*atīndriya*) is attained through *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference (see §IV.5). The proponent then offers a definition of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as the inference of one characteristic (*dharma*) from

prabhānurañjitaṃ antarikṣaṃ dṛṣṭvā candrārṇkayor udayaṃ pratipadyate tadā śeṣavat / āha: etad api nāsty udāharaṇaṃ anekāntāt / na hi prabhānurāgo 'ntarikṣe candrārṇkanimitta eva bhavati / kiṃ tarhi / digdāhādīnimitto 'pi / ucyate: yadā tarhi nadīpūraṃ dṛṣṭvā vṛṣṭiṃ pratipadyate tadā śeṣavat / āha: etad api nāsty udāharaṇaṃ anekāntāt / nadīpūrasya hi nimittamanekavidhaṃ bhavati / himavilayanasetubhaṅgagajakṛīḍādi / tasmād ayuktam etat / ucyate: yadā tarhi parṇaṃ dṛṣṭvā śālukam pratipadyate 'ñkuraṃ vā dṛṣṭvā bījaṃ iti tadā śeṣavat / athavā punar astu pūrv<am> evodāharaṇaṃ / yat tūktam (83.9) anekāntād ityatra brūmaḥ: vītāvītāsāmarthyāt / vītāvītābhyāṃ hetubhūtābhyāṃ abhipretārthasiddhir iti vakṣyāmaḥ / prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttimukhena cāvītaprayogaḥ / tatra yadā prasaṅgināṃ himavilayanādīnāṃ deśakālalingaiḥ pratiśedhaḥ kriyate tadā muktasamśayaṃ pratipattir bhavati / deśatas tāvat tadyathā dakṣiṇāpathe nāsti himavilayanasantubhavaḥ / kālato yathā prāvṛṭkāle / līngato 'pi yasmān mudgagavedhuka-śyāmākakāṣṭhatṛṇamūtraśakṛtprabhṛtīnāṃ anupalambhas tathoṣmakaluṣatvādīnāṃ upalambhaḥ / tasmāt pariśeṣato meghyā evāpa iti / tasmān nānekāntaḥ / evaṃ kṛtvā pūrvāṇy apy udāharaṇāny upapannāni bhavanti deśādivicārasāmarthyāt / (YD on SK 5, p. 84, l. 2 – p. 85, l. 4).

another, based on their invariable association, giving the example of *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* found in the GBh of the inference of the movement of the heavenly bodies from their change in position, as well as additional example of the inference of growth in the case of plants and trees from the observation of their height, having already observed that the height of a building is caused by growth. The opponent objects that these are merely examples of inference from effect to cause (*śeṣavat*), thus making *śeṣavat* identical with *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*. The proponent's reply to this objection is somewhat obscure. He rejects the opponent's criticism on the basis of the presence of a rule (*niyama*) in *śeṣavat* inference that is absent from *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference, and gives as examples of *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* the inference of the general quality of being for the sake of another from the general quality of being an aggregate, used to prove the existence of Consciousness (cf. SK 17a: *saṃghātaparārthatvāt*), and the inference that sound (*śabda*) is non-eternal from the fact that it is produced.³⁴¹ HARZER (2006)

³⁴¹ *sāmānyatodrṣṭam nāma yatraikadārthay< o> r avyabhicāram upalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca tajjātīyayor avyabhicāram pratipadyate tadyathā kvacid dhūmāgnisambandham drṣṭvā kvacid dhūmāntareṇāgnyantarasyāstitvaṃ pratipadyate / āha: naitad asty udāharaṇam aviśeṣaprasaṅgāt / sarvatraiva hy anumāne kvacid arthayor avyabhicāram upalabhyānyatra tajjātīyayor arthayor avyabhicāram pratipadyate tadyathā kvacit sādhanavato mṛtṭpīṇḍād ghaṭaniṣpattim upalabhyānyatra sādhanavataḥ pīṇḍāntarād ghaṭāntaraniṣpattim pratipadyate / tathaikatra nadīpūrād vṛṣṭim upalabhyānyatra nadīpūrād vṛṣṭyantaram avasīyate / tathā ca sati trayāṇām aviśeṣaprasaṅgaḥ / ucyate: yadā tarhi sahabhuvām ekasya viśiṣṭagaṇam upalabhya śeṣāṇām api tadvattvam anumīyate tadā sāmānyatodrṣṭam tadyathā vṛkṣād ekasya phalasya pākam upalabhya śeṣāṇām phalānām vṛkṣāntarāṇām ca pāko 'numīyate / āha: etad api nāsty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi sarveṣām phalānām tylakālam pāko bhavati pūrvāparakālaniṣpannatvān nimittabhedāc ca / ucyate: yadā tarhi samudrād ekam udabindum prāśya śeṣasya lavaṇatānumīyate, sthālyām vaikaṃ pulākam upalabhya śeṣāṇām pāko 'numīyate tadā sāmānyatodrṣṭam / āha: naitad apy asty udāharaṇam akṛtsnasaṅgrahāt / vakṣyaty ayam upariṣṭād ācāryaḥ*

sāmānyatas tu drṣṭād atīndriyāṇām prasiddhir anumānāt / (SK6ab)

iti / tatraivaṃ pramāṇe parikalpyamāne kāryakāraṇayos tatsaṅghātānām ca sukhaduḥkhamoha-svabhāvopalambhāt tanmātrāhaṃkāramahatpradhānānām samadhigamaḥ syāt na puruṣasya tajjātīyārthānupalambhāt / ucyate: yadā tarhi kvacid dharmēṇa dharmāntarasyāvyabhicāram upalabhyāikadharmopalambhād bhinnajātīye 'tyantānupalabdhasya dharmāntarasya pratipattis tadā sāmānyatodrṣṭam tadyathā devadatte gamanād deśāntaraprāptim upalabhyātyantādrṣṭam jyotiṣām deśāntaraprāpter gamanam anumīyate / tathā prāsādādīnām vṛddhipūrvakam dīrghatvam upalabhyauṣaddhivanaspatīnām dīrghatvadarśanād vṛddhir anumīyate / āha: naitad apy asty udāharaṇam pūrvēṇāviśeṣāt / kāryāt kāraṇasyādhigamaḥ śeṣavad iti pūrvam atisṛṣṭam bhavatā / atrāpi ca deśāntaraprāptilakṣaṇāt kāryād gatilakṣaṇasya kāraṇasyādhigamaḥ / tasmāc cheṣavatsāmānyatodrṣṭayor abhedaprasaṅgaḥ / ucyate: na anīyamāt / yatra hi niyamataḥ kāryeṇa kāraṇam adhigamyate tac cheṣavad ity ayam asmadabhisandhiḥ / na tu tad asti sāmānyatodrṣṭe / kasmāt / saṅghātatasāmānyāt pārārthyasāmānyasādhanaṃ api drṣyate / yathāha—

translates *niyama* as ‘regular causal relation’³⁴² and takes the proponent’s point to be that *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is not based (like *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat*) upon a causal relation, thus making it a key tool in establishing the existence of Consciousness, which is not involved in any causal relation.³⁴³

Although the YD’s explanations of the forms of inference are generally similar to those of the GBh and MV, the evidence of the YD offers a number of insights absent from the other two texts. The YD offers a most sophisticated definition of *pūrvavat* inference, an additional classification of inference into *vīta* and *avīta*, and an illustration of the ten members of formal inference (five of which are also accepted by the later MV, which otherwise generally follows the GBh). The YD also shows that the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, *vīta* and *avīta* forms of inference are useful in establishing the existence of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*, particularly of the two primary *tattvas* (*prakṛti* and *puruṣa*).

A noticeable difference in the manner of classification of the forms of inference is apparent from the YD to the later TK, which perhaps testifies to a loss of knowledge of the intricacies of Sāṃkhya epistemology after the period in which the YD was composed.

The TK also mentions the twofold division of inference into direct (*vīta*) and indirect (*avīta*) and the threefold division into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, but does not mention the members (*avayava*) of inference (ten in the YD, five in the MV). Moreover, its interpretation of the relationship between the twofold division (into *vīta* and *avīta*) and the threefold division (into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) is somewhat different from that attested by the YD.

<vya>bhicārād viśeṣās tu pratītiḥ pratipādakāḥ // (PS.2.19cd; PSV.:Peking.Ce.32a8-32b1, 113b5-6; Derge.Ce.31a7)

iti / sādhyasādhanaśāmānyayor api dṛśyate / yathānityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti / tattraivaṃ sati niyamavādināḥ pratijñāhāniḥ / (YD on SK 5, p. 85, l. 4 – p. 86, l. 23).

³⁴² HARZER (2006), p. 46.

³⁴³ HARZER (2006), p. 115, n. 59.

Vācaspati equates *avīta* with *śeṣavat*³⁴⁴ and *vīta* with *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*³⁴⁵. This correlation is absent from the YD, although the use of *avīta* is mentioned in connection with *śeṣavat* inference in the YD (see above).

The TK interprets *avīta* or *śeṣavat* inference as having ‘that which remains’ as its object³⁴⁶ and presents an example of this type of inference in the context of its discussion of SK 9, which presents the Sāṃkhya position that an effect pre-exists in its cause (*satkāryavāda*; see §II.1).³⁴⁷ Here, Vācaspati gives a series of proofs for the identity of cause and effect, based on the example of threads and the cloth which they produce. Each of these reasons consists in the presentation of a relation between two objects different in nature, the inapplicability of which to the case of the threads and cloth is then demonstrated.³⁴⁸ This is somewhat different from the illustration of *avīta* inference in the YD, where it is used to establish a cause by the elimination of all possible alternative causes (see above). HARZER (2006) suggests that the differences between the YD and TK with regard to the interpretation of *avīta*

³⁴⁴ *tatrāvītaṃ śeṣavat* / (TK on SK 5, p. 24, l. 17).

³⁴⁵ *vītaṃ dvedhā—pūrvavat sāmānyato drṣṭam ca* / (TK on SK 5, p. 25, l. 1).

³⁴⁶ *śiṣyate pariśiṣyate iti śeṣaḥ, sa eva viṣayatayā yasyāsty anumānajñānasya tac cheṣavat* / (TK on SK 5, p. 24, ll. 17-18).

³⁴⁷ SK 9: *asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam* // ‘Because of the non-production of a non-existent thing, because of the relation of a cause [to its instruments], because of the absence of origination from everything, because of the production of that which it is possible [to produce from a particular cause] by that which is capable [of producing that particular effect], and because of the state of being a cause, the effect is [pre-]existent [in the cause].’

³⁴⁸ *kāryasya kāraṇābhedasādhanāni—ca pramāṇāni* (1) *na paṭas tantubhyo bhidyate, tantudharmatvāt / iha yat yato bhidyate tat tasya dharmo na bhavati, yathā gaur aśvasya dharmas ca paṭas tantūnām, tasmān nārthāntaram* / (2) *upādānopādeyabhāvāc ca nārthāntaratvaṃ tantupaṭayoḥ / yayor arthāntaratvaṃ na taylor upādānopādeyabhāvaḥ, yathā ghaṭapaṭayoḥ / upādānopādeya-bhāvās ca tantupaṭayoḥ / tasmān nārthāntaratvaṃ* / (3) *itaś ca nārthāntaratvaṃ tantupaṭayoḥ, saṃyogāprāptyaabhāvāt / arthāntaratve hi saṃyogo drṣṭo yathā kuṇḍabadarayoh, aprāptir vā yathā himavadvindhayoh / na ceha saṃyogāprāpto, tasmān nārthāntaratvaṃ* iti / (4) *itaś ca paṭas tantubhyo na bhidyate, gurutvāntarakāryāgrahaṇāt / iha yat yasmād bhinnam, tat tasmāt tasya gurutvāntaram kāryam grhyate, yathaikapalikasya svastikasya gurutvakāryo ‘vanativīṣeṣas tasmād dvipalikasya svastikasya gurutvakāryo ‘vanatibhedo ‘dhikaḥ / na ca tathā tantugurutvakāryāt paṭagurutvakāryāntaram drṣyate / tasmād abhinnas tantubhyaḥ paṭa iti / tāny etāny abhedasādhanāny avīṭāni* / (TK on SK 9, p. 47, ll. 12-24).

inference testify to the loss of knowledge of its original function by Vācaspati's time.³⁴⁹

The TK defines *pūrvavat* inference as the inference of a universal (*sāmānya*) based on the previous perception of a particular individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), giving the example of the inference of fire (as a universal) on a hill from the perception of smoke, based on the the prior perception of a particular fire in a kitchen. *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, on the other hand, is defined as the inference of a universal of which a specific individual has not been perceived. As an example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, Vācaspati gives the inference of the faculties (*indriya*), the particular individuals of which are by their nature beyond perception, based on the fact that there must be an instrument by which sense-objects are perceived.³⁵⁰ *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is thus, as in the YD, again presented as a key tool for establishing knowledge of certain Sāṃkhya *tattvas*.

The TK's interpretation of inference, perhaps as a reflection of the text's late date, thus differs greatly from those of the GBh, MV, and YD, although its interpretation of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is similar to that of the YD and not incompatible with that of GBh and MV. It is this third form of inference which will prove most relevant to the discussion of the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, since it allows

³⁴⁹ HARZER (2006), pp. 96-97.

³⁵⁰ *tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviśayaṃ yat tat pūrvavat, pūrvam prasiddham, dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyam iti yāvat, tad asya viśayatvenāsty anumānajñānasyeti pūrvavat / yathā dhūmād vahnitvasāmānyaviśeṣaḥ parvate 'numīyate, tasya vahnitvasāmānyaviśeṣasyasvalakṣaṇam vahniviśeṣo dṛṣṭo rasavatyām / aparaṃ ca vītaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa-sāmānyaviśayaṃ / yathendriyaviśayaṃ anumānam / atra hi rūpādivijñānānām kriyātvena karaṇavattvam anumīyate / yady api karaṇatvasāmānyasya chidrādaḥ vāsyādisvalakṣaṇam upalabdham, tathā 'pi yajjātīyaṃ rūpādivijñāne karaṇatvam anumīyate tajjātīyasya karaṇasya na dṛṣṭam svalakṣaṇam prayakṣeṇa / indriyajātīyaṃ hi tat karaṇam, na cendriyatvasāmānyasya svalakṣaṇam indriyaviśeṣaḥ pratyakṣagocarō 'rvāgdṛṣām, yathā vahnitvasāmānyasya svalakṣaṇam vahnih / so 'yam pūrvavataḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭāt saty api vītatvena tulyatve viśeṣaḥ / atra ca dṛṣṭam darśanam, sāmānyata iti sāmānyasya, sārvaṇibhaktikas tasil / adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasya sāmānyaviśeṣasya darśanam sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam ityarthah / sarvaṃcaitad asmābhir nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkāyāṃ vyutpāditam iti nehoktaṃ vistarabhayāt //* (TK on SK 5, p. 25, ll. 1-14).

for the ascertainment of objects beyond sensory experience (cf. SK 6 and discussion in §IV.5).

As has been shown above, the YD provides a good deal of information on the ways in which inference is used to establish the primary objects of the Sāṃkhya enquiry. In the YD, *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* is presented as the key to establishing the existence of Consciousness (*puruṣa*), which is by nature exempt from any causal relation. The inference of Consciousness is also used to illustrate the ten-membered formal expression of a direct (*vīta*) inference. The commentator makes use of the indirect (*avīta*) inference in establishing the existence of Materiality (*prakṛti*). The evidence of the YD also shows that the *vīta* and *avīta* inferences may be used in conjunction. In addition, the implications of the YD's presentation of the ten members of formal inference will be used in CHAPTER V to clarify the commentator's assumptions with regard to the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) in the context of the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.

§3. The commentators' views on the *pramāṇa* of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*).

The third and final *pramāṇa* accepted by the Sāṃkhya tradition is authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*). The SK tells us that what is beyond the sphere even of *sāmānyato drṣṭa* inference can be apprehended through *āptavacana* (SK 6; see §IV.5). However, it has generally been assumed that *āptavacana* holds little value in the Sāṃkhya tradition with regard to the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya

tattvas,³⁵¹ although LARSON (1979) speculates that *āptavacana* ‘is probably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers’.³⁵² The general lack of attention in Sāṃkhya studies given to the relation of *āptavacana* to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge is primarily a consequence of the fact that the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries have little to say in this respect. However, some of the evidence of the YD suggests links between the notion of *āptavacana*, the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, and the use of inference to establish the existence of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*.

In general, the commentators’ interpretations of *āptavacana* are similar in their essential aspects, although the evidence of the YD provides more information regarding the sources of *āptavacana* and suggests links between this *pramāṇa* and the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers. A summary of the commentator’s interpretations of *āptavacana* follows below. A more detailed discussion of the YD’s treatment of this *pramāṇa* and its applicability to the *ṛṣi* Kapila will be presented in CHAPTER V.³⁵³

The GBh states that what is not apprehended by perception or inference is apprehended by authoritative testimony and mentions three statements as examples of authoritative testimony: ‘Indra is the king of the gods’; ‘there is [the land of] the northern Kurus’; and ‘there are nymphs (*apsaras*) in heaven’. These statements are presumably given as examples of the communication of information which cannot be confirmed by perception or inference but which must taken on trust in the authority of the speaker. This is typical of statements made by the Vedas and their ancillaries—that is, statements which must be taken on trust in the infallibility of

³⁵¹ E.g., FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274: ‘The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.’

³⁵² LARSON (1979), p. 159.

³⁵³ The testimony provided by the TK with regard to Kapila in this context will also be introduced in §V.5.

Vedic revelation. Following these statements, Gauḍapāda quotes two verses explaining that authoritative testimony is equivalent to doctrine (*āgama*), and that an authority (*āpta*) is one whose faults have been eradicated and who thus would not utter a false statement, who is intent on his own duty, who is free from passion and hatred, and who is always respected by other people of this kind.³⁵⁴ In other words, the authoritative status of a statement depends on the credentials of the speaker.

SK 5d defines *āptavacana* as *āptaśruti*. GBh reads the latter compound as a *dvandva*, meaning authorities (*āpta*) and revelation (*śruti*). Gauḍapāda defines authorities as teachers (*ācārya*), including Brahmā and others, and revelation simply as the Veda.³⁵⁵

The MV mentions Brahmā and Sanatkumāra as examples of authoritative individuals who are free from passion and hatred, and gives the following statements as examples of authoritative testimony: ‘there are nymphs in heaven’; ‘there is a divine grove, where are particular sounds, etc.’; and ‘there is an occupant in the celestial chariot (*vimāna*)’.³⁵⁶ Again, these are examples of statements which cannot be confirmed through perception or inference by an ordinary human being.

Māṭhara gives the same interpretation of *āptaśruti* as the GBh and then adds that an authority (*āpta*) is one who has directly ascertained objects in accordance with reality, thus has ‘the qualities [of things] placed [directly] before the eyes’

³⁵⁴ *pratyakṣeṇānumānena vā yo 'rtho na grhyate sa āptavacanād grāhyaḥ / yathā—indro devarājaḥ, uttarāḥ kuravaḥ svarga 'psarasa ityādi / pratyakṣānumānāgrāhyaṃ athāptavacanād grhyate / api cuktam—*

*āgamo hy āptavacanam, āptam doṣakṣayād viduḥ /
kṣīṇadoṣo 'nṛtam vākyaṃ na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt //
svakarmany abhiyukto yaḥ saṅgadveṣa vivarjitaḥ /
pūjitas tadvidhair nityam āpto jñeyaḥ sa tādrśaḥ //* (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 25-31).

³⁵⁵ *āptaśrutir āptavacanam ca / āptā ācāryā brahmādayaḥ / śrutir vedaḥ / āptāś ca śrutiś ca āptaśrutir, tad uktam āptavacanam iti //* (GBh on SK 5, p. 52, ll. 7-8).

³⁵⁶ *yathā svarge 'psarasaḥ santi, nandanam vanam, tatra viśeṣāḥ śabdādayo viśayā, vimāne 'dhivāsa iti / āptā rāgadveṣādirahitā brahmasanatkumārādayaḥ, śrutir vedaḥ, tābhyām upadiṣṭam tatheti śraddheyam āptavacanam /* (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 2-5).

(*sākṣātkṛtadharman*³⁵⁷, a term also occurring in the YD; see §IV.9, V.1-2), and grasps the meaning of revelation in accordance with reality. Here, Māṭhara quotes the two verses found in the GBh's commentary on SK 4, explaining that authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) is equivalent to doctrine (*āgama*) and defining an authoritative person (*āpta*).³⁵⁸

The TK interprets the term *āptaśruti* differently. Vācaspati interprets the term *śruti* in this context as the knowledge of the meaning of a statement, produced by that statement. He thus defines *āptaśruti* as 'valid knowledge of the meaning of a statement'.³⁵⁹

Vācaspati states that authoritative testimony is preceded by the inference of the connection between a statement and its meaning and suggests that this is why authoritative testimony is defined after inference in the SK.³⁶⁰ But he also clarifies that authoritative testimony is distinct from inference, since a statement cannot be considered a characteristic mark (*liṅga*) of the object it expresses. He also states that there need not be any previously perceived connection between a statement and its meaning, giving as an example the work of a new poet who formulates statements not seen before.³⁶¹

³⁵⁷ On the interpretation of this term, see the review of AKLUJKAR (2009) in CHAPTER III.

³⁵⁸ *āptaśrutir āptavacanam tu / tṛtīyaṃ pramāṇam / āptā brahmādaya ācāryāḥ, śrutir vedas tad etad ubhayam āptavacanam / āptiḥ sākṣādarthaprāptir yathārthopalambhaḥ tayā vartata ity āptaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharman yathārthāptiā śrutārthagrāhī tad uktam āptacanam / tatrāpi prasiddhilakṣaṇā guṇayogāt tisraḥ śabdavṛttayaḥ / tatra lākṣaṇātraividhyam / jahallakṣaṇā 'jahallakṣaṇā jahadajahallakṣaṇā cetyādi pramāṇaśāstreṣu bahutaraḥ prapañca āste / tatra prakrāntam eva tāvad abhidhīyate bhagavataḥ kapilasya matam /*

*āgamaḥ hy āptavacanam āptam doṣakṣayād viduḥ /
kṣīṇadoṣo 'nṛtaṃ vākyaṃ na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt //
svakarmāṇy abhiyukto yo rāgadveṣavivarjitaḥ /
pūjitas tadvidhair nityam āpto jñeyah sa tādṛśaḥ //* (MV on SK 5, p. 13, ll. 11-22).

³⁵⁹ *āptā prāptā yukteti yāvat / āptā cāsau śrutiś ceti āptaśrutiḥ śrutiḥ vākyaajanitam vākyaarthajñānam /* (TK on SK 5, p. 26, ll. 26-27).

³⁶⁰ *prayojakavṛhasabdasravaṇasamanantaram prayojavṛddhapravṛttihetujñānānumānapūrvakatvāc chabdarthasambandhagrahaṇasya, svārthasambandhajnānasahakāriṇaś ca śabdasyārthapratyāyaka-
tvād anumānapūrvakatvam ity anumānānantaram śabda lakṣayati—āptaśrutir āptavacanam tu iti /* (TK on SK 5, p. 26, ll. 22-25).

³⁶¹ *tu śabdenānumānād vyavacchinati / vākyaārtho hi prameyo, na tu taddharmono vākyaṃ, yena tatra liṅgaṃ bhavet / na ca vākyaṃ vākyaṃ vākyaārtham bodhayat sambandhagrahaṇam apekṣate,*

The TK also states that authoritative testimony is valid because it is grounded in the Veda, which is not composed by humans and free from deficiencies and doubts, and that not only the Veda itself but also the traditional texts (*smṛti*), epics (*itihāsa*), and mythological texts (*purāṇa*) are considered authoritative because they are grounded in the Veda.³⁶² This twofold classification of authoritative testimony, traditionally formulated as a distinction between *śruti* and *smṛti*, may be compared to the classification in the GBh and MV into authorities (*āpta*) and revelation (*śruti*). Thus, Vācaspati's interpretation of the sources of *āptavacana* does not essentially conflict with that of the previous two commentators.

The YD interprets the term *āptaśruti* as an *ekaśeṣa* ('single remainder'), an interpretative technique also used in the YD's interpretation of the term *pratiṣṭhāyādhyavasāya* in the context of its definition of the *pramāṇa* of perception (see §IV.1). According to this interpretation, the term *āptaśruti* refers both to the Veda (*śruti*), which is by nature authoritative (*āpta*), and to the statements (*śruti*) of reliable people (*āpta*), which include traditional texts (*smṛti*), the limbs of the Veda (*vedāṅga*)³⁶³, texts treating logic (*tarka*), the epics (*itihāsa*), and the mythological texts (*purāṇa*), as well as the statements of learned, good men who are engaged in various arts (*śilpa*). The commentator also specifies that an authoritative statement is made by one who is free from passion, etc.³⁶⁴

abhinavakaviracitasya vākyasyādṛṣṭap[ū]rvasyānanubhūtacaravākyārthabodhakatvād iti / (TK on SK 5, p. 28, ll. 17-20).

³⁶² *tac ca svataḥ pramāṇam / apauruṣeyavedavākyajanitatvena sakaladoṣāśaṅkāvinirmukte[na] yuktam bhavati / evaṃ vedamūlasamṛtītiḥāsapurāṇavākyajanitam api jñānam yuktam bhavati* / (TK on SK 5, p. 27, ll. 10-12).

³⁶³ The limbs or auxiliaries of the Veda (*vedāṅga*) are traditionally six: pronunciation (*śikṣā*), metre (*chandas*), grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), etymology (*nirukta*), astrology (*jyotiṣa*), and ritual (*kalpa*).

³⁶⁴ *āptā nāma rāgādiviyuktasyāgrhyamānakāraṇā parārthā vyāhṛtiḥ / śravaṇam śrutiḥ / āptā cāsau śrutiś ca āptaśrutiḥ / athavāptāśrutiḥ āptaḥ / akāro matvarthīyaḥ (cf. Pāṇ. 5.2.127) / tadyathā tundo ghaṭa iti / āptebhyaḥ śrutir āptaśrutiḥ / āptaśrutiś cāptaśrutiś cāptaśrutiḥ / sarūpāṇām ity ekaśeṣaḥ (cf. Pāṇ. 1.2.64) / tatra pūrveṇāptaśrutigrahaṇenedaṃ pratipādayati / apuruṣabuddhipūrvaka āmnāyaḥ svatantraḥ puruṣaṇiḥśreyasārtham pravartamāno niḥsaṃśayaṃ pramāṇam iti / dvitīyena manvādinibandhanānām ca smṛtīnām vedāṅgatarketihāsapurāṇānām śiṣṭānām nānāśilpābhi-*

Interestingly, given the SK's rejection of the Veda as a means to liberation (see §II.3), the author of the YD describes the Veda in this context as 'functioning for the sake of the ultimate bliss of human beings' (*puruṣaṇiḥśreyasārthaṃ pravartamānaḥ*). This could be taken as an instance of mere lip-service to the Veda, such as is apparent elsewhere in Sāṃkhya texts. However, as will be discussed further in §V.1, in another context (under SK 2) the YD goes to great lengths to show that the Veda does not contradict Sāṃkhya doctrine but in fact supports it.³⁶⁵ The YD thus promotes a continuity of authority between the Veda and Sāṃkhya *śāstra*.

Later in the text, in the context of its commentary on SK 6cd, the YD specifies that the condition of authority (*āptatva*) is applicable to people described as *īśvaramaharṣi*³⁶⁶, 'who are free from faults such as passion, who are of undoubted intelligence, and who have seen suprasensuous objects, or to anyone else (i.e. besides an *īśvaramaharṣi*) who has these characteristics'. Further, the statements of a person in his own field of learning are considered necessarily valid. The maintenance of each body of teaching (*śāstra*) is given as the reason for this latter provision.³⁶⁷ One would assume that Sāṃkhya *śāstra* would be included in this provision. The YD-*kāra* thus appears to make room for the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine in his definition of the function of *āptavacana*.

The YD's classification of the sources of authoritative testimony thus basically accords with those given in the GBh, MV, and TK, although in the latter

yuktānām cāduṣṭamanasām yad vacas tat pramāṇam ity etat siddham bhavati / (YD on SK 5d, p. 87, ll. 4-12).

³⁶⁵ See MOTEGI (2006), pp. 47-52, for an analysis of this discussion in the YD.

³⁶⁶ See CHAPTER III for BRONKHORST (1983)'s contribution to the discussion of this problematic term, and further discussion in §V.3.

³⁶⁷ *vyapagatarāgādidoṣānām asandigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadṛśvanām īśvaramaharṣiṇām āptatvam ācakṣmahe na sarveṣām / yadi vānyo 'py evamdharmo 'sti bhavatu pramāṇam / kiṃ cānyat / svaviśaye ca tatpramāṇasyādoṣavattvāt / yasya khalv api[]yo viśayas tasya tasmin viśaye vaco 'ntareṇāpi sādhanam pramāṇam ity avaśyam abhyupagantavyam / itarathā pratiśāstram ācārasthitinīyamānām adṛṣṭārthānām apratipattiḥ syāt* / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-10).

three texts the provision for the maintenance of *śāstra* is not explicitly given. As will be discussed further in §V.2, this provision by the YD appears to reflect the text's broader interpretation of the nature of the transmission of doctrine from generation to generation.

The YD mentions that the objects of authoritative testimony are 'completely beyond perception' (*atyantaparokṣa*).³⁶⁸ However, later the commentator states that the objects of authoritative testimony include both those objects the knowledge of which is obstructed for some reason and those objects completely beyond perception (*atyantaparokṣa*) and devoid of any common characteristic (by which they might be inferred). As examples of the latter category, he lists heaven (*svarga*), liberation (*apavarga*), and the gods (*deva*).³⁶⁹

The fact that the YD leaves room for the attainment through authoritative testimony of knowledge of things normally capable of being perceived or inferred (this inference being hindered in some way), not just of knowledge of things completely beyond the sphere of perception and inference, will become crucial to the discussion of the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine in §V.2, where it will be shown that inference and authoritative testimony tend to overlap with regard to their application in the transmission of doctrine.

However, like the TK, the YD makes a point of distinguishing authoritative testimony from inference. The YD gives as a reason for this the fact that not all statements but only those which are authoritative can be considered valid means of

³⁶⁸ *āptavacanam tu pramāṇabhūtadvārako 'tyantaparokṣe 'rthe niścaya ity uddeśamātram idam /* (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 14-15).

³⁶⁹ *etad uktam bhavati: tasmād api sāmānyatodrṣṭād anumānād yan na siddhyati pratyakṣagrāhyam api svayam adrṣṭam kāraṇāntarapratibaddhaviśayabhāvam atyantaparokṣam vā svargāpavarga-devatādi dharmasāmānyarahitam id āptāgamāt sādhyam /* (YD on SK6cd, p. 99, ll. 10-13).

knowledge.³⁷⁰ The commentator later gives a lengthy argument in defense of this distinction.³⁷¹

It is clear from all of the commentaries that the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition (assuming that they are composed by authoritative individuals) can be classed among the sources of authoritative testimony, although this fact is generally implicit. Although the YD and TK both emphasize the distinction between inference and authoritative testimony, the YD makes clear that formal inference is an essential tool in the explanation of a *śāstra* (see §IV.2), the maintenance of which is provided for in the YD's definition of authoritative individuals. Thus, we can say that for an authority such as a Sāṃkhya commentator, formal inference serves as a tool by which to transmit Sāṃkhya doctrine through the medium of authoritative testimony, by demonstrating the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya principles are established. In this and other respects (see §V.1-2), the evidence of the YD suggests that *āptavacana* can be seen to hold more value in Sāṃkhya than generally assumed.

§4. The inclusion of other means of knowledge under the headings of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.

Although the Sāṃkhya tradition accepts only three *pramāṇas*, various other *pramāṇas* are accepted by other schools. As mentioned in §II.4, the SK states that all other *pramāṇas* are included within the three accepted in Sāṃkhya. The manner in which the commentators attempt to illustrate the inclusion of other *pramāṇas* in

³⁷⁰ *tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ / āptaśrutir eva āptavacanam na śabdāmātram / evaṃ sati yad uktam tantrāntarīyair śiṃṣapādisabdānām nirvikalpam anumāne 'ntarbhāvas trilakṣaṇatvāt iti tad ayatnataḥ pratikṣiptam bhavatīti vyākhyātāni pramāṇāni* / (YD on SK 5d, p. 87, ll. 12-16).

³⁷¹ YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 10 – p. 105, l. 9. NAKADA (1992, p. 485) suggests that this argument is a response to the view of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, who denies the validity of *āptavacana* as a separate *pramāṇa*.

perception, inference and authoritative testimony, provides some insight into the respective spheres and limits of these *pramāṇas*.

SK 4b³⁷² suggests that all valid means of knowledge can be subsumed under the categories of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony. Commenting on this portion of the verse, the GBh, MV, TK, and YD illustrate the ways in which the various *pramāṇas* accepted by other schools can be considered to fall into one of these three categories.

GBh mentions presumption (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), negation (*abhāva*), conceptualisation (*pratibhā*)³⁷³, folklore (*aitihya*), and comparison (*upamāna*), and says that these are held by Jaimini (the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*).³⁷⁴ However, these do not entirely correspond to the usual Mīmāṃsā list of six valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*): presumption (*arthāpatti*), inference (*anumāna*), negation (*abhāva*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), doctrine (*āgama*), and comparison (*upamāna*). The reasons for this discrepancy are unclear, but the *pramāṇas* dealt with in the YD, MV, and TK correspond, with slight variations, to Gauḍapāda's list (see below).

Gauḍapāda explains that presumption is included in inference, while equivalence, negation, conceptualisation, folklore, and comparison are all included

³⁷² *sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt* (SK 4b).

³⁷³ I have chosen to translate *pratibhā* as 'conceptualisation'—in the sense of any mental formation of an object of knowledge independent of the operation of the sense-faculties—because this term seems to best cover the range of meanings ('memory', 'intuition', and 'imagination') ascribed to the term in the YD (see below, n. 390), while the other commentators do not offer interpretations of the term. The second interpretation offered by the YD, 'intuition', corresponds to the meaning of the term in the Grammarian (*vyākaraṇa*) tradition.

³⁷⁴ *ṣaṭ pramāṇāni jaiminiḥ / atha kāni tāni pramāṇāni / arthāpattiḥ, sambhavaḥ, abhāvaḥ, pratibhā, aitihiyaṃ, upamānaṃ ceti ṣaṭ pramāṇāni* / (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 1-3).

in authoritative testimony.³⁷⁵ MV's list is the same as GBh's, but Māthara includes all six under the category of inference.³⁷⁶

The TK mentions five of the six *pramāṇas* listed in the GBh and MV, but deals with them in a different order and under SK 5 rather than SK 4. He first explains that comparison (*upamāna*) functions by means of a combination of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.³⁷⁷ He then argues that presumption (*arthāpatti*) should be included in inference,³⁷⁸ negation (*abhāva*) in perception,³⁷⁹ equivalence (*sambhava*) in inference,³⁸⁰ and folklore (*aitihya*) in authoritative testimony.³⁸¹

The variety in the commentators' classifications of these *pramāṇas* suggests that there was no set tradition of interpretation in this regard, and that they were all unsure as to how to deal with the problem. Very little justification is provided for

³⁷⁵ *etāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni triṣu drṣṭādiṣv antarbhūtāni / tatrānumāne tāvad arthāpattir antarbhūtā / sambhavābhāvapratiḥaitihyopamāś cāptavacane* / (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 14-15).

³⁷⁶ *nanv arthāpattiḥ sambhavo 'bhāvaḥ pratibhā aitihiyam upamānaṃ cetiprabhṛtīni santi bahūni pramāṇāntarāṇi katham atra trividham pramāṇam iti saṅgatiḥ / atrocyate—sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt / sarvāṇi hi pramāṇāni pramāṇatraye 'viruddhāni / tatra pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta ity ukte rātrau bhuṅkta ity arthaḥ / sā 'rthāpattir anumānam eva / prastha ity ukte catvāraḥ kuḍavā iti bodhaḥ sambhavaḥ / so 'py anumānam eva / abhāvaś ca prāgitaretarapradhvamsātyantābhāvabhedāc caturddhā / yathā vṛhiṣeṣaṇadarśanān na vṛṣṭo deva iti vṛṣṭer abhāvaṃ sādhayati / so 'py anumānabhedāḥ / pratibhā yathā—*

daḥṣiṇena tu vindhyasya sahyasya tu yad uttaram /

prthivyām ā samudrāyām sa pradeśo manoramah //

ity ukte tatra śobhanā guṇāḥ santīti pratibhotpadyate / pratibhā jānatām jñānam / sā 'py anumānavam eva / aitihiyam yathā—asmin vaṭe yakṣiṇī prativasati iti janā vadanti ity ukte, sā vighnaṃ karoti, dhanādi yacchatīti jñānam, tad apy anumānam eva / upamānam—yathā gaus tathā gavaya ity apy anumānam eva / (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 6-21).

³⁷⁷ *tathā hi—upamānaṃ tāvad yathā gaus tathā gavaya iti vākyam / tajjanitā dhīrāgama eva / yo 'py ayam gavayaśabdo gosadrśasya vācaka iti pratyayaḥ, so 'py anumānam eva / yo hi śabdo yatra vṛddhaiḥ prayujyate, so 'sati vṛtṭyantare, tasya cācakaḥ, yathā gośabdo gotvasya / prayujyate caivam gavayaśabdo gosadrśe, iti tasyaiva vācaka, iti tat jñānam anumānam eva / yat tu gavayasya cakṣuhsannikṛṣṭasya gosadrśyājñānam tat pratyakṣam eva / ata eva smaryamāṇāyām gavi, gavayasadrśyājñānam pratyakṣam / na tv anyad gavi sādṛśyam anyac ca gavaye / bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo hi jātyantaravartī jātyantare sādṛśyam ucyate / sāmānyayogaś caikaḥ / sa ced gavaye pratyakṣo, gavy api tathait nopamānasya prameyāntaram asti, yatra pramāṇāntaram upamānam bhavet, iti na pramāṇāntaram upamānam //* (TK on SK 5, p. 30, ll. 1-10).

³⁷⁸ *tasmān nānumānāt pramāṇāntaram arthāpattir iti siddham* (TK on SK 5, p. 32, l. 4).

³⁷⁹ *evam abhāvo 'pi pratyakṣam eva /* (TK on SK 5, p. 33, l. 30).

³⁸⁰ *sambhavas tu, yathā—khāryām droṇāḍhakaprasthādyavagamaḥ / sa cānumānam eva /* (TK on SK 5, l. 7).

³⁸¹ *yac cānirdiṣṭapravakṛkaṃ pravādapāraparyamātram iti hocur vṛddhāḥ, ity aitihiyam, yathā iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ prativasati iti, na tat pramāṇāntaram anirdiṣṭapravakṛkatvena sāmśayikatvāt / āptavakṛkatvaniścaye tvāgama eva /* (TK on SK 5, p. 34, ll. 20-23).

these classifications in the commentaries discussed above, but the YD presents a more involved discussion, in the course of which some relevant points are raised with regard to the spheres of perception and inference.

The YD deals with seven separate *pramāṇas* held by other schools, adding gesture (*ceṣṭa*) to the list in the GBh and MV. The commentator begins this discussion by responding to an opponent who quotes NS 1.1.3, which asserts perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and testimony (*śabda*) as the four accepted means of knowledge according to Nyāya,³⁸² and then quotes an unidentified verse giving six means of knowledge, corresponding to the six accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), testimony (*śabda*), comparison (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), and negation (*abhāva*).³⁸³ The opponent also mentions that according to others, there are nine *pramāṇas*, with the addition of equivalence (*sambhava*), report (*aitihya*)³⁸⁴, and gesture (*ceṣṭa*).³⁸⁵ The proponent responds by arguing that comparison (*upamāna*) and report (*aitihya*) should be included in authoritative testimony³⁸⁶ and that presumption (*arthāpatti*), equivalence (*sambhava*), negation (*abhāva*), and gesture (*ceṣṭa*) should be included in inference.³⁸⁷

³⁸² *pratyakṣānumānopamāṇaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni* / (NS 1.1.3, quoted in YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 18-19).

³⁸³ *pratyakṣam anumānam ca śabdaś copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavaḥ sādhyasādhakāḥ* // (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 20-21).

³⁸⁴ Based on the example given in the YD (*iti ha uvāca yājñavalkyaḥ (Brh. U. 2.4.13)* (YD on SK 4ab, p. 71, l. 4)), the translation ‘report’ for *aitihya* seems more appropriate, in contrast to its use (as ‘folklore’) in the example offered by GBh, MV, and TK: *bravīti loko yathātra vaṭe yakṣiṇī pravasaṭī* (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, l. 13); *asmin vaṭe yakṣiṇī pravasaṭi iti janā vadanti ity ukte, sā vighnam karoti, dhanādi yacchatīti jñānam* (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 18-20); *iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ pravasaṭi* (TK on SK 5, p. 34, l. 21).

³⁸⁵ *etāni sambhavaṭihyaceṣṭāsahitāni navety apare* / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 22).

³⁸⁶ *tasmāt suṣṭhūktam (71.1) upamaitihyāvacanam āptopadeśāt siddher iti* / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 72, ll. 20-21).

³⁸⁷ *arthāpattisambhavābhāvaceṣṭānām anumānasiddeḥ / avacanam ity anuvartate* / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 72, l. 22 – p. 73, l. 1; and see ff.).

The YD's treatment of 'conceptualisation' (*pratibhā*)³⁸⁸ as a potential *pramāṇa* deserves some attention, since it will become relevant to the discussion of the nature of Kapila's knowledge in CHAPTER V. The opponent objects that *pratibhā*, interpreted firstly as memory, should be considered a separate *pramāṇa*. The proponent argues that the knowledge of which memory consists is gained originally through perception, inference, or authoritative testimony. The opponent then suggests that the innate knowledge of seers (*ārṣaḥ sāmśiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ*) should be considered *pratibhā*.³⁸⁹ The proponent responds by arguing that Kapila's knowledge was already established (at his birth; cf. the discussion of innate knowledge (*sāmśiddhika jñāna*) in §IV.8), so that Kapila had no need to acquire it through a *pramāṇa*. No reference to other *ṛṣis* (besides Kapila) is made here, but the opponent does then suggest that *pratibhā* be applied to the knowledge of *yogins*, to which the proponent replies that the knowledge of *yogins* is included in perception (see §IV.1). Finally, the opponent suggests that *pratibhā* refers to 'worldly' (*laukika*) knowledge, interpreted as pure imagination. The proponent dismisses this type of knowledge as invalid.³⁹⁰ The YD thus dismisses *pratibhā* as a potential

³⁸⁸ See n. 373 above on the translation of the term *pratibhā*.

³⁸⁹ This interpretation of the term *pratibhā* corresponds to its use in the Grammarian tradition as 'intuition'.

³⁹⁰ *āha: pratibhā tarhi pramāṇāntaram bhaviṣyati / ucyate: keyaṃ pratibhā nāma / āha: yo 'yam anādaḥ saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiraścām abhinne 'rthe bāhye śtryādaḥ pratyaye pūrvābhyāsa-vāsanāpekṣaḥ kuṇapakāminībhakṣyādyākārabhedabhinnapratyaya itikartavyatāṅgam utpadyate sā hi pratibhā / tathā cōktam—*

yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate /

svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā // (PS. 5.47; PSV.:Peking.Ce. 82b6, 168b3;

Derge.Ce. 7a5)

yena hi yo 'rtho 'bhyastaḥ sukhādītvena tasya vināpi tenārthena śabdamaṭrāt pratipattir utpadyate / tadyathā vyāghro 'tra prativasatīty ukte vināpi bāhyenārthenābhyāsavaśād eva svedavepathu-prabhṛtayo bhavanti / tasmāt pratibhāiva devamanuṣyatiraścām itikartavyatāṅgatvāt pramāṇam iti / āha ca—

pramāṇatvena tām lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanugacchati /

vyavahārāḥ pravartante tiraścām api tadvaśāt // (cf. VP. II.147)

ucyate: pratibhāyā dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa rūpāntarānupapatteḥ / avacanam ity anuvartate / yadi pūrvābhyāsavāsanāpekṣaḥ pratyayaḥ pratibhety upagamyaṭe tena tarhy asau pratyakṣam anumānam āptavacanam <v>ety etad āpannam / kasmāt / yato na hi dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa pratyayarūpaṃ kadācid apy upalabhāmahe / tasmān na tebhyo 'rthāntaram pratibhā / āṛṣapratyayasambhavād ayuktam iti cet / syād etat / asty āṛṣo hi dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa sarvapadārtheṣu sāmśiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātibho

means of knowledge, and instead positions the supernormal knowledge of *yogins* within the framework of the *pramāṇas* and the knowledge of Kapila outside of this framework. As has already been discussed (§IV.1), the YD suggests that *yogins* may gain the ability to directly perceive the subtle elements (*tanmātra*) as a result of progressive yogic practice. This form of knowledge is here contrasted with the innate *ārṣa* knowledge of Kapila, who is exempt from such progressive practice as well as from the need to attain knowledge through any *pramāṇa*.

A contrast can be drawn between this passage in the YD and a statement by Vācaspati in the TK regarding *ārṣa* knowledge (the knowledge of *ṛṣis*). Vācaspati states that the three means of knowledge posited by the SK (perception, inference, and authoritative testimony) are only those which apply to ordinary people, since a philosophical treatise (*śāstra*) is for their benefit, while the *ārṣa* discrimination (*vijñāna*) of *yogins* and gods is not mentioned, since it does not apply to ordinary people.³⁹¹ In contrast to the YD, Vācaspati thus does not distinguish between the knowledge of *ṛṣis* and the knowledge of *yogins*, nor does he attempt to reconcile their knowledge with the three *pramāṇas*. The fact that the YD does address these issues appears to reflect a more elaborate conception of the nature of *ārṣa* knowledge

bhaviṣyatīti / etac cāpy ayuktam / kasmāt / uktatvāt / uktam (68.12) etat siddharūpaṃ bhagavataḥ paramarṣer jñānam / ato na pramāṇāpekṣam iti / yoginām iti cen na anabhyupagamāt / na hi yoginām apramāṇapūrvakaṃ jñānam iti yathā tathā vakṣyāmaḥ / sa laukika iti cen na aniścitatvāt / syād etat asti laukikaḥ pratyayo dṛṣṭādivyatiṛeṇa / tadyathā santamase vrajato drāḡ iti vijñānam utpadyate 'sti me pratīghāti dravyaṃ purastād ūrdhvam avasthitam iti / tac ca naivam / kasmāt / aniścitatvāt / na hi tatra niścaya utpadyate idam tad dravyam asti purato vā vyaktam astīti / na cāniścitaṃ pramāṇajñānam iṣyate / kiṃ cānyat / anavasthāprasaṅgāt / yadi caivamjātīyako 'pi pratyayaḥ pramāṇam abhyupagamyate tenānavasthā prāpnoti / kiṃ kāraṇam / anavasthānād dhi vikārasya <kāmakrodhalobhabhayaviṣādādidvārako> vikalpaḥ saṃyaṃ mithyā vā yasmād aneka utpadyate tasmān na laukikaḥ pratyayaḥ pratibhā / yat tu khalv idam ucyate (75.8) arthābhyāsavāsanaṇpekṣāsatsv api vyāghrādiṣu pratipattir utpadyata iti / satyam etat / sā tu mithyājñānatvāt pramāṇatvena na pariḡrhyata ity ayam adoṣaḥ / tasmāt siddham dṛṣṭādivyatiṛeṇa rūpāntarānupapatteḥ pratibhāyāḥ pṛthagabhidhānam / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 74, l. 22 – p. 76, l. 12).

³⁹¹ *etac ca laukikapramāṇābhipreyaṃ, lokavyutpādanārthatvāc chāstrasya, tasyaivātrādhikārāt / āṛṣaṃ tu vijñānam yoginām ūrdhvasrotasāṃ na lokavyutpādanāyālam iti sad api nābhihitam, anadhikārāt // (TK on SK 4, p. 17, ll. 22-24).*

and its role in the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, as will be discussed in CHAPTER V.

§5. The means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as productive of the discrimination (*vijñāna*) leading to liberation (*mokṣa*).

With regard to the epistemology of Sāṃkhya, the main concern of this study is the production of knowledge specifically leading to liberation (*mokṣa*) and the process by which such knowledge is transmitted through text and doctrine. Therefore, of paramount concern in the present context are the views of the commentators with regard to which means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) lead to the stated goal of Sāṃkhya, i.e. discrimination (*vijñāna*) between the manifest (*vyakta*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*), and the knower (*jñā*; i.e. *puruṣa*) (SK 2; see §II.3).

This is a complex issue, on which none of the commentators entirely agree, and there are even apparent discrepancies within some of the commentaries themselves. MISHRA (1961) suggests that none of the commentators grasped the original intent of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which was to correlate the three *pramāṇas* (perception, inference and authoritative testimony) with the three objects of the Sāṃkhya inquiry: manifest, unmanifest and knower.³⁹² Whatever the merits of MISHRA's hypothesis, which would be difficult to determine with certainty, the evidence of the commentaries provides us with a much more complex picture of the relation of the *pramāṇas* to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge. This issue, particularly in the YD, is also connected with the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), to be treated in the second half of this

³⁹² MISHRA (1961), pp. 411-413.

chapter. The passages examined in the present section will be confined to those which offer explicit connections between the respective spheres of the *pramāṇas* and the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*.

The GBh introduces SK 4 as an explanation of the means of knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest, and knower,³⁹³ and clarifies that some of the *tattvas* are established through perception, some through inference, and some through authoritative testimony.³⁹⁴ Strangely, though, in this context Gauḍapāda does not specify which principles are established through which means of knowledge.

However, in his commentary on SK 6, which states that suprasensuous objects are established through *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference and those not established even through this are established through authoritative doctrine,³⁹⁵ Gauḍapāda explains that primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*) are established through *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference, while the manifest (*vyakta*)—presumably including the manifest principles of intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahaṃkāra*), the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*), the eleven faculties (*indriya*), and the five gross elements (*mahābhūta*)—is established through perception. As examples of the objects to be established through authoritative testimony, he gives the stock examples: ‘Indra is the king of the gods’, ‘there is [the land of] the northern Kurus’, and ‘there are nymphs (*apsaras*) in heaven’.³⁹⁶ This interpretation seems to conflict

³⁹³ *evam eṣāṃ vyaktāvyaktajñānāṃ trayāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ kaiḥ kiyadbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ, kena kasya vā pramāṇena siddhir bhavati* / (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 15-16).

³⁹⁴ *prameyaṃ—pradhānaṃ, buddhiḥ, ahaṃkāraḥ, pañca tanmātrāṇi, ekādaśendriyāṇi, pañca mahābhūtāni, puruṣa iti / etāni pañcaviṃśatis tattvāni vyaktāvyaktajñā ity ucyante / tatra kiñcit pratyakṣeṇa sādhyam, kiñcid anumānena, kiñcid āgameneti trividham pramāṇam uktam* // (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 18-21).

³⁹⁵ *sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇāṃ prasiddhir anumānāt/ tasmād api cāsiddham paroḥṣam āptāgamāt siddham* // (SK 6); see MISHRA (1961) for an alternative interpretation of the original meaning of this verse.

³⁹⁶ *pradhānapuruṣāv atīndriyau sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumānena sādhyete yasmān mahadādi līṅgaṃ triguṇam / yasyedam triguṇam kāryam tat pradhānam iti / yataś cācetanam cetanam ivābhāti, ato 'nyo 'dhiṣṭhātā puruṣa iti / vyaktaṃ pratyakṣasādhyam / tasmād api cāsiddham paroḥṣam āptāgamāt siddham / yathā indro devarājah, uttarāḥ kuravaḥ, svarge 'psarasa iti paroḥṣam āptavacanāt siddham* // (GBh on SK 6, ll. 7-11).

with his statement under SK 4 that some of the *tattvas* are to be established through authoritative testimony,³⁹⁷ as well as with the general Sāṃkhya view that of the manifest principles, only the gross elements (*mahābhūta*) are open to perception by ordinary people. The GBh offers no further evidence to explain these discrepancies.

This classification of the objects of the *pramāṇas* also leaves open the question: what role do the Sāṃkhya texts themselves, presumably to be classed as authoritative testimony, play in the attainment of knowledge of the *tattvas*?

The MV follows the GBh in treating SK 4 as an exposition of the means of knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest, and knower,³⁹⁸ but differs from Gauḍapāda by stating that some of the principles are established through perception, some through inference, and some through both authorities (*āpta*) and inference.³⁹⁹ If we interpret this to mean that some of the principles can be established either by inference or by authoritative testimony, it would seem to resolve one of the discrepancies apparent in Gauḍapāda's classification of the principles into objects of perception and inference, which Māṭhara follows.⁴⁰⁰ In this case, we might assume that knowledge of the Sāṃkhya principles normally established through inference (i.e. *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*) could also be gained from the authoritative testimony of a Sāṃkhya teacher. The MV's commentary on SK 6 also differs from that of the GBh

³⁹⁷ SOLOMON (1974, p. 12) notes that the SVS, SV, and SSV bear the same discrepancy: 'It may be noted that all the commentators say that of the 25 Sāṃkhya principles some are established by *pratyakṣa*, some by *anumāna* and some by *āgama*; but none has mentioned even later what is established by *āgama*.'

³⁹⁸ *eṣāṃ vyaktāvyaktajñānāṃ prameyāṇāṃ sādhanāya pramāṇāṇy āha pramāṇaprameyapramāṇi-pramitīkrameṇa hi sakalasya siddhir dṛṣṭā* / (MV on SK 4, p. 10, ll. 13-14).

³⁹⁹ *prameyā vyaktāvyaktajñāṇāḥ / pramātā ātmā / tatra trayaviṃśatikāṃ vyaktam / avyaktam pradhānam / jñāḥ kṣetrajñāḥ / tad amiśāṃ madhye kiñcit pratyakṣeṇānyad anumānenetarad āptānumānābhyāṃ pramīyate* (MV on SK 4, p. 12, ll. 4-7).

⁴⁰⁰ *atra pradhānapuruṣāv atīndriyau tayoh sāmānyato dṛṣṭād anumānāt siddhiḥ / yasmān mahādi līṅgaṃ triguṇaṃ dṛṣṭvā kāryaṃ tatkāraṇaṃ adṛṣṭam apy asti triguṇaṃ ceti sādhyate pradhānam / na hy asata sadutpattiḥ syād iti / na ca kāraṇasadrṣaṃ kāryaṃ syād iti / vyaktam tu pratyakṣeṇaiva sādhitam iti tadarthe na prayatnaḥ / yasmāḥ jaḍamakriyāśaktihetucumbakavad avaśyaṃ puruṣa iti jñāsidhiḥ* // (MV on SK 6, p. 14, ll. 5-11).

in not offering any examples of the objects of authoritative testimony, so Māṭhara's intentions with regard to the nature of *āptavacana* are not entirely clear.

The TK offers yet another classification of the respective spheres of the *pramāṇas*. Introducing SK 6, Vācaspati states that the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have been explained (in the previous two verses) for the purpose of establishing the existence of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower. Vācaspati then explains that the manifest, which he takes to refer to the five gross elements (*mahābhūta*), is known directly through perception, while *pūrvavat* inference is used to establish such things as the existence of fire from the presence of smoke. He then introduces SK 6 as an explanation of the means used to establish objects of knowledge difficult to establish by ordinary means and suggests that this explanation is an important function of a philosophical treatise (*śāstra*).⁴⁰¹

Although SK 6 mentions only the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of inference, Vācaspati takes also *śeṣavat* inference to be implied (by the use of the particle *ca* in the verse) as a means of establishing suprasensuous objects of knowledge. Strangely, he does not comment on the establishment of suprasensuous objects through authoritative testimony, but rather lists heaven (*svarga*), the unseen force of action and consequence (*apūrvā*), deities (*devatā*), and the order of the manifestation of the manifest principles (intellect, etc.) as objects established through *śeṣavat* inference (equated by Vācaspati with indirect (*avīta*) inference; see §IV.2).⁴⁰² Thus, according to the TK, the gross elements (*mahābhūta*) are established through perception,

⁴⁰¹ *evaṃ tāvad vyaktāvyaktajñālakṣaṇaprameyasiddhyartham pramāṇāni lakṣitāni / tatra vyaktam prthivyādi svarūpataḥ pāṃsulapādako hāliko 'pi pratyakṣataḥ pratipadyate, pūrvavatā cānumānena dhūmādidarśanāt vahnyādīni ceti, tad vyutpādanāya mandaprayojanam śāstram iti duradhigamam anena vyutpādyam / tatra yat pramāṇam yatra śaktam tad uktalakṣaṇebhyaḥ pramāṇebhyo niṣkṛṣya darśayati /* (TK on SK 6, p. 35, ll. 1-5).

⁴⁰² *upalakṣaṇam caitat, śeṣavad ity api draṣṭavyam /* (TK on SK 6, p. 35, ll. 31-32); *tat kiṃ sarveṣv atīndriyeṣu sāmānyato dṛṣṭam eva pravartate / tathā ca yatra tan nāsti mahadādyārambhakrame svargāpūrvadevatādaḥ ca, tatra teṣāṃ abhāvaḥ prāpta ity ata āha—tasmād api iti / tasmād ity etāvataiva siddhe cakāreṇa śeṣavad ity api samuccitam /* (TK on SK 6, p. 36, ll. 14-15).

primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*) are established through *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference, and the rest of the principles are established through *śeṣavat* inference. Vācaspati thus seems to have no use for authoritative testimony, at least insofar as the establishment of Sāṃkhya knowledge is concerned. It is perhaps significant, though, that he holds the explanation of the inference of these principles to be an important function of the SK as a philosophical treatise (*śāstra*). This can be compared to the YD's statement that the 'members of explanation' (*vyākhyāṅga*) used in formal inference fulfill an important role in the explanation of *śāstra* to those of lesser intellectual capacity.⁴⁰³

As discussed above (§IV.2-3), the YD makes a provision for the transmission of *śāstra* as a part of the function of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) and treats the ten members (*avayava*) of formal inference as a tool for the exposition of *śāstra*, as illustrated by the commentator's establishment of the existence of Consciousness (*puruṣa*) by means of this formal inference. This suggests that authoritative testimony may serve as the medium by which inferential Sāṃkhya knowledge is transmitted from teacher to pupil.

It has also been shown that, according to the YD, the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of inference, in particular, is a key tool in the establishing the existence of Consciousness, which is not involved in any relationship of cause and effect, while the indirect (*avīta*) form of inference is used to establish the thesis that primordial Materiality is the source of the manifest universe (§IV.2). In addition, we have seen that the YD allows for the perception of the subtle elements (*tanmātra*), in addition to the gross elements (*mahābhūta*), by *yogins* and gods (§IV.1). In summary, several forms of inference are treated by the YD as cooperative tools in the acquisition of

⁴⁰³ See n. 331 (§IV.2).

knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*, although authoritative testimony also appears to play a role in connection with inference, while direct perception of at least some of the higher *tattvas* is a possibility for extraordinary individuals.

Aside from the evidence discussed above, the YD does not, in the manner of the other commentaries, offer a direct correlation between the various means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the manifest, unmanifest and knower as objects of knowledge. However, in the context of another Sāṃkhya paradigm, that of the conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect, the commentator distinguishes between ordinary knowledge, which is gained by means of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, and the extraordinary knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness.⁴⁰⁴ This paradigm, along with the related paradigm of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), provides further clarification of the process by which the discrimination (*vijñāna*) leading to liberation (*mokṣa*) is attained. The views of the commentators with regard to these two paradigms will be outlined in the following sections (§IV.6-10). The conclusions drawn in these sections with regard to the YD's views will be explored further in the discussions in CHAPTER V of the commentator's views on the importance of Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the tradition to which it gave rise.

⁴⁰⁴ *jñānam dvividham śabdādyupalabdihlakṣaṇam guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdihlakṣaṇam ca / tatra śabdādyupalabdihlakṣaṇam pratyakṣānumānāgamarūpam / guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdihlakṣaṇam ca dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajam ca / tayoṛ apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo 'dhyayanam (SK 51a) iti siddhikāṇḍānupatitāni pramāṇāni / abhyāsajam punar vairāgyaparvāvajayaprṣṭhalabdham śāntam amalam dhruvam sakalabhavābhavapratipakṣabhūtam / yad ācāryo vakṣyati—*

evam tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham iti aparīśeṣam /

aviparyayād viśuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam // (SK 64) iti /

(YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 7-14).

§6. The commentators' views on the results of the conditions (*bhāva*).

In the Sāṃkhya system, knowledge of the principles (*tattva*) underlying the experiential world is considered the only means to liberation (*mokṣa*). As outlined in CHAPTER I, the present study seeks to determine how the production of this knowledge in individual seekers is considered to be related to the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers and texts initiated by the ṛṣi Kapila. In addition to the paradigm of the three means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), which deals with the production of knowledge in general, two other paradigms treated by the Sāṃkhya texts are connected with the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* in particular. These are the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*). Of these, the former also contains information regarding the results of certain objectives often emphasized in other schools of Indian philosophy: the attainment of merit (*dharma*) through Vedic ritual and ethical conduct, the maintenance of an attitude of dispassion (*vairāgya*) with regard to the objects of experience, and the attainment of a set of supernatural powers, termed lordliness (*aiśvarya*) in Sāṃkhya, as a result of yogic discipline.

As outlined in §II.5, Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that there are eight conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect (*buddhi*): merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), passion (*avairāgya*), lordliness (*aiśvarya*), and non-lordliness (*anaiśvarya*). Of these conditions, only knowledge leads to liberation from the cycle of transmigration (*saṃsāra*), while the other seven conditions serve to maintain this cycle, determining the circumstances of the subsequent incarnation of the subtle body (*liṅga*). It is unclear from the SK, however, how the *bhāva* of *jñāna* is produced in relation to the operation of the three

pramāṇas accepted in Sāṃkhya. It is also unclear whether any of the other *bhāvas* may assist in the production of *jñāna*.

The commentators generally agree in their interpretations of the results of the *bhāvas*. The YD, however, provides much information not found in the other commentaries, particularly with regard to the *bhāva* of *jñāna* and the relationship between *jñāna* and the other *bhāvas* (see §IV.7). The function of *jñāna* in relation to Kapila in the YD will be explored further in CHAPTER V. Below follows a summary of the commentators' views on the results of the *bhāvas*, with attention drawn to the YD's interpretative contributions.

The GBh explains that the merit (*dharma*) results in the transmigration of the subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*) to the worlds of eight kinds of supernatural beings, but mentions only seven in this context: the worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, the *gandharvas*, the *rākṣasas*, and the *piśācas*.⁴⁰⁵ According to Gauḍapāda, demerit (*adharma*) results in rebirth in the bodies of cattle, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate objects.⁴⁰⁶ The MV presents nearly identical lists, with the omission of the world of Soma and the addition of the worlds of the ancestors (*pitṛ*) and of the *yakṣas*.⁴⁰⁷ The YD also states that eight divine levels can be attained through merit,⁴⁰⁸ and five animal levels through demerit,⁴⁰⁹ though it does not list them in

⁴⁰⁵ GBh adds the world of the *yakṣas* as an eighth to this list under SK 53.

⁴⁰⁶ *dharmam nimittam kṛtvā ūrdhvam upayāti / ūrdhvam ity aṣṭau sthānāni grhyante / tad yathā—brāhmaṇam, prajāpatyam, saumyam, aindraṇam, gāndharvaṇam, rākṣasaṇam, piśācam iti / tat sūkṣmaśarīraṇam gacchati / paśuṃṛgapakṣisarīṣpasthāvarānteṣv adharmo nimittam /* (GBh on SK 44, p. 155, ll.33-35).

⁴⁰⁷ *tatra dharmo nimittam / iha loke dharmam yaḥ kurute tan nimittam kṛtvā sūkṣmaśarīraṇam ūrdhvam gacchati / ūrdhvam ity aṣṭānāṃ devayonīnāṃ grahaṇam / tatra ādyam brāhmaṇam / prajāpatyam, aindraṇam, pitṛyam, gāndharvaṇam, yākṣaṇam, rākṣasaṇam piśācam ity etāny aṣṭau sthānāni sūkṣmaśarīraṇam gacchati / tatra dharmo nimittam, ūrdhvaḡamaṇam naimittikam /* (MV on SK 44, p. 61, ll. 10-14).

⁴⁰⁸ *ukto dharmah / tadanuṣṭhānād aṣṭavikalpāyāṃ tiryagbhūmāv utpattir bhavati /* (YD on SK 44a, p. 235, l. 8).

⁴⁰⁹ *adharmo 'py uktaḥ / tadanuṣṭhānāt pañcavikalpāyāṃ tiryagbhūmāv utpattir bhavati /* (YD on SK 44b, p. 235, ll. 10-11).

this context.⁴¹⁰ This classification of beings corresponds to that of the phenomenal creation (*bhautika sarga*) in SK 53, which states that there are eight divine levels, five animal levels, and one human level (see §II.2). The TK offers a slightly different interpretation of the effects of merit and demerit, mentioning only that worlds such as heaven (*dyu*) are attained through merit, while worlds such as *sutala* (a subterranean region) are attained through demerit.⁴¹¹ It is unclear from the text of the TK how this scheme is related to the threefold classification of the *bhautika sarga* in SK 53. In any case, in all of the commentaries it is clear that merit and demerit determine the level of the phenomenal cosmos on which the subtle body is reincarnated. The YD further clarifies that merit and demerit are also responsible for the relative circumstances of one's birth—in terms of social position, appearance, disposition, benefits, and disease—within a single level of the cosmos.⁴¹²

As discussed in §II.5, SK 44 states that the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) results in liberation. The GBh and MV specify that this condition refers to the knowledge of the twenty-five principles (*tattva*),⁴¹³ held by the Sāṃkhya texts to be the only means to liberation (see §II.3). This interpretation also seems to be implicit in the commentary of the TK and the YD on SK 44.

Under SK 23, however, the YD specifies that the condition of knowledge is twofold; it includes both the knowledge of words (*śabda*), etc., which is gained

⁴¹⁰ Under SK 53, the YD lists Brahmā, Prajāpati, Indra, the ancestors (*pitṛ*), the Gandharvas, the Nāgas, the Rakṣases, and the Piśācas as the eight divine beings, and cattle, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate objects as the five levels of animal life (YD on SK 53abc, p. 256, ll. 12-15).

⁴¹¹ *dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvaṃ dyuprabhṛtiṣu lokeṣu / gamanam adhaṣṭād bhavaty adharmeṇa sutaḷādiṣu lokeṣu* / (TK on SK 44, p. 129, ll. 14-15).

⁴¹² *āha: ekabhūmiviśeṣānupapattiḥ gativīṣeṣāt / yadi bhāvānām bhūmiviśeṣanimittatvaṃ niyamyate tenaikasyām bhūmau hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭatvaṃ jātyākṛtisvabhāvānugrahopaghātānām na prāpnoti / ucyate: na tarhy anena bhūmiviśeṣo niyamyate / kiṃ tarhi / ūrdhvaśabda utkṛṣṭavacanāḥ / dharmeṇa deveṣu mānuṣeṣu tiryakṣu cordhvagamanam utkṛṣṭaṃ janma bhavati / tathādharmād adhogamanam apakṛṣṭaṃ janma bhavatīti* / (YD on SK 44ab, p. 235, ll. 12-18).

⁴¹³ *kiṃ ca, jñānena cāpavargaḥ / apavargaḥ ca pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānam / tena nimittenāpavargo mokṣaḥ* / (GBh on SK 44, p. 156, ll. 1-2); *kiṃ cānyat—jñānena cāpavargaḥ / yat pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānam tena jñānena tat sūkṣmaśarīraṃ nivartate* / (MV on SK 44, p. 61, ll. 19-20).

through perception, inference, and authoritative testimony (see §II.4), as well as the knowledge of the difference between Materiality and Consciousness. This latter form of knowledge is further divided into that which is unprecedented (*apūrvā*) and that which is generated through practice (*abhyāsaja*). The commentator equates the unprecedented form with ‘the means of knowledge discussed under the heading of the attainments (*siddhi*), including reflection (*ūha*)⁴¹⁴, speech (*śabda*), and study (*adhyayana*)’ (these are part of the *pratyayasarga*; see §IV.9-10).⁴¹⁵ He refers to these attainments as means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), although the context suggests that these are considered different in nature from the normal three *pramāṇas* of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony. This supposition may be supported by reference to a statement made by the commentator under SK 51, that the first attainment, reflection (*ūha*), occurs in the absence of perception, inference, or authoritative testimony.⁴¹⁶

The commentator’s definition of the second form of liberating knowledge, that which is generated through practice (*abhyāsaja*), is somewhat obscure. He says that this form of knowledge is *vairāgyaparvāvajayaprṣṭhalabdha*.⁴¹⁷ Immediately prior to this discussion of the forms of knowledge, the commentator uses the term *parvan* to refer to a particular form of merit (*dharma*) as a ‘step’ on a stairway to elevation and ultimate bliss, via the other *bhāvas* characterised by the constituent quality of goodness (*sāttvika*):

Through the performance of these [*yamas* and *niyamas* as a form of *dharma*⁴¹⁸], the quality of *sattva*, in such an ascendance (*uttaraṇa*)⁴¹⁹ of an

⁴¹⁴ On the YD’s interpretation of the term *ūha*, see §IV.9, n. 507.

⁴¹⁵ *jñānam dvividhaṃ śabdādyupalabdihilakṣaṇaṃ guṇapurūṣāntaropalabdihilakṣaṇaṃ ca / tatra śabdādyupalabdihilakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣānumānāgamarūpam / guṇapurūṣāntaropalabdihilakṣaṇaṃ ca dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajam ca / tayoṛ apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo ’dhyayanam (SK 51a) iti siddhikāṇḍānupatitāni pramāṇāni / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 6-11).*

⁴¹⁶ *tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇābalenaiva pratipadyate sādya siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13).*

⁴¹⁷ *abhyāsajam punar vairāgyaparvāvajayaprṣṭhalabdham (YD on SK 23ab, p. 192, l. 11).*

⁴¹⁸ See §IV.7, nn. 444, 445.

ascetic (*yati*), attains the state of being an impression (*āśayatā*), which causes an increase of the forms [i.e. *bhāvas*] such as knowledge (*jñāna*). This first step (*parvan*)⁴²⁰ becomes a stairway (*sopāna*) to elevation (*abhyudaya*)⁴²¹ and ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa*), engaged in which this ascetic becomes qualified for undertaking the other steps.⁴²²

Based on this usage of the term *parvan*, the compound *vairāgyaparvāvajayaprṣṭhalabdhā*, as a description of *abhyāsaja jñāna*, might be translated as ‘attained upon the height of winning⁴²³ the step of dispassion’. This suggests that this form of liberating knowledge is considered the result of a progressive form of practice, perhaps involving the generation of both merit and dispassion (see §IV.7) as ‘steps’ to knowledge. The commentator goes on to describe knowledge generated through practice as ‘peaceful, pure, eternal, and being the opposite of all existence and non-existence’. In this connection, the commentator quotes SK 64, which describes liberating knowledge as arising from ‘the practice of truth (or of the *tattvas*)’⁴²⁴ (*tattvābhyāsa*).⁴²⁵

⁴¹⁹ The root *ut-tī-* can mean ‘to cross over’ or ‘to arise out of’ [water]. Here, the term *uttaraṇa* probably alludes to the common Sāṃkhya image of the cycle of transmigration (*samsāra*) as an ocean. Cf., for instance, the YD’s explanation of the name *tāraka* for the first *siddhi* (*ūha*): ‘*tāraka* carries one over the ocean of *samsāra*’ (*tārayati samsārārṇavād iti tārakam* / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 13-14)). In keeping with the image in the present passage of the *bhāvas* as a ‘stairway’ (by which one would ‘arise out of’ the ocean of *samsāra*), I have translated *uttaraṇa* as ‘ascendancy’.

⁴²⁰ The entry for *parvan* in MONIER-WILLIAMS testifies to its use as ‘the step of a staircase’ also in the *Raghuvamśa*.

⁴²¹ This use of the term *abhyudaya* probably encompasses both its literal meaning, as the ‘elevation’ attained by climbing a stairway, and its figurative meaning of ‘prosperity’ or ‘happiness’.

⁴²² *eteṣāṃ avilopenānuṣṭhānād yater evaṃvidhottaraṇe sattvadharma āśayatām pratipadyate yo jñānādīnām rūpānām āpyāyanam karoti / etad abhyudayaniḥśreyasayoḥ sopānabhūtam prathamam parva yatrāyam avasthito yatir itareṣāṃ parvanām anuṣṭhāne yogyo bhavati* / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 4-6).

⁴²³ I have used ‘winning’ for *avajaya* here as in ‘winning a foothold’. The term *avajaya* means ‘overcoming’, ‘conquering’ or ‘winning through conquest’. The implication here seems to be that one has gained through effort or ‘won’ the *vairāgya* step. From the ‘height’ or ‘top’ (*prṣṭha*) of this conquest, the *jñāna* step is attained next.

⁴²⁴ The significance of the phrase *tattvābhyāsa* in its original context is probably ‘repeated study of the *tattvas*’, but in the present passage the YD-*kāra* seems to take *abhyāsa* as ‘practice’ in a broader sense.

⁴²⁵ *abhyāsajam punar vairāgyaparvāvajayaprṣṭhalabdhām śāntam amalām dhruvam sakala-bhavābhavapratipakṣabhūtam / yad ācāryo vakṣyati—*

evaṃ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham iti aparīṣeṣam /

aviparyayād viśuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam // (SK 64) iti /

(YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 11-14).

In summary, the YD divides the condition of knowledge into 1. the ordinary knowledge gained through perception, inference, and authoritative testimony; 2. liberating knowledge attained suddenly (*apūrva*) through one of the attainments (*siddhi*; see §IV.9-10); 3. liberating knowledge resulting from a progressive form of practice (*abhyāsaja*).

This classification of the forms of the condition of knowledge presents some interpretative problems when considered in connection with several other passages of the YD. The relation between these forms and the threefold division of the *bhāvas* into innate (*sāṃsiddhika*), deriving from Materiality (*prākṛtika*), and deriving from the products (*vaikṛta*) in SK 43 (see §IV.8) is unclear. In its commentary on SK 43, the YD equates the *vaikṛta* form of knowledge, like the unprecedented (*apūrva*) form mentioned under SK 23, with the attainments (*siddhi*) (see §IV.10 and CHAPTER V), but it is unclear if a precise identification of *vaikṛta* with *apūrva* is to be supposed. Also, the suggestion that the liberating knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness is attained without the use of the normal *pramāṇas* of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, appears to conflict with the general position of the Sāṃkhya commentators that knowledge of these principles is established through inference, as demonstrated by the YD's illustrations of the ten-membered inference, the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of inference, and the indirect (*avīta*) inference (see §IV.2, IV.5). It is probably the case that the YD-*kāra* does not always consider the implications of his views outside of their immediate interpretative context. Nevertheless, several apparent assumptions behind these views can be established with some certainty, as will be demonstrated in §IV.10 and §V.1-2.

Aside from the passage discussed above, the YD does not discuss the *bhāva* of knowledge (*jñāna*) as representative of forms of knowledge apart from the

liberating knowledge of the Sāṃkhya principles (*tattva*), while the issue is not raised in the other commentaries. In most contexts, the commentators focus on the fact that the condition of knowledge leads to liberation (SK 44c), while its opposite, the condition of ignorance (*ajñāna*), is a precondition of bondage to transmigration (SK 44d).

The commentators are unanimous in listing three forms of the bondage resulting from ignorance: deriving from Materiality (*prākṛta*, *prākṛtika*, *prakṛtibandha*), deriving from the products (*vaikārika*, *vaikṛtika*, *vaikārikabandha*), and deriving from sacrifice (*dākṣiṇika*, *dākṣiṇaka*, *dakṣiṇābandha*).⁴²⁶ This classification may appear to conflict with the classification of the conditions (*bhāva*) in general into innate (*sāṃsiddhika*), deriving from Materiality (*prākṛta*, *prākṛtika*), and deriving from the products (*vaikṛta*, *vaikṛtika*) (see §IV.8). It should perhaps be kept in mind, though, that the three forms of bondage refer to the phenomenal consequences of one of the *bhāvas* (ignorance, in this case) rather than to the *bhāva* itself. In any case, no attempt is made by the commentators to reconcile these two classifications.

The MV provides a brief explanation of the three forms of bondage resulting from the condition of ignorance. Māṭhara interprets the first form, *prakṛtibandha*, as self-identification with the eight sources (*prakṛti*) or productive principles, that is, with primordial Materiality, intellect, ego, and the five subtle elements. According

⁴²⁶ *viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ / ajñānaṃ nimittam / sa caiva nimittikaḥ prākṛto vaikāriko dākṣiṇikaś ca bandhaḥ iti vakṣyati purastāt / yad im uktam—*

*prākṛtena ca bandhena tathā vaikārikeṇa ca /
dākṣiṇena tṛtīyena baddho nānyena mucyate //*

(GBh on SK 44, p. 156, ll. 3-6); *jñānaviparyayo 'jñānam, tasmād bandhas trividho bhavati / prakṛtibandho, dakṣiṇābandho vaikārikabandhaś ceti //* (YD on SK 44d, p. 236, ll. 5-6); *ato 'jñānaṃ nimittam bandho naimittikaḥ / sa ca bandhas trividhaḥ / prakṛtibandho vaikārikabandho dakṣiṇābandhaś ceti //* (MV on SK 44, p. 62, ll. 1-3); *viparyayāt atattvajñānāt iṣyate bandhaḥ / sa ca trividhaḥ—prākṛtiko vaikṛtiko dākṣiṇakaś ceti //* (TK on SK 44, p. 129, l. 18 – p. 130, l. 4); I have departed from Mainkar's (*Gauḍapādabhāṣya* (1972)) and Jha's (*Tattvakaumudī* (2004)) translations of the forms of bondage as 'natural, acquired and personal' and 'natural, evolutionary and personal', respectively, in order to be more literal and to draw attention to the interpretation of these three forms by the YD (see below).

to the MV, bondage to the products (*vaikārikabandha*) is the idea of ultimate bliss in the worlds of Brahmā, etc. In other words, according to Māṭhara, this second form of bondage lies in the misconception that the ultimate goal of life is rebirth at a higher level of the cosmos, rather than liberation from the cycle of transmigration altogether. Māṭhara interprets the third form of bondage, *dakṣiṇābandha*, simply as resulting from the sacrifice of cows, etc.⁴²⁷

The TK offers a slightly different interpretation of the first two forms of bondage. According to Vācaspati, *prākṛtika* bondage applies to those who worship primordial Materiality (*prakṛti*) as the self (*ātman*). Vācaspati mentions that those under this first form of bondage are called *prakṛtilaya*, ‘dissolved into the sources’, referring to the result of the condition of dispassion (*vairāgya*) (SK 45; see below). According to Vācaspati, *vaikṛtika* bondage applies to those who worship the evolutes (*vikāra*), including the elements, faculties, ego, and intellect, as Consciousness (*puruṣa*). Like Māṭhara, Vācaspati interprets the *dākṣiṇaka* form of bondage as resulting from sacrificial acts.⁴²⁸

The YD treats SK 45abc as an explanation of the three forms of bondage (mentioned as the result of the condition of ignorance under SK 44). The commentator equates *prakṛtibandha* with *prakṛtilaya* (interpreted as dissolution into

⁴²⁷ *tatra prakṛtibandho nāmāṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu paratvenābhimānaḥ / vaikārikabandho nāma brahmādisthāneṣu śreyobuddhiḥ / dakṣiṇābandho nāma gavādidāṇejyānimittaḥ /* (MV on SK 44, p. 62, ll. 2-5).

⁴²⁸ *prakṛtāv ātmajñānād ye prakṛtim upāsate teṣāṃ prākṛtiko bandhaḥ, yaḥ purāṇe prakṛtilayān pratyucyate pūrṇaṃ śatasahasraṃ hi tiṣṭhanty avyaktacintakāḥ iti / vaikāriko bandhas teṣāṃ ye vikārān eva bhūtendriyāhaṅkārabuddhiḥ puruṣadhiyopāsate tān pratīdam ucyate—*

daśa manvantarāṇiḥa tiṣṭhantīndriyacintakāḥ /

bhautikāś tu śatam pūrṇaṃ, sahasraṇ tv ābhimānikāḥ //

bauddhā daśa sahasrāṇi tiṣṭhanti vigatajvarāḥ /

te khalv amī videhā yeṣāṃ vaikṛtiko bandhaḥ iti //

iṣṭāpūrtena dākṣiṇakaḥ / puruṣatattvānabhijño hīṣṭāpūrtakārī kāmopahatamanā badhyate iti // (TK on SK 44, p. 130, ll. 5-15).

the eight sources), as the result of the condition of dispassion (*vairāgya*) (SK 45a).⁴²⁹ In this passage, he mentions that dispassion falls under the heading of contentment (*tuṣṭi*),⁴³⁰ one of the four divisions of the *pratyayasarga*, thus providing an important link between the two paradigms (see §IV.10). The commentator then equates bondage to sacrifice (*dakṣiṇābandha*) with the performance of sacrifice leading to transmigration (*saṃsāra*) as the result of the condition of passion (*rāga*, *avairāgya*) (SK 45b).⁴³¹ He equates bondage to the products (*vaikārikabandha*) with the pleasure taken in the non-obstruction (*avighāta*) (of one's will) resulting from the condition of lordliness (*aiśvarya*).⁴³² No connection is made between the forms of bondage and the remaining condition, non-lordliness (*anaiśvarya*).

The YD's interpretation of *prakṛtibandha* is thus similar to that of the TK, while its interpretation of *dakṣiṇābandha* is compatible with that of the TK and MV, although the latter commentaries do not provide any of the correlations between the forms of bondage and the results of the conditions of dispassion, passion, and lordliness. The fact that the YD does provide this correlation between the results of ignorance and the results of the other conditions shows that the conditions overlap with regard to their functions. The YD addresses this issue by explaining that ignorance serves as a precondition for the results brought about by the other conditions (besides knowledge). The commentator also explains that in the case of someone, such as Kapila (see CHAPTER V), who has attained the condition of

⁴²⁹ *āha: kasmād bhāvāt prakṛtibandho bhavati <iti> / ucyate: vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ (SK 45a) vairāgyād aṣṭasu prakṛtiṣu layaṃ gacchati / asāv ucyate prakṛtibandha iti / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, ll. 7-10).*

⁴³⁰ *tataś ca viparītaṃ yad eva vairāgyaṃ tuṣṭikāṇḍānupatitaṃ prakṛtyādiṣu paratvābhimānāḥ / tata eva prakṛtilayo bhavati nānyasmāt / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, ll. 16-18).*

⁴³¹ *āha: atha dakṣiṇābandhaḥ kutaḥ / ucyate: saṃsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt / (SK 45b) yo 'yaṃ dṛṣṭānuśravikaviśayābhilāṣaḥ sa rāgaḥ / tatra dṛṣṭaviśayarāgāt tatprāptinirvartakaṃ karma karoti tataś ca tatropapadyate / ānuśravikaviśayābhilāṣād agnihotrādiṣu pravartate tataś ca svargādiṣūtpattir bhavati / asau dakṣiṇābandhaḥ / (YD on SK 45b, p. 236, l. 23 – p. 237, l. 2).*

⁴³² *ayad aṣṭaguṇam aiśvaryaṃ animādi prāg upadiṣṭaṃ (193.1) tasmāt sve sve viśaye 'vighāta utpadyate / tadabhiratir vaikāriko bandhaḥ / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 12-13).*

knowledge (*jñāna*), the other conditions (such as dispassion) do not lead to the results described (such as dissolution in Materiality).⁴³³ In other words, the conditions determine the path of the subtle body only for so long as one has not attained knowledge. As we have seen above, the YD also suggests that the other *sāttvika* conditions may even serve as steps to the attainment of knowledge in a particular incarnation (see further discussion in §IV.7).

Although the YD differs substantially from the other commentaries in correlating the condition of lordliness (*aiśvarya*) with the *vaikṛta* form of bondage, the commentators all agree with regard to the interpretation of lordliness itself. GBh, YD, MV, and TK all equate lordliness with eight traditional supernatural powers, commonly referred to as *siddhi* in the Yoga school but also referred to as *aiśvarya* in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* (ca. 500-700)⁴³⁴ on *Yogasūtra* 3.45. Vyāsa enumerates these as atomisation (*aṇiman*), lightness of weight (*laghiman*), magnification (*mahiman*), acquisition (*prāpti*), irresistibility (*prākāmya*), control (*vaśīṭva*), lordship (*īśīṭṛva*), and transportation to wherever one likes (*yatrakāmāvasāyitva*).⁴³⁵ The TK's interpretation of these powers is closest to the VBh, although like the other commentators, Vācaspati states that there are eight but lists nine, adding heaviness (*gariman*). Gaudapāda provides explanations for eight of the nine listed, leaving out

⁴³³ *āha: yadi [tribhis] tribhīr nimittair vairāgyādibhis trividho bandho nirvartyate yad uktam (236.5) ajñānād bandha iti tad ayuktam / bhāvāntaram hy ajñānam / ataḥ phalāntareṇa bhavitavyam iti / ucyate: na mūlakāraṇatvāt / jñānavarjitānām hi bhāvānām yat phalam tatrajñānam mūlam tannimittatvāt sarveṣām / na hi jñānivairāgyam alam prakṛtilayāya, tathetarāṇi paramarśyādāv adrṣṭatvāt / vicitraṁ kāryam ekasmāt kāraṇād ayuktam iti vairāgyādīny asādhāraṇāni prthak kalpyante / sādharmaṇam tv ajñānam / ato na kaścid doṣaḥ / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 14-21).*

⁴³⁴ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 16.

⁴³⁵ *tato 'ñimādiprādurbhāvaḥ kāyasampattadharmānabhighātaś ca // (YS 3.45, p. 371, l. 12); tatrāñimā bhavaty aṇuḥ / laghimā laghur bhavati / mahimā mahān bhavati / prāptir aṅgulyagreṇāpi sprṣṭi candramasam / prākāmyam icchānabhighātaḥ, bhūmāv unmajjati nimajjati yathodake / vaśīṭvam bhūtabhautikeṣu vaśībhavaty avāśyaś cānyeṣām / īśīṭṛvam teṣām prabhavāpyayavyūhānām īṣṭe / yatra kāmāvasāyitvam satyasankalpāt, yathā sankalpas tathā bhūtaprakṛtīnām avasthānam / na ca śakto 'pi padārthaviparyāsam karoti / kasmāt / anyasya yatra kāmāvasāyinaḥ pūrvasiddhasya tathābhūteṣu samkalpād iti / etāny aṣṭāv aiśvaryaṇi / (VBh on YS 3.45, p. 371, ll. 13-19); I have adopted the translations for the first seven of these terms from LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (2008), p. 210.*

heaviness, while Vācaspati provides explanations for all nine. The YD states simply that atomisation, magnification, lightness, and heaviness are characteristics of the elements (*bhūta*), while the rest are characteristics of the intellect (*buddhi*). In other words, some of these abilities are physical while others intellectual. The GBh and MV provide an etymological gloss of the term *aiśvarya* as the ‘condition of the Lord’ (*īśvarabhāva*).⁴³⁶ The TK connects these abilities with *yogins*.⁴³⁷ While it is thus apparent that the powers of lordliness are generally connected with some form of spiritual attainment in the Sāṃkhya texts, it should be kept in mind that the YD equates the pleasure taken in these abilities with bondage to the products (*vaikārikabandha*), which is considered a hindrance to liberation.

Similarly, the condition of dispassion (*vairāgya*), resulting in dissolution into the eight productive principles (*prakṛtilaya*), is presented by the Sāṃkhya commentators in terms of a certain degree of spiritual attainment but also as a hindrance to liberation. In this respect, the Sāṃkhya system differs from

⁴³⁶ See §V.3 for a discussion of the role of *īśvara* in classical Sāṃkhya and in the YD in particular.

⁴³⁷ *aiśvaryam īśvarabhāvaḥ / tac cāṣṭaguṇam—āṇimā, mahimā, garimā, laghimā, prāptiḥ, prākāmyam īśitvaṃ, vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṃ ceti / aṇor bhāvo 'nimā, sūkṣmo bhūtvā jagati vicaratīti / mahimā, mahān bhūtvā vicaratīti, laghimā, mṛṇālītūlāvayavād api laghutayā puspakesarāgreṣv api tiṣṭhati / prāptiḥ, abhimataṃ vastu yatrataṭrāvasthitam prāpnoti / prākāmyam, prakāmato yad evecchati tad eva vidadhāti / īśitvaṃ, prabhutayā trailokyam api īṣṭe / vaśitvaṃ, sarvaṃ vaśībhavati yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṃ, brahmādistambaparyantaṃ yatra kāmā tatraivāśya svecchayā sthānāsanavihārān ācaratīti / (GBh on SK 23, p. 107, ll. 21-28); tathā aiśvaryaḥ avighātaḥ / etad aiśvaryaṃ, aṣṭaguṇam ānimādiyuktam / (GBh on SK 45, p. 158, l. 1); aiśvaryam apratighātalakṣaṇam / <t>at punar aṣṭavidham ānimā mahimā laghimā garimā prāptiḥ prākāmyam īśitvaṃ vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṃ iti / tatrānimā mahimā laghimā garimeti bhūtavaiśeṣikam / buddhes tu prāptyādi / (YD on SK 23c, p. 193, ll. 1-4); yad aṣṭaguṇam aiśvaryaṃ ānimādi prāg upadiṣṭam (193.1) tasmāt sve sve viśaye 'vighāta utpadyate / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 12-13); aiśvaryaṃ īśvarabhāvenety aṣṭavidham / ānimā laghimā garimā mahimā prāptiḥ prākāmyam īśitvaṃ vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṃ iti / (MV on SK 23, p. 40, l. 22, p. 41, l. 2); kiṃ cānyat—aiśvaryaḥ avighātaḥ yat pūrvam aiśvaryaṃ ānimādikam aṣṭavidham nirdiṣṭam tasmād aiśvaryaḥ prārthitānām avighāto bhavati na muktiḥ / (MV on SK 45, p. 62, ll. 20-22); aiśvaryaṃ api buddhidharmo, yato 'nimādiṣṭaḥ / atrānimā 'nubhāvo yataḥ śīlām api praviśati / laghimā laghubhāvaḥ, yat, sūryamarīcīn ālambya sūryalokaṃ yāti / garimā gurubhāvaḥ yato gurur bhavati / mahimā mahato bhāvaḥ, yato mahān bhavati / prāptiḥ, yato 'ṅgulyagreṇa sprśati candramasam / prākāmyam icchānabhiḥghāto yato, bhūmāv unmajjati nimajjati ca yathodake / vaśitvaṃ yato bhūtabhautikam vaśībhavaty avaśyam / īśitvaṃ yato bhūtabhautikānām prabhavasthitim īṣṭe / yac ca kāmāvasāyitvaṃ sā satyasaṅkalpatā, yena yathā 'sya saṅkalpo bhavati bhūteṣu tathaiva bhūtāni bhavanti / anyeṣāṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ niścayāḥ niścetavyam anuvīdhīyante, yoginas tu niścetavyāḥ padārthāḥ niścayam iti (TK on SK 23, p. 95, ll. 16-25).*

renunciatory traditions, which focus on dispassion or non-attachment as the means to liberation, as the YD-*kāra* points out:

That which has been said by other teachers—‘the liberation of Consciousness is from dispassion or from [a combination of] knowledge and dispassion’—is contradicted.⁴³⁸

As discussed above, the YD equates *prakṛtilaya* with *prakṛtibandha*, one of the results of the condition of ignorance (*ajñāna*). The GBh and MV describe *prakṛtilaya* as absorption into the eight productive principles (*prakṛti*)—that is, into primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*), intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahaṁkāra*), and the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*)—after death. This applies to one who is endowed with the condition of dispassion but also ignorance. After this absorption, transmigration continues. The MV adds that an individual who has attained *prakṛtilaya* believes that he has attained liberation.⁴³⁹ The YD and TK also interpret *prakṛtilaya* as dissolution into the eight productive principles, the TK adding that the individual worships these principles as the self.⁴⁴⁰ Like the GBh and MV, the TK states that one who has attained *prakṛtilaya* is subsequently reborn.⁴⁴¹ Thus, although it is passion (*rāga*) that is said to lead to transmigration (*saṁsāra*) (SK 45), the commentators clarify that its opposite, dispassion (*vairāgya*), if not accompanied by the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*), is also followed by transmigration after a period of dissolution in the productive principles.

⁴³⁸ *yad uktam anyair ācāryaiḥ vairāgyāt puruṣakaivalyam jñānavairāgyābhyāṁ ca iti tatpratiṣiddham bhavati* / (YD on SK 44c, p. 235, ll. 20-22).

⁴³⁹ *yathā kasyacid vairāgyam asti na tattvajñānam / tasmāt ajñānapūrvād vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ, mṛto 'ṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu pradhānabuddhyaṁkāraṇamātreṣu līyate na mokṣaḥ / tato bhūyo 'pi saṁsarati* / (GBh on SK 45, p. 157, ll. 30-32); *yathā kasyacid vairāgyam asti / jīvendriyo viśayebhyo virakto na yamānyamaparaḥ kevalam na tu jñānam asti guṇapuruṣāntarākhyam / tenājñānena vairāgyapūrveṇa nāsti mokṣaḥ / kevalam aṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu layo bhavati pradhānabuddhyaṁkāraṇamātreṣu / tatra līnam ātmānam muktam ity avagacchati / bhūyaḥ saṁsaraṇakāle saṁsarati triṣu lokeṣu śarīrotpattir bhavati / tatra vairāgyam nimittam prakṛtilayo naimittikaḥ* / (MV on SK 45, p. 62, ll. 10-16).

⁴⁴⁰ *vairāgyād aṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu layam gacchati* / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, l. 10); *vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ iti—puruṣatattvānabhiñāsya vairāgyamātrāt prakṛtilayaḥ, prakṛtigrāheṇa prakṛtimahadahaṁkāra-bhūten driyāṇi grhyante, teṣv ātmabuddhyopāśyamāneṣu layaḥ* / (TK on SK 45, p. 131, ll. 17-19).

⁴⁴¹ *kālāntareṇa ca punar āvirbhavati* (TK on SK 45, p. 131, l. 19).

Although *vairāgya* is thus generally considered to hinder liberation through a false identification with the productive principles of Materiality, there is also evidence in the commentaries that it may eventually lead to the condition of *jñāna* and consequent liberation. As will be discussed in the following section, the YD appears to view both *vairāgya* and a form of *dharma* gained through yogic practices as potentially cooperative with the production of *jñāna*.

As we have seen, the YD provides more information than the other commentaries concerning the nature of the *bhāva* of *jñāna*. According to the YD-*kāra*, *jñāna* in the form of liberating knowledge of the *tattvas* can be attained either through the unprecedented (*apūrva*) means identified with the attainments (*siddhi*), or as a result of the practice of the other *sāttvika bhāvas*, which themselves are not directly related to the acquisition of knowledge. The *siddhis* will later be shown to be connected with the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil, thus providing key information with regard to the importance of the Sāṃkhya tradition to the individual's attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* (§IV.9-10, V.1-2). The possibility that a seeker of liberation may, on the other hand, independently undergo a progressive practice leading to liberating knowledge 'generated through practice' (*abhyāsaja*) will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

§7. Evidence for the production of merit (*dharma*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), lordliness (*aiśvarya*), and knowledge (*jñāna*) as a progressive process.

Although the Sāṃkhya texts hold that the liberation gained through the condition (*bhāva*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) is hindered by the other seven conditions, there is some evidence in the commentaries that the conditions of merit (*dharma*), dispassion

(*vairāgya*), and lordliness (*aiśvarya*) may also be considered conducive to the attainment of the condition of knowledge.

As mentioned above (§IV.6), the YD explains, under SK 23, that a particular form of merit (*dharma*) is conducive to the attainment of the other conditions characterised by goodness (*sāttvika*), including knowledge. The commentator explains that *dharma* in general is generated by the performance of actions prescribed by revelation (*śruti*) and traditional texts (*smṛti*) (which are considered by the Sāṃkhya commentators to be the two main sources of authoritative testimony (see §IV.3)). The commentator then divides *dharma* into two forms. The first form brings about the enjoyment of desirable body, faculties, and objects in the worlds of Brahmā, etc.—that is, in higher levels of the phenomenal cosmos—and is considered secondary or unessential (*aṅgabhūta*) to knowledge (*jñāna*), etc.⁴⁴² The implication seems to be that this first form of merit does not lead to the other *sāttvika bhāvas*. The second form of merit, on the other hand, is said to lead to the other *sāttvika bhāvas* (knowledge, etc.) becoming a first step toward elevation (*abhyudaya*) and ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa*).⁴⁴³

According to the text of the critical edition, the commentator appears to state, after his description of the first form of *dharma*, that the second form of *dharma* is produced by sacrificial oblations and by the performance of restraints (*yama*) and observances (*niyama*).⁴⁴⁴ However, since the commentator has at this point given no explanation of the means by which the first form of merit is cultivated, we might be justified in slightly amending the text so that the term *agnihotrahavanādikriyānuṣṭhānasādhanaḥ* ('the means to which is the performance of [sacrificial]

⁴⁴² *tatra śrutismṛtivyahitānām karmaṇām anuṣṭhānād buddhyavasthaḥ sattvāvayava āśayabhūto dharma ity ucyate / sa tu dvividhaḥ / brahmādisthāneṣv abhipretaśarīrendriyaviṣayopalabhoga-ni<r>vartako jñānādyaṅgabhūtaś ca prathamaḥ /* (YD on 23bc, p. 191, ll. 33-36).

⁴⁴³ See n. 422 (§IV.6).

⁴⁴⁴ *agnihotrahavanādikriyānuṣṭhānasādhano yamaniyamasādhanaḥ <ca> itaraḥ /* (YD on SK 23bc, p. 191, ll. 36-37).

actions such as the offering of oblations to the sacrificial fire') is read as part of the preceding line and therefore descriptive of the first form of merit, while the second form (which is conducive to the production of *jñāna*) is described in terms of the performance of the yogic activities of *yama* and *niyama*. This interpretation would agree with that of the TK (see below).

The author of the YD enumerates the restraints (*yama*) as non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), truth (*satya*), not stealing (*asteya*), non-wickedness (*akalkatā*), and chastity (*brahmacarya*), and the observances (*niyama*) as non-anger (*akrodha*), service to one's teacher (*guruśuśrūṣā*), purity (*śauca*), lightness of eating (*āhāralāghava*), and cautiousness (*apramāda*).⁴⁴⁵ These differ somewhat from the usual lists given by the texts of the Yoga school: non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), truth (*satya*), not stealing (*asteya*), chastity (*brahmacarya*), and non-greed (*aparigraha*) for the restraints,⁴⁴⁶ and purity (*śauca*), contentment (*saṃtoṣa*), asceticism (*tapas*), recitation (*svādhyaya*), and devotion to the Lord (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*) for the observances.⁴⁴⁷ The GBh and MV quote these lists from the YS and include them as forms of merit, the GBh adding compassion (*dayā*) and charity (*dāna*) as productive of merit.⁴⁴⁸

The TK is similar to the YD in dividing merit into two types. The first is generated by the performance of sacrifice (*yāga*) and charity (*dāna*) and leads to prosperity (*abhyudaya*), while the second is generated by the performance of the

⁴⁴⁵ *tatrāhiṃsā satyam asteyam akalkatā brahmacaryam iti pañca yamāḥ* (cf. YS 2.30) / *akrodho guruśuśrūṣā śaucam āhāralāghavam apramāda iti pañca niyamāḥ* / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 191, l. 33 – p. 192, l. 6).

⁴⁴⁶ *ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ* // (YS 2.30, p. 242, l. 27).

⁴⁴⁷ *śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ* // (YS 2.32, p. 247, l. 26).

⁴⁴⁸ *tatra dharmo nāma dayādānayaṃ yamāmalakṣaṇaḥ* / *tatra yamā niyamāś ca pātāṅjale 'bhihitāḥ* / *ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ* (YS 2.30) / *śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvara-praṇidhānāni niyamāḥ* (YS 2.32) / (GBh on SK 23, p. 107, ll. 11-14); *tatra dharmo nāma varṇinām āśramiṇām ca samayāvirodhena yaḥ prokto yamāmalakṣaṇaḥ sa dharmo* / *tatra pañca yamāḥ pañca niyamāḥ* / *ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ* / *śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ* / (MV on SK 23, p. 38, l. 12-15).

eightfold *yoga* (referring again to Patañjali's system) and leads to ultimate bliss (*niḥśreyasa*).⁴⁴⁹ The commentators thus include such yogic practices as productive of *dharma* and, in the case of the YD and TK, as steps toward liberation. The YD's explicit identification of the sources of these practices with the main categories of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) provides a reference point by which to reconstruct the commentator's views with regard to the role of such doctrine in the generation of liberating knowledge (see §V.1-2).

As discussed above (§IV.6), the YD also suggests that a particular form of liberating knowledge (*abhyāsaja*, 'generated through practice') is brought about by the attainment of dispassion (*vairāgya*). This suggestion is complicated by the commentator's definition of dispassion, also under SK 23, as a 'clarity of intellect brought about by the practice of knowledge'.⁴⁵⁰ Evidently, the commentator holds the conditions of knowledge and dispassion to be mutually cooperative. The phrase 'practice of knowledge' (*jñānābhyāsa*) suggests that the condition of *jñāna* itself may develop progressively (perhaps in conjunction with the development of *dharma* and *vairāgya*), rather than arising as a sudden and complete enlightenment as in the case of the *apūrva* form of *jñāna* (see §IV.6).

The YD is not alone among the commentaries in suggesting the possibility of the progressive development of the condition of *jñāna*. The GBh and MV provide a specific order of progression of the four *sāttvika* conditions. According to these texts, in the case of the form of *jñāna* derived from the products (*vaikṛta*; see §IV.8), one first obtains knowledge from a teacher, which leads to dispassion, then merit,

⁴⁴⁹ *dharmo 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasahetuḥ tatra yāgadānādyanuṣṭhānajanito dharmo 'bhyudayahetuḥ, aṣṭāṅgayogānuṣṭhānajanitaś ca niḥśreyasahetuḥ* / (TK on SK 23, p. 93, ll. 31-33).

⁴⁵⁰ *virāgas tu rāgapratipakṣabhūto jñānābhyāsaopajanito buddheḥ prasādaḥ* / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, l. 15).

then lordliness.⁴⁵¹ This progression accords with the above-mentioned statement by the YD that dispassion results from the practice of knowledge. In addition, the fact that this progression applies only to one form of *jñāna* (*vaikṛta*) and that the *bhāvas* may therefore be produced either progressively or not, can be compared to the YD's statement that knowledge may be produced suddenly or as the result of a progressive practice.

In summary, the evidence of the GBh, MV, YD and TK suggests that the production of the four *sāttvika* conditions may occur in a progressive manner, though this is not always the case. The YD testifies that knowledge may be unprecedented (*apūrva*) or may result from the practice of the other conditions, while the practice of knowledge may lead to the acquisition of other *sāttvika* conditions (which thus, in combination with knowledge, do not result in further transmigration; see §IV.6). This evidence will be taken into account throughout the discussions in CHAPTER V of the relationship between Sāṃkhya doctrine and practice according to the YD.

§8. The classification of the conditions into innate (*sāṃsiddhika*), deriving from primordial Materiality (*prākṛtika*), and deriving from the products (*vaikṛta*).

The Sāṃkhya commentators' views on the manner in which the *bhāva* of *jñāna* is produced are complicated by another classification of the *bhāvas* in the SK. In the context of this classification, the commentators make special reference to the *ṛṣi* Kapila, who is singled out from all other beings in terms of the manner in which his

⁴⁵¹ *tathā vaikṛtā yathā—ācāryamūrtim nimittam kṛtvā asmadādīnām jñānam utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam, vairāgyād dharmam, dharmād aiśvaryam iti* / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 7-8); *vaikṛtikā yathā—ācāryādīmūrtim adhikṛtya utpannā vaikṛtikā ity ucyante / ācāryam nimittam kṛtvā jñānam utpadyate / jñānāt vairāgyam, vairāgyād dharmo, dharmād aiśvaryam* / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 12-15).

knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* was produced. The YD's discussion of this classification of the *bhāvas* also provides a link between the *bhāvas* and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*; see §IV.9-10), by extension providing a clearer picture of the role of the Sāṃkhya tradition of texts and teachers in the attainment of liberating knowledge by individual seekers (see §V.1-2).

As mentioned above (§II.5), Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the conditions (*bhāva*) are threefold: *sāṃsiddhika*, *prākṛtika*, and *vaikṛta* (SK 43).⁴⁵² These terms are usually translated as 'innate', 'natural', and 'acquired', respectively. Although I will retain the translation of *sāṃsiddhika* as 'innate', alternative translations of the latter two terms, closer to their etymological significance, can be proposed on the basis of the commentaries. This section will highlight the interpretation of these terms by the YD in particular, in order to provide context for a discussion of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* in §IV.10, as well as for further discussion in CHAPTER V of the YD's views on the production of the *bhāva* of *jñāna* in relation to Kapila and his role in the initiation of the Sāṃkhya tradition.

The commentators all agree that *sāṃsiddhika*, *prākṛtika*, and *vaikṛta* refer to the manner in which the *bhāvas* are produced, although their interpretations of the terms vary slightly. The argument for revising the translations of these terms must be made on the basis of the commentators' illustrations of the three modes of production of the *bhāvas*.

The GBh and MV give as an example of the *sāṃsiddhika* variety of the conditions the production of the *sāttvika* conditions of the ṛṣi Kapila (see CHAPTER V): Kapila was endowed with merit (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), and lordliness (*aiśvarya*) as he was born at the time of the first creation

⁴⁵² *sāṃsiddhikāś ca bhāvāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtāś ca dharmādyāḥ / dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ* // (SK 43).

(*ādisarga*).⁴⁵³ As examples of *prākṛtika* conditions, Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara give the conditions of four sons of Brahmā, named by Gauḍapāda as Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra.⁴⁵⁴ The two commentators state that these four beings were endowed with the four *sāttvika* conditions when their bodies were sixteen years of age. The MV adds that these conditions arose suddenly, ‘like the sight of a treasure’.⁴⁵⁵ This description suggests that these conditions were latent in the individuals, though their manifestation was delayed until a certain age, and justifies the usual translation of *prākṛtika* (or *prākṛta*) as ‘natural’. In contrast, the *vaikṛta* form of the conditions is interpreted by the GBh and MV as applicable to ordinary people, who acquire knowledge from a teacher, leading to the production of the other three *sāttvika* conditions (see §IV.7). Gauḍapāda explains the term *vaikṛta* by the fact that the body of a teacher is a product (*vikṛti*).⁴⁵⁶ Although it is clear from these texts that the *vaikṛta* conditions are considered to be ‘acquired’ rather than latent in

⁴⁵³ *tatra sāmsiddhikā yathā bhagavataḥ kapilasyādisarge utpadyamānasya catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannāḥ—dharmāḥ, jñānaḥ, vairāgyaḥ aiśvaryaḥ iti* / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 3-5); *tatra sāmsiddhikāḥ tāvat yathā kapilasya bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ādisarge utpannasya ime catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannā dharmo jñānaḥ vairāgyaḥ aiśvaryaḥ iti / ete sāmsiddhikā ucyante* / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 6-9).

⁴⁵⁴ These figures also appear in a list of seven *ṛṣis*, including Kapila, found in MBh 12.327.64-65, a variation of which occurs in the GBh:

*sanakaḥ sanatkujātaś ca sanakaḥ sasanandanaḥ /
sanatkumāraḥ kapilaḥ saptamaś ca sanātanaḥ //
saptaita mānasāḥ proktā ṛṣayo brahmaṇaḥ sutāḥ /
svayamāgatavijñānā nivṛttaḥ dharmam āsthitāḥ //* (MBh 12.327.64-65);
*sanakaś ca sanandanaś ca tṛtīyaś ca sanātanaḥ /
āsurīḥ kapilaś caiva voḍhuḥ pañcaśikhaś tathā /
ity ete brahmaṇaḥ putrāḥ sapta proktā maharṣayaḥ //* (GBh on SK 1, p. 35, ll. 16-18).

It is not clear whether the term *brahman* in these verses is to be taken as masculine or neuter, but the mythological subject matter probably makes a case for the former. See §V.5 for a discussion of the significance of GBh’s grouping of Kapila with these *ṛṣis*, in contrast to the YD’s elevation of Kapila to a special status.

⁴⁵⁵ *prākṛtāḥ kathiyante—brahmaṇaś catvāraḥ putrāḥ sanakasānandanasanātanasanatkumārā babhūvuḥ / teṣāṃ utpannakāryakāraṇānāṃ śārīrīṇāṃ ṣoḍaśavarṣāṇāṃ ete bhāvāś catvāraḥ samutpannāḥ, tasmād ete prākṛtāḥ* / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 5-7); *prākṛtikā nāma brahmaṇaḥ putrāḥ kila sanakādayo babhūvuḥ / teṣāṃ utpannakāryakāraṇānāṃ śārīravatāṃ ṣoḍaśavarṣāṇāṃ evaite catvāro bhāvā akasmād evotpannā / nidhidarśanavat / ete ca prākṛtikā bhāvā ucyante* / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 9-12).

⁴⁵⁶ *tathā vaikṛtā yathā—ācāryamūrtiṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā asmadādīnāṃ jñānam utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyaḥ, vairāgyād dharmāḥ, dharmād aiśvaryaḥ iti / ācāryamūrtir api vikṛtir iti tasmād vaikṛtā* / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 7-9); *vaikṛtikā yathā—ācāryādīmūrtim adhikṛtya utpannā vaikṛtikā ity ucyante / ācāryaṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā jñānam utpadyate / jñānāt vairāgyaḥ, vairāgyād dharmo, dharmād aiśvaryaḥ / evam ete catvāro bhāvā asmadādiṣv api vartante / tad evaṃ vaikṛtā ity ucyante* / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 12-16).

the individual (as are the *prākṛtika* variety), according to Gauḍapāda's etymological explanation a literal translation of the term would be 'deriving from a product'. Although Gauḍapāda does not specify the source of this product, according to Sāṃkhya cosmology this would ultimately be primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa's classification of the principles (*tattva*) into sources (*prakṛti*) and products (*vikṛti*) (SK 3)⁴⁵⁷ may be relevant to Gauḍapāda's interpretation of the term *vaikṛta*, insofar as the gross elements (*mahābhūta*) that make up a teacher's body are classed as products (*vikṛti*).

In the context of its discussion of these three types of the *bhāvas*, the YD mentions only innate knowledge as possessed by Kapila, although elsewhere the text (like the other classical commentaries) mentions that he was endowed also with innate merit, dispassion, and lordliness.⁴⁵⁸ In explanation of his *sāṃsiddhika jñāna*, the text explains that since he was not encumbered by wickedness (*khalatva*), there was no hindrance to the production of his knowledge at the same time as the manifestation of his psycho-physical body (*kāryakaraṇa*)⁴⁵⁹. The commentator goes on to say that for others, due to an obscuration of the constituent quality of goodness (*sattva*), the condition of knowledge results from a 'flowing' (*abhiśyanda*) from Materiality (*prakṛti*) after some time; this is the *prākṛta* variety.⁴⁶⁰ The assumption

⁴⁵⁷ *mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivilkṛtayaḥ sapta /*

śoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ // (SK 3).

⁴⁵⁸ *paramarṣir bhagavān sāṃsiddhikair dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvairyair āviṣṭapiṇḍo viśvāgrajaḥ kapilamuniḥ /* (YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 13-14).

⁴⁵⁹ The term *kāryakaraṇa* occurs very frequently in the YD. In the same context (of the discussion of the forms of the *bhāvas*), GBh appears to gloss *utpannakāryakaraṇa* as *śarīrin* ('embodied') (see n. 455 above). In the YD, *kāryakaraṇa* usually occurs in the singular (cf. n. 695 (§V.3)) and appears to refer simply to the 'body', but in this passage it also occurs in the dual (p. 234, l. 3; see n. 460 below), in which case it would literally translate 'the effect and the instrument'. Presumably, the term refers to the combination of the subtle body (the 'instrument') and the physical body (the 'effect'). (Cf. SK 43cd: '[The *bhāvas*] are seen to be located in the instrument; the embryo, etc., are located in the effect.' (*dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ*).) I thus use the term 'psycho-physical body' here in the sense of the entire intellectual and physical organism.

⁴⁶⁰ *tathā cārṣer ūho nopapadyate / pratibandhābhāvāt / na hy asya kāryakaraṇavyūha-samakāla-jñānotpattau kaścit pratibandho 'sti / aparivṛtakhalatvād yataḥ kālāntaram pratikṣeta / tasmād asya sahaiva kāryakaraṇābhyaṃ jñānam abhiniṣpadyate pradīpaprakāśavat / ity atah*

that *prakṛti* as used in the singular here refers specifically to primordial Materiality (*mūlaprakṛti*; *pradhāna*) can be supported with reference to the YD's application of the term *prākṛta*, later in the commentary on SK 43, to the production of physical bodies (see below), in which they are said to arise out of *pradhāna*.⁴⁶¹ According to this definition, then, the term *prākṛta* may be interpreted as 'deriving from primordial Materiality'.

The YD also gives several examples of individuals born with innate (*sāmsiddhika*) conditions other than knowledge, as well as several in whom there arose *sāttvika* conditions deriving from primordial Materiality (*prākṛta*). As an illustration of the production of *prākṛta* conditions, the text describes the dispassion of Āsuri (Kapila's disciple), which arose when he was 'favoured' (*anugrṛhīta*) by a 'stream of purity' (*śuddhisrotas*) from *prakṛti*.⁴⁶² This description further supports the above translation of *prākṛta* as 'deriving from primordial Materiality'.

In summary, according to the YD, not only do *prākṛta* conditions arise 'naturally', but they arise specifically due to a flowing (*abhiśyanda*) or stream (*srotas*) from Materiality (*prakṛti*). The implications of this definition will be discussed further in CHAPTER V. No explanation of the term *vaikṛta* is provided by the YD, but as in the GBh and MV, the YD states that *vaikṛta* conditions are

sāmsiddhikam / anyeṣāṃ tu sattvasyāpaṭutvāt kālāntareṇa prakṛtyabhiśyandād <yad> drāḡ iti bhavati kṣṇasarpadarśanavat tat prākṛtam / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 31 – p. 234, l. 5).

⁴⁶¹ *prākṛtaṃ yathā mātmyāśārīrābhi<dhy>ānāt tasya hy abhi<dhy>āno bhavati hatāhaṃ putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye mām paraṃ <cāparaṃ> ca jñāsyanti (cf. 239.13) / sa yādrk sargam abhidhyāyati tādrk pradhānād utpadyate* (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, ll. 25-28). This assumption can be further supported by reference to another passage of the YD (on SK 39ab, p. 228, ll. 11-12), which uses similar terminology in describing the circumstances of the birth of Kapila himself; the implications of this terminological link will be discussed in §V.4.

⁴⁶² *yathā ca paramarṣer jñānaṃ sāmsiddhikam evam mātmyāśārīrasyaśaiśvaryam bhṛgvādīnām dharmāḥ sanakādīnām vairāgyam, adharmo yakṣarākṣaḥprabhṛtīnām, anaiśvaryam ṣaṭsiddhikṣaya-kālotpannānām mānuṣānām tiraścāṃ ca, rāgo 'jñānaṃ <ca> paramarṣivarjyānām / prākṛtās tu tadyathā vairāgyam bhagavadāsureḥ / tasya hi paramarṣisambhāvanād utpanno dharmo 'śuddiṃ pratidvandvibhāvād apaja<ghāna> / tasyām apahatāyām prakṛteḥ śuddhisrotaḥ pravṛttam yenānugrṛhīto duḥkhatrayābhīghātād utpannajijñāsaḥ pravrajitaḥ / tathā maheśvarasamparkān nandina aiśvaryam, nahuṣasyāgastyasamparkād dharma ityādi /* (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 6-14).

The YD also outlines the views of two Sāṃkhya teachers preceding Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vindhyavāsin,⁴⁶⁴ with regard to the classification of the forms of the conditions. According to the YD, Pañcādhikaraṇa held a twofold division of the conditions, into *prākṛtika* and *vaikṛtika*. He divided the former into three types: ‘simultaneous with the principles’ (*tattvasamakāla*), ‘innate’ (*sāṃsiddhika*), and ‘flowing’ (*ābhiṣyandika*). He divided the latter into ‘self-acquired’ (*svavaikṛta*) and ‘acquired from others’ (*paravaikṛta*).⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶³ *vaikrtās tu bhāvā asmadādīnām* / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, l. 14).

⁴⁶⁵ *pañcādhikaraṇasya tādā dvividhaṃ jñānaṃ prākṛtikam vaikṛtikam ca / prākṛtikam trividhaṃ tattvasamakālaṃ saṃhataś ca mahāṃs tattvātmanā mahati ca pratyayo bhavati / utpannakārya-karaṇasya tu sāmsiddhikam ābhiśyandikam ca bhavati / utpannakāryakaraṇasya tu sāmsiddhikam ābhiśyandikam ca bhavati / sāmsiddhikam yat saṃhatavyūhasamakālaṃ niṣpadyate yathā paramarṣer jñānam / ābhiśyandikam ca sāmsiddhakāryakaraṇasya kāraṇāntarenotpadyate / vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividhaṃ / svavaikṛtaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ ca / svavaikṛtaṃ tāraṇam / paravaikṛtaṃ siddhyantarāṇi / āha ca—*

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Vindhyavāsin, the *vaikṛtika* forms of knowledge (*tāraka*, etc.; see §IV.10) are common to everyone.⁴⁶⁶ Since no mention is made in this passage of Pañcādhikaraṇa's *ābhiśyandika* form of knowledge, it is not clear whether Vindhyavāsin's attained (*siddha*) form encompasses both the *ābhiśyandika* and *vaikṛtika* forms or only the *vaikṛta* form. The former seems more likely, though, since we are told that Vindhyavāsin rejects *tattvasama* and *sāmsiddhika* but not *ābhiśyandika*.

The author of the YD explains that Īśvarakṛṣṇa rejects the possibility of knowledge arising simultaneously with the principles (as held by Pañcādhikaraṇa).⁴⁶⁷ The YD's description of the production of *prākṛta* knowledge as the result of a flowing (*abhiśyanda*) from Materiality (*prakṛti*) (see above) suggests an equivalence between Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *prākṛta* and Pañcādhikaraṇa's *ābhiśyandika*. Furthermore, the fact that Pañcādhikaraṇa placed innate (*sāmsiddhika*) knowledge under the heading of natural (*prākṛtika*), and the YD's explanation of the distinction between these two types (see above), suggest that *sāmsiddhika* knowledge is essentially of the same nature as *prākṛtika* knowledge, except that in Kapila's unique case there was no hindrance to the production of this condition from Materiality. Later in this passage, the YD-*kāra* also suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa accepts Pañcādhikaraṇa's division of

⁴⁶⁶ *vindhyavāsinas tu nāsti tattvasamaṃ sāmsiddhikaṃ ca / kiṃ tarhi / siddh<a>rūpaṃ niṣpadyate yasmād gurumukhābhipratipatteḥ pratipatsyata ity <etad apy> āha siddhaṃ nimittaṃ naimittakasyānugrahaṃ kurute nāpūrvam utpādayati iti (cf. YBh on YS 4.12) / nimittanaimittikabhāvāc caivam upapadyate / tatra paramarṣeḥ paṭur ūho 'nyeṣāṃ kliṣṭa ity ayaṃ viśeṣaḥ / sarveṣāṃ eva tu tārakādyaviśiṣṭam / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 20-26). In the critical edition, Wezler and Motegi have amended the phrase *siddhirūpaṃ* (in all manuscripts) to *siddharūpaṃ* (as above); the original reading, however, would also make sense if we assume the identity of *vaikṛta jñāna* with *siddhi* (see §IV.10).*

⁴⁶⁷ *ācārya āha trividhā bhāvāḥ sāmsiddhikāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtikāś ca (cf. SK 43ab) iti / tatra sāmsiddhikagrahaṇāt tattvasamakālaṃ pratyācaṣṭe naiva tad astīti / katham / yadi hi tathā syāt tattvāntarānutpatti<h> / saṅghāto vyūhaś cānarthakaḥ syāt / mahaty utpannam jñānam tatraivopalabham iti kaḥ saṅghātārthaḥ / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 27-31).*

vaikṛta knowledge into *svavaikṛta* and *paravaikṛta*, stating that ‘*vaikṛta* is twofold, as before’.⁴⁶⁸

The YD is unique among the commentaries in taking the threefold classification into *sāṃsiddhika*, *prākṛtika*, and *vaikṛta* to apply not only to the production of the *bhāvas* but also to the production of the physical body. SK 43cd states that ‘[the *bhāvas*] are seen to be located in the instrument [i.e., either the intellect (*buddhi*) or the internal instrument plus the faculties⁴⁶⁹]; the embryo, etc., are located in the effect [i.e., the body].’⁴⁷⁰ GBh, MV and TK take the term ‘embryo, etc.’ (*kalalādi*) to refer to a series of stages in the development of the physical body.⁴⁷¹ The YD does not mention these stages, discussing instead the manner in which the body and its characteristics are produced. In this connection, the YD-*kāra* takes the threefold division applied to the *bhāvas* in SK 43ab to apply also to ‘the embryo, etc.’ As examples of the *sāṃsiddhika* category, he mentions the bodies of planets, stars, and asterisms,⁴⁷² and the particular innate characteristics of species, such as the whiteness of swans and the variegated colours of partridges and peacocks. He interprets the *prākṛta* category to refer to the ability of gods to produce

⁴⁶⁸ *vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividhaṃ pūrvavat* / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 234, ll. 5-6).

⁴⁶⁹ GBh glosses *karaṇa* as *buddhi* (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, l.13: *buddhiḥ karaṇam tadāśrayiṇaḥ*), while MV identifies the ‘instruments’ (*karaṇāni*) with the sense- and action-faculties and the threefold internal instrument of *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, and *manas* (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 19-21: *karaṇāny ucyante buddhi-karmāntaḥkaraṇabhedāḥ trayodaśa / tāny āśrityāṣṭau bhāvāḥ pravartante* /); cf. SK 33ab, which presents this division into internal and external instruments: *antaḥkaraṇam trividhaṃ daśadhā bāhyaṃ trayasya viśayākhyam*.

⁴⁷⁰ *dr̥ṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ* (SK 43cd).

⁴⁷¹ *kāryaṃ dehas tadāśrayāḥ kalalādyāḥ, ye mātṛjā ity uktāḥ / śukraśoṇitasamyoge vivṛddhihetukāḥ kalalādyā budbudamāṃsapeśīprabhṛtayaḥ, tathā kaumārayauvanasthaviratvādayo bhāvāḥ, annapānaranimittāḥ nispadyante / ataḥ kāryāśrayiṇa ucyante annādiviśayabhoganimittā jāyante* / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 15-18); *yathā sūkṣmaśarīram utpattikāle mātur udaraṃ praviśati / mātuh rudhiraṃ pituh śukraṃ tasya sūkṣmaśarīrayopacayaṃ kurute / kalalabudbudaghanamāṃsapeśī-garbhakumārayauvanasthāvirādayo ’nnapānaranimittā utpadyante* / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, l. 23 – p. 61, l. 3); *kāryaṃ śarīram tadāśrayiṇaḥ, tasyāvasthāḥ, kalalabudbudamāṃsapeśīkaraṇādūdyanṅa-pratyāṅgavyūhāḥ garbhasthasya, tato nirgatasya bālasya bālyakaumārayauvanavārdhakānūti* / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 22-24).

⁴⁷² The term *vaivarta*, literally meaning ‘revolution’, must refer to ‘revolving heavenly bodies’ here, since it is glossed as *grahanakṣatratārādi*, ‘planets, asterisms and stars’. According to MONIER-WILLIAMS, the term *vivarta* is similarly attested as a name of the sky, ‘the revolving one’, in Vedic literature. Perhaps the bodies of stars and planets are considered innate in the sense that they have always existed?

bodies that arise directly out of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*). As examples of this, he refers to a mythological story (reproduced in full by the YD-*kāra* in the context of his discussion of the *pratyayasarga*; see §IV.9) in which a *māhātmyaśarīra* (‘body of greatness’) ⁴⁷³ produces sons simply by thinking about them, and also to the production of millions of Rudras by Śiva (*maheśvara*).⁴⁷⁴ As an example of the *vaikṛta* form of the production of bodies, the commentator describes a pregnant woman who gives birth after drinking milk, ‘as described in the science of medicine (*bhīṣagveda*)’.⁴⁷⁵

In this passage, the description of the *māhātmyaśarīra*’s sons as arising out of *pradhāna* supports the translation of *prākṛtika* as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (see above). Moreover, since milk can be considered a product (*vikṛti*), like the body of a teacher as mentioned by GBh (see above), the translation of *vaikṛta* as ‘deriving from the products’ would be appropriate in this instance as well.

The TK’s interpretation of the SK’s classification of the forms of the conditions (SK 43) differs from that of the other commentaries. Vācaspati takes the

⁴⁷³ On the apparent identification of the *māhātmyaśarīra* with either Brahmā or Śiva, see the review in CHAPTER III of BRONKHORST (1983) and the discussion in §V.3.

⁴⁷⁴ Since two separate mythological stories are referenced in this passage, there is no reason to take *māhātmyaśarīra* and *maheśvara* to refer to the same figure, despite the evidence presented by BRONKHORST (1983, p. 152) for the identity of *māhātmyaśarīra* with Śiva (cf. §V.3).

⁴⁷⁵ *yathā caite tathā—kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ || (SK 43d) trividhaiveti / kalalādigrahaṇena śarīraṇy āha / teṣāṃ ākṛtivaiśvarūpyaṃ caturdaśavidhe saṃsāre trividham / tatra samsiddhikas tāvat vaivartānāṃ grahanakṣatratārādīnāṃ / jātikṛtaś ca viśeṣaḥ <yathā(?)> haṃsānāṃ śauklyam tittirimayūrādīnāṃ citracchadatvam iti / prākṛtaṃ yathā māhātmyaśarīrābhi<dhy>ānāt tasya hy abhi<dhy>āno bhavati hantāhaṃ putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye mām param <cāparam> ca jñāsyanti (cf. 239.13) / sa yādṛk sargam abhidhyāyati tādrk pradhānād utpadyate tadyathā maheśvarasya rudrakotiśṣṭau iti / vaikṛtās tu kalalādyā yathā bhīṣagvede ‘bhīhitam kṣīraṃ pītṛvā garbhīṇī gauram putram janayati (cf. Brh. U. 6.4.14) iti / (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, l. 20 – p. 235, l. 2). LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) appear to have fundamentally misinterpreted this passage by correlating the three forms of the production of bodies with the possession of the three forms of the *bhāvas*: ‘The author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, in explaining the adjectives “*sāmsiddhika*,” “*prākṛta*,” and “*vaikṛta*” as modifiers of the term “*bhāva*” in verse 43 of the *Kārikā* [...] comments that those beings endowed with “modified” (*vaikṛta*) predispositions transmigrate in the usual fashion through a continuing process of rebirth, (b) those beings endowed with “inherently powerful” (*prākṛta*) predispositions (namely, the *māhātmyaśarīras*, or Great Beings) can generate whatever bodies they wish; and (c) those beings endowed with “innate” (*sāmsiddhika*) or perfect predispositions have subtle bodies that transmigrate among “the planets, the lunar mansions, and the stars” (*grahanakṣatratārādī*).’*

term *sāṃsiddhika* as a gloss on *prākṛtika*, thus making the classification twofold: *prākṛtika* and *vaikṛtika*. He describes the *prākṛtika* variety as ‘natural’ (*svābhāvika*) and ‘innate’ (*sāṃsiddhika*) and offers the stock example of Kapila’s innate merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness.⁴⁷⁶ Although this equivalence of *prākṛtika* and *sāṃsiddhika* is clearly a departure from the views of the earlier commentators, it does call to mind the essential similarity between the two suggested by the YD. Vācaspati explains the *vaikṛtika* variety as being brought about after the individual’s birth, by means of the performance of activities such as the worship of deities. As an example of *vaikṛtika* conditions, he mentions the *sāttvika* conditions of the great seers (*maharṣi*) such as Prācetasā^{477 478}. It is significant that, following the general trend of the earlier commentators, Vācaspati distinguishes between Kapila and other *ṛṣis* in this respect (see CHAPTER V).

In summary, the YD provides a more elaborate interpretation of the nature of the *sāṃsiddhika* and *prākṛtika* forms of the *bhāvas* than do the other commentaries. This interpretation is compatible with the explanations of GBh and MV. The evidence of the YD suggests that *prākṛtika* conditions are the result of a flowing (*abhiṣyanda*) or stream (*srotas*) from Materiality (*prakṛti*), that the term *prākṛtika* thus be translated as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’, and that *sāṃsiddhika* conditions are also of a *prākṛtika* nature but differ in being produced at the birth of an individual. The fact that, according to the YD’s interpretation of the term *prākṛtika*, physical bodies, like the *bhāvas*, can be produced directly from *pradhāna*, will be discussed further in §V.4, in connection with the circumstances surrounding

⁴⁷⁶ *vaikṛtikāḥ naimittikāḥ puruṣasya jātasyottarakāladevatārādhanādinotpannāḥ / prākṛtikāḥ svābhāvikā bhāvāḥ sāṃsiddhikāḥ / tathā hi—sargādāv ādividvān atra bhagavān kapilo mahāmuniṛ dharmajñāna-vairāgyaiśvaryasampannāḥ prādurbabhūveti smaranti* / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 1-4)

⁴⁷⁷ Jha (*Tattvakaumudī* (2004), p. 128) identifies *prācetasā* as an epithet of Vālmīki, although it could also refer to Manu or (perhaps less likely) Dakṣa.

⁴⁷⁸ *vaikṛtās ca bhāvā asāṃsiddhikāḥ, ye upāyānuṣṭhānen-otpannāḥ, yathā prācetasaprabhṛtīnām maharṣīṇām / evam adharmajñānāvairāgyānaiśvaryaṇy api* / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 5-7).

the birth of Kapila himself. The GBh's explanation of the term *vaikṛta* suggests that it be similarly interpreted as 'deriving from the products', which accords with the YD's interpretation of the *vaikṛta* production of physical characteristics. The TK, like the other commentaries, affords a special status to Kapila in terms of the production of his *bhāvas*. However, the TK differs fundamentally from the other commentaries in its classification of the forms of the conditions, suggesting a break in the tradition of interpretation.

Although, as discussed in §IV.6-7, in the context of SK 23 the YD-*kāra* explains that liberating knowledge may either be produced suddenly (*apūrvā*) through the attainments (*siddhi*) or may be generated through practice (*abhyāsaja*), we have seen that under SK 43 the commentator also allows for the 'flowing' of this knowledge directly from primordial Materiality, which in the case of Kapila occurred at the time of his birth. It would seem logical to assume that the *sāṃsiddhika* and *prākṛtika* modes of production of *jñāna* apply only to the kind of extraordinary individuals who are mentioned by the YD-*kāra* in this context, while most seekers are considered capable of attaining only *vaikṛta jñāna* either in a sudden fashion or through progressive practice. One would expect the Sāṃkhya texts themselves to play a prominent role in informing such ordinary individuals of the existence of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*. The commentator's discussion of the modes of production of the *bhāvas* does not tell us much about the role of the Sāṃkhya tradition in the production of *jñāna*. However, as will be shown in §IV.10, this discussion does provide a link to the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the *pratyayasarga*, which directly concerns the transmission of knowledge through teacher and text.

§9. The commentators' interpretations of the intellectual creation

(*pratyayasarga*).

The manner in which the condition (*bhāva*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) is attained by ordinary seekers of liberation, and the role of the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers in producing such knowledge, can be clarified by reference to the YD's treatment of the related Sāṃkhya paradigm of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*).

The commentators' interpretations of the four categories and fifty subcategories of the *pratyayasarga* follow the classifications given in SK 46-51 (see §II.5), although these interpretations vary. After a discussion of the commentators' views on the general nature of the *pratyayasarga*, this section will focus specifically on the commentators' explanations of the forms of attainment (*siddhi*), one of the four main divisions of the *pratyayasarga*. Attainment is associated by the commentators with the production of knowledge leading to liberation (*mokṣa*, *kaivalya*) and with the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil. The discussion of attainment, particularly in the YD, thus provides some key information with regard to the nature of Kapila's knowledge and the importance of his authority in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

GBh, MV and TK are unanimous in glossing the term *pratyaya* as *buddhi* (intellect) and explaining the term *pratyayasarga* as thus 'the creation of the intellect'.⁴⁷⁹ The YD offers three alternative explanations of the term. First, the commentator gives *padārtha* and *lakṣaṇa* as synonyms of *pratyaya*, indicating that *pratyayasarga* refers to the 'creation of categories [i.e. of the fifty categories

⁴⁷⁹ *pratyayo buddhir ity uktā, adhyavasāyo buddhir dharmo jñānam ity ādi* / (GBh on SK 46, p. 160, l. 4); *pratyayāt buddher utpanno yasmāt tasmāt pratyayasarga ity ucyate* / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 8-9); *pratīyate 'neneti pratyayo buddhiḥ, tasya sargaḥ* / (TK on SK 46, p. 133, l. 1).

(*padārtha*)⁴⁸⁰]. The second explanation corresponds to that of the GBh, MV and TK, but the YD adds that *sarga* (creation) refers to the effect or function of the intellect. Lastly, the commentator suggests that the term could be interpreted as ‘the creation caused by an intellect’.⁴⁸¹

In connection with the third explanation of the term *pratyayasarga*, the YD-*kāra* quotes a passage (arguably from the pre-classical Sāṃkhya text *Śaṣṭitantra*)⁴⁸² relating a mythological story in which a *māhātmyaśarīra* (‘body of greatness’)⁴⁸³, referred to by the YD-*kāra* as Brahmā, produces as his sons, by means of his thought alone, a series of gods (*deva*) associated with particular streams (*srotas*): five gods having ‘primary streams’ (*mukhyasrotas*), twenty-eight having ‘horizontal streams’ (*tiryaksrotas*), nine having ‘upward streams’ (*ūrdhvasrotas*), and eight having ‘downward streams’ (*arvāksrotas*). The YD-*kāra* equates these with the five forms of error (*viparya*), the twenty-eight forms of incapacity (*aśakti*), the nine forms of contentment (*tuṣṭi*), and the eight forms of attainment (*siddhi*), respectively.⁴⁸⁴ Elsewhere, he mentions that the *māhātmyaśarīra*’s sons arise out of primordial

⁴⁸⁰ As outlined in §II.5, the *pratyayasarga* is divided into four main categories—error (*viparyaya*), incapacity (*aśakti*), contentment (*tuṣṭi*) and attainment (*siddhi*)—which are subdivided into fifty categories (*padārtha*).

⁴⁸¹ *pratyayasarga iti pratyayaḥ padārtho lakṣaṇam iti paryāyāḥ / pratyayānām sargaḥ pratyayasargaḥ padārthasargo lakṣaṇasarga ity arthaḥ / athavā pratyayo buddhiḥ niścayo 'dhyavasāya iti paryāyāḥ / tasya sargo 'yam, ataḥ pratyayasargaḥ pratyayakāryaṁ pratyayavyapāra ity arthaḥ / athavā pratyayapūrvakaḥ sargaḥ pratyayasargaḥ / buddhipūrvaka ity uktaḥ /* (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, ll. 6-10).

⁴⁸² On the apparent origin of this passage in the *Śaṣṭitantra*, see the reviews in CHAPTER III of FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961).

⁴⁸³ On the identification of the *māhātmyaśarīra* with either Brahmā or Śiva, see the review in CHAPTER III of BRONKHORST (1983) and further discussion in §V.3.

⁴⁸⁴ *evaṁ hi śāstraṁ mahadādiviśeṣāntaḥ sargo buddhipūrvakatvāt / utpannakāryakaraṇas tu māhātmyaśarīra ekākinam ātmānam avekṣyābhidadhyau hantāhaṁ putrān sraṁsyē ye me karma kariṣyanti / ye mām paraṁ cāparaṁ ca jñāsyanti / tasyābhidhyāyataḥ pañca mukhyasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuh / teṣūtpanneṣu na tuṣṭiṁ lebhe / tato 'nye tiryaksrotaso 'ṣṭāviṁśatiḥ prajājñe / teṣv apy asya matir naiva tasthe, athāparena vordhvasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuh / teṣv apy utpanneṣu naiva kṛtārtham ātmānam mene / tato 'nye 'ṣṭāv arvāksrotaso utpeduh / evaṁ tasmād brahmaṇo 'bhidhyānād utpannaḥ, tasmāt pratyayasargaḥ / sa viparyayākhyo 'śaktyākhyas tuṣṭyākhyas siddhyākhyas ceti /* (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-20).

Materiality (*pradhāna*) (see §IV.8).⁴⁸⁵ Moreover, in his discussion of the function of *siddhi* in particular, the commentator states: ‘The stream of attainment (*siddhisrotas*) which is always issuing out of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*) does not function in all beings, on account of the interference of error, incapacity, and contentment.’⁴⁸⁶ As discussed by OBERHAMMER (1961)⁴⁸⁷, it is significant that thus, according to the YD, the categories of the *pratyayasarga*, like the *prākṛtika* variety of the *bhāvas* (see §IV.8), arise as a stream out of *pradhāna*. This and other evidence in the YD of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* will be discussed in §IV.10.

In his commentary on SK 51, the YD-*kāra* correlates the four streams mentioned above to four classes of beings. Inanimate objects (*sthāvara*) have ‘primary streams’ (*mukhyasrotas*) and are thus characterised by error (*viparyaya*). Animals (*tiryāṇc*) have ‘horizontal streams’ (*tiryaksrotas*) and are thus characterised by incapacity (*aśakti*). Gods (*deva*) have ‘upward streams’ (*ūrdhvasrotas*) and are thus characterised by contentment (*tuṣṭi*). Human beings (*mānuṣa*) have ‘downward streams’ (*arvāksrotas*) and are thus characterised by attainment (*siddhi*). Human beings therefore progress toward attainment but are hindered by error, incapacity, and contentment.⁴⁸⁸ The GBh, however, appears to conflict with this scheme by defining *siddhi* as ‘knowledge characterised by the constituent quality of goodness (*sāttvika*) in one with an upward stream (*ūrdhvasrotas*)’.⁴⁸⁹ It is unclear whether Gauḍapāda holds gods rather than human beings to be capable of attainment, or

⁴⁸⁵ *prākṛtaṃ yathā mātmyā<a>śarīrābhi<dhy>ānāt tasya hy abhi<dhy>āno bhavati hantāhaṃ putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye mām paraṃ <cāparaṃ> ca jñāsyanti* (cf. 239.13) / *sa yādṛk sargam abhidhyāyati tādṛk pradhānād utpadyate tadyathā maheśvarasya rudrakotiṣṭṭau iti* / (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, ll. 25-29).

⁴⁸⁶ *nityapravṛttasyāpi pradhānāt siddhisrotaso viparyayāśaktituṣṭipratibandhāt sarvaprāṇiṣv apravṛttir bhavati* / (YD on SK 51d, p. 252, l. 30 – p. 253, l. 1).

⁴⁸⁷ OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 139-140.

⁴⁸⁸ *viparyayāt tāvat sthāvareṣu / te hi mukhyā<a>srotaso viparyayātmānaḥ / aśaktes tiryakṣu / te hi tiryaksrotaso śaktiātmānaḥ / tuṣṭer deveṣu / te hy ūrdhvasrotasas tuṣṭyātmānaḥ / mānuṣās tv arvāksrotasah saṃsiddhyātmānaḥ / tasmāt ta eva tārakādiṣu pravartante sattvarajastamasām cāṅgāṅgibhāvānīyamād viparyayāśaktituṣṭibhiḥ pratihanyanta iti na sarveṣāṃ sarvadā siddhir bhavati* / (YD on SK 51, p. 253, ll. 1-6).

⁴⁸⁹ *tathā aṣṭavidhā siddhiḥ / sāttvikāni jñānāni tatraivordhvasrotasi* / (GBh on SK 47, p. 162, l. 16).

rather holds human beings rather than gods to be characterised by upward streams. There is no evidence available to explain this discrepancy between the evidence of the GBh and the YD. The YD, however, provides a more complete and elaborate picture of the relation of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* to the four classes of beings.

In summary, the *pratyayasarga* can be defined as a creation of fifty categories, representing the various effects or functions of the intellect, and applicable in different degrees to different classes of beings. The mythological dimension of the production of these categories, added by the YD, is representative of a general tendency on the part of the YD-*kāra*—a tendency, at least in this instance, which seems to be carried on from the *Śaṣṭitantra*⁴⁹⁰—to incorporate figures of divine authority or prominence into discussions of Sāṃkhya doctrine (see §V.3-5).

With regard to the four divisions of the *pratyayasarga*, GBh and MV illustrate the relationship between them with an example involving the perception of a post (*sthāṇu*). In this situation, error (*viparyaya*) is described as a doubt as to whether it is a post or a person. Incapacity (*aśakti*) is the inability to dispel this doubt, even when the post is seen clearly. Contentment (*tuṣṭi*) applies to one who does not care about knowing whether it is a post or not. Attainment (*siddhi*) is the realisation that it is in fact a post, when one sees a creeper or a bird upon it.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 260: ‘Religious sects present their theories not in the abstract objective form like the philosophical schools. They would rather like to clothe them in the form of stories and they especially give them a drapery of myths. [...] The influence of such a myth-making kind shows itself in many parts of the Sāṃkhya theory of the old school of Vṛṣagaṇa.’

⁴⁹¹ *tatra saṃśayo 'jñānaṃ viparyayaḥ / yathā sthānudarśane sthānura ayam puruṣo veti saṃśayaḥ / aśaktir yathā—tam eva sthānum samyag drṣtvā saṃśayam chettum na śaknotīty aśaktiḥ / eva tṛtīyaś tuṣṭyākhyo yathā—tam eva sthānum jñātum saṃśayitum vā necchati, kim anenāsmākam ity eṣā tuṣṭiḥ / caturthaś siddhyākhyo yathā—ānanditendriyaḥ sthānum ārūdhām vallim paśyati śakunim vā, tasya siddhir bhavati sthānura ayam iti / (GBh on SK 46, p. 160, ll. 5-10); saṃśayabuddhir viparyayaḥ sthānura ayam puruṣo veti / bhūyo 'pi sthānum prasamīkṣya na śaknoty antaram gantum evam asyāśaktir utpannā / tatas tṛtīyaś tam eva sthānum jñātum saṃśayitum vā necchati kim anenāsmākam*

In a similar manner, YD uses the example of the attainment of merit (*dharma*) to illustrate the categories of the *pratyayasarga*. When one engaged in the pursuit of *dharma*, abandoning sacrifices like the *agniṣṭoma*, creates confusion (*saṃkara*)⁴⁹², this is considered error (*viparyaya*). In this context, incapacity (*aśakti*) is the inability [to perform sacrifice] due to a deficiency in the means [of sacrifice]. Contentment (*tuṣṭi*) is satisfaction with merely lighting [the sacred fire] (*ādhāna*). Attainment (*siddhi*) is the performance of the particular [sacrificial] act in its entirety. The commentator adds that these categories are applicable in the same way to the pursuit of other objects.⁴⁹³ In his commentary on SK 51, the YD-*kāra* describes *siddhi* as the attainment of *abhipretam artham*.⁴⁹⁴ The significance of this phrase is not clear from the context, but in its broadest, most literal sense it translates as ‘an intended object’.⁴⁹⁵

These passages suggest that the categories of the *pratyayasarga* describe potentially any situation in which the attainment of an object is considered to be hindered by error, incapacity and contentment (cf. SK 51d⁴⁹⁶). However, the

ity eṣā tuṣṭiḥ / bhūyaś caturtho (dr̥ṣṭam yasmin) sthāṇvādirūḍhāṃ valliṃ paśyati śakuniṃ vā / tato 'sya niścaya utpadyate sthāṇur ayam ity eṣā siddhiḥ / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 11-16).

⁴⁹² The term *saṃkara* usually refers to the intermixture of castes through indiscriminate marriage, but it could alternatively refer simply to confusion of the elements of the ritual act. Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992), p.322) follow the former interpretation, while KENGHE (1968, p. 366) follows the latter. KENGHE's interpretation seems more likely, given the context of the performance of ritual.

⁴⁹³ *tadyathā dharmārthapravṛtto 'gniṣṭomādīn parityajya saṃkaram kurvīta so 'sya viparyayaḥ, sādhanavaikalyād asāmarthyam aśaktiḥ, ādhānamātrasantoṣas tuṣṭiḥ, kṛtsnasya kriyā-viśeṣasyānuṣṭhānam siddhiḥ / evaṃ <anyā> rthādiṣu yojyam / yaś cāyam caturvidhaḥ phalaviśeṣo viparyayādir ākhyataḥ* (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, l. 22 – p. 240, l. 2). My interpretation follows the emendation of the text by Wezler and Motegi. The phrase *arthādiṣu* in all manuscripts, coming after the illustration of *dharma*, could alternatively suggest that the passage refers to the traditional four ‘goals of man’ (*puruṣārtha*): *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, and *mokṣa*.

⁴⁹⁴ *tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam artham vicāraṇābalenaiva pratipadyate sādya siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate /* (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13); *etāsāṃ saṃśrayeṇābhipretam artham yataḥ saṃsādhayantīty atah pūrvācāryagataṃ mārgam āruruḥṣus tatpravaṇaḥ syād iti /* (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, ll. 22-24).

⁴⁹⁵ For a possible alternative explanation of the phrase *abhipretam artham*, see §V.1.

⁴⁹⁶ *siddheḥ pūrvo 'nkuśas trivividhaḥ /* (SK 51d): ‘The previous are the threefold curb to attainment.’ GBh, MV, and TK explain the term *aṅkuśa* (literally, ‘hook’) using the metaphor of an elephant which is restrained by a hook; e.g.: *yathā hastī gr̥hītāṅkuśena vaśo bhavati, evaṃ viparyayāśaktituṣṭibhir gr̥hīto loko 'jñānam prāpnoti /* (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, ll. 19-20).

commentators generally discuss *siddhi* in terms of the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and stress that, like the condition of *jñāna* (see §IV.6), *siddhi* leads ultimately to the attainment of liberation (*kaivalya*). For instance, YD refers to liberation as the ‘highest attainment’.⁴⁹⁷ GBh and MV say that *siddhi* leads to knowledge of the principles (*tattva*), which in turn results in liberation.⁴⁹⁸ Given this concern with the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge in particular, it is possible that the term *abhipretārtham* in the YD refers more specifically to the ‘intended goal’ of Sāṃkhya—that is, to liberation through knowledge.

Similarly, the commentators’ explanations of the subdivisions of *viparyaya*, *aśakti*, and *tuṣṭi* generally focus upon their role as hindrances to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge. For a discussion of the views of GBh, YD, JM and TK (with a focus on the YD) on these subdivisions, see KENGHE (1968). KENGHE has demonstrated the relation of the categories of *viparyaya* and *tuṣṭi* to the doctrines of Pātañjalayoga (see CHAPTER III). Moreover, OBERHAMMER (1961) has suggested that the categories of the *pratyayasarga* had their origins as ‘meditative existential attitudes’ in ‘circles connected with Yoga’.⁴⁹⁹ Accordingly, the YD’s explanation of the way in which *siddhi* eliminates *viparyaya*, *aśakti*, and *tuṣṭi* seems to reflect a view of *siddhi* as the result of yogic practice. The YD-*kāra* explains that because *siddhi* results in unrestricted knowledge, it eliminates error. Similarly, because *siddhi* results in non-obstruction with regard to things past, present and future, things near and remote, and things grasped by the senses and suprasensuous (*atīndriya*), it eliminates incapacity. These abilities recall the supernormal powers termed *siddhi* in

⁴⁹⁷ *eteṣāṃ mārge ’vasthāpanāt parām siddhiṃ kaivalyalakṣaṇām acireṇa prāpnoti* / (YD on SK 51d, p. 253, ll. 12-13).

⁴⁹⁸ *sasiddhes tattvajñānam utpadyate / tasmāt mokṣa iti* / (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, l. 21); *siddhes tattvajñānam tasmāc ca mokṣa iti* (MV on SK 51, p. 69, l. 19).

⁴⁹⁹ OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 162-163.

Yoga and associated with *aiśvarya* (also said to result in non-obstruction⁵⁰⁰) in Sāṃkhya (see §IV.6), as well as the fact that *yogins* are said to be able to perceive suprasensuous objects (see §IV.1). Moreover, the YD continues, because *siddhi* leads to knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness, it dispels contentment (*tuṣṭi*) with any lesser stage of accomplishment (*bhūmi*). This accords with KENGHE's⁵⁰¹ comparison of *tuṣṭi* with the notion of *alabdhabhūmikatva* ('the state of not having attained a stage') in Yoga.⁵⁰²

It thus seems reasonable to conclude that this passage of the YD reflects, in some sense, the original association of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* with stages of yogic practice. However, the commentators' descriptions of the subdivisions of *siddhi* do not mention the practices of Yoga but rather deal largely with the production and transmission of knowledge. As KENGHE notes,⁵⁰³ the notion of *siddhi* in Sāṃkhya can thus be sharply contrasted with the notion of *siddhi* or *aiśvarya* in Pātañjalayoga, which is generally held by the Sāṃkhya texts to be a hindrance to liberation through knowledge (see §IV.6). The Sāṃkhya commentators' association of *siddhi* with the attainment of knowledge, rather than of supernatural abilities, reflects the system's emphasis on knowledge as the sole means to liberation. The remainder of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the subdivisions of *siddhi* and their relation to the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.

As outlined in §II.5, SK 51 lists the eight varieties of *siddhi* as reflection (*ūha*), speech (*śabda*), study (*adhyayana*), the three removals of pain

⁵⁰⁰ SK 45c: *aiśvaryād avighāto*.

⁵⁰¹ KENGHE (1968), p. 369.

⁵⁰² *yathā ca siddheḥ viparyayāśaktituṣṭayaḥ pratipakṣā evaṃ siddhir api viparyayādīnām / sā hy utpannā sarvān etān nivartayati / katham / aviparītajñānaṃ viparyayam, atītānāgatavartamāneṣu sannikṛṣṭeṣu viprakṛṣṭeṣv indriyagrāhyeṣv atīndriyeṣu cāpratighātād aśaktim, puruṣasya prakṛtīvikāravayatiriktasya darśānāt sarvāsu bhūmiṣu tuṣṭim* / (YD on SK 51d, p. 253, ll. 7-11).

⁵⁰³ KENGHE (1968), p. 373.

(*duḥkhavighāta*), attainment of/from friends (*suhṛtprāpti*), and charity (*dāna*). GBh explains each of these as a distinct means of attaining liberation. Reflection (*ūha*) is described as the reflection by an individual on the questions: ‘What is the truth here? What is the highest? What leads to the ultimate? Doing what will I have attained my goal?’ This reflection leads to the knowledge of the distinctions between the principles (*tattva*) and resultant liberation. Knowledge gained through speech or language (*śabda*) produces the same knowledge of the principles and liberation. Likewise, study (*adhyayana*) of texts (*śāstra*) such as the Veda leads to the same result. (This point is surprising, given Sāṃkhya’s rejection of scriptural (*ānuśravika*) means to liberation (SK 2; see §II.3).) The three pains are listed as personal (*ādhyātmika*), external (*ādhibhautika*) and divine (*ādhidaivika*), which are explained by the commentators under SK 1 in connection with the reason given for initiating the Sāṃkhya enquiry.⁵⁰⁴ These pains motivate one to approach a teacher (*guru*), from whose teachings one attains liberation. The seventh *siddhi*, *suhṛtprāpti*, is described simply as the attainment of knowledge from a friend, which likewise leads to liberation. Lastly, charity (*dāna*) is the attainment of liberating knowledge from a holy man (*bhagavat*) whom one has given gifts such as shelter, medicine, staff, bowl, food or clothing.⁵⁰⁵ Although Gauḍapāda thus explains each of these

⁵⁰⁴ E.g., GBh on SK 1, p. 36, ll. 1-6: *tatra duḥkhatrayam—ādhyātmikam, ādhibhautikam, ādhidaivikam ceti / tatrodhyātmikam dvividham—śārīraṃ, mānasam ceti / śārīraṃ vātapittaśleṣaviparyayakṛtaṃ jvarātisārādi / mānasam priyaviyogāpriyasamyogādi / ādhibhautikam caturvidhabhūtagrāmanimittam manuṣyapaśumṛgapakṣisarīspadamśamaśakayūkāmatakuṇamatsya-makaragrāhasyāvarebhyo jarāyujāṇḍajasvedajodbhijebhyaḥ sakāśād upajāyate / ādhidaivikam—devānām idaṃ daivam, divaḥ prabhavatīti vā daivam /*

⁵⁰⁵ *ūho yathā kaścin nityam ūhate—kim iha satyam, kiṃ param, kiṃ naiḥśreyasam, kiṃ kṛtvā kṛtārthaḥ syām—iti cintayato jñānam utpadyate pradhānād anya eva puruṣa iti, anyā buddhiḥ, anyo ’haṅkāraḥ, anyāni tanmātrāṇḍriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtānīty evaṃ tattvajñānam utpadyate yena mokṣo bhavati / eṣā ūhākyā prathamā siddhiḥ / tathā śabdajñānāt pradhānapuruṣabuddhy-ahāṅkāratārendriyapañcamahābhūtaviṣayaṃ jñānam bhavati, tato mokṣa ity eṣā śabdākyā siddhiḥ / adhyayanād vedādiśāstrādhyayanāt pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānam prāpya mokṣam yāti, ity eṣā tṛtīyā siddhiḥ / duḥkhavighātatrāyam / ādhyātmikādhibhautikādhidaivikaduḥkhatrayavighātāya guruṃ samupagamyā tata upadeśān mokṣam yāti / eṣā caturthī siddhiḥ / eṣaiva duḥkhatrayabhedāt tridhā kalpanīyā / iti ṣaṭ siddhayaḥ / tathā suhṛtprāptiḥ / yathā kaścid suhṛtjñānam adhigamyā mokṣam gacchati / eṣā saptamī siddhiḥ / dānam / yathā kaścid bhagavatam pratyāśrayauśadhi-*

siddhis in terms of a separate means of attaining liberating knowledge, he does not explain the specific nature of *śabda*, and it seems as though *duḥkhavigāta*, *suhṛtprāpti*, *dāna*, and perhaps *adhyayana* would fall under the general category of *śabda*, given that they all involve the transmission of knowledge through the medium of language.

The explanation of the *siddhis* given by MV includes some elements found in GBh but differs in important respects. Māṭhara also mentions the questions considered by one engaged in reflection (*ūha*), but adds that thinking thus, one obtains knowledge from oneself, from a teacher (*guru*), or from a text (*śāstra*). The second *siddhi* is explained as the attainment of liberating knowledge upon hearing the words (*śabda*) of someone reciting [a text]. One obtains this knowledge through study (*adhyayana*) when by serving a *guru* one is able to study and understand Sāṃkhya knowledge. In contrast to GBh, MV treats the three removals of pain (*duḥkhavigāta*) as preliminary steps to attaining knowledge through one of the first three *siddhis*. In explanation of attainment of/from friends (*suhṛtprāpti*), Māṭhara says that someone who is foolish does not come to understand through the presence of a *guru*, and that *suhṛtprāpti* is when such a person is taught Sāṃkhya knowledge by a compassionate friend using language that is easy to understand, so that ‘even stones would understand’. MV’s explanation of charity (*dāna*) accords with that of GBh: one attains Sāṃkhya knowledge by propitiating *gurus* by means of various gifts.⁵⁰⁶

tridaṇḍakuṇḍikādīnām grāsācchādanādīnām ca dānenopakṛtya, tebhyo jñānam avāpya mokṣaṃ yāti / eṣā aṣṭamī siddhiḥ / (GBh on SK 51, p. 170, l. 27 – p. 171, l. 9).

⁵⁰⁶ *tatra ūho nāma yathā kaścit cintayati, kiṃ paraṃ yathātmayaṃ, kiṃ niḥśreyasaṃ, kiṃ kṛtvā sukhaṃ prāpyate / evam asya cintayato jñānam utpadyate svataḥ śāstrato guruto vā / yat pradhāna-buddhyahankāraṇamātrendriyabhūtāny anyāni aham anya iti tato mokṣaṃ gacchati eṣā ūhasiddhiḥ prathamā / caurasādhutadanugāmīsvāmipathikasamyogādivat prakṛtipuruṣaśiṣyagurukramajñānam / tad yathā grāmam ācchidya caurā yānti / tatsārthamādhye sādhuḥ eko gacchati / tadanugāmī ca svāmī / caturthaḥ pathikas tadabhijñāḥ / pathikacauramādhye sādhuḥ api cauraguṇāsprṣṭo ‘pi tadanugāminā cauratayā pratītas tādṛggaṇanāyām (pratītaḥ) tadabhijñāna pathikena svāmī*

Insofar as the MV includes attainment from oneself, from a *guru*, and from a *śāstra* in its definition of *ūha*, there seems to be some overlap in terms of the nature of the various *siddhis*, as was also apparent in GBh. In general, both texts emphasize the role of a *guru* and the power of language in the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge. The MV suggests that even a foolish person may attain such knowledge with the help of a compassionate friend who is willing to use simple language.

In contrast to these texts, the YD does not define the *siddhis* in terms of the attainment specifically of Sāṃkhya knowledge, but it does offer a clearer explanation of the differences in the functions of the *siddhis* in relation to the transmission of knowledge. Reflection (*ūha*) is explained as the attainment of the intended object (*abhipretam artham*) through the power of reflection (*vicāraṇa*) without recourse to perception, inference, or doctrine (the normal means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); see §II.4, IV.1-5).⁵⁰⁷ Both *ūha* and *vicāraṇa* usually indicate a process of logical reasoning, which here must nevertheless function independently of the *pramāṇa* of inference (*anumāna*). This ceases to be a problem when we

sambodhito yad ahaṃ sarvaṃ jñāmi amī caurā ayaṃ sādhuḥ eva tatārthānuvartitī / evaṃ caurasthānīyo buddhyahankāratātmārendriyabhūtasamavāyaḥ, sādhuḥsthānīyaś ca puruṣaḥ, tadanugāmīsthānīyaḥ śiṣyo, bhedenā boddhyāḥ / pathikasthānīyo guruḥ / tasmā jñānam pratikātrayenaivāvagamya—gurutaḥ, śāstrataḥ, svataḥ ity ūhasiddhiḥ prathamoktā / śabda nāma yathā kasyacit paṭhataḥ (tam asya jñānam) śabdaṃ śrutvā 'nyat pradhānam anyo 'ham iti tanmārgapravṛttiprabuddho mokṣaṃ gacchati evaṃ eṣa dvitīyā siddhiḥ śabdata utpannā / kaścit gurupāsanayā tato 'dhīyāvagamya sakalaṃ jñānam āpnoti / tṛtīyādhyayanasiddhiḥ sāṃkhyajñānam adhīya sañjātā / evaṃ etās tīrasaḥ siddhayaḥ / śeṣa vyākhyāyante / duḥkhavighātatrāyaṃ iti / yathā kaścīd ādāv abhihitādhyātmikādi-duḥkhatrayeṇābhībhūto 'sya pratikāraṇa ūhaṃ śabdān adhīyantaṃ vā pratipadya jñānam adhigamya mokṣaṃ yātīti duḥkhavighātāya yatrohāditrayaṃ adhikurute tad api siddhitrayaṃ / evaṃ ṣaṭ siddhayaḥ / kaścīd dūrmedhā guroḥ sakāśāt nāvadhārayati / tat kenacit pratyupakārānapekṣeṇa suhṛdā tasmāt saṃsārakūpāt ujjihṛsuṇā tadanukūlatayā kṛpāvatā sugamavacobhir vairāgyapūrvakaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaropalābdirūpaṃ sāṃkhyajñānam upadiśatā samuddhṛtam ālokyāha bhagavān śāstrakāraḥ suhṛtpṛāptir iti / te hi suhṛdā tathopadiśanti suhṛttayā yathā pāṣāṇā 'py avabudhyate / uktaṃ ca—

*eṣa āturacittānāṃ mātṛāsparśecchayā vibhūḥ /
bhavasindhuplavo dṛṣṭo yad ācāryānuvartanam //*

eṣa saptamī siddhiḥ / kaścīd āvāhanasaṃvāhanabhikṣāpātravastracchatrakamaṇḍaluprabhṛtidānena gurūn ārādhyā sāṃkhyā adhigamya mokṣaṃ gacchati eṣa 'ṣṭamī siddhiḥ dānādibhir upāyair niṣpannā / (MV on SK 51, p. 67, l. 20 – p. 69, l. 7).

⁵⁰⁷ *taroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam artham vicāraṇābalenaiva pratipadyate sādya siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate / tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 12-14).*

consider that inference is generally presented by the YD as an aid in the communication of knowledge to another (see §IV.2). *Ūha* must, in contrast, represent some sort of independent mental activity.

Speech (*śabda*) is explained by the YD as attainment from the teaching of a *guru* by one who is frustrated from attaining the object oneself. Study (*adhyayana*) is similarly a means of attainment for one who is unable to attain even from another's teaching.⁵⁰⁸ The YD-*kāra* says that beings up to Brahmā attain the intended object (*abhipretam artham*) through these three means of attainment.⁵⁰⁹ He then quotes a passage from the *Nirukta* (NU), apparently to illustrate the nature of these three *siddhis* (see below).⁵¹⁰ Like the MV, the YD treats the three removals of pain (*duḥkhavighāta*) as preliminary steps to attainment through one of the first three *siddhis*. The YD describes attainment of/from friends (*suhṛtprāpti*) as the removal of doubts after recourse to a good friend who is endowed with happiness. The final *siddhi* is described as attainment through one of the first three *siddhis* after overcoming misfortune through charity (*dāna*).⁵¹¹ The commentator closes this

⁵⁰⁸ *yadā tu svayaṃ pratipattau pratihanyamāno gurūpadeśāt pratipadyate sā dvitīyā siddhiḥ sutāram ity apadiśyate / katham / sukhān anenādyatve 'pi bhavasamkātāt tarantīti / yadā tv anyopadeśād apy asamarthaḥ pratipattum adhyayanena sādhayati sā tritīyā siddhis tārāyantaṃ ity apadiśyate / tad etat tāraṇakriyāyā adyatve 'py avyāvṛttatvān mahāviśayatvāt tārāyantaṃ ity apadiśtam /* (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 15-21).

⁵⁰⁹ *ta ete trayāḥ sādhanopā<yā>yair ā brahmaṇaḥ prāṇino 'bhipretam artham prāpnvanti /* (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 21-22).

⁵¹⁰ *āha ca sākṣātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ / te'parebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmebhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto 'pare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca (Nir. 1.20) iti / bilmaṃ bhāsanam saṃyakpratibhāsāya viśiṣṭaḥ samketa uktaḥ /* (YD on SK 51, p. 251, l. 22 – p. 252, l. 2).

⁵¹¹ *eśam tu sādhanopāyānām pratyānikapraṭiśedhāya duḥkhavighātatrāyaṃ / duḥkhāni trīṇy ādhyātmikādīni / tatra cādhyātmikānām vātādīnām siddhipratyanikānām āyurvedakriyānuṣṭhānena vighātaṃ kṛtvā pūrveśam trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sā caturthī siddhiḥ pramodaṃ ity abhidhīyate / katham / nivṛttarogā hi prāṇinaḥ pramodayanta iti kṛtvā / yadā tv ādhibhautikānām mānuṣādīnimittānām siddhipratyanikānām sāmādinā yatidharmānugūṇena vopāyena pūrveśam trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sā pañcamī siddhiḥ pramuditam ity abhidhīyate / katham / anudvigno hi pramudita iti kṛtvā / yadā tu śītādīny ādhidaivikāni dvandvāni siddhipratyanikāni svadharmānurodhena pratihatya pūrveśam trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sā ṣaṣṭhī siddhir modamānam ity abhidhīyate / katham / dvandvānupahatā hi prāṇino modanta iti kṛtvā / suhṛtprāptiḥ / yadā tu kuśālasaṃsprṣtam sanmitram āśritya sandehanivṛttiṃ labhate sā ramyakam iti saptamī siddhir apadiśyate / ramyo hi loke sanmitrasamparkaḥ / tasya saṃjñāyām (cf. Pāṇ. 4.3.147) ramyam eva ramyakam / dānam / yadā tu daurbhāgyam dānenātītya pūrveśam trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sāṣṭamī siddhiḥ sadāpramuditam ity abhidhīyate / subhago hi sadāpramudito bhavati /*

discussion with the following statement: ‘Since [people] accomplish the intended object by recourse to these [*siddhis*], one desirous to advance upon the path travelled by previous teachers (*ācārya*) should be intent upon them.’⁵¹²

Since the YD-*kāra* states that all beings attain the intended object through one of the first three *siddhis*, it seems reasonable to assume that *suhr̥tprāpti*, like *duḥkḥavigāta* and *dāna*, is considered a preliminary step to attainment through one of the first three *siddhis*. Thus, according to the YD, the three primary *siddhis* are reflection (*ūha*), speech (*śabda*), and study (*adhyayana*). The nature of these three *siddhis*, and the commentator’s statement that the *siddhis* allow one to follow the path travelled by previous teachers, suggest that these three primary *siddhis* describe the process by which knowledge has been produced and transmitted from *guru* to disciple. Moreover, the term *ācārya* (‘teacher’) usually refers to Sāṃkhya teachers (especially Īśvarakṛṣṇa) in the YD.⁵¹³ The use of this term here could thus be taken to imply that the *siddhis* are important primarily insofar as they describe the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge. This supposition may be supported by reference to the commentator’s classification of the forms of knowledge under SK 23, in which he refers to the first three *siddhis* as the means to unprecedented (*apūrvā*) knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness.⁵¹⁴ The distinction in the same passage between this *apūrvā* form of knowledge and knowledge attained by means of the usual *pramāṇas* accords with the commentator’s definition of *ūha*.

tasmād daurbhāgyanivṛttiḥ sadāpramuditam / ity evam etāḥ siddhayo ’ṣṭau vyākhyātāḥ / (YD on SK 51, p. 252, ll. 2-22).

⁵¹² *etāsām saṃśrayeṇābhipretam arthaṃ yataḥ saṃsādhayantīty ataḥ pūrvācāryagataṃ mārgam āruruḥṣus tatpravaṇaḥ syād iti /* (YD on SK 51, p. 252, ll. 22-24).

⁵¹³ Cf., for example, the YD’s discussion of the forms of the *bhāvas*, in which *ācārya* is used to refer both to Sāṃkhya teachers in general (YD on SK 43, p. 23, ll. 5-6: *tatrācāryānām vipratipattiḥ*) and to Īśvarakṛṣṇa in particular (YD on SK 43, p. 23, ll. 27-28: *ācārya āha trividhā bhāvāḥ samsiddhikāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtikāś ca* (cf. SK 43ab) *iti* /). The commentator also refers to Kapila himself as an *ācārya* in the context of SK 70 (see §V.4, n. 754).

⁵¹⁴ YD on SK 23, p. 192, ll. 7-11; see §IV.6, n. 415.

More information on the nature of these three primary *siddhis* can be ascertained from the YD-*kāra*'s use of the NU quotation. In its original context, this passage⁵¹⁵ occurs in a section of the NU devoted to the praise of those who know the proper, etymological meanings of words. WEZLER (2001) argues that this passage thus 'also deals with the praise of those who know the meaning—of course of the Veda—and the censure of those who do not.'⁵¹⁶ The passage in question is also notably quoted in the *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* (VPV).⁵¹⁷ AKLUJKAR (2009) offers a translation of the NU passage, based on interpretative information obtained largely from the context of the VPV in which it is quoted:

There came about (or there were) (at a distant time) seers who had discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things. Through instruction, they have entrusted materially effective speech formations to others who had not discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things. The others experiencing fatigue toward instruction, have set down for transmission this corpus (i.e., the commentandum of the Nirukta, the Nighaṇṭus etc...) and the Veda and the Veda ancillaries in order to grasp the image. (The word) *bilma* is (to be thought of as) *bhilma* or (as) *bhāsana*.⁵¹⁸

The YD-*kāra*'s use of this quotation reflects his tendency to appropriate the Vedic model of transmission when discussing the manner in which Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted (see §V.1-2). Evidently, the YD-*kāra* views reflection (*ūha*) as comparable to the abilities of the 'seers who had discovered the (ordinarily

⁵¹⁵ *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ / te 'varebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmabhyā upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṁ granthaṁ samāmnāsiṣuḥ / vedaṁ ca vedāṅgāni ca / bilmaṁ bhilmaṁ bhāsanam iti vā* / (NU 1.20, p. 41, l. 17 – p. 42, l. 2). YD (see n. 510), like the Vṛtti on *Vākyapadīya* 1.5 (p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1) has '*parebhyo* and '*pare* for '*varebhyo* and '*vare*. WEZLER (2001, p. 218, n. 19) observes that '*apara* is not semantically clearer than *avara*, and both words mean "low, inferior" and suggests that '[t]he secondarily attested reading, not found in mss. of the Nir. itself, is hence most probably due to a scribal mistake.' However, AKLUJKAR (2009, p. 85-86) argues: '*avara* has a strong association with "later" and "inferior"...whereas *apara* does not. One would thus be justified in suspecting that the *avara: apara* variation reflects a consciously and/or carefully maintained tradition.'

⁵¹⁶ WEZLER (2001), p. 217.

⁵¹⁷ VPV 1.5, p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1.

⁵¹⁸ AKLUJKAR (2009), pp. 25-26. With regard to the meaning of the obscure term *bilma*, glossed by the YD as 'a particular hint for a complete similitude' (*saṃyakpratibhāsāya viśiṣṭaḥ saṃketah*; see n. 510 above), AKLUJKAR argues (pp. 23-24): 'The entity it refers to must either consist of the mantras or be a means to the mantras. Under the first alternative, it would be a collection, recasting (rearrangement, redaction, etc.) or reflection of the mantras (the entity received by or revealed to the s-k-d ṛṣis); under the second, at least, something that follows the lead or determining status of the mantras.'

imperceptible) properties of things’ (*sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayah*), speech (*śabda*) as comparable to the instruction and transmission (i.e. to a pupil by a *sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣi*) of ‘materially effective speech formations’ (*mantra*),⁵¹⁹ and study (*adhyayana*) (i.e. of Sāṃkhya texts) as comparable to study of the Veda (i.e. the collected and organised *mantras*) and the Vedāṅgas (including the NU).⁵²⁰ The significance of this understanding of the *siddhis* in relation to the knowledge of Kapila and the tradition initiated by him must be considered in the light of the YD-*kāra*’s apparent view of the relationship between the *siddhis* and the *bhāvas*, to be discussed below (§IV.10).

The TK’s treatment of the *siddhis* differs substantially from those of the earlier commentators. Vācaspati presents the three removals of pain (*duḥkha-vighāta*) as the three primary *siddhis*, and offers two alternative explanations of the other five. According to the first interpretation, they are progressive steps to the removals of pain. Study (*adhyayana*) of philosophical texts with a *guru* leads to ‘speech’ (*śabda*), which Vācaspati interprets as the knowledge of the meaning [of the texts studied] gained from the speech [of the *guru*]. These two *siddhis*, *adhyayana* and *śabda*, are grouped together as ‘hearing’ (*śravaṇa*). Reflection (*ūha*) is described as an investigation into the meaning of doctrine (*āgama*) through logic (*nyāya*) that is not inconsistent with the doctrine itself, in order to establish a conclusion (*uttarapakṣa*) by removing doubts (*saṃśaya*) and objections

⁵¹⁹ WEZLER (2001, pp. 232-233) suggests that *upadeśena* in the NU passage (n. 515) be taken as a ‘comitative instrumental’—i.e. that “oral instruction” accompanied the delivering over of the *mantras* by the “seers”—and that ‘what is meant by *upadeśa* is “a method of teaching students” [...] which aims at a correct and full understanding of the wording of a *mantra*, the syntax and the semantics at least of some of the expressions used, and above all, of the meaning of the *mantra* as a whole’.

⁵²⁰ With regard to the discontinuation of ‘oral instruction’, WEZLER (2001, p. 233) observes: ‘That the *avare* failed to continue the sacred tradition in this regard is tantamount to the contention, i.e. awareness, or feeling, of an important loss in this sacred tradition. But it does not imply that there are no means at all that would enable a student to find out the “meaning of the Veda”; it is however of an essentially different nature: not an “oral instruction” which can be traced back to the *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo* themselves [...] but ancillary texts only, the *Vedāṅgas*, compiled by human beings [...].’

(*pūrvapakṣa*). According to Vācaspati, *ūha* is also known as *manana* (‘thought’ or ‘reflection’). *Suhr̥tprāpti* is interpreted as the acquisition of friends (such as a *guru*, pupils, and fellow students) with whom one can discuss the conclusions drawn through *ūha*. *Dāna* is glossed as ‘purity’, specifically ‘purity of discriminative knowledge’, as the result of a long period of practice (*abhyāsa*), which leads to the removal of the three forms of pain.⁵²¹

The TK’s second explanation of the five secondary *siddhis* basically accords with the MV’s interpretations of these *siddhis*, with the exception of *ūha*. According to this scheme, Vācaspati interprets *ūha* as the ascertainment of truth without instruction, etc., as the result of practice (*abhyāsa*) undertaken in previous lives.⁵²² Of course, this scheme also differs from that of the MV in that the three removals of pain are considered primary rather than secondary attainments.

Following his presentation of these alternative explanations of the *siddhis*, Vācaspati makes a remark that reflects his distance and detachment from the issues under discussion:

⁵²¹ *ūha iti / vihanyamānasya duḥkhasya tritvāt tadvighātās traya itīmā mukhyās tisraḥ siddhayaḥ, tadupāyatayā tv itarā gaṇyaḥ pañca siddhayaḥ, tā api hetuhetumattayā vyavasthitāḥ / tatrādyā 'dhyayanalakṣaṇā siddhir hetur eva / mukhyās tu siddhayaḥ hetumatya eva / madhyamās tu hetuhetumatyaḥ / vidhivad gurumukhād adhyātmavidyānām akṣarasvarūpagrahaṇam adhyayanam prathamā siddhis tām ucyate / tatkāryam śabdaḥ, śabdaḥ iti padam śabdajanitam arthajñānam upalakṣayati, kāryam kāraṇopacārāt / sā dvitīyā siddhiḥ sutāram ucyate / pāṭi[h]ārthābhyān tad idan dvidhā śravaṇam / ūhaḥ tarkaḥ āgamāvirodhinyāyēnāgamārthaparīkṣaṇam / parīkṣaṇaṇ ca saṁśayapūrvapakṣanirākaraṇenottarapakṣavyavasthāpanam / tad idam mananam ācakṣate āgamināḥ / sā tṛtīyā siddhis tātātāram ucyate / suhṛtprāptiḥ / nyāyena svayamparīkṣitam apy artham na śraddadhāte; na yāvad guruśiṣyasabrahmacāribhis saha saṁvādyate / ataḥ suhṛdām guruśiṣyasabrahmacāriṇām saṁvādakānām prāptiḥ suhṛtprāptiḥ sā siddhiḥ caturthī ramyaka ucyate / dānam ca śuddhir vivekajñānasya, daip śodhane [Pāṇini 6.4.68] ity asmād dhātor dānapadavyutpatteḥ / yathāha bhagavān patañjaliḥ—vivekakhyātir aviṣṭavo duḥkhatrayasya hānopāyaḥ iti [Yogasūtra 2.26] aviṣṭavaḥ śuddhiḥ sā ca savāsanasaṁśayaviparyāsānām parihāreṇa vivekāśātkārasya svacchapravāhe 'vasthāpanam / sā ca na vinā''daranairantarya-dīrghakālaśevitābhyāsaparipākād bhavātīti dānena (vivekakhyātīḥ kāryeṇa) so 'pi saṁgrhītaḥ / seyam pañcam siddhis sadāmuditam ucyate / tisraś ca mukhyāḥ siddhayaḥ pramodamuditamodamānā, ity aṣṭau siddhayaḥ / (TK on SK 51, p. 143, l. 14 – p. 145, l. 22).*

⁵²² *anye vyācakṣate—vinopadeśādīnā prāgbhāvīyābhyāsavaśāt tattvasya svayamūhanam yat sā siddhir ūhaḥ / yasya sāmṁkhyasāstrapāṭham anyadīyam ākārnya tattvajñānam utpadyate sā siddhiḥ śabdaḥ, śabdapāṭhād anantaram bhāvāt / yasya śiṣyācāryasambandhena sāmṁkhyasāstraṁ granthato 'rthataś cādhitā jñānam utpadyate sā 'dhyayanahetukā siddhir adhyayanam / suhṛtprāptir iti yasyādhigatatattvam suhṛdam prāpya jñānam utpadyate sā jñānalakṣaṇā siddhis tasya suhṛtprāptiḥ / dānaḥ ca siddhihetuḥ, dhanādidānenārādhito jñānī jñānam prayacchati / (TK on SK 51, p. 145, ll. 28-34).*

We, who are concerned with the explanation merely of settled opinions (*siddhānta*), with disregard for the faults of others, say that the propriety or impropriety of this should be judged only by the learned.⁵²³

This approach can be contrasted to that of the YD-*kāra*, who, when presenting alternative interpretations of a particular doctrine, usually makes a point of specifying the view established by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK,⁵²⁴ which he regards as the definitive expression of Sāṃkhya doctrine (see §V.2).⁵²⁵ This difference in attitude, generally apparent when comparing the YD and TK, reflects the fact that, as suggested by JACOBSEN (2008), ‘the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth century’.⁵²⁶ Vācaspati himself, as is well known, was a Vedāntin, and he seems to have maintained an interpretative distance in his discussions of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

While there is thus a great deal of divergence in the classical commentators’ interpretations of the *siddhis*, they are unanimous in providing a series of alternative names for the *siddhis*, although these names vary slightly from text to text. According to GBh, *ūha*, *śabda*, *adhyayana*, *ādhyātmikaduḥkhavighāta*, *ādhibhautikaduḥkhavighāta*, *ādhidaivikaduḥkhavighāta*, *suhṛtprāpti*, and *dāna* are ‘in another text (*śāstra*)’ respectively named *tāra*, *sutāra*, *tāratāra*, *pramoda*, *pramudita*, *pramodamāna*, *ramyaka*, and *sadāpramudita*.⁵²⁷ The MV gives the same names, with the exception of *mohana* instead of *pramodamāna* for the sixth *siddhi*.⁵²⁸ The YD’s list contains several variations: *tāraka*, *sutāra*, *tārayanta*,

⁵²³ *asya ca yuktāyuktatve sūribhir evāvagantavye iti kṛtam paradoṣodbhāvanena naḥ siddhāntamātra-vyākhyānapravṛttānām iti* / (TK on SK 51, p. 146, ll. 1-2).

⁵²⁴ E.g., the presentation of alternative views on the forms of the *bhāva* of *jñāna* (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 4 – p. 234, l. 19); see §IV.8, nn. 464-467.

⁵²⁵ The YD-*kāra* holds the SK to be ‘just like an image in a mirror of the *tantra* of the supreme *ṛṣi*’: *pāramarśasya tantrasya bimbam ādarśagam yathā* (YD Intro., p. 3, l. 3). See further discussion in §V.2.

⁵²⁶ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 36.

⁵²⁷ *āsām aṣṭānām siddhīnām śāstrāntare saṃjñāḥ kṛtāḥ—tāram, sutāram, tāratāram, pramodam, pramuditam, pramodamānam, ramyakam, sadāpramuditam iti* / (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, ll. 10-11).

⁵²⁸ *āsām aṣṭānām pūrvavan nāmāntarāṇi / tāram sutāram tāratāram pramodam pramuditam mohanam ramyakam sadāpramuditam iti* / (MV on SK 51, p. 69, ll. 7-9).

pramoda, *pramudita*, *modamāna*, *ramyaka*, and *sadāpramudita*.⁵²⁹ The YD also provides explanations of the significance of these names. For example, *ūha* is known as ‘carrying over’ (*tāraka*) because it ‘carries one over (*tārayati*) the ocean of transmigration (*saṃsāra*)’.⁵³⁰ The TK provides similar names in the course of its first alternative explanation of the *siddhis*: *tāratāra*, *sutāra*, *tāra*, *pramoda*, *mudita*, *modamāna*, *ramyaka*, and *sadāmudita*.⁵³¹ Evidently, Vācaspati was familiar with a list basically the same as those used by the other commentators but was unsure as to which name correlated with which particular *siddhi*, so that in changing the order of the first three *siddhis* he confused their corresponding names. Overall, the variations among the commentators with regard to these names suggest that they represent an older stratum of tradition. FRAUWALLNER (1973) argues that the explanations of these names provided by the YD-*kāra* reflect a ‘sectarian terminology’ apparent in the doctrines of the *Śaṣṭitantra*.⁵³²

Whatever the origins of these alternative names for the *siddhis*, the fact that they are well-established in the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries is significant for our present purpose, for they provide a link in the YD between this paradigm and that of the conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect. The following section (§IV.10) will present this and other evidence in the commentaries of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*. Ultimately, this will serve to clarify the applicability of the YD’s version of the *siddhi* model to the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, and the role of Kapila in terms of this model.

⁵²⁹ See nn. 507, 508, 511 above.

⁵³⁰ *tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam* / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 13-14).

⁵³¹ See n. 521 above.

⁵³² FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 260; see CHAPTER III and §V.3.

§10. The relationship between the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), according to the commentaries.

The discussions in the preceding sections have shown that the condition (*bhāva*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) represents the primary goal of the Sāṃkhya path, that the evidence of the YD clarifies the ways in which this condition is produced in both extraordinary and ordinary individuals, and that the YD-*kāra* considers the paradigm of the attainments (*siddhi*), a part of the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), to be descriptive of the acquisition of Sāṃkhya knowledge by individuals with extraordinary insight and the transmission of this knowledge to later generations through direct teaching and the formulation of written texts. The relation of the process of transmission through *siddhi* to the modes of production of *jñāna*, and thus the importance of the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers and texts to the acquisition of Sāṃkhya knowledge by successive generations of seekers, remains to be clarified.

The relationship between the two paradigms of the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* is unclear from the text of the SK and has generated much discussion among scholars. As outlined in CHAPTER III, FRAUWALLNER (1973)⁵³³ and OBERHAMMER (1961)⁵³⁴ view the *bhāvas* as a newer doctrine playing the same role in the system as the *pratyayasarga*. FRAUWALLNER observes that thus ‘the explanations which the commentaries give for their juxtaposition are unsatisfactory and forced’.⁵³⁵ However, the evidence of the YD has more recently been shown to suggest a more satisfactory and more elaborate interpretation of this relationship.

⁵³³ Ibid., p. 268.

⁵³⁴ OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 155.

⁵³⁵ FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 269.

CHAKRAVARTI (1975)⁵³⁶, KENGHE (1968)⁵³⁷, and LARSON (1984)⁵³⁸ have all rightly observed that the YD treats the principles (*tattva*) as the forms of manifest Materiality, the *bhāvas* as descriptive of its activity, and the *pratyayasarga* as the phenomenal result of this activity. LARSON's interpretation of this relationship became the basis for LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)'s treatment of these paradigms, in which the *tattvas* are presented as the 'constitutive dimension' of the Sāṃkhya system, the *bhāvas* as the 'projective dimension', and the *pratyayasarga* as the 'consequent dimension'.⁵³⁹ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA compare these three dimensions, respectively, to the 'hardware' of a computer, the 'software', and the 'printout of the functioning system'.⁵⁴⁰ With regard to the relationship between the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*, a component of the second 'dimension') and the attainments (*siddhi*, a component of the third 'dimension'), they interpret the evidence of the YD to suggest that 'the predisposition toward knowledge (*jñāna*) generates the spiritual attainments (*siddhi*) conducive to final discrimination and release'.⁵⁴¹ However, as I will argue in the present section, further evidence in the YD linking the concepts of *jñāna* and *siddhi* complicates this interpretation of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*.

Before moving on to a consideration of the evidence of the YD with regard to this relationship, it will be helpful to examine the other commentators' attempts to connect the two paradigms, in order to provide some context for this discussion. The GBh and MV suggest that the *pratyayasarga* explains the nature of the eight instrumental causes (*nimitta*, i.e. the *bhāvas*) and their eight phenomenal effects

⁵³⁶ CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 302.

⁵³⁷ KENGHE (1968), p. 366.

⁵³⁸ LARSON (1984), pp. 63-64.

⁵³⁹ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 64.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 65.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., p. 58.

(*naimittika*, i.e. ‘upward movement’, etc.; see SK 44-45 and §IV.6).⁵⁴² In other words, the *pratyayasarga* is presented as, in some sense, a reclassification of the *bhāvas* and their results, but no further explanation of this relationship or correlation between the *bhāvas* and the categories of the *pratyayasarga* is given in these texts. The TK refers to the *pratyayasarga* as a description of the eight *bhāvas*⁵⁴³ and specifies that the *bhāva* of knowledge (*jñāna*) is included in attainment (*siddhi*), while the other seven *bhāvas*—merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), passion (*avairāgya*), lordliness (*aiśvarya*), and non-lordliness (*anaiśvarya*)—are included in error (*viparyaya*), incapacity (*aśakti*), and contentment (*tuṣṭi*).⁵⁴⁴ Vācaspati, however, does not provide any more specific correlation between these sets of categories, and the nature of this equivalence is unclear. Does this scheme imply that the process of *siddhi* is identical with *jñāna*, or does *siddhi* lead to *jñāna*, or vice versa?

As has become evident, the YD’s basic view of the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* differs fundamentally from the simple equivalence suggested by the other commentators. The YD’s view, as discussed by CHAKRAVARTI (1975), KENGHE (1968) and LARSON (1984), is made apparent at the end of the commentary on SK 45, preceding the discussion of the *pratyayasarga*, in which the YD-*kāra* equates the *tattvas* with the forms (*rūpa*) of the manifest (*vyakta*) and the *bhāvas* with the activity (*pravṛtti*) of the manifest, and states that the result

⁵⁴² *eṣa nimittaiḥ saha naimittikaḥ śoḍaśavidhoḥ vyākhyātaḥ, sa kimātmaka ity āha—eṣa pratyayasargo viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyākhyāḥ / guṇavaiśamyavimarddena tasya bhedaś tu pañcāśat //46// yathā eṣa śoḍaśavidho nimittanaimittikabhedaḥ vyākhyātaḥ, eṣa pratyayasarga ucyate / (GBh on SK 46, p. 159, l. 28 – p. 160, l. 4); nanu nimittanaimittikaprasaṅgaḥ kimātmaka iti ? atrocyate—eṣa pratyayasargo viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyādhyaḥ / guṇavaiśamyavimarddena tasya bhedaś tu pañcāśat //4[6]// eṣa iti / āryādvayena śoḍaśavidho naimittikaḥ sarga uktaḥ / pratyayasarga ucyate / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 4-8).*

⁵⁴³ *buddhidharmān dharmādīn aṣṭau bhāvān samāsavyāsābhyāṃ mumukṣūṇāṃ heyopādeyaṇ darśayitum prathamam tāvat samāsam āha—(TK on SK 46, p. 132, ll. 20-21).*

⁵⁴⁴ *tatra viparyayāśaktituṣṭiṣu yathāyogaṃ saptānāṃ ca dharmādīnāṃ jñānavarjam antarbhāvaḥ, siddhau ca jñānasyeti / (TK on SK 46, p. 133, ll. 4-5).*

(*phala*) of the manifest is about to be described.⁵⁴⁵ A slightly different scheme is laid out in the commentary on SK 2:

Of these [the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower], the manifest is characterised by form, activity, and result. The form is the intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven faculties, and the five gross elements. Generally, the activity is twofold: [activity] the purpose of which is desire for what is beneficial, and [activity] the purpose of which is prevention of what is unbeneficial. Specifically, [activity] is the five sources of action (*karmayoni*)—perseverance, etc.—and the five vital breaths (*vāyu*)—*prāṇa*, etc. The result is twofold: perceptible and imperceptible. Of these, the perceptible [result] is defined as attainment, contentment, incapacity, and error, and the imperceptible [result] is the obtaining of a body in the cycle of transmigration (*saṃsāra*), from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass.⁵⁴⁶

While this passage does not mention the *bhāvas* in connection with the activity of the manifest, it does allude to their results, in terms of the trajectory of an individual in the cycle of transmigration (see §IV.6). Evidently, both this trajectory and the categories of the *pratyayasarga* are considered aspects of the result of the activity of the manifest. LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) discuss the role of the sources of action (*karmayoni*) and vital breaths (*vāyu*) according to the YD and group them with the *bhāvas* as a part of the ‘projective dimension’ of the manifest.⁵⁴⁷ While the relations among these various aspects of the system presented by the YD are not entirely clear, it is clear that the *bhāvas* are considered at least an aspect of the activity of the manifest, while the *pratyayasarga* is considered at least an aspect of the result of this activity.

Some passages of the YD could be taken to indicate a simple equivalence between the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*, similar to that suggested by the other

⁵⁴⁵ *evam eṣa tattvasargo bhāvasargaś ca vyākhyātaḥ / etac ca vyaktasya rūpaṃ pravṛttiś ca parikalpyate / phalam idānīm vakṣyāmaḥ //* (YD on SK 45d, p. 237, ll. 26-27)

⁵⁴⁶ *tatra rūpapravṛttiphalalakṣaṇaṃ vyaktam / rūpaṃ punar mahān ahaṃkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāṇy ekādaśendriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtāni / sāmānyataḥ pravṛttir dvividhā hitakāmaprayojanā cāhita-pratiṣedhaprayojanā ca / viśeṣataḥ pañca karmayonayo <dh>ṛtyādyāḥ / prāṇādyāś ca pañca vāyavaḥ / phalaṃ dvividham / drṣṭam adrṣṭam ca / tatra drṣṭam siddhitsuṣyaśaktiviparyayalakṣaṇam adrṣṭam brahmādaḥ stambaparyante saṃsāre śarīrapratilambha ity etad vyaktam /* (YD on SK 2d, p. 49, ll. 8-14)

⁵⁴⁷ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 54-56, 64-65.

commentaries. As mentioned in §IV.6, under SK 23 the YD-*kāra* associates the unprecedented (*apūrva*) form of the *bhāva* of *jñāna* with the *siddhis*,⁵⁴⁸ while under SK 45 he mentions that *vairāgya* falls under the heading of *tuṣṭi*.⁵⁴⁹ An (at least partial) equivalence between *vairāgya* and *tuṣṭi* is also suggested by the YD-*kāra*'s explanation of the first form of *tuṣṭi*, which results in dissolution in Materiality (*prakṛtilaya*),⁵⁵⁰ also held to be the result of *vairāgya* (SK 45; see §IV.6).

These statements, however, do not preclude the possibility that a cause-effect relationship is implied. Rather, since the *siddhis* are referred to as 'means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) in the passage on SK 23, it seems reasonable to assume that they lead to the condition of *jñāna*. This would be an instance of the 'result' realm affecting the 'activity' realm. Similarly, the YD-*kāra*'s descriptions of *tuṣṭi* as the result of a *yogin*'s activity in the phenomenal realm of experience⁵⁵¹ would seem to suggest that this contentment results in the production of the condition of *vairāgya* in the intellect (see SK 43, §IV.8) which in turn leads to such results as dissolution in *prakṛti*.

This interpretation of the function of *siddhi* and *tuṣṭi* in relation to the production of the *bhāvas* suggests that LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)'s interpretation of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhāvas* must be revised. Although the *pratyayasarga* is considered, in some sense, to be the result (*phala*) of the activity (*pravṛtti*) described by the *bhāvas*, nevertheless at least some

⁵⁴⁸ *jñānam dvividham śabdādyupalabdihlakṣaṇam guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdihlakṣaṇam ca / tatra śabdādyupalabdihlakṣaṇam pratyakṣānumānāgamarūpam / guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdihlakṣaṇam ca dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajam ca / tasya apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo 'dhyāyanam (SK 51a) iti siddhi-kāṇḍānupatitāni pramāṇāni / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 7-11).*

⁵⁴⁹ *vairāgyam tuṣṭikāṇḍānupatitam (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, l. 17).*

⁵⁵⁰ *sa khalv ayam yogī pradhānalakṣaṇām bhūmim avajītya tanmahimnā ca <jagad> aśūnyam dṛṣtvā vyatiriktasya padārthāntarasyaḥ bhāvaṁ manyamānas tām eva bhūmim kaivalyam iti grhṇāti / bhinne ca dehe prakṛtau layam gacchati tataś ca punar āvartate / (YD on SK 50ab, p. 244, ll. 16-19).*

⁵⁵¹ Cf., for example, the description of the production of the first *tuṣṭi* (n. 550 above). As mentioned in §IV.9, KENGHE (1968) has documented the YD's association of the *tuṣṭis* with stages of yogic practice.

of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* are also able to lead to the production of new *bhāvas*. The possibility that the YD-*kāra* thus considers these two realms to be mutually determinative finds further support elsewhere in the text.

As discussed in §IV.8, according to the YD, the *prākṛtika* form (and probably by implication the *sāmsiddhika* form) of the *bhāvas* arises as a stream from primordial Materiality (*prakṛti*, *pradhāna*), in contrast to the *vaikṛta* form, which pertains to ‘ordinary people’⁵⁵² and is either ‘self-acquired’ (*svavaikṛta*) or ‘acquired from others’ (*paravaikṛta*).⁵⁵³ Like *prākṛtika bhāvas*, the categories of the *pratyayasarga* are described as arising in streams from Materiality (§IV.9).⁵⁵⁴ OBERHAMMER (1961) takes the similarity in the mode of production of *prākṛtika bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* as an indication that the two paradigms have the same function, and suggests that the categories of the *pratyayasarga*, like the *bhāvas*, are partly pre-determined and partly acquired:

[We] can suppose that the Pratyaya-s are, like the Bhāva-s, innate, i.e. conditioned by Karma, and thus condition the historical existence of beings. On the other hand, they are acquired as ‘habitus’, and thus they lead to salvation.⁵⁵⁵

OBERHAMMER recognizes that the categories of the *pratyayasarga* must, in some way, be considered both determined and determining, but he fails to take into account another statement by the commentator which clarifies the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhāvas*.

Again, as discussed in §IV.8, according to the YD’s commentary on SK 43, the Sāṃkhya teacher Pañcādhikaraṇa held the *vaikṛta* form of the *bhāva* of *jñāna* to be twofold: ‘self-acquired’ (*svavaikṛta*), and ‘acquired from others’ (*paravaikṛta*),⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵² See n. 463 (§IV.8).

⁵⁵³ See nn. 465, 468 (§IV.8).

⁵⁵⁴ See nn. 484, 485, 486 (§IV.9).

⁵⁵⁵ OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 140, n. 1.

⁵⁵⁶ *vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividham / svavaikṛtaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ ca* / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 12).

and Īśvarakṛṣṇa's system agrees with this classification.⁵⁵⁷ In the same passage, the YD-kāra equates the *svavaikṛta* form with *tāraka* and the *paravaikṛta* form with 'the other *siddhis*'.⁵⁵⁸ The commentator then quotes a verse (perhaps to be taken as attributed to Pañcādhikaraṇa himself) that equates *svavaikṛta* with *tāraka* and states that *paravaikṛta* is 'seven-fold—*sutāra*, etc.'.⁵⁵⁹ As shown in §IV.9, the terms *tāraka*, etc., are well-established in the Sāṃkhya tradition as alternative names for the eight *siddhis* listed in SK 51. According to this scheme, then, *ūha* is *svavaikṛta jñāna*, while the other *siddhis* are *paravaikṛta jñāna*. This classification agrees with the YD-kāra's description of the *siddhis*, insofar as *ūha* is attainment [by oneself] 'through the power of reflection', while the other two primary *siddhis* involve attainment from others through direct teaching (*śabda*) or study of transmitted texts (*adhyayana*), the secondary *siddhis* also involving interaction with others.⁵⁶⁰

The YD's exposition of Pañcādhikaraṇa's classification of the *bhāvas* ends with the statement that, 'as is the *bhāva* of *jñāna*, so are the other *bhāvas*—*dharma*, etc.'⁵⁶¹ This does not necessarily mean that the *siddhis* also describe the attainment of other *vaikṛta bhāvas* than *jñāna*. As we have seen, the production of *vairāgya* seems to be associated with *tuṣṭi* rather than *siddhi*, in which case *tuṣṭi* might represent *vaikṛta vairāgya*, in contrast, for instance, to the *prākṛta vairāgya* of Kapila's disciple Āsuri.⁵⁶² On the other hand, the commentator's use of the attainment of *dharma* to illustrate the categories of the *pratyayasarga*,⁵⁶³ as well as

⁵⁵⁷ *vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividhaṃ pūrvavat* / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 5-6).

⁵⁵⁸ *svavaikṛtaṃ tārakam / paravaikṛtaṃ siddhyantarāṇi* / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, ll. 12-13).

⁵⁵⁹ *vaikṛtaṃ api ca dvividhaṃ svavaikṛtaṃ tatra tārakam bhavati / syāt saptavidhaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ <su> tāradī nirdiṣṭam* // (YD on SK 43, p. 233, ll. 17-18).

⁵⁶⁰ See nn. 507, 508, 511 (§IV.9).

⁵⁶¹ *yathā jñānam evaṃ dharmādayo 'pīti* / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 19).

⁵⁶² See n. 462 (§IV.8).

⁵⁶³ *tadyathā dharmārthapravṛtto 'gniṣṭomādīn parityajya saṃkaram kurvīta so 'sya viparyayaḥ, sādhanavaikalāyād asāmarthyam aśaktiḥ, ādhānamātrasantoṣas tuṣṭiḥ, kṛtsnasya kriyā-viśeṣasyānuṣṭhānam siddhiḥ / evaṃ <anyā> rthādiṣu yojyam / yaś cāyam caturvidhaḥ phalaviśeṣo viparyayādir ākhyataḥ* (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, l. 22 – p. 240, l. 2).

his reference simply to an ‘intended object’ (*abhipretam artham*)⁵⁶⁴ as the object of *siddhi* (§IV.9), might suggest that *siddhi* does describe the attainment of at least some other *bhāvas*. The commentator’s position on this issue is never clarified, and it seems not to be a concern in the text. Rather, the YD-*kāra* focuses his discussion of the production of the *bhāvas* mainly on *jñāna*, and his discussion of the *siddhis* also seems to reflect a concern with the production and transmission of knowledge.

For our present purposes, then, it can be said with some certainty that the YD-*kāra* views *siddhi* as the *vaikṛta* form of *jñāna*. How does this form of *jñāna* differ from the *sāṃsiddhika* and *prākṛta* forms? Since it is clear that *siddhi* is part of the ‘perceptible result’⁵⁶⁵ of the activity of manifest Materiality, we can conclude that this *vaikṛta jñāna* is produced in the phenomenal realm of ordinary experience, in contrast to the *sāṃsiddhika* and *prākṛta* forms of *jñāna*, which are produced directly from primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*). This conclusion agrees with the interpretation, suggested by the GBh, of the term *vaikṛta* as ‘deriving from the products’,⁵⁶⁶ i.e. deriving from the phenomenal (*vaikṛta*) realm of manifest Materiality. Further support for this conclusion is provided by the YD-*kāra*’s statement that the *vaikṛta bhāvas* are applicable to ordinary people.⁵⁶⁷ This suggests that for those without special, direct access to the stream flowing from *pradhāna*, *jñāna* must be attained in the *vaikṛta* realm. In this ordinary, phenomenal realm of

⁵⁶⁴ *tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇābalenaiva pratipadyate sādya siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate* / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13); *etāsāṃ saṃśrayeṇābhipretam arthaṃ yataḥ saṃsādhayanīty atah pūrvācāryagataṃ mārgam āruruḥṣus tatpravaṇaḥ syād iti* / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, ll. 22-24). For a possible alternative explanation of the phrase *abhipretam artham*, see §V.1.

⁵⁶⁵ See n. 546 above.

⁵⁶⁶ See n. 456 (§IV.8).

⁵⁶⁷ *vaikṛtās tu bhāvā asmadādīnām* / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, l. 14).

experience, the ‘stream of attainment from Materiality’ is obstructed by error, incapacity and contentment.⁵⁶⁸

With regard to the nature of Kapila’s knowledge and his role in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, this equivalence of *siddhi* with *vaikṛta jñāna* holds an important implication. The production of Kapila’s *sāṃsiddhika jñāna* must be removed from the context of *siddhi*, as the YD-*kāra* makes clear:

And thus *ūha* is not applicable to the *ṛṣi*, because of an absence of hindrance. There is no hindrance to the production of his *jñāna* at the same time as the manifestation of his body.⁵⁶⁹

Although the term *ṛṣi*, rather than *paramarṣi* (‘supreme *ṛṣi*’), is used in this passage, the context suggests that Kapila alone is meant, since only he is said to have been born with innate *jñāna*, while everyone else is born with innate *ajñāna*.⁵⁷⁰ Thus, the process of the production of knowledge as described by *ūha* does not apply to Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine. This is despite the fact that *ūha*, like Kapila’s knowledge,⁵⁷¹ is said to occur in the absence of the usual *pramāṇas* of perception, inference, or authoritative testimony,⁵⁷² and also despite the fact that the YD-*kāra* seems to compare *ūha* to the abilities of the *sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣis* in NU 1.20.⁵⁷³ Evidently, if the YD-*kāra* does see *ūha* as applicable to *ṛṣis*, it must be to lesser *ṛṣis* than Kapila.

Of course, the distinction between *ūha* and Kapila’s *sāṃsiddhika jñāna* does not mean that Kapila might not have transmitted his knowledge to Āsuri by means of the second *siddhi*, *śabda*, or even that someone else might not attain the same knowledge through *ūha*. It is also likely, based on the content of the NU passage

⁵⁶⁸ *nityapravṛttasyāpi pradhānāt siddhisrotaso viparyayāśaktituṣṭipratibandhāt sarvaprāṇiṣv apravṛttir bhavati* / (YD on SK 51d, p. 252, l. 30 – p. 253, l. 1).

⁵⁶⁹ *tathā carṣer ūho nopapadyate / pratibandhābhāvāt / na hy asya kāryakaraṇavyūhasamakāla-jñānotpattau kaścit pratibandho ’sti* / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 31 – p. 234, l. 1).

⁵⁷⁰ See n. 462 (§IV.8).

⁵⁷¹ See n. 390 (§IV.4).

⁵⁷² See n. 507 (§IV.9).

⁵⁷³ See nn. 510, 518 (§IV.9).

quoted in this connection, that the YD-*kāra* views the third *siddhi*, *adhyayana*, as the consequence of the transition from direct *guru*-disciple transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine to the composition of Sāṃkhya texts like the SK. The YD-*kāra*'s apparent view of the nature of the SK in relation to Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine will be discussed further in §V.2. The implications of the special status assigned to Kapila's knowledge as a direct product of unmanifest *prakṛti* will be considered in §V.4.

The discussions in this chapter have clarified several points with regard to the process by which liberating Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted, according to the Sāṃkhya commentaries in general and the YD in particular. In the context of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) accepted by Sāṃkhya, inference (*anumāṇa*) is generally emphasized by the commentators as a means of establishing the existence of the Sāṃkhya principles (*tattva*). This might suggest that independent reasoning is privileged over received knowledge in Sāṃkhya. The YD, however, treats inference as a tool in the exposition of philosophical texts (*śāstra*) to ordinary seekers. The maintenance of the traditions of transmission of such *śāstras* is provided for by the YD's definition of the *pramāṇa* of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*). Thus, inference and authoritative testimony seem to work together in the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge from *guru* to disciple. That is, logic is used to validate Sāṃkhya doctrine.

In addition, the YD, like the other Sāṃkhya commentaries, allows for the direct perception (*dṛṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*) of the subtle elements (*tanmātra*) by gods and *yogins*. The YD specifies that the perception of these normally suprasensuous *tattvas* is enabled either by progressive yogic practice or, in the case of the gods, by the accumulation of merit (*dharma*). This extraordinary perception, in contrast to the

YD's portrayal of inference, would appear to function independently of authoritative testimony and the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

The YD's exposition of the modes of production of the condition (*bhāva*) of knowledge (*jñāna*), which is held by the Sāṃkhya texts to result in liberation, suggests that this condition may arise in extraordinary individuals as the result of a direct stream (*srotas*, *abhiśyanda*) from primordial Materiality (*prakṛti*, *pradhāna*), and that in the case of the ṛṣi Kapila this condition was manifested from *prakṛti* at the time of his birth. In the case of ordinary individuals, the condition of *jñāna* is attained in the phenomenal (*vaikṛta*) sphere of experience, either suddenly (*apūrvā*) through the attainments (*siddhi*), which are associated with the transmission of knowledge through teaching and texts, or as the result of a progressive practice (*abhyāsaja*), which involves the yogic practices of the restraints (*yama*) and observances (*niyama*) and consequently the attainment of merit (*dharma*) and dispassion (*vairāgya*). The latter mode of production can be compared to the text's suggestion that the perception of the subtle elements is enabled through yogic practice and the accumulation of merit, while inference and authoritative testimony, like the *siddhis*, are connected with the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

We can thus conclude that, according to the evidence of the YD, the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition and the explanation of these texts through the traditional *guru-disciple* relationship are considered to play an important role in the production of liberating knowledge in ordinary seekers. While the YD does admit the possibility of attaining this knowledge independently of the Sāṃkhya tradition, this would not seem to involve independent logical thought but rather the performance of yogic practices as a means of developing merit and dispassion as steps to the attainment of knowledge. The ṛṣi Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya tradition, is unique in being exempt from the need to acquire knowledge of the *tattvas* either through the *siddhis*

or through independent yogic practice. The following chapter will discuss in more detail the YD's view of the nature and origin of Kapila and the importance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge to the continued maintenance of the Sāṃkhya tradition.

CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the *Yuktidīpikā*.

As outlined in the preceding chapter, the evidence of the YD appears to resolve several interpretative issues apparent in the classical Sāṃkhya system. The commentator's definition of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) makes a provision for the maintenance of every *śāstra* (§IV.3). The YD also appears to treat inference (*anumāna*) primarily as a tool for the transmission of doctrine through the elucidation of *śāstra* (§IV.2). The text suggests a novel interpretation of the three forms of the conditions (*bhāva*) as 'innate' (*sāṃsiddhika*), 'deriving from primordial Materiality' (*prākṛtika*) and 'deriving from the products' (*vaikṛta*) (§IV.8). A connection between the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) and the attainments (*siddhi*) is apparent in the text, which allows for a clearer conception of the relationship between the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) (§IV.10). According to this relationship, Kapila, whose *jñāna* is produced directly from *pradhāna* at the time of his birth, is unique in being exempt from the need to attain knowledge through one of the *siddhis*. This chapter will explore the implications of all of these points with regard to the YD's view of the process of the production and transmission of knowledge (§1), the importance of Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine (§2), and the nature and origin of Kapila and his knowledge (§3-5).

§1. The YD-*kāra*'s attitude to received knowledge.

As has become apparent in the course of the preceding chapter, many passages of the YD contain evidence of the author's view of the process by which knowledge is produced and transmitted. In general, the YD places more importance upon the continuity of tradition than do the other classical commentaries. This emphasis on continuity is apparent with regard both to the Sāṃkhya tradition in itself and to the relationship of the Sāṃkhya tradition to the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, particularly to the Vedas. The first section of this chapter will examine the passages in which this emphasis on continuity is apparent and will consider the interpretative strategies employed by the commentator to account for the uninterrupted transmission of knowledge.

As discussed by MOTEGI (2006), the YD attempts to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to acknowledge their authority. MOTEGI analyses a lengthy debate on the nature of the Vedas, presented in the commentary on SK 2,⁵⁷⁴ in which the YD-*kāra* argues 'that there are no inconsistencies in the scriptural statements of the Vedas' and 'that liberation by means of knowledge is supported by the Vedic scriptures'.⁵⁷⁵ That is, according to the YD-*kāra*, although the Vedas prescribe ritual activity leading to rebirth at a higher level of the phenomenal cosmos,⁵⁷⁶ they also prescribe the preferable path of knowledge leading to liberation.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁴ YD on SK 2, p. 31, l. 14 – p. 54, l. 16; see MOTEGI (2006), pp. 48-52.

⁵⁷⁵ MOTEGI (2006), p. 51.

⁵⁷⁶ E.g., YD on SK 2b, p. 34, ll. 13-15: 'Though it is a cause of attaining heaven, the performance of [ritual] action prescribed by the Vedas is not possible without injury to living beings, so it is disregarded by those desirous of benefitting [living beings].' (*sati svargaprāptinimitatve vedavihitasya karmaṇaḥ samanuṣṭhānaṃ prāṇi- \langle nā \rangle m upaghātam antareṇa na sambhavatīti hitakāmair apy upekṣyate* /).

⁵⁷⁷ E.g., YD on SK 2d, p. 50, ll. 13-14: 'This goal, liberation through knowledge, is supported by the Vedas, not unfounded.' (*āmnāyanibandhano hy ayam artho jñānān mokṣa iti na yādrccikaḥ* /).

As also noted by MOTEGI,⁵⁷⁸ this tendency to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas is also evident in the YD's definition of the *pramāṇa* of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*), which includes the Vedas as authoritative by nature, as well as the statements of authoritative persons (*āpta*), which include the traditional texts (*smṛti*) of the Brāhmaṇical tradition.⁵⁷⁹ In terms of authoritative sources of doctrine, this definition puts the Vedic texts on a par with the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition. With regard to Sāṃkhya teachers, we can assume that the commentator's mention of *īśvaramaharṣis* as authoritative figures (*āpta*)⁵⁸⁰ would include at least Kapila, the *paramarṣi* (see §IV.3, V.3). Sāṃkhya texts composed by later teachers would be implicitly included in *āptavacana* by the YD-*kāra*'s provision for the maintenance of every body of knowledge (*śāstra*).⁵⁸¹

In addition to this continuity of doctrinal authority between the Vedic tradition and the Sāṃkhya tradition, the YD reflects a Vedic influence in its conception of the nature of tradition itself. The commentator appears to model his presentation of the process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted upon the process of Vedic revelation and transmission. This is apparent in the commentator's use of the quotation from NU 1.20 to illustrate the nature of the three primary *siddhis*,⁵⁸² which are associated with the unprecedented (*apūrvā*) production of Sāṃkhya knowledge.⁵⁸³ According to this interpretation of the *siddhis*, some extraordinary individuals have the ability to independently attain Sāṃkhya knowledge through mental reflection (*ūha*, *vicāraṇa*), without the use of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by which knowledge is ordinarily attained. This is compared to the ability of the Vedic *ṛṣis* who have intuitive insight into the

⁵⁷⁸ MOTEGI (2006), p. 53.

⁵⁷⁹ See n. 364 (§IV.3).

⁵⁸⁰ See n. 367 (§IV.3).

⁵⁸¹ See n. 367 (§IV.3).

⁵⁸² See nn. 510, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9).

⁵⁸³ See n. 425 (§IV.6).

properties of things (*sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣi*). The teaching of Sāṃkhya knowledge to others by those who have attained it through *ūha* is compared to the transmission of Vedic *mantras* through teaching (*upadeśa*). The formulation of Sāṃkhya texts for the transmission of knowledge through study (*adhyayana*) is compared to the formulation of the collected and assembled Vedas and Vedāṅgas, which, as we have seen, have the same authoritative status as Sāṃkhya texts.

Although Kapila's innate knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge attained through *ūha*,⁵⁸⁴ these two forms of knowledge appear to share some characteristics. Like the knowledge attained through *ūha*, Kapila's knowledge does not require any *pramāṇa*.⁵⁸⁵ Both forms of knowledge have the same object, insofar as both are identified with forms of the *bhāva* of *jñāna*, which is described primarily in terms of Sāṃkhya knowledge leading to liberation.⁵⁸⁶ Kapila's initiation of a tradition by imparting his knowledge to Āsuri⁵⁸⁷ can be compared to the transmission of knowledge through the second *siddhi*, *śabda*. Thus, although Kapila is singled out (apparently even from other *ṛṣis*) in terms of the production of his knowledge, the tradition of knowledge initiated by him can be compared to the paradigm of the *siddhis*, and therefore to the process of Vedic revelation and transmission.

Another possible connection can be drawn between the YD's presentation of the *siddhis* and Kapila's initial formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge. As mentioned in §IV.9, the NU passage quoted in connection with the *siddhis*⁵⁸⁸ originally occurs in a section of the NU devoted to the praise of those who know the proper, etymological meanings of words. A similar concern is reflected in a passage of the

⁵⁸⁴ See n. 569 (§IV.10).

⁵⁸⁵ See n. 390 (§IV.4); n. 507 (§IV.9).

⁵⁸⁶ See nn. 425 (§IV.6); 558, 559 (§IV.10); cf. SK 44c: *jñānena cāpavargaḥ* /.

⁵⁸⁷ SK 70ab: *etat pavitraṃ agryaṃ munir āsuraye 'nukampayā pradadau* /.

⁵⁸⁸ See nn. 510, 418, 519, 520 (§IV.9).

YD, in which the commentator emphasizes the fact that Kapila's initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine involved only etymologically significant names for the *tattvas*. These names are considered *arthanibandha*, 'dependent on meaning', rather than *svarūpabandha*, 'dependent on their own form' or 'conventional':

A name (*saṃjñā*) is a word (*śabda*) the purpose of which is the conveyance of what is signified (*saṃjñin*). This is twofold: dependent on meaning (*arthanibandha*) and conventional (*svarūpanibandha*). [...] There is no conventional word of the glorious supreme *ṛṣi*, who, having diligently ascertained the inherent form of all the principles (*tattva*) by means of *ārṣa*⁵⁸⁹ knowledge, bestowed names. For example, primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*): 'the products are put forth (*pradhīyante*) in it'; Consciousness (*puruṣa*): 'in the body (*pur*) it lies (*śete*)'; and so on. Also for the teachers (*ācārya*) who follow his views, there is no regard for the assignment of new names, on account of the complete communication through these same [names].⁵⁹⁰

The efficacy of Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine is established here in terms of his concern for linguistic precision. Given this concern with the meanings (*artha*) of the names of the *tattvas*, it is possible that the phrase *abhipretam artham* as it occurs in the YD's explanation of the *siddhis*,⁵⁹¹ refers not simply to an 'intended object' but more specifically to 'approved meaning'—that is, to the etymological meanings behind the names of the *tattvas*.

According to this interpretation, which is only a possibility, the names of the *tattvas* would be viewed as the essence of the Sāṃkhya system. For those without direct access—through *ūha* or *ārṣa jñāna* (in the case of Kapila)—to the objects of knowledge behind these names, either teaching (*śabda*) by a *guru* or study (*adhyayana*) of Sāṃkhya *śāstra* would serve to clarify them. This interpretation

⁵⁸⁹ The term *ārṣa* ('pertaining to *ṛṣis*') is also used to refer to Kapila's innate knowledge in the context of the YD's discussion of the *pramāṇas* (§IV.4, n. 390).

⁵⁹⁰ *saṃjñipratyāyanārthaḥ śabdaḥ saṃjñā* (cf. MBhāṣya I.38.20) / *sā ca dvividhā / arthanibandhanā svarūpabandhanā ca* / (YD Intro., p. 7, ll. 16-17); *prayatnato bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ārṣeṇa jñānena sarvatattvānām svarūpam upalabhya saṃjñām vidadhato nāsti svarūpanibandhanāḥ śabdaḥ / tadyathā pradhīyante 'tra vikārā iti pradhānam / "puri śete"* (cf. e.g. Gop. Br. I.1.39) *iti puruṣa ityādi / tanmatānusāriṇām apy ācāryānām tābhir eva saṃvyavahārān nāsty apūrvasaṃjñāvidhānam praty ādaraḥ* / (YD Intro., p. 7, ll. 23-27). The use of the feminine *tābhiḥ* ('through these') in the last line must refer to *saṃjñā* rather than to the masculine *śabda*.

⁵⁹¹ See nn. 507, 509 (§IV.9).

would agree with WEZLER (2001)'s interpretation of the significance of the NU passage as a description of the process by which knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic *mantras* is transmitted.⁵⁹² The *ṛṣis* who initially formulate the *mantras* (or in our case, the names of the *tattvas*), do so based upon their direct knowledge of the principles underlying reality, as AKLUJKAR (2009) explains: 'The *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva* of the seers means direct, undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of those properties and actions or processes which make the world what it is.'⁵⁹³ For later generations, without direct knowledge of these principles, an understanding of the meaning (*artha*) of the *mantras* (or of the names of the *tattvas*) would serve to produce the same knowledge.

The above discussion of the etymological significance of Kapila's names for the *tattvas* also demonstrates the importance placed by the YD on the linguistic conformity of subsequent Sāṃkhya teachers to Kapila's original *śāstra*. The names of the *tattvas* are considered the core of Kapila's system, to which all subsequent Sāṃkhya teachers have appealed. In this and other respects, the commentator shows a concern for establishing the conformity of the SK, in particular, to Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

§2. The YD-*kāra*'s view of the nature of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

At many points in the YD, the commentator shows a concern for establishing the efficacy of the SK to produce Sāṃkhya knowledge. In effect, the commentator seeks to show that study (*adhyayana*) of this text is a valid means of attaining the

⁵⁹² WEZLER (2001), p. 232-233; see nn. 516, 519, 520 (§IV.9)

⁵⁹³ AKLUJKAR (2009), p. 17.

knowledge originally formulated by Kapila and passed down to others originally through direct teaching (*upadeśa*, *śabda*).

In the introductory verses of the text, the commentator discusses the process of transmission by which the system founded by Kapila came to be summarised in the SK. The first stage of this development describes the transition from direct teaching (from Kapila to his disciple) to the composition of a fixed Sāṃkhya text:

Thinking that, on account of its immensity, it would not be possible, even in hundreds of years, to complete the learning of that great philosophical system (*tantra*) for the cessation of the three pains, which the sage (*muni*) proclaimed to the wise Āsuri, who desired to know the truth, sages whose intellects were subtle and whose wisdom was flawless, summarising it by means of a short text (*grantha*), set down⁵⁹⁴ that *ārṣa* teaching out of a desire for the welfare of pupils (*śiṣya*).⁵⁹⁵

This ‘short text’ represents the first fixed formulation of Kapila’s original system. The next stage in the development of the Sāṃkhya tradition describes the expansion of this original formulation by later teachers:

But the proponents of the theories of Consciousness (*puruṣa*), the Lord (*īśa*), or atoms (*anu*) [as the source of the universe]⁵⁹⁶, and the Buddhists (*vaināśika*),⁵⁹⁷ materialists (*prākṛtika*),⁵⁹⁸ and perverted people (*vikārapuruṣa*)⁵⁹⁹ were opponents of that [system]. For the sake of thwarting

⁵⁹⁴ The term *nibaddha* must be used here in the sense ‘composed’ or ‘set down’, though this does not necessarily mean ‘written down’. Likewise the term *grantha* (‘text’) does not necessarily refer to a written text, but rather to a fixed, formulated composition.

⁵⁹⁵ *tattvaṃ jijñāsamānāya viprāyāsuraḥ munīḥ /
yad uvāca mahat tantraṃ duḥkhatrayanivṛttaye /2/
na tasyādhigamaḥ śakyaḥ kartuṃ varṣasatair api /
bhūyastvād iti saṃcintya munibhiḥ sūksmabuddhibhiḥ /3/
granthenālpēna saṃkṣīpya tad āṛṣam anuśāsanam /
nibaddham amalaprajñaiḥ śiṣyāṇāṃ hitakāmyayā /4/* (YD Intro., p. 1, l. 7 – p. 2, l. 1).

⁵⁹⁶ Cf. the YD’s use of indirect (*avīta*) inference to establish *pradhāna* as the source of the universe (§IV.2, n. 334). Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) identify the *puruṣavādins* as ‘non-dualists’, the *īśavādins* as ‘theists’, and the *aṇuvādins* as ‘the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’.

⁵⁹⁷ Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term *vaināśikāḥ* as ‘nihilists’ and specify that this refers to the Buddhists.

⁵⁹⁸ Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term *prākṛtikāḥ* as ‘materialists’ and specify that this refers to the Cārvākas, although this does not seem to be an attested sense of the term. Presumably the term refers to those who hold *prakṛti* to be the only real entity.

⁵⁹⁹ Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term *vikārapuruṣāḥ* as ‘perverted persons’, apparently taking *vikāra* in the same sense as *vikārita*, but it is not clear precisely to whom this refers. Given the usual technical use of the terms *vikāra* and *puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya, perhaps another alternative would be that the term refers to *vikārapuruṣavādins*—that is, to those who hold that the *puruṣa* is a product (*vikāra*) of *prakṛti*—but more evidence would be required to establish this.

the desires of those [opponents], thickets⁶⁰⁰ of logic (*tarka*), difficult to traverse, were fashioned by teachers (*ācārya*), whose intellects were subtle, in their own philosophical systems (*tantra*).⁶⁰¹

At this stage, the Sāṃkhya system takes the form of a school represented by various teachers in debate with other schools. The commentator next identifies the SK as a summary of the various arguments put forward by these teachers, which are classified according to a system of sixty categories of discussion:

These [thickets of logic] are inaccessible to those pupils whose intellects are confused with regard to the truth. Therefore, this handbook (*prakaraṇa*)—or even complete treatise (*śāstra*)—its meaning condensed, called the ‘Seventy [Verses]’ (*saptati*), was composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, on the basis of which, all of the categories (*padārtha*) will be explained in this [commentary]. The existence of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*), oneness, purposefulness, difference, subservience to another, plurality, disjunction, conjunction, continuation of the remaining [body after discrimination], and non-agency, have been handed down as the ten fundamental topics (*cūlikārtha*).⁶⁰² Error (*viparyaya*) is five-fold, and there are said to be nine contentments (*tuṣṭi*). Incapacity (*asāmarthyā*) of the instruments is considered twenty-eight-fold. Along with the eight attainments (*siddhi*), these sixty categories (*padārtha*) will be fully explained by definition and in due succession in this [commentary]. Hence, this treatise (*śāstra*) is adequate for establishing multiplicity^{603 604}.

⁶⁰⁰ Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term *gahvarāḥ* as ‘ditches’, but the usual sense of the term is ‘thicket’, which would agree with the imagery of the first introductory verse of the text, which in some manuscripts is repeated after the present verse: ‘Insults to the elephant of Sāṃkhya, whose tusks are the direct and indirect [inferences], who inhabits the forest of debate, are as flimsy as a thicket of *sallakī* trees.’ (*vītāvītaviṣāṇasya pakṣatāvanasevinaḥ / pravādāḥ sāmṃkhyakarīṇaḥ sallakīṣaṇḍabhaṅgurāḥ* // (YD Intro., p. 1, ll. 3-4; p. 2, ll. 6-7).

⁶⁰¹ *pratipakṣāḥ punas tasya puruṣeśāṇuvādināḥ /
vaināśikāḥ prākṛtikā vikārapuruṣās tathā* /5/
*teṣāṃ icchāvighātārtham ācāryaiḥ sūkṣmabuddhibhiḥ /
racitāḥ sveṣu tantreṣu viśamās tarkagahvarāḥ* /6/ (YD Intro., p. 2, ll. 2-5).

⁶⁰² For an overview of the significance of these ten fundamental topics, usually known as *mūlikārtha* (cf. TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-18), see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 93-94. Marginal notes in two of the YD manuscripts gloss *cūlātva* with *prādhānya* (‘prevalance’ or ‘supreme importance’) explain that the ten topics are called *cūlikārtha* because they are similar to a *cūlikā*, which usually refers to a bird’s crest (YD Intro., p. 2, n.1).

⁶⁰³ This ‘multiplicity’ (*nānātva*) probably refers to the distinctions between the manifest (*vyakta*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*), and Consciousness (*puruṣa*) (cf. SK 2).

⁶⁰⁴ *śiṣyair duravagāhās te tattvārthabhrāntabuddhibhiḥ /
tasmād īśvarakṛṣṇena saṃkṣiptārtham idam kṛtam* /7/
*saptatyākhyam prakaraṇam sakalam śāstram eva vā /
yasmāt sarvapaḍārthānām iha vyākhyā kariṣyate* /8/
*pradhānāstitvam ekatvam arthavattvam athānyatā /
pārārthyam ca tathānaikyam viyogo yoga eva ca* /9/
*śeṣavṛttir akartṛtvam cūlikārthāḥ smṛtā daśa /
viparyayaḥ pañcavidhas tathoktā nava tuṣṭayaḥ* /10/
*karaṇānām asāmarthyam aṣṭāvīmśatidhā matam /
iti ṣaṣṭiḥ padārthānām aṣṭābhiḥ saha siddhibhiḥ* /11/

These sixty topics form the basic framework of the *Śaṣṭitantra* ('System of Sixty [Categories]').⁶⁰⁵ From these verses, it is not clear whether the YD-*kāra* views these categories as an aspect of Kapila's original system or as a product of the later teachers mentioned in the previous verses. Elsewhere, however, the commentator mentions that Kapila had innate knowledge of 'all categories'.⁶⁰⁶ As suggested by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987),⁶⁰⁷ it appears that the YD thus views the *Śaṣṭitantra* as a system initiated by Kapila himself and reflected in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's summary of Sāṃkhya doctrine.⁶⁰⁸ Thus, Kapila's original system (apparently featuring sixty categories), after being summarised in a fixed composition and then expanded upon by later teachers in debate with other schools, was re-summarised by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK.

In the last of the YD's introductory verses, the commentator explicitly asserts that the SK is an authoritative expression of the system founded by Kapila, and explains his own function as a commentator:

[This] short text, not short in meaning, is possessed of all the characteristics of a philosophical system (*tantra*), just like an image in a mirror of the philosophical system of the supreme *ṛṣi*. I will undertake an explanation of it for the sake of justification according to logic. May wise men receive it well, out of compassion even if it is incorrect.⁶⁰⁹

*yathākramaṃ lakṣaṇataḥ kārtsnyenehābhidhāsyate /
tasmād ataḥ śāstram idam alaṃ nānāvasiddhaye* /12/ (YD Intro., p. 2, l. 8 – p. 3, l. 1). Verses 9 through 11 above are quoted directly by the TK (on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 758, §V.5).

⁶⁰⁵ For a discussion of the issues surrounding the possible authorship and date of the *Śaṣṭitantra*, as well as the question as to whether the term refers to a single text or group of texts, or just a general framework for treating Sāṃkhya, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 125-128.

⁶⁰⁶ *asty āṛṣo hi dṛṣṭādivyātirekeṇa sarvapaḍārtheṣu sāmśiddhikāḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātibho bhaviṣyātīti* / (YD on SK 4, p. 75, ll. 19-21).

⁶⁰⁷ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 127) seem to oversimplify in their interpretation of these opening verses: 'The *Yuktidīpikā* indicates in its introductory verses that the scheme [the *Śaṣṭitantra*] was handed down by Kapila himself and that it involved a huge treatise that could not be mastered even in a hundred years; hence, the need for Īśvarakṛṣṇa's summary.' Rather, as has become evident, Kapila's system went through an initial summarisation, then a period of expansion by later teachers, then a re-summarisation by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. There is no explicit direct connection in these verses between the sixty topics and Kapila's original treatise.

⁶⁰⁸ This does not preclude the possibility that, as argued by OBERHAMMER (1961), there was also a single text treating these sixty topics, composed by Vṛṣagaṇa, and referred to as the *śāstra* in the YD (see CHAPTER III).

⁶⁰⁹ *alpagantham analpārtham sarvais tantraguṇair yutam* /

The commentator sees his task as to prove the authoritative status of the SK as a complete *tantra*, to ‘unpack’ the meaning behind the verses through logical argument and thereby to demonstrate the continuity between Kapila’s original system and Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s summary. The reference to the SK as ‘an image in a mirror’ in this passage can be compared to SK 73, a verse added to the end of the SK by the MV: ‘Thus, this brief *śāstra* is not deficient with respect to meaning, and is just like an image reflected in a mirror of the great body of the *tantra*.’⁶¹⁰ However, the YD’s explicit statement of purpose, and its realisation in the YD-*kāra*’s lengthy dialogical debates in defence of what he perceives as Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s views, have no parallel in any of the other classical commentaries. At the opposite extreme from the YD-*kāra*’s attitude lies the detached reporting of Vācaspatimiśra.⁶¹¹

The remainder of the introductory section of the YD is devoted to an explanation in prose of the characteristics of a proper *tantra*,⁶¹² which include proper ‘naming’ (*saṃjñā*) according to etymological significance. As discussed above (§V.1), the commentator views Kapila’s names for the *tattvas* as a point of continuity in the Sāṃkhya tradition.⁶¹³ Thus, the SK conforms to Kapila’s original system both in its utilisation of the sixty categories (*padārtha*) for the discussion of doctrine and in its preservation of the key technical terminology of the system. The other key characteristics of a *tantra* discussed by the commentator are adequacy of aphorisms (*sūtra*), adequacy of means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), adequacy of the

pāramarśasya tantrasya bimbam ādarśagaṃ yathā /13/

tasya vyākhyāṃ kariṣyāmi yathānyāyopapattaye /

kārunyād apy ayuktāṃ tām pratinandantu sūrayaḥ /14/ (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 1-4).

⁶¹⁰ MV, p. 85, ll. 12-13: *tasmāt samāsadṛṣṭaṃ śāstram idaṃ nārthataś ca parihīnam / tantrasya ca brhanmūrter darpaṇasaṅkrāntam iva bimbam* //73//. MV (p. 85, ll. 19-20) explains that *tantra* refers to the *śaṣṭitantra*: ‘Thus, in [this] short text, the manifestation of the entire system of sixty [topics] is effected. This is the sense [of the verse].’ (*evam alpaśāstre śaṣṭitantrasya kṛtsnasyāpi vyaktir abhihitety arthaḥ* /).

⁶¹¹ Vācaspati says that he is ‘concerned with the explanation merely of settled opinions (*siddhānta*), with disregard for the faults of others’ (see §IV.9, n. 523).

⁶¹² YD Intro., p. 3, l. 6 – p. 8, l. 16.

⁶¹³ See n. 590 (§V.1).

members [of formal inference] (*avayava*),⁶¹⁴ completeness (*anyūnatā*), statement of uncertainty and determination (*saṁśayanirṇayokti*), brief statement (*uddeśa*), detailed statement (*nirdeśa*), succession [of categories discussed] (*anukrama*), and instruction (*upadeśa*).⁶¹⁵

With regard to the form of the SK, the YD breaks up the *kārikās* (verses) of the text and treats them as *sūtras* (short aphorisms). In their critical edition of the YD, Wezler and Motegi have established that the text of the YD itself consists of a short *vārttika* text with a *bhāṣya* text layered around it, but that both are the product of the same author, ‘who wanted thus to follow the model of Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* embodying the work of Kātyāyana, and hence ultimately to create a kind of counterpart, within the tradition of Sāṃkhya, to the works of the famous *trimunis* of Vyākaraṇa, thus raising the Sāṃkhya-kārikā to the status of a Sūtra’.⁶¹⁶ The YD-kāra’s use of the NU passage in explaining the *siddhis*,⁶¹⁷ his concern for the etymological significance of the names of the *tattvas*,⁶¹⁸ and his frequent interpretative analysis of Sanskrit compounds⁶¹⁹ could also be taken to reflect his emulation of the Grammarian tradition.⁶²⁰

The commentator’s interest in etymology is also displayed in his explanation of the term *sūtra*. First he suggests that a *sūtra* ‘indicates’ (*sūcayati*) particular objects, illustrating this with an example from the SK.⁶²¹ Secondly, he suggests that,

⁶¹⁴ See nn. 322-324 (§IV.2).

⁶¹⁵ The commentator lists these characteristics in a verse (perhaps to be taken as a quotation) before explaining them in detail: *sūtrapramāṇavayavopattir anyūnatā saṁśayanirṇayoktiḥ / uddeśanirdeśam anukramaś ca saṁjñopadeśāv iti tantrasampat* // (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 10-11).

⁶¹⁶ YD, p. xxii.

⁶¹⁷ See nn. 510, 515, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9).

⁶¹⁸ See n. 590 (§V.1).

⁶¹⁹ Cf. n. 312 (§IV.1), n. 364 (§IV.3).

⁶²⁰ LARSON (1979, p. 281) observes that ‘one has the impression that the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* was a grammarian rather than a philosopher since many passages of the text deal with the analysis of Sanskrit compounds together with references to Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*.’ As MOTEGI (2006, p. 54) suggests, an analysis of this aspect of the YD deserves a separate study.

⁶²¹ *āha: atha sūtram iti kasmāt / ūcyate: sūcanāt sūtram / sūcayati tāṃs tān arthaviśeṣān iti sūtram / tadyathā kāraṇam asty avyaktam (SK 16a) bhedānaṃ parimāṇāt (SK 15a) iti / atra pratijñāhetū*

more specifically, a *sūtra* ‘indicates the knowledge (*buddhi*) of a mendicant (*bhikṣu*) whose outer and inner organs⁶²² have been withdrawn, with regard even to various suprasensuous (*atīndriya*) objects, such as primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*)’.⁶²³ This knowledge corresponds to that of the figures known as *īśvaramaharṣi*⁶²⁴ from the passage of the YD that deals with the definition of authoritative figures (*āpta*),⁶²⁵ ‘who are free from faults such as passion, of undoubted intelligence, and who have seen suprasensuous (*atīndriya*) objects’.⁶²⁶ As discussed in §IV.3, this passage also makes a provision for the maintenance of each *śāstra* by individuals recognised as authorities in their own fields of learning.⁶²⁷ The commentator’s definition of the term *sūtra* thus provides a link between his view of the SK and his definition of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*). The SK can be considered to fall under the category of authoritative testimony insofar as it provides a means for later generations to access Kapila’s firsthand knowledge of the suprasensuous *tattvas*.

The commentator’s inclusion of ‘adequacy of the members [of formal inference]’ (*avayavopapatti*)⁶²⁸ in the characteristics of a proper *tantra* is also significant with regard to his view of the function of the SK. The commentator specifies that this refers to the ten members (*avayava*) of formal inference, including the five ‘members of explanation’ (*vyākhyāṅga*) and the five ‘members of teaching

kañhoktau / taylor upayogi drṣṭāntaṃ sādhyasiddhaye samartham iti kṛtvā mūlaśakalāda<yo> 'trāntar anabhihitā apy etasmād avasīyante / (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 20-25).

⁶²² See §II.4 and SK 33, 35.

⁶²³ *athavā bhikṣor upasaṃhṛtabahiṣkaraṇāntaḥkaraṇasya teṣu teṣv atīndriyeṣv api pradhānādiṣv artheṣu buddhiṃ sūcayātīti sūtram / (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 25-26).*

⁶²⁴ See §V.3 on the significance of this term.

⁶²⁵ See n. 367 (§IV.3).

⁶²⁶ *vyapagatarāgādidoṣāṅgāṃ asandigdhamatīnāṃ atīndriyārthadṛśvanāṃ īśvaramaharṣiṅgāṃ āptatvaṃ ācakṣmahe na sarveṣāṃ / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-5).*

⁶²⁷ *svaviśaye ca tatprāmāṇyasyādoṣavattvāt / yasya khalv api[]yo viśayas tasya tasmin viśaye vaco 'ntareṇāpi sādhanam pramāṇam ity avasīyam abhyupagantavyam / itarathā pratiśāstram ācārasthitiniyamānāṃ adṛṣṭārthānāṃ apratipattiḥ syāt / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 7-10).*

⁶²⁸ See above, nn. 612, 615.

to others' (*parapratipādanāṅga*).⁶²⁹ As discussed in §IV.2, these ten members constitute the direct (*vīta*) inference⁶³⁰ and are considered necessary because 'it is impossible to transmit meaning (*artha*) to another intellect (*buddhi*) without [the use of] a statement (*vākyam*).'⁶³¹ In particular, the commentator argues that the members of explanation (*vyākhyāṅga*) are necessary for the sake of the favour (*anugraha*) of those of ordinary intellect, which is considered the reason for the explanation of *śāstra*.⁶³²

The commentator defends his attribution of these ten members of inference to the SK in a series of exchanges with an opponent,⁶³³ in which he argues that although they are not mentioned in the SK, their use is implied by Īśvarakṛṣṇa's mention of inference (*anumāna*)⁶³⁴ and demonstrated by his doctrinal statements.⁶³⁵ As discussed by HARZER (2006), the commentator thus treats the so-called *sūtras* of the SK as 'arguments in accordance with the rules of forming an inference'.⁶³⁶ As discussed in §IV.2, the YD-*kāra* demonstrates the use of not only direct (*vīta*) inference, but also indirect (*avīta*) inference and inference from general correlation

⁶²⁹ *avayavāḥ punar jijñāsādayaḥ pratijñādayaś ca / tatra jijñāsādayo vyākhyāṅgaṃ pratijñādayaḥ parapratyāyanāṅgaṃ / tān uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ* (89.16f.) / (YD Intro., p. 4, ll. 6-8). Cf. nn. 322, 324 (§IV.2).

⁶³⁰ See n. 333 (§IV.2).

⁶³¹ *vākyam antareṇārthasya buddhyantare saṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt* (YD on SK 6ab, p. 89, ll. 14-15).

⁶³² 'The favour of all should be effected. For this purpose, the explanation of *śāstra* is practiced by the learned, not for their own sake or for the sake of those with intellects similar to their own.' (*sarvasya cānugrahaḥ kartavya ity evamarthaṃ śāstravyākhyānaṃ vipaścibhiḥ pratāyate na svārthaṃ svasaḍṣābuddhyarthaṃ vā* / (YD on SK 6, p. 93, ll. 15-16).) For context, see n. 331 (§IV.2).

⁶³³ YD Intro., p. 4, l. 9 – p. 6, l. 11.

⁶³⁴ *ucyate: pramāṇāntarbhāvāt / pramāṇeṣv antarbhāva eṣām ity ayam upadiṣṭo hetur asmābhiḥ / anumānāṅgaṃ hi jijñāsādayaḥ / tasmāt tadantarbhūtās ta iti na pṛthag upadiśyante* / (YD Intro., p. 5, ll. 4-6).

⁶³⁵ *naitad yuktam anupadeśān na santi jijñāsādayaḥ / kiṃ tarhi / anupadiṣṭam apy eṣām astitvaṃ liṅgāt pratipadyāmahe yad ayam ācāryaḥ—duḥkhatrayābhīghātāj jijñāsā tadapaghātake hetau / (SK 1ab) iti jijñāsanaṃ ācaṣṭe / kāraṇam asty avyaktam (SK 16a) iti pratijñāṃ karoti / bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt (SK 15a) iti hetuṃ vyapadiśati / naṭavad vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam (SK 42d) iti drṣṭāntaṃ dyotayati / kṣīrasya yathā tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya (SK 57b'd) ity upasaṃharati / tasmāt trividhaṃ karaṇaṃ dvāri (SK 35cd) iti nigamayati / na cānabhipretair ācāryāṇāṃ śāstre vyavahāro lakṣyate / tena vayaṃ liṅgāt pratipadyāmahe santi jijñāsādayo 'vayavāḥ śāstra iti* / (YD Intro., p. 4, ll. 16-26).

⁶³⁶ HARZER (2006), p. 17.

(*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), in establishing the doctrines laid out in the SK.⁶³⁷ The commentator's primary concern is thus to show that the SK illustrates the processes of inference by which the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* are established.

As discussed in §IV.3, the YD leaves room for the transmission through authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) of objects of knowledge also knowable through perception or inference.⁶³⁸ Evidently, the commentator views the communication of Sāṃkhya doctrine, through the medium of formal inference, as the function of the SK as an authoritative *tantra*. In other words, we might say that the SK is treated as a manual for the inference of Sāṃkhya knowledge. Although the *pramāṇa* of inference is treated as a key tool for establishing Sāṃkhya doctrine, the *pramāṇa* of authoritative testimony is required to demonstrate the inference of this doctrine to those of ordinary cognitive capacity. Those individuals of extraordinary cognitive capacity may be able to grasp this doctrine independently through reflection (*ūha*). Although *ūha* is said to occur independently of the *pramāṇas*,⁶³⁹ it can perhaps be thought of as a kind of independent inferential process, since the *pramāṇa* of inference is rather treated in terms of the formulation and communication of an inferential statement.

The YD's view of the relationship between the SK and Kapila's original *tantra* seems to fit a model identified by POLLOCK (1985) as prevalent in the classical period of Indian *śāstra*. POLLOCK illustrates the widespread assumption, in the texts of this period, of the primordial existence of valid doctrine. He characterises the initial apprehension and articulation of a body of doctrine by a qualified individual as 'the necessary commencement of the tradition'.⁶⁴⁰ Subsequently, the learning of

⁶³⁷ See nn. 323, 334, 335, 341 (§IV.2).

⁶³⁸ See n. 369 (§IV.3).

⁶³⁹ See n. 507 (§IV.6).

⁶⁴⁰ POLLOCK (1985), p. 507.

this *śāstra* ‘serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice’ of which it treats.⁶⁴¹ Such a text is considered the ideal prototype for future treatments of its subject. Tradition thus takes the form of a perpetual appeal to this prototype, which is viewed as the vital substance of a particular system of knowledge.⁶⁴²

As we have seen, the YD treats the names of the *tattvas* as an essential point of continuity in the Sāṃkhya tradition. Insofar as these names conform to the significance (*artha*) of the *tattvas* themselves—in other words, to the fundamental properties (*dharman*) of reality⁶⁴³—they can be considered to exist primordially in a potential form. According to this interpretation, Kapila’s initial manifestation of the primordial Sāṃkhya *śāstra* corresponds to POLLOCK’s ‘commencement of the tradition’, while Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s conformity to that original *śāstra* ‘serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice’ of the inference of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* by later individuals. In this sense, the authoritative testimony given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa serves as a blueprint for the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge. The suggestion that other *ṛṣis* may attain the same knowledge independently through *ūha* conforms with POLLOCK’s observation that an original *śāstra* may be made accessible to later generations either ‘through faithful intermediaries’ or ‘by sudden revelation’.⁶⁴⁴

Moreover, POLLOCK observes that this view of the origination and transmission of knowledge stems from the notion that the Vedas are primordially existent⁶⁴⁵ and may be related to the doctrine of the pre-existent effect (*satkāryavāda*).⁶⁴⁶ As we have seen (§V.1), the YD-*kāra* appears to emulate the

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., p. 507.

⁶⁴² Similarly, AKLUJKAR (2009, p. 11) notes that ‘almost all accounts of getting back a lost fundamental teaching have reference to that teaching’s survival somewhere in a hidden or unidentified form. The very logic of the situation can be said to demand the assumption of a lost yet not-completely-lost original.’

⁶⁴³ Cf. the YD’s use of NU 1.20: nn. 510, 515, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9).

⁶⁴⁴ POLLOCK (1985), p. 512.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 519.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 517-518.

model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the Sāṃkhya tradition. The notion of *satkāryavāda* is also a key doctrine in the Sāṃkhya system, used to account for the creation of the manifest *tattvas* out of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*).⁶⁴⁷ It seems plausible that the YD-*kāra* would assume that just as a fixed number of *tattvas* pre-exist in *pradhāna*, so does the knowledge of these *tattvas* pre-exist in a fixed formulation. We will find support for this interpretation in connection with the origination of Kapila and his knowledge in §V.4.

This view of the function of the SK would resolve a potential tension between Sāṃkhya doctrine and its legitimising mechanism, between the fact that the *tattvas* may presumably be inferred by any individual and the fact that they were originally intuited by an individual with extraordinary abilities. According to the view implicit in the YD's treatment of the SK, these two facts mutually validate one another. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's conformity to Kapila's original *śāstra* serves to assist later generations in the practice of Sāṃkhya, while at the same time, the practice of Sāṃkhya inference, as embodied in the SK and demonstrated by the YD, serves to validate the assertion of the universal reality of the *tattvas* and thus the universal applicability of Kapila's *śāstra*.

The YD's view of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine thus conforms to a model prevalent in the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, emulating the model of the Vedic *ṛṣis* in its conception of Kapila's role in the initiation of the Sāṃkhya tradition. However, the YD also clearly elevates Kapila above other *ṛṣis*.

⁶⁴⁷ SK 9: 'Because of the non-production of a non-existent thing, because of the relation of a cause [to its instruments], because of the absence of origination from everything, because of the production of that which it is possible [to produce from a particular cause] by that which is capable [of producing that particular effect], and because of the state of being a cause, the effect is [pre-]existent [in the cause].' (*asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //*). The commentators use this doctrine to prove that the manifest *tattvas* exist in *pradhāna* in an unmanifest form; e.g., YD on SK 9, p. 109, ll. 12-13: 'We assert that there would be no manifestation of the products, beginning with the intellect, out of primordial Materiality if they were non-existent.' (*nāvidyamānasya mahadāder vikārasya pradhānād āvirbhāva iti pratijānīmahe //*)

Kapila is treated as the only *ṛṣi* born with innate (*sāṃsiddhika*) Sāṃkhya knowledge and as therefore exempt from the need even to grasp this knowledge through reflection (*ūha*).⁶⁴⁸ The YD recognises the existence of other *ṛṣis*, as well as of *yogins*, *devas*, and the Lord (*īśvara*). The following section will present an overview of the evidence in the YD with regard to the nature and status of these figures, in order to provide some context for a discussion of the significance of the special status afforded Kapila (§V.4-5).

§3. *īśvara*, *devas*, *yogins* and *ṛṣis* in the *Yuktidīpikā*.

References to several classes of extraordinary or divine beings occur in the YD. In large part, the subject matter discussed in connection with these figures is peripheral to the concerns of the Sāṃkhya system as presented in the SK. As we have seen, rebirth in the realms of deities (*deva*), at higher levels of the phenomenal cosmos, is considered a possibility as the result of the condition of merit (*dharma*), but this is considered inferior to the goal of liberation through the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) (§IV.6). In general, the commentators hold that *devas* and *yogins* are able to directly perceive the subtle elements (*tanmātra*) (§II.4, IV.1), although this fact is not discussed in connection with the pursuit of liberation through Sāṃkhya knowledge. Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya, is known as the supreme *ṛṣi* (*paramarṣi*), and occasional references to other *ṛṣis* are found in the commentaries.⁶⁴⁹ The nature of *ṛṣis* and the relative status of Kapila, however, are not discussed in detail in the commentaries.

⁶⁴⁸ See n. 569 (§IV.10).

⁶⁴⁹ E.g., GBh's mention of the seven *ṛṣis* who are sons of Brahmā (§IV.8, n. 454), YD's plural use of the term *īśvaramaharṣi* (§IV.3, n. 367), and YD's quotation of NU 1.20 (§IV.9, n. 510). See further discussion below.

Of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, the YD contains the most evidence regarding the nature and status of such extraordinary figures. As apparent in some of the passages analysed in CHAPTER IV, the YD reveals a mythological orientation in its explanation of certain doctrines. In particular, the YD incorporates figures of cosmological prominence into the Sāṃkhya discussion more often than do the other commentaries. This is apparent, for example, in the commentator's repeated references to a *māhātmyaśarīra* ('body of greatness').

FRAUWALLNER (1973) argues that the passage, quoted by the YD, relating the *māhātmyaśarīra*'s production of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* as his sons,⁶⁵⁰ reflects a mythological orientation apparent in the doctrines of Vṛṣagaṇa's *Śaṣṭitantra*,⁶⁵¹ stemming from the influence of 'religious sects' on early Sāṃkhya.⁶⁵² OBERHAMMER (1961) attributes eleven quotations found in the YD to the *Śaṣṭitantra*,⁶⁵³ although it is not clear whether the *Śaṣṭitantra* is in fact a single text, a group of texts, or just a general framework for the discussion of Sāṃkhya doctrine.⁶⁵⁴ Given the YD-*kāra*'s apparent familiarity with the *Śaṣṭitantra*—or, at any rate, with earlier sources of Sāṃkhya doctrine—it is possible that the YD's presentation of divine figures in general reveals elements of earlier Sāṃkhya tradition not found in the other classical commentaries.⁶⁵⁵

As discussed in §IV.9, the YD-*kāra* refers to the *māhātmyaśarīra* as Brahmā⁶⁵⁶ and elsewhere states that his sons arose out of primordial Nature

⁶⁵⁰ See n. 484 (§IV.9).

⁶⁵¹ On the identification of this passage as a quotation from Vṛṣagaṇa's *Śaṣṭitantra*, see the reviews in CHAPTER III of FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961).

⁶⁵² FRAUWALLNER (1973), pp. 259-260.

⁶⁵³ OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 165-170.

⁶⁵⁴ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 125-128. Cf. the YD's presentation of the sixty categories (§V.2, nn. 604, 608).

⁶⁵⁵ The other commentators, for example, class such statements as 'Indra is king of the gods' in the category of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) (§IV.3, nn. 354, 356), which they present as practically unimportant in the context of the Sāṃkhya inquiry, while the YD, as we shall see below, discusses divine figures in connection with several aspects of the system.

⁶⁵⁶ See n. 484 (§IV.9).

(*pradhāna*), an instance of the *prākṛtika* form of the production of physical bodies.⁶⁵⁷ More information on the *māhātmyaśarīra* is found in another passage of the YD, in which the commentator clarifies his position on the nature of the Lord (*īśvara*), in response to arguments for the Lord's role as creator, as held by the Pāsupatas and Vaiśeṣikas, who serve as opponents to the Sāṃkhya viewpoint in this passage:⁶⁵⁸

[Opponent:] And the scripture (*śruti*) also describes [the Lord's] embodiment (*mūrti*)⁶⁵⁹ 'clothed in skins, trident in hand, bow stretched, having black locks of hair', and so on. If [it is argued that] because of admitting to this, there is the relinquishment of your position, [this] would be the idea: if, due to the statements of scripture, the Lord (*īśvara*) is regarded as having embodiments (*mūrtimat*), by this his existence is established.

[Proponent:] Why?

[Opponent:] Because the quality of having embodiments is not applicable to a non-existent thing.

[Proponent:] This is also irrelevant.

[Opponent:] Why?

[Proponent:] On account of [your] non-understanding of [our] intention. For we do not reject the particular power of the glorious one (*bhagavat*)⁶⁶⁰ absolutely, on account of [his] acquisition of a body of greatness (*māhātmyaśarīra*), etc. This is our intention: there is no initiator (*prayoktṛ*) of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*) that is distinct from the two, as you have said.⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁷ See n. 485 (§IV.9).

⁶⁵⁸ *āha*: *asty evam īśvara iti pāsupatavaiśeṣikāḥ / kasmāt / kāryaviśeṣasyātiśayabuddhipūrvakatvāt /* (YD on SK 15, p. 157, ll. 13-14).

⁶⁵⁹ The concept of 'embodiment' (*mūrti*) should be distinguished from that of the 'incarnations' or 'descents' (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu, who is not mentioned in the text. As will become clear below, *īśvara*'s embodiment consists in his appropriation of a psycho-physical body (*kāryakaraṇa*) composed of the *tattvas* of *prakṛti*. The use of the term *mūrti* does not imply that *īśvara* takes on such a body in order to fulfill any specific purpose as in the case of Viṣṇu's *avatāras*.

⁶⁶⁰ It is unlikely that *bhagavat* is used specifically as an epithet of Kṛṣṇa/Viṣṇu here, since nowhere else in the text does Viṣṇu appear to be mentioned, nor are the embodiments of *īśvara* ever termed *avatāra*, and elsewhere *bhagavat* is used simply as an adjective applied to figures such as Kapila and Āsuri (cf. n. 462 (§IV.8) and n. 754 (§V.4)).

⁶⁶¹ *śrutir api cāśya mūrtim ācaṣṭe "kṛttivāsāḥ pinākahasto vitatadhanvā nīlaśikhaṇḍī"* (cf. *Tai.S.1.8.6.2*) *ityādi / tadabhyupagamāt svapakṣahānir iti cet / syān matam / yadi tarhi śrutivacanān mūrtimān īśvaraḥ parigṛhyate tena siddham asyāstitvam / kasmāt / na hy asato mūrtimattvam upapadyata iti kṛtvā / etad apy ayuktam / <kasmāt> / abhiprāyānavabodhāt / na hy ekāntena vayaṃ bhagavataḥ śaktiviśeṣaṃ pratyacakṣmahe māhātmyaśarīrādiparigrahāt / yathā [tu] bhavatocyate / pradhānapuruṣavyatiriktaḥ tayoh prayoktā nāstīty ayam asmadabhiprāyaḥ /* (YD on SK 15, p. 159, 19-27).

As noted by BRONKHORST (1983),⁶⁶² the characteristics of Śiva are attributed to *īśvara*'s embodiment here. This apparent association of the *māhātmyaśarīra* with Śiva would appear to conflict with the commentator's reference to the *māhātmyaśarīra* as Brahmā (see above). Moreover, in the passage of the YD dealing with the *prākṛtika* production of physical bodies, Śiva is referred to as *maheśvara* ('Great Lord') but mentioned separately from the *māhātmyaśarīra*.⁶⁶³ Perhaps we are to understand an implicit identity between Śiva and Brahmā, or rather that *māhātmyaśarīra* refers to an incarnation of *īśvara* in the form of either Śiva or Brahmā (that is, both are possessors of a 'body of greatness'). This would agree with the interpretation of CHAKRAVARTI (1975), who assumes a plurality of *māhātmyaśarīras*.⁶⁶⁴ Alternatively, since only the opponent refers to Śiva in the above passage, perhaps the proponent rather accepts only Brahmā (equated with the *māhātmyaśarīra*) as a form of *īśvara*. This would be consistent with the fact that the opponent represents a Pāśupata viewpoint, while elsewhere in the text only Brahmā is associated with the *māhātmyaśarīra*. Whatever the explanation, it is perhaps significant that Viṣṇu is never associated with *īśvara* in the YD, while in later Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts an explicit identification is made between *īśvara* and Viṣṇu (see §V.5). Since the term *māhātmyaśarīra* never occurs in the plural, I will assume in the following that only one *māhātmyaśarīra* is referred to in the YD. The above passage does suggest, though, that *īśvara* takes on not only the form of the *māhātmyaśarīra*, but other forms as well.

As apparent from the passage quoted above, the YD accepts the existence of *īśvara* but denies him any role in the process of creation, such as that attributed to him by the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas. BRONKHORST (1983) observes that, in fact,

⁶⁶² BRONKHORST (1983), p. 152.

⁶⁶³ See nn. 474, 475 (§IV.8).

⁶⁶⁴ CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 222.

‘no Sāṃkhya texts of the first millennium deny God’s existence’, and that ‘more often than not they give us the impression that they accept God’s existence as a matter of course, but do not accept His causal agency with respect to the world’.⁶⁶⁵

With regard to the evidence in the YD for this view of *īśvara*, BRONKHORST draws attention to the fact that the commentator treats *īśvara* as a form of pure consciousness, like *puruṣa*, and therefore passive.⁶⁶⁶

We will establish the non-agency of Consciousness (*puruṣa*) in [the verse]: ‘And from that opposition...’ [SK 19a].⁶⁶⁷ This same rule is to be observed in the negation of the causality of the Lord also, on account of non-difference with regard to consciousness.⁶⁶⁸

The YD thus accepts the existence of *īśvara*, but denies him any activity, including any role in the creation of the cosmos.⁶⁶⁹ This corresponds to the view of *īśvara* in the YS, where he is presented as a particular *puruṣa* who serves as a model for the aspiring *yogin*:

Or [absorption (*samādhi*) can be attained]⁶⁷⁰ through devotion to the Lord (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*). The Lord is a particular *puruṣa*, untouched by the stores of affliction, action, and fruition. In him is the pre-eminent seed of omniscience (*sarvajñabīja*). [He is] the *guru* even of earlier [*gurus*]⁶⁷¹, on account of not being limited by time.⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁵ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 155.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 149.

⁶⁶⁷ SK 19: ‘And from that opposition [of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*], the *puruṣa*’s state of being a witness, isolation, indifference, state of being an observer, and non-agency are established.’ (*tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sāksitvam asya puruṣasya / kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca* //).

⁶⁶⁸ “*tasmāc ca viparyāsāt*” (SK 19a) *ity atra puruṣasyākartṛtvam upapādayiṣyāmaḥ / caitanyāviśeṣād īśvarasyāpi sa eva vidhiḥ kāraṇatvapratishedhe boddhavyaḥ* / (YD on SK 15, p. 157, 10-12).

⁶⁶⁹ Cf. TK on SK 56, p. 152: ‘It is not from Materiality superintended by the Lord, on account of the absence of the superintendence of one who is inactive. For an inactive carpenter does not superintend his axe, etc.’ (*neśvarādhiṣṭhitaprakṛtikṛto nirvyāpārasyādhiṣṭhātṛtvāsambhavāt / na hi nirvyāpāras takṣā vāsyādy adhiṣṭhāti* //).

⁶⁷⁰ VBh on YS 1.23, p. 65, ll. 6-7: *kim etasmād evāsannataraḥ samādhir bhavati / athāsya lābhe bhavaty anyo ’pi kaścid upāyo na veti* /

⁶⁷¹ VBh on YS 1.26, p. 81, ll. 5-6: *pūrve hi guravaḥ kālenāvacchidyante / yatrāvacchedārthena kālō nopāvariate sa eṣa pūrveṣām api guruḥ* /

⁶⁷² *īśvarapraṇidhānād vā* //23//
kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ //24//
tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam //25//
purveṣām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt //26// (YS 1.23-26).

The YS's characterisation of *īśvara* as a *guru* associated with omniscience places him in the category of figures of doctrinal authority and calls to mind the YD's portrayal of Kapila, who was born with 'innate knowledge of all categories'.⁶⁷³ The VBh, a text roughly contemporary with the YD, makes this association explicit:

Even in the absence of his own favour (*anugraha*), the favour (*anugraha*) of beings is his motive: 'I will lift up the transmigrating *puruṣas* through the teaching of knowledge (*jñāna*) and merit (*dharma*) in the ages (*kalpa*), dissolutions (*pralaya*), and great dissolutions (*mahāpralaya*).⁶⁷⁴ And thus it has been said: 'The first knower (*ādividvas*), the glorious supreme *ṛṣi*, taking control of a transformation-mind (*nirmāṇacitta*)⁶⁷⁴, out of compassion taught the philosophical system (*tantra*) to Āsuri, who desired to know.'⁶⁷⁵

This passage explicitly associates *īśvara* with Kapila, who was prompted to take on a created mind (as an aspect of *prakṛti*) and to impart the Sāṃkhya system out of compassion for other beings. Although the YD does not explicitly associate *īśvara* with Kapila or even refer to *īśvara* as a *guru*, the general similarity between the YD's view of *īśvara* and that of the Yoga school could be taken to suggest that, according to the YD, the other forms taken on by *īśvara* (besides the *māhātmyaśarīra*) might include Kapila.

BRONKHORST's article argues that the YD-*kāra* does appear to view Kapila as an embodiment of *īśvara*, primarily on the basis of the commentator's use of the term *īśvaramaharṣi*⁶⁷⁶ in describing authoritative individuals (*āpta*).⁶⁷⁷ The term *īśvaramaharṣi* occurs twice in the text, both times in the context of the YD's

⁶⁷³ *asty ārṣo hi dṛṣṭādivyatiṛeṇa sarvapadārtheṣu sāmśiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātibho bhaviṣyatīti* / (YD on SK 4, p. 75, ll. 19-21).

⁶⁷⁴ CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 85) points out the similarity of the concept of *nirmāṇacitta* to the Buddhist concept of *nirmāṇakāya* ('transformation-body') as it occurs in *Dīgha Nikāya* 2.86: 'Buddha also speaks of *nirmāṇa-kāya* i.e. the calling up of a mental image while describing the immediate fruits of the life of a recluse who has entered into and abides in the supreme meditation.'

⁶⁷⁵ *tasyātmānugrahābhāve 'pi bhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam / jñānadharmopadeśena kalpaprālāya-mahāpralāyeṣu saṃsāriṇaḥ puruṣān uddhariṣyāmīti tathā cōktam / ādividvān nirmāṇacittam adhiṣṭhāya kārūṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jijñāsamānāya tantraṃ provāceti* // (VBh on YS 1.25, p. 46). Vācaspati attributes the quoted passage to the early Sāṃkhya teacher Pañcaśikha (TV on VBh 1.25, p. 78, l. 18: *tathā cōktam iti / pañcaśikhācāryeṇa iti śeṣaḥ* /).

⁶⁷⁶ See n. 367 (§IV.3).

⁶⁷⁷ BRONKHORST (1983), pp. 152-155.

discussion of authoritative individuals and both times in the plural.⁶⁷⁸ The term could mean either ‘the Lord and great *ṛṣis*’ (as a *dvandva* compound) or ‘great *ṛṣis* who are the Lord’ (as a *karmadhāraya* compound).⁶⁷⁹ BRONKHORST prefers the latter interpretation, arguing that, given the YD’s view of *īśvara* as passive consciousness, the term *īśvara* alone cannot refer to an authoritative figure, ‘for pure awareness does not possess authoritativeness or opinions’.⁶⁸⁰ BRONKHORST further supports his preference for the interpretation ‘great *ṛṣis* who are *īśvara*’ by suggesting that it is unlikely that *īśvara* here refers to an embodiment of the Lord in the form of a *māhātmyaśarīra*, since the term *īśvara* does not appear to designate a *māhātmyaśarīra* anywhere else in the YD.⁶⁸¹

BRONKHORST finds support for his argument that *īśvaramaharṣi* refers to ‘the great seers who are [incorporations of] God’⁶⁸² in two passages of the MV.⁶⁸³ The first of these passages is the opening verse of the MV, where we find that Kapila is explicitly connected with *īśvara*:

I bow down, with the highest devotion, to the Lord, the light of Kapila, the bestower of all knowledge, who abides in the sun, eternal.⁶⁸⁴

As BRONKHORST suggests, the equation of *īśvara* with the ‘light’ of Kapila agrees with the fact that in Sāṃkhya and Yoga *īśvara* usually designates a particular

⁶⁷⁸ YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 4-5 (see n. 367 (§IV.3)) and about twenty lines later in an objection to the proponent’s position: ‘[Opponent:] On account of the similarity of authoritative statements and incontrovertible statements. Just as the statements of authorities such as a goldsmith are unfailing, so are *īśvaramaharṣis* authoritative. Therefore, their statements are also unfailing. Here, the quality of being similar objects can be supposed. Thus, doctrine is only inference.’ (*āha: āpta-v<ādā>viśaṃvādasāmānyāt / yathā hairaṇyakaprabhṛtīnām āptānām vākyaṃ avyabhicāry evam īśvaramaharṣayo ’pi cāptāḥ / tasmād eṣām api vākyaṃ avyabhicārīti śakyam atrāpi sāmānya-viśayatvaṃ kalpayitum / evam anumānam evāgama iti* / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 22 – p. 101, l. 3)).

⁶⁷⁹ BRONKHORST (1983, p. 153, n. 6) argues that a third possibility, ‘the seers, who are Gods’, is ruled out by the YD’s ‘consistent use of singular endings after *īśvara*...and *bhagavat*’.

⁶⁸⁰ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 153.

⁶⁸¹ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 153.

⁶⁸² Ibid., p. 153.

⁶⁸³ Ibid., pp. 156-157.

⁶⁸⁴ *sarvavidyāvidhātāram ādityasthaṃ sanātanaṃ / nato ’smi parayā bhaktyā kāpilaṃ jyotir īśvaram* // (MV Intro., p. 1, ll. 3-4).

puruṣa—according to this passage, the *puruṣa* belonging to Kapila.⁶⁸⁵ In other words, the MV suggests that *īśvara* becomes associated with Kapila in the same way that other *puruṣas* become associated with subtle and physical bodies due to conjunction with *prakṛti* (see §II.2). This is confirmed by the other passage of the MV to which BRONKHORST refers, which presents a mythological account of the circumstances of Kapila’s birth:

For the glorious *maharṣi*, endowed with innate merit (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), dispassion (*vairāgya*), and power (*aiśvarya*), an incarnation (*avatāra*) of the glorious ancient *puruṣa*, out of a desire to show kindness to the world, the son of Prajāpati Kardama, named Kapila, came here in Devahūti, the daughter of Svāyambhuva Manu.⁶⁸⁶

The suggestion in this passage that Kapila did not merely transmit the Sāṃkhya doctrine out of compassion, as the SK itself testifies,⁶⁸⁷ but actually incarnated solely for this purpose, provides an answer to the question of the reason for Kapila’s incarnation with innate Sāṃkhya knowledge. We will return to this passage in the discussions in §V.4-5 of the YD’s view of the soteriological purpose behind Kapila’s incarnation and the relation of this view to the evidence of the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.

BRONKHORST suggests that the ‘glorious ancient *puruṣa*’ to whom Māṭhara refers ‘is, of course, God (*īśvara*)’⁶⁸⁸ and takes the passage as confirmation of the assumption that Kapila is one of the *īśvaramaharṣis* to whom the YD ascribes authority. However, there is nothing in either of the MV passages to suggest that *īśvara* incarnates in the bodies of other *maharṣis* than Kapila.

⁶⁸⁵ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 157: ‘God is the light of Kapila. What this means is clear: God is the Self which resides, shines, in Kapila.’

⁶⁸⁶ *iha hi bhagavān maharṣiḥ sāmśiddhikadharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryasampanno bhagavataḥ purāṇa-puruṣasyāvatāro jagadanujighṛkṣayā prajāpateḥ kardamasya putraḥ svāyambhuvasya manor duhitari devahūtyām kapilo nāma babhūva* / (MV on SK 1, p. 1, ll. 14-17).

⁶⁸⁷ SK 70ab: ‘The sage transmitted this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion.’ (*etat pavitram agryam munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau* /).

⁶⁸⁸ BRONKHORST (1983), p. 156.

Two possible alternatives to BRONKHORST's interpretation of the term *īśvaramaharṣi* can be proposed. Firstly, given the fact that the YD clearly elevates Kapila above other *ṛṣis* in terms of his possession of innate (*sāṃsiddhika*) knowledge,⁶⁸⁹ *īśvaramaharṣi* could be taken as a *dvandva* compound. According to this interpretation, 'the Lord (in the form of Kapila) and the (other) great *ṛṣis*' would be considered firsthand authorities on suprasensuous matters.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that Kapila and Brahmā are given equal cosmological status in the YD, as apparent in a passage describing the bodies of the various classes of beings:

Of these, the bodies of gods (*deva*) are of four kinds: due to the favour (*anugraha*) of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*), like those of the supreme *ṛṣi* and Brahmā (*virīṇca*)⁶⁹⁰; due to their attainments (*siddhi*),⁶⁹¹ like those of Brahmā's sons and grandsons;⁶⁹² from mother and father, like those of the sons of Aditi and Kaśyapa; or only from fathers, like that of Vasiṣṭha from Mitra and Varuṇa.⁶⁹³

This passage suggests that because Kapila's body is produced in the same manner as that of Brahmā (i.e. the *māhātmyaśarīra*), he is also likely to be considered an incarnation of *īśvara*. The significance of the fact that the bodies of Kapila and Brahmā were created out of the 'favour' (*anugraha*) of *pradhāna* will be discussed in the following section. While Kapila is here classed as a *deva* and mentioned alongside Brahmā, there is no evidence to suggest that other *ṛṣis* might be given the same status.

⁶⁸⁹ See n. 569 (§IV.10).

⁶⁹⁰ The term *virīṇca* usually refers to Brahmā, but it may also be applied to Viṣṇu or Śiva, according to MONIER-WILLIAMS. The fact that Brahmā is mentioned later in this passage, as well as elsewhere in the text (cf. §V.4, n. 729), suggests that the same figure is meant here. JACOBSEN (2008, p. 48) likewise assumes that *virīṇca* refers to Brahmā.

⁶⁹¹ The nature of the *siddhis* whereby bodies are produced will be discussed in the following section; see n. 735 (§V.4).

⁶⁹² See §V.5 for a discussion of the identity of Brahmā's sons and grandsons.

⁶⁹³ *tatra devānām caturvidhaṃ śarīraṃ pradhānānugrahād yathā paramarṣer virīṇcasya ca, tatsiddhibhyo yathā brahmaṇaḥ putrāṇām tatputraputrāṇām ca, mātāpitṛto yathāditeḥ kaśyapasya ca putrāṇām kevalād vā yathā pitṛto mitrāvaruṇābhyām vasiṣṭhasya* / (YD on SK 39, p. 228, ll. 12-15).

The differences between Kapila and the *māhātmyaśarīra* are made clear in two passages of the YD. The first passage describes the make-up of their bodies in terms of the three constituent qualities (*guṇa*):

Of these, he whose psycho-physical body (*kāryakaraṇa*)⁶⁹⁴ is primarily goodness (*sattva*) is the supreme ṛṣi. He whose [psycho-physical body] is abundant in goodness (*sattva*) and activity (*rajas*) is the *māhātmyaśarīra*.⁶⁹⁵

The implications of this distinction with regard to the intellectual characteristics of each of these figures are made clear in the YD's illustration of the innate (*sāmsiddhika*) variety of the conditions (*bhāva*):

And just as the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the supreme ṛṣi is innate, so is the lordliness (*aiśvarya*) of the *māhātmyaśarīra*.⁶⁹⁶

This makes it clear that Kapila would be more likely than the *māhātmyaśarīra* (who is possessed of the powers of lordliness rather than knowledge) to be considered an authoritative figure by the author of the YD. Kapila thus shares the *māhātmyaśarīra*'s cosmological status but is unique in his possession of innate Sāṃkhya knowledge.

Given the evidence of the YD, the VBh and the MV, it seems likely that Kapila would be considered an embodiment of *īśvara* by the YD-*kāra*, although this cannot be established definitively. However, there is nothing in any of these texts to suggest that other great ṛṣis might also be considered embodiments of *īśvara*, and the unique position afforded Kapila in terms of his cosmological status and his possession of innate *jñāna* suggests that the association with *īśvara* would be confined to the supreme ṛṣi alone. As discussed in §V.1, the YD's treatment of the

⁶⁹⁴ BRONKHORST (1983, pp. 152-154) notes this passage and translates the term *kāryakaraṇa* as 'instrument for effects', arguing that it refers simply to 'an instrument of understanding (*buddhi*), etc.'. However, cf. n. 459 (IV.8). WEZLER (1970, p. 258)'s translation, 'Körper und psychischen Organe', agrees with my interpretation.

⁶⁹⁵ *tatra yasya sattvapradhānam kāryakaraṇam sa paramarṣiḥ / yasya sattvarajobahulaṃ sa māhātmyaśarīraḥ* / (YD on SK 15, p. 161, ll. 17-18).

⁶⁹⁶ *yathā ca paramarṣer jñānam sāmsiddhikam evam māhātmyaśarīrasyaiśvaram* (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 6-7).

siddhis suggests that other *ṛṣis* might attain through reflection (*ūha*) the same knowledge that was innate in Kapila. According to the interpretation of *īśvaramaharṣi* as a *dvandva*, then, these *maharṣis* would equally be considered sources of authoritative testimony, though distinguished from Kapila as an embodiment of *īśvara*.

The other alternative interpretation of the term *īśvaramaharṣi* is suggested by MOTEGI (2006)'s translation of the term as 'great seers of lord-like power'.⁶⁹⁷ Presumably, MOTEGI takes *īśvara* in its adjectival sense, meaning 'capable' or 'powerful'. Despite the fact that elsewhere in the YD the term *īśvara* always seems to be used as a noun referring specifically to 'the Lord',⁶⁹⁸ this reading is perhaps the most simple, since it does not require us to conjecture that the Lord takes on the form of Kapila and/or other *ṛṣis*. According to this interpretation of the term (as a *karmadhāraya*), *īśvaramaharṣis* would be those great *ṛṣis* who are 'lordly' (*īśvara*)—in other words, who have attained the condition of lordliness (*aiśvarya*).

As discussed in §IV.9, according to the YD, *siddhi*, like the condition of *aiśvarya*, results in 'non-obstruction' (*avighāta*, *apratighāta*),⁶⁹⁹ and there is evidence that *siddhi* and the other categories of the *pratyayasarga* were originally associated with stages of yogic practice.⁷⁰⁰ Similarly, in the third chapter of the YS and VBh, the supernatural powers of *aiśvarya* are presented as a result of a *yogin*'s development.⁷⁰¹ An explicit connection between the abilities of *īśvara* and *yogins* is found in the YD's commentary on SK 56, which mentions in passing that 'a single

⁶⁹⁷ MOTEGI (2006), p. 53, n. 27.

⁶⁹⁸ Cf. n. 679 above.

⁶⁹⁹ See nn. 500, 502 (§IV.9).

⁷⁰⁰ See nn. 499, 501 (§IV.9) and the reviews of OBERHAMMER (1961) and KENGHE (1968) in CHAPTER III.

⁷⁰¹ Cf. YS 3.44-45: 'From concentration on the grossness, inherent form, subtlety and purposiveness [of the elements], there is victory over the elements. Then there is the manifestation of [the powers of] atomisation, etc., perfection of the body, and non-injury from the qualities of [the physical body].' (*sthūlasvarūpasūṣmānvayārthavattvasaṃyamād bhūtajayaḥ //44// tato 'ñimādiprādurbhāvaḥ kāyasampat taddharmānabhīghātaś ca //45//*).

īśvara or *yogin* has a multitude of bodies due [merely] to the application of desire’ (see further discussion in §V.4).⁷⁰² Moreover, *īśvara* is associated with omniscience in the YS,⁷⁰³ while ‘unrestricted knowledge’ (*aviparītajñānaṃ*) (in other words, omniscience) is presented as a result of *siddhi* in the YD.⁷⁰⁴ On the basis of this evidence, it is possible that the term *īśvaramaharṣi* refers to those *ṛṣis* who, through yogic practice resulting in *siddhi*, have become similar to *īśvara* in terms of their omniscience, which thus qualifies them to be authoritative figures (*āpta*). Of course, this definition of *īśvaramaharṣi* would also include Kapila, who is born with such knowledge (as well as *aiśvarya* and the other *sāttvika bhāvas*).⁷⁰⁵

That the YD accepts progressive yogic practice as conducive to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge is apparent in the text’s treatment of the merit (*dharma*) attained through the yogic practices of *yama* and *niyama* as a step on a path to knowledge and liberation, also apparently involving the generation of dispassion (*vairāgya*).⁷⁰⁶ Moreover, the fact that the perception of the subtle elements by *yogins* is possible only after the gross elements have been ‘completely attained’ (*samprāpta*) by them (see §IV.3)⁷⁰⁷ suggests that yogic practice is a progressive activity, which may perhaps eventually lead to a *yogin* to independently attain Sāṃkhya knowledge through reflection (*ūha*) and thereby become qualified as an authoritative figure (*āpta*), an ‘*īśvaramaharṣi* who is free from faults such as

⁷⁰² *ekasyeśvarasya yogino vecchāyogād anekāsarīratvam* (YD on SK 56, p. 262, ll. 22-23).

⁷⁰³ See n. 672 above.

⁷⁰⁴ See n. 502 (§IV.9).

⁷⁰⁵ See n. 696 above; n. 458 (§IV.8).

⁷⁰⁶ See nn. 422, 425 (§IV.6) and nn. 442, 444 (§IV.7).

⁷⁰⁷ *devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api grhṇanti [prāg eva viśeṣāt] / yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣānām* / (YD on SK 34ab, p. 218, ll. 3-5). This can be compared to the YS’s statement that ‘victory over the elements’ leads to various supernatural abilities (cf. n. 701 above).

passion, who is of undoubted intelligence, and who has seen suprasensuous objects'.⁷⁰⁸

However, the YD also makes a clear distinction between the knowledge of *yogins* and the knowledge of *ṛṣis*. Yogic perception is included in the framework of the *pramāṇas*,⁷⁰⁹ while the knowledge of Kapila,⁷¹⁰ as well as the knowledge attained through *ūha* (apparently associated with other *ṛṣis*),⁷¹¹ falls outside of this framework. Similarly, Sāṃkhya knowledge generated through practice (*abhyāsaja*) is distinguished from the unprecedented (*apūrva*) knowledge attained through the *siddhis* (which include *ūha*).⁷¹² This suggests that *ūha* is not an ability that results from yogic practice but is rather a spontaneous occurrence, perhaps the fulfilment of a potential inherent in *ṛṣis* alone.

In the absence of further evidence, it is impossible to determine which interpretation of the term *īśvaramaharṣi* is assumed by the YD-*kāra*. On account of the lack of definitive evidence in the text that *īśvara* takes on a body in the form of Kapila and/or other *ṛṣis*, I would be inclined to take the term as a *karmadhāraya* meaning 'lordly great *ṛṣis*', whether this refers to *ṛṣis* who have become lordly through yogic practice or who are inherently lordly. The choice of interpretation, however, does not affect the fact that while other *ṛṣis* and *yogins* may be able to attain Sāṃkhya knowledge independently, Kapila is clearly distinguished from them in terms of his innate knowledge.

Kapila is unique among *ṛṣis*, insofar as the YD elevates him to the status of a deity (*deva*)—possibly even an embodiment of *īśvara*—whose body, endowed with innate knowledge of the Sāṃkhya categories, was produced 'due to the favour

⁷⁰⁸ *vyapagatarāgādidoṣāṇām asandigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadṛśvanām īśvaramaharṣiṇām āptatvam ācakṣmahe na sarveṣām* / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-5). For context, see n. 367 (§IV.3).

⁷⁰⁹ See n. 390 (§IV.4).

⁷¹⁰ See n. 390 (§IV.4).

⁷¹¹ See nn. 507, 510 (§IV.9).

⁷¹² See n. 415 (§IV.6).

(*anugraha*) of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*)'.⁷¹³ The implications of this fact, in terms of the apparent purpose behind Kapila's birth, will be considered in the following section.

§4. The origin, nature and role of Kapila and his knowledge, according to the *Yuktidīpikā*.

The fact that, according to the YD, Kapila was born with innate knowledge of the distinction between Materiality (*prakṛti*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*) presents an interpretative problem when considered in the context of the basic teleology of Sāṃkhya. In order to reiterate this aspect of the Sāṃkhya system, it will be helpful to introduce an analogy.

The relationship between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* can be illustrated by the image of an audience of *puruṣas* in a cinema watching a screen on which is projected the activity of *prakṛti*. The objectives of this film are two: first, the enjoyment or entertainment of the *puruṣas*, and second, the realisation of the nature of the viewing experience (see §II.3). That is, at first *prakṛti*'s activity takes the form of escapism, in which each *puruṣa* identifies himself with the actions on screen, but its ultimate objective is to attain a kind of self-reflexivity, drawing attention to the fact that it is actually only a film, at which point the film ends and the *puruṣas* are left in a darkened cinema; that is, they are liberated from the viewing experience.

This analogy is somewhat complicated by the fact that *prakṛti* functions differently with regard to each particular *puruṣa*.⁷¹⁴ That is, despite the fact that there is only one screen, the viewing experience is so subjective that every *puruṣa*

⁷¹³ See n. 693 above, n. 460 (§IV.8) and n. 606 (§V.2).

⁷¹⁴ I.e., as a result of the conditions (*bhāva*), which determine the phenomenal circumstances of an individual's incarnation (see §II.5, IV.6).

sees something different, depending upon which stage in the process of realisation it has reached. This process may in fact require multiple viewings. Each phenomenal reincarnation of an individual can be thought of as a return to the cinema for another viewing. *Prakṛti* writes a new character into its film for the benefit of each *puruṣa* entering the cinema. If the character on screen with whom a *puruṣa* identifies is killed off before the realisation of separation sets in, the *puruṣa* leaves briefly and returns to identify with a new character. When eventually the self-reflexive aspect of the film sinks in and the *puruṣa* ceases to identify with any of the characters, the film ends once and for all for that particular *puruṣa*, although it continues for others.

This understanding of the process central to Sāṃkhya meets with an interesting problem when we consider the leading actor in *prakṛti*'s film, Kapila, who was born with innate knowledge of the fact that he was only a character in this film. Since it is this knowledge that is held to result in the liberation of the *puruṣa* identified with a particular character in the film, we might ask why Kapila was written into the film in the first place. That is, if the *puruṣa* with which Kapila is associated has no need for further experience of *prakṛti*'s activity, what is the purpose of Kapila's birth?

The evidence of the YD suggests a unique explanation of Kapila's role on the Sāṃkhya screen. As noted in the previous section, the VBh and MV associate Kapila with *īśvara*, who incarnated out of compassion for transmigrating beings.⁷¹⁵ While it is possible that the YD also views Kapila as an embodiment of *īśvara*, this association is not explicit, and the YD mentions *pradhāna* rather than *īśvara* in connection with Kapila's birth.

As already discussed, according to the YD, the bodies of both Kapila and Brahmā were born 'due to the favour (*anugraha*) of primordial Materiality

⁷¹⁵ See nn. 675, 684, 686 (§V.3).

(*pradhāna*)'.⁷¹⁶ Kapila's disciple, Āsuri, was also 'favoured' (*anugrāhita*) by a stream (*srotas*) of purity from *pradhāna*, which led to the production of his 'dispassion deriving from (primordial) Materiality' (*prākṛtika vairāgya*).⁷¹⁷ Moreover, the *anugraha* of everyone, including those of inferior intellectual capacity, is given as the reason for the explanation of *śāstra* by means of formal inference.⁷¹⁸

It is clear that the notion of *anugraha* in the YD is connected with *prakṛti*'s activity and with the production of such things as dispassion and knowledge.⁷¹⁹ Beyond these suggestions, the YD does not explain the nature of *anugraha*. In the *Mahābhārata* (MBh), however, the term is often used in the context of the duties proper to a king.⁷²⁰ For example, in Book 3 of the epic, Hanumān, in conversation with Bhīma, refers to *nigraha*, 'repression' or 'punishment', and *anugraha*, 'favour', shown towards one's subjects, as two complementary duties of a king:

When a king correctly proceeds with repression and favour, then the limits of the people are well established.⁷²¹

It is possible to draw an analogy between these two duties of a king and the two purposes of *prakṛti*. Just as a king both represses and favours his people, *prakṛti* both binds the *puruṣas* by the illusion of identification with the phenomenal world and liberates them by producing the knowledge of their actual difference from *prakṛti*.

⁷¹⁶ See n. 693 (§V.3).

⁷¹⁷ See n. 462 (§IV.8).

⁷¹⁸ See n. 331 (§IV.2). Cf. VBh's mention of the *anugraha* of beings as the motivation behind *īśvara*'s incarnation (§V.3, n. 675).

⁷¹⁹ It should also be noted that OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 152-163) argues that a particular creation of *prakṛti*, the *anugrahasarga*, may have been introduced into the Sāṃkhya system in the *Śaṣṭitantra* (although the YD's *śāstra* quotations do not make reference to it) and then replaced with the paradigm of the *bhāvas* in the SK. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study to determine whether the YD's use of the term *anugraha* bears any connection to the *anugrahasarga*.

⁷²⁰ I thank Prof. James Fitzgerald for drawing my attention to this usage of the term.

⁷²¹ *nigrahānugrahaiḥ samyag yadā rājā pravartate / tadā bhavati lokasya maryādā suvyavasthitā* // (MBh 3.149.39).

It thus seems plausible that the term *anugraha* in the YD refers to the manifestation of *prakṛti*'s soteriological purpose. The process by which this purpose is manifested in the phenomenal sphere is consistently described in terms of a 'stream' or 'flowing' (*srotas*, *abhiṣyanda*). Āsuri is favoured by a 'stream of purity' (*śuddhisrotas*) from *pradhāna*.⁷²² The 'stream of attainment' (*siddhisrotas*) always flows from *pradhāna* but is hindered by error, incapacity, and contentment.⁷²³ (The latter three categories can be thought of as representing 'repression' (*nigraha*), also manifested in streams from *pradhāna* by the *māhātmyaśarīra*.⁷²⁴) The *prākṛtika* form of the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) arises as a 'flowing' (*abhiṣyanda*) from *prakṛti*.⁷²⁵ Under SK 69, the commentator even refers to the Sāṃkhya system itself as a 'stream of science' (*vidyāsrotas*).⁷²⁶

This imagery suggests that *prakṛti*'s soteriological tendency can be manifested as a stream flowing directly from its primordial, unmanifest aspect (*pradhāna*) into the phenomenal sphere of experience, where it takes on a variety of forms conducive to the liberation of particular *puruṣas*. The manifestation of Kapila's physical body appears to be an instance of this manifestation of *anugraha*. Since Kapila was born with innate *jñāna*, we can assume that this knowledge itself was also a result of *prakṛti*'s *anugraha*. This assumption is supported by the argument, presented in §IV.8, that Kapila's *sāṃsiddhika* knowledge was essentially of a *prākṛtika* character, except that in Kapila's unique case there was no hindrance to the production of this knowledge directly from *pradhāna*.⁷²⁷ As suggested in

⁷²² See n. 462 (§IV.8).

⁷²³ See n. 486 (§IV.9).

⁷²⁴ See nn. 484, 485 (§IV.9).

⁷²⁵ See n. 460 (§IV.8).

⁷²⁶ YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 14-16: '[The Sāṃkhya system] was expounded—i.e., completely explained—by this sage Kapila because he was capable of interpreting the stream of science practiced since long ago.' (*tena kapilamuninā samākhyātaṃ samyag ākhyātaṃ cirābhyastasya vidyāsrotaso nirvacanasāmarthyāt* /).

⁷²⁷ See nn. 460, 462, 465 (§IV.8).

§V.2, the original Sāṃkhya *śāstra* may be considered to pre-exist in *pradhāna* in a potential form, which would agree with the fact that Kapila was born directly from *pradhāna* with innate knowledge of the substance of this *śāstra*.

Both Kapila and the knowledge with which he was born thus seem to be viewed as a direct manifestation of *prakṛti*'s soteriological tendency. Since Kapila himself was born with none of the hindering intellectual conditions (*tāmasa bhāva*) which would account for his embodiment,⁷²⁸ we can assume that this manifestation was for the general *anugraha* of other embodied *puruṣas*. This is confirmed by the YD's explanation of the difference between the embodiment of Kapila and Hiraṇyagarbha (i.e., Brahmā)⁷²⁹ and embodiment as the result of one's intellectual conditions (*bhāva*):

Before the manifestation of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*), there was no possibility of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), on account of the fact that these are qualities of the intellect (*buddhi*), and [the intellect] is a product (*vikāra*) of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*). Then, without those [*bhāvas*], [the constituent qualities] of goodness (*sattva*), etc., aiming at the [dual] purpose of the experience of [the sensory objects of] sound (*śabda*), etc., and the realisation of the difference between the constituent qualities (*guṇa*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*), remaining in the state of the intellect (*mahat*), ego (*ahaṃkāra*), subtle elements (*tanmātra*), faculties (*indriya*), and elements (*bhūta*), produced bodies (*śarīra*) beginning with those of supreme ṛṣi and Hiraṇyagarbha. But after the time of the decay of the six attainments (*ṣaṭsiddhi*), the cycle of transmigration (*saṃsāracakra*) began as a result of the functioning of activity (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*) due to the interaction and variegation of the constituent qualities (*guṇa*).⁷³⁰

The embodiment of Kapila and Brahmā is here presented as prior to the initiation of the cycle of transmigration and associated explicitly with the two general reasons given by the SK for the activity of *prakṛti* in relation to *puruṣa*: observation of that

⁷²⁸ *paramarṣir bhagavān samsiddhikair dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvairyair āviṣṭapiṇḍo viśvāgrajah kapilamuniḥ* / (YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 13-14).

⁷²⁹ Given that *virīṇca* and *hiraṇyagarbha* are both common epithets of Brahmā, and both are mentioned together with Kapila, it is likely that they refer to the same figure.

⁷³⁰ *prāk pradhānapravṛtter dharmādharmayor asambhavo buddhidharmatvāt tasyāś ca pradhānavikāra^{<ra>}tvāt / tatas tadvyatiriktaṃ śabdādyupa^{<bhoga>}lakṣaṇaṃ guṇapurūṣāntaropalabdhi^{<ra>}lakṣaṇaṃ cārthaṃ uddiśya sattvādayo mahadahaṃkāratanmātrendriyabhūtatenāvasthāya paramarṣihiraṇyagarbhādīnāṃ śarīraṃ utpādayanti / ṣaṭsiddhikṣayakālottaraṃ tu guṇavimardavaicitryād rajastamovṛtṭyanupāti saṃsāracakraṃ pravṛttam <iti>* / (YD on SK 52, p. 255, ll. 8-13).

activity and the eventual realisation of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.⁷³¹

Later in this passage, the commentator reiterates that the *bhāvas* begin to function in connection with the subtle body (and thus to direct its transmigratory path) only after the time of the decay of the ‘six attainments’.⁷³² These ‘six attainments’ are different from the eight attainments comprising the *siddhi* category of the *pratyayasarga* and are explained in another passage of the YD as six extraordinary forms of reproduction:

In the first creation, offspring and the like were manifested by the beings produced out of Materiality (*prakṛti*) by the mind (*manas*) alone, as desired, without the union of a couple, due to an abundance of the quality of goodness (*sattva*). This occurs even today, as the tortoise bears her eggs through thought (*nirūpita*) [alone]. Even then, having looked at one’s beloved with the eyes, one [would] consider his purpose accomplished.⁷³³ When this [ability] was diminished, attainment through speech (*vāksiddhi*) came into being. After speaking [together], whatever the beings desire is produced. This occurs even today, as the conch bears offspring by [crying]⁷³⁴. Also, having spoken with one’s beloved, one experiences great pleasure. When this [ability] was diminished, attainment through the hands (*hastasiddhi*) came into being. Touching hands, they produce the desired object. This occurs even today, as having looked at one’s beloved for a long a time and having touched hands, there arises pleasure. When this [ability] was diminished, attainment through embracing (*āśleṣasiddhi*) came into being. By embracing, beings attain what is desired. This occurs even today, as embracing one’s beloved, there is delight. When this [ability] was diminished, attainment by copulation (*dvandvasiddhi*) began. A man and a woman, coming together, would produce offspring, and [the notion of] possession—‘this is mine, this is mine’—came

⁷³¹ Cf. SK 37: ‘Because the intellect produces every experience of the *puruṣa* and also [because] it distinguishes the subtle difference between *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*.’ (*sarvaṃ pratyupabhogaṃ yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ / saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaraṃ sūkṣmaṃ //*).

⁷³² so ‘*yaṃ liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyas ca ṣaṭsiddhiḥ śayakālād ūrdhvaṃ bhavati* / (YD on SK 52cd, p. 256, l. 20).

⁷³³ I follow LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) in interpreting this line as a description of a separate *siddhi*, since attainment through sight is clearly different from attainment through the mind alone, and without this assumption there would be only five *siddhis* in this passage. However, given the context of the rest of the passage, it would be more natural to take this line as an illustration of the preceding *siddhi*. It is probable that the text is corrupt here and an explanation of ‘attainment through sight’ is missing from the preceding portion of the passage, in which case the tortoise’s *nirūpita* might refer not to ‘thought’ but to ‘sight’. It is also strange that the first two *siddhis* have not been named, as the last four have.

⁷³⁴ The Critical Ed. has *vitatena* here, which makes no sense in this context. *vitata* is an adjective meaning ‘spread out’, ‘bent’, or ‘wide’. Three manuscripts attest to the reading *vikṛtena* (YD, p. 229, n. 9), which also makes no sense. Kumar and Bhargava (YD (1990-92), p. 293) amend the text to *viruta*, which they translate as ‘crying’; for lack of a better alternative, I have followed this suggestion.

into being. Only at this time is transmigration (*saṃsāra*) explained [to have begun].⁷³⁵

Evidently, these forms of reproduction apply to those beings who existed between the time of the production of Kapila and Brahmā from *prakṛti* and the time of the onset of *saṃsāra*. As mentioned in §V.3, the bodies of Brahmā's sons and grandsons are said to have been produced by means of *siddhis*.⁷³⁶ Taken together, these passages suggest that Kapila and Brahmā were produced first, directly out of primordial Materiality, for the purpose of manifesting the two primary purposes of *prakṛti*'s activity. Brahmā then produced offspring by means of the first form of attainment (by thought alone).⁷³⁷ The powers of attainment of the generations succeeding Brahmā gradually deteriorated until the normal cycle of transmigration (according to the *bhāvas*) began.⁷³⁸

Some major interpretative conclusions can be drawn from the evidence of the YD presented so far. Given the fact that Brahmā appears to initiate the physical creation of succeeding generations of beings, he seems to fulfill the first purpose of *prakṛti*, the experience of *prakṛti*'s activity (in the form of bodily incarnation) by various *puruṣas*.⁷³⁹ Moreover, Brahmā's creation of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* as streams out of *pradhāna* would also be conducive to the

⁷³⁵ *pūrvesarge prakṛter utpannānām prāṇinām sattvadharmotkarṣād antareṇa dvayasamāpattim manasaivāpatyam anyad vā yathepsitam prādurbhūva / tad etad adyāpi cānuvartate yat kacchapikā nirūpitenāṇḍadhāraṇam karoti / priyam khalv api cakṣuṣā nirikṣya kṛtārtham ātmānam manyate / tasyām api kṣiṇāyām vāksiddhir babhūva / abhibhāṣya prāṇino yad icchanti tadāpādayanti / tad adyāpy anuvartate yac chaṅkhī vitatenāpatyam bibharti / priyam khalv api sambhāṣya mahatīm prītim anubhavati / tasyām upakṣiṇāyām hastasiddhir babhūva / saṃsprīya pāṇim īpsitam artham upapādayanti / tad etad adyāpy anuvartate yat priyam cīrād ālokyā pāṇau saṃsprīya prītir bhavati / tasyām upakṣiṇāyām āśleṣasiddhir babhūva / ālīṅganena prāṇina īpsitam labhante / tad etad adyāpy anuvartate yat priyam ālīṅgya nirvṛtir bhavati / tasyām upakṣiṇāyām dvandvasiddhir ārabdhā strīpūṃsau saṅghṛṣyāpatyam utpādayetām mamedam mamedam iti ca parigrahāḥ pravṛttāḥ / etasminn evāvasare saṃsāro varṇyate / (YD on SK 39cd, p. 229, ll. 4-17).*

⁷³⁶ See n. 693 (§V.3).

⁷³⁷ This is supported by the fact that the *māhātmyaśarīra*'s production of his sons out of *pradhāna* by thought alone is mentioned by the YD-*kāra* as an instance of the *prākṛta* production of physical bodies (see §IV.8, n. 475).

⁷³⁸ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) suggest that this scheme 'was presumably an ancient way of explaining the manner in which divine realm reproduction differs from natural reproduction'.

⁷³⁹ Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973, p. 284): 'The God Brahmā not only creates the worlds, he also creates beings who populate them.'

experience of *puruṣas* in the phenomenal realm.⁷⁴⁰ This agrees with the fact that Brahmā (identified with the *māhātmyaśarīra*) was born with innate *aiśvarya*⁷⁴¹—in other words, with the power to manifest his will in the world by thought alone.

Although, as apparent from the discussion in §V.3, *īśvara* plays no role in the initial manifestation of the *tattvas* from *pradhāna*, it seems that once he has become embodied in the form of the *māhātmyaśarīra* he has the power to influence the shape taken by this manifestation in the phenomenal realm. This ability, however, is apparently not confined to the *māhātmyaśarīra* or other deities. The YD also tells us that ‘a single *īśvara* or *yogin* has a multitude of bodies due [merely] to the application of desire’.⁷⁴² It is perhaps significant in this connection that both gods and *yogins* are also able to perceive the subtle elements (*tanmātra*),⁷⁴³ the non-specific (*aviśeṣa*) forms of the specific (*viśeṣa*) elements which compose the phenomenal level of experience. MALINAR (1999) suggests that *yogins* are able to influence the particular phenomenal configurations of reality precisely because they have attained an insight into the productive nature of the *tattvas* as principles common (*sāmānya*) to all particular (*viśeṣa*) aspects of the phenomenal world:

Insight into the productivity of *prakṛti* is only ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated as *aiśvarya*. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of ‘natural’, *prākṛtic* possibilities.⁷⁴⁴

In other words, yogic practice may lead to the same ability, innate in the *māhātmyaśarīra*, to manifest physical bodies directly out of the productive potential of *pradhāna*. One suspects that such an ability would be designated by the YD-*kāra*,

⁷⁴⁰ See n. 475 (§IV.8), n. 484 (§IV.9).

⁷⁴¹ See n. 696 (§V.3).

⁷⁴² *ekasyeśvarasya yogino vecchāyogād anekāśarīratvam* (YD on SK 56, p. 262, ll. 22-23).

⁷⁴³ *tatra devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api grhṇanti [prāg eva viśeṣāt] / yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇām / asmadādīnāṃ tu viśeṣān eva tamasā parivṛtatvāt* (YD on SK 34, p. 218, ll. 3-5).

⁷⁴⁴ MALINAR (1999), p. 641.

according to the scheme outlined in §IV.8, as *vaikṛta aiśvarya*—as lordliness deriving from a practice undertaken in the phenomenal (*vaikṛta*) realm of experience.

Kapila, on the other hand, who was born with innate *jñāna*, would appear to fulfill the second primary purpose of *prakṛti*; by disseminating his knowledge of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, he effects the salvation of embodied beings. This interpretation agrees with PARROTT (1990a)’s argument that *prakṛti* is viewed by the Sāṃkhya texts as ‘a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means’.⁷⁴⁵ It seems that Kapila fulfills *prakṛti*’s role as a *guru* with regard to all *puruṣas*.

JACOBSEN (2008) draws a similar conclusion regarding the relative roles of Kapila and Brahmā according to the YD: ‘Here the salvific function—the revelation of knowledge that leads to release—and the world creating function are separated. The first function belongs to Kapila, the second to the body of greatness.’⁷⁴⁶ JACOBSEN contrasts this division in labour between Kapila and Brahmā with the later view of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu (see §V.5): ‘Polytheism means that the divine functions are divided between several gods. [...] Making Kapila an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu is a development in the direction of monotheism.’⁷⁴⁷ In other words, in the context of the YD, the Sāṃkhya system’s acceptance of a plurality of deities (as different manifestations of the interaction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) allows for the two primary purposes of *prakṛti*—embodiment and salvation—to be fulfilled by two separate figures.

In terms of his innate knowledge, Kapila is effectively assigned a higher status even than Brahmā, which would explain the commentator’s statement that ‘all beings up to Brahmā’ must attain the ‘intended goal’ of (or ‘intended meaning

⁷⁴⁵ PARROTT (1990a), p. 82.

⁷⁴⁶ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 45. CHAKRAVARTI (1975, pp. 282-283) suggests a similar division in labour, contrasting Kapila’s salvific function to the duties of other deities (interpreted by CHAKRAVARTI as an entire class of *māhātmyaśarīras*).

⁷⁴⁷ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 49.

[behind]⁷⁴⁸) Sāṃkhya by means of one of the three primary *siddhis*,⁷⁴⁹ by which the knowledge innate in Kapila is transmitted to later generations. In fact, Kapila is elsewhere said to have been born ‘first’ or ‘chief’ among all (*viśvāgraja*).⁷⁵⁰

This unique soteriological purpose behind Kapila’s manifestation is reflected in the commentator’s expression of homage to Kapila at the beginning of the text:

Homage to the supreme *ṛṣi*, the *guru* whose splendour is equal to the rays of the sun, who is a sun for the deep darkness of *samsāra*.⁷⁵¹

Kapila, initially born out of the favour (*anugraha*) of *prakṛti*, continues to manifest this soteriological tendency through his role as a *guru*, initiating a tradition of knowledge and becoming an icon and exemplar to which later seekers aspire. In the commentator’s description of the onset of Āsuri’s *prākṛtika vairāgya*, for example, Āsuri’s esteem for Kapila serves as the initiating factor that leads to his inclination toward knowledge as a result of the *anugraha* of *pradhāna*.⁷⁵²

Of course, Kapila does not impart his knowledge with a view to self-aggrandizement. The commentator stresses that Kapila’s motivation in disseminating his knowledge has nothing to do with any of the reasons that usually motivate individuals:

[Opponent:] There is no reason for the transmission, on account of the inapplicability of the causes (*nimitta*) such as merit (*dharma*). The transmission of the philosophical system (*śāstra*) for the sake of merit

⁷⁴⁸ See n. 590 (§V.1).

⁷⁴⁹ See n. 509 (§IV.9).

⁷⁵⁰ YD on SK 1, p. 8, l. 20; on SK 69, p. 267, l. 14. Although the term *viśvāgraja* could refer simply to the fact that Kapila was born ‘at the beginning of the universe’, the term *agra* usually has a connotation of superiority or prominence.

⁷⁵¹ *ṛṣaye paramāyārkaamarīcisamatejase /*

samsāragahanadhvāntasūryāya gurave namaḥ // (YD Intro., p. 1, ll. 5-6). WEZLER (1970, p. 258) notes this passage in his discussion of the deity-like nature of Kapila in Sāṃkhya.

⁷⁵² YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 9-13: ‘But the *prākṛtika* [conditions] are those like the dispassion of the glorious Āsuri. For his merit, produced due to his esteem for the supreme *ṛṣi*, destroyed his impurity, because of being opposed [to it]. When this was destroyed, a stream of purity came forth from *prakṛti*, favoured by which, having become a mendicant, the desire to know arose in him, due to affliction from the three forms of suffering.’ (*prākṛtās tu tadyathā vairāgyam bhagavadāsureḥ / tasya hi paramarṣisambhāvanād utpanno dharmo ’śuddhiṃ pratidvandvibhāvad apaja<ghāna> / tasyām apahatāyām prakṛteḥ śuddhisrotāḥ pravṛttam yenānugrhitō duḥkhatrayābhīghātād utpannajiñāsaḥ pravrajitaḥ* /).

(*dharma*) is not applicable to the supreme *ṛṣi*, on account of [his] non-attachment to the results [of merit]. It is not for the sake of profit (*artha*) or pleasure (*kāma*), on account of the contingency of the neglect of pupils.⁷⁵³ It is not for the sake of liberation (*mokṣa*), on account of the attainment of that from innate knowledge (*sāṃsiddhika jñāna*) itself. It is not for the sake of the opposites of these [potential causes], because this is impossible. Consequently, the teacher (*ācārya*) imparted the treasure of the philosophical system (*śāstra*) for no reason.

[Proponent:] It was not for no reason. Rather, he imparted it out of compassion (*anukampā*). Seeing Āsuri being oppressed by the personal, divine, and external pains (*duḥkha*), ascertaining the non-functioning of the pains (*duḥkha*) in himself, who was endowed with a psycho-physical body (*kāryakaraṇa*), due to the power of knowledge (*jñāna*), and [ascertaining] the virtues of his disciple, [thinking] ‘How can Āsuri, and other people by way of him, have the same equanimity that I have with regard to pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) due to the presence of knowledge (*jñāna*)?’, the glorious supreme *ṛṣi* thus declared the philosophical system (*śāstra*) out of compassion (*anukampā*).⁷⁵⁴

Once the Sāṃkhya *śāstra* has thus been manifested by Kapila out of compassion, it continues to effect ‘the *anugraha* of everyone’ through the explication of its categories by later Sāṃkhya teachers such as Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the YD-*kāra*.⁷⁵⁵ Kapila’s original *śāstra* continues to serve as the ideal prototype of the system and the ultimate source of authority for Sāṃkhya teachers.⁷⁵⁶ However, as discussed in §V.2-3, it is apparently also possible for other *ṛṣis* to access this *śāstra* independently through mental reflection (*ūha*), through an extraordinary capacity inherent in *ṛṣis*, or possibly as a result of their progressive practice of yogic

⁷⁵³ The significance of the phrase *nārthakāmārthaṃ śiṣyāṇām anāyāsaprasaṅgāt* is unclear, but it most likely implies that Kapila would be neglectful of pupils if he was motivated by profit and pleasure. Alternatively, it might mean that pupils would be neglectful (i.e., not willing to study with Kapila) if they had to pay for it.

⁷⁵⁴ *āha: sampradānasyākasmikatvam dharmādinimittānupapatteḥ / na tāvāt paramarṣer dharmārthaṃ śāstrapradānam u<pa>padyate phalenānabhiṣvaṅgāt / nārthakāmārthaṃ śiṣyāṇām anāyāsaprasaṅgāt / na mokṣārthaṃ sāṃsiddhikenaiva jñānena tatprāpteḥ / na tadviparītārthaṃ asambhavāt / pariśeṣād akasmād ācāryaḥ śāstranidhānaṃ pradadāv iti / ucyate: na akasmāt kiṃ tarhi anukampayā pradadau / ādhyātmikādhidaivikādhibhautikair duḥkhaiḥ pīḍyamānaṃ āsurim upalabhya, svātmani ca jñānasāmarthyāt sati kāryakaraṇasamprayoge duḥkhānām apravṛtīm pariññāya śiṣyaguṇāṃś ca, kathaṃ nāma yathā mama sukhaduḥkheṣu jñānopanipātāt sāmyam evam āsurer api syāt, taddvāreṇānyeṣāṃ api puruṣāṇām <ity> evam anukampayā bhagavān paramarṣiḥ śāstram ākhyātavān / (YD on SK 70ab, p. 268, l. 20 – p. 269, l. 3).*

⁷⁵⁵ See n. 331 (§IV.2); cf. nn. 595, 604, 609 (§V.2).

⁷⁵⁶ See n. 590 (§V.1) and n. 609 (§V.2).

discipline. This would not invalidate the significance of Kapila's original manifestation of the *śāstra*, but would rather confirm the universality of that *śāstra*.

Assuming that these conclusions are valid, there remains an interpretative problem with regard to the position of the *puruṣa* with which Kapila is associated. To return to the cinema image: is there a liberated *puruṣa* behind Kapila still in the audience, watching the film projected by *prakṛti* for the benefit of other *puruṣas*? Or, perhaps, is Kapila without his own particular *puruṣa* but rather projected onto the screen for the benefit of all *puruṣas*?

As discussed in §V.3, there is some evidence to suggest that Kapila might be considered an embodiment of *īśvara*. The soteriological conception of Kapila apparent in the YD would be compatible with the VBh's reference to 'the *anugraha* of beings' as the motivation behind *īśvara*'s embodiment as Kapila.⁷⁵⁷ The fact that, according to the YD, Kapila is manifested from *pradhāna* in the same manner as Brahmā, who is considered an embodiment of *īśvara*, might suggest that Kapila is regarded as a similar embodiment.

On the other hand, given the veneration with which Kapila is treated in the YD, if he were considered an embodiment of *īśvara*, one would expect the commentator to make this explicit. Moreover, as we have seen, Kapila's manifestation is explicitly associated only with the soteriological purpose of *prakṛti*, which is directed towards all beings except for Kapila. It thus seems plausible that Kapila, the bearer of a primordial Sāṃkhya *śāstra*, is considered a direct manifestation of *prakṛti* in its primordial, universal aspect, before the activity of *prakṛti* becomes differentiated according to the intellectual conditions (*bhāva*) associated with particular *puruṣas*. In other words, in a postmodern twist, the

⁷⁵⁷ See n. 675 (§V.3).

director makes an appearance in his own film in order to remind the other characters of the fact that it is only a film.

§5. The soteriological role of Kapila in the *Yuktidīpikā*, in relation to the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.

This view of the nature of Kapila and the role of his knowledge in relation to subsequent Sāṃkhya tradition is unique among the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries examined in this study. The relative terseness of these other commentaries, especially with regard to the issues surrounding doctrinal authority, would make it difficult to determine whether they assume a similar view of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. Moreover, as the comparison of these texts in CHAPTER IV has made clear, the YD's views generally bear little relation to those of the other commentaries.⁷⁵⁸ However, a few major points of difference can be observed, which make it possible to offer some tentative conclusions with regard to the place of the YD's views in the context of the historical development of the Sāṃkhya school.

In order to provide some context for this discussion, a few words must first be said about the origins of the figure of Kapila. JACOBSEN (2008) presents a comprehensive discussion of the history of the occurrences of Kapila in Sanskrit literature. The earliest text to refer extensively to a *ṛṣi* (or *ṛṣis*) called Kapila is the MBh.⁷⁵⁹ JACOBSEN argues that 'several Kapilas' are mentioned in the MBh,⁷⁶⁰ and

⁷⁵⁸ There is nothing in the YD to suggest that the commentator was familiar with the earlier GBh, and it is my general feeling that the YD-*kāra* was unaware of the commentarial tradition of which both GBh and MV are representative. The MV likewise does not explicitly refer to the views of the YD. Similarly, although, as LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 227-228) observe, Vācaspati appears to quote directly from the YD on one occasion (TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 604, §V.2), he does not appear to make use of the YD's views in his interpretation of the SK.

⁷⁵⁹ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 12.

identifies two distinct Kapila figures in particular, representing two different forms of ascetic tradition.⁷⁶¹

The contradictory natures of these two Kapilas may be considered evidence of the existence of two different Kapila figures, one a Vedic ascetic and one influenced by Śramaṇa ideas, or they may represent two stages in the history of Kapila, beginning as a Vedic ascetic and thereafter being appropriated by ascetics who had adopted Śramaṇa values. If any of these should be thought of as the Sāṃkhya Kapila is not clear.⁷⁶²

In some respects, the Kapila associated with non-Vedic asceticism seems to most obviously prefigure the Sāṃkhya Kapila.⁷⁶³ In the MBh, this Kapila rejects the authority of *śāstra* in favour of first-hand experience.⁷⁶⁴ This can be compared to the classical Sāṃkhya rejection of scriptural (*ānuśravika*) means to liberation.⁷⁶⁵ Similarly, in the *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* (BDhS), Kapila is presented as a demon (*asura*) and founder of the ascetic stages of life (*āśrama*)—in other words, as an opponent of the Vedic tradition.⁷⁶⁶ BRONKHORST (2007) cites this BDhS passage as evidence for his argument that Kapila was originally a deity associated with the

⁷⁶⁰ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 13.

⁷⁶¹ JACOBSEN (2008, pp. 13-16) cites the episode in which Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara in MBh 3.3.104-8, and suggests that this Kapila represents the Vedic tradition of asceticism ‘associated with *tapas*; with the acquisition of powers and immense feats of asceticism’ (pp. 22-23), in contrast to the Kapila who converses with Syūmarāśmi in the form of a cow in MBh 12.260-62 (see JACOBSEN, pp. 16-18), who represents a tradition that ‘belonged to a different world-view, a world-view that emphasised *karma*, *saṃsāra*, *punarbhava*, and *mokṣa*’ (pp. 22-23).

⁷⁶² JACOBSEN (2008), p. 23.

⁷⁶³ Similarly, JACOBSEN (1998, p. 85) concludes: ‘Judging from the content of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, it seems probable that its founder was similar in many ways to the Buddha or Mahāvīra. He was an extraordinary human being, who by himself realized the form of liberation that could be attained by oneself by means of discriminative knowledge.’

⁷⁶⁴ MBh 12.260.17: ‘If you see anything perceptible here that is considered superior to non-violence, besides treatises on doctrine, speak it.’ (*yad atra kiṃcit pratyakṣam ahimsāyāḥ param matam / r̥te tv āgamaśāstreḥhyo brūhi tad yadi paśyasi //*).

⁷⁶⁵ SK 2ab: ‘The scriptural [means] are like the perceptible, for they are connected with impurity, decay, and excess.’ (*dr̥ṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātīśayayuktaḥ*).

⁷⁶⁶ BDhS 2.11.27-28 (Olivelle’s translation): ‘There is, however, only a single order of life, the teachers maintain, because no offspring is produced in the others. With respect to the above position they cite this: “There was once a demon named Kapila, the son of Prahlāda. It was he who created these divisions in his campaign against the gods. No wise man should pay any heed to them.” ’ (*ekāśramyaṃ tv ācāryā aprajanatvād itareṣāṃ // tatrodāharanti / prāhlādir ha vai kapilo nāmāsura āsa / sa etān bhedāṃś cakāra devaiḥ saha spardhamānaḥ / tān manīṣī nādrīyet //*). JACOBSEN (2008, p. 12) notes the anti-ritual nature of Kapila in this passage. As noted by both BRONKHORST (2007, p. 68) and JACOBSEN (2008, p. 12), Kapila is also associated with the founding of renunciatory practices in *Baudhāyanagr̥hyasūtra* 4.17.

ascetic traditions of the region of ‘Greater Magadha’⁷⁶⁷—traditions which, BRONKHORST argues, originated outside of the Vedic milieu.⁷⁶⁸

As discussed by both BRONKHORST and JACOBSEN,⁷⁶⁹ Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the MBh, including Viṣṇu, Śiva, Prajāpati and Viriṇca. He is also mentioned in a passage of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (ŚU)—identified by BRONKHORST as ‘perhaps the earliest reference to “the seer Kapila”’⁷⁷⁰—in which he appears to be associated with Hiranyagarbha and Rudra.⁷⁷¹ JACOBSEN suggests that this early association ‘may perhaps have contributed to the later divinization of Kapila and to the Sāṃkhya perception of him having been created at the beginning of each cycle of creation’.⁷⁷² BRONKHORST, on the other hand, argues that Kapila was considered a deity even prior his appearance in the ŚU.⁷⁷³

While the divine associations of Kapila are apparent from early in the tradition, the development of the figure is not straightforward, as JACOBSEN’s study makes clear. Not only is Kapila associated with various deities and presented as a non-Vedic ascetic, as BRONKHORST emphasizes, but he also occurs as a Vedic-style

⁷⁶⁷ BRONKHORST (2007), pp. 61-68.

⁷⁶⁸ BRONKHORST (2007), p. 28: ‘There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Brahmanical texts examined here describe forms of asceticism which are based on some shared assumptions. These assumptions were not part of the Brahmanical heritage. No, they should be considered as having been current in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, before they came to exert an influence on texts that present themselves as belonging to the Brahmanical tradition.’

⁷⁶⁹ BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63; JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 19-20.

⁷⁷⁰ BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63.

⁷⁷¹ ŚU 5.1-2 (Olivelle’s translation): ‘Two things, knowledge and ignorance, are set down in the imperishable and infinite fort of *brahman*, where they lie hidden. Now, ignorance is the perishable and knowledge is the immortal. But the one who rules over both knowledge and ignorance is another—who alone presides over womb after womb, and thus over all visible forms and all the sources of birth; who in the beginning carried this Kapila born of the seer together with his body of knowledge and would look on him as he was being born.’ (*dve akṣare brahmapure tv anante vidyāvidye nihite yatra gūḍhe / kṣaram tv avidyā hy amṛtaṃ tu vidyā vidyāvidye īśate yas tu so ’nyaḥ // yo yoniṃ yoniṃ adhitiṣṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāni yonīś ca sarvāḥ / ṛṣiprasūtaṃ kapilaṃ yas tam agre jñānair bibharti jāyamānaṃ ca paśyet //*). Olivelle (ŚU, p. 625, n. 2) suggests that this may be a reference to the Sāṃkhya Kapila in particular.

⁷⁷² JACOBSEN (2008), p. 10.

⁷⁷³ BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63: ‘Modern interpreters have not infrequently preferred the translation “tawny, red” to “Kapila”, because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-12) shows that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiranyagarbha and linked to Rudra. This identity poses no problem the moment we abandon the idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.’

ascetic⁷⁷⁴ and even a Vedic *ṛṣi*. As JACOBSEN observes, Kapila does not usually appear in the traditional lists of seven *ṛṣis*, although he does appear in such a list in the MBh.⁷⁷⁵

Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka, together with Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila, and the seventh, Sanātana—these seven *ṛṣis* are declared the mental sons of Brahmā, whose discrimination (*vijñāna*) has come of its own accord, who dwell in the renunciatory (*nivṛtta*) *dharma*.⁷⁷⁶

The association of Kapila with renunciation in this verse conforms with his portrayal elsewhere as an ascetic associated with *śramaṇa* ideals, while the mention of discrimination (*vijñāna*) recalls the primary objective of the Sāṃkhya system: ‘discrimination between the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower’ (*vyaktāvyaktajñānavijñāna*).⁷⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the fact that Kapila is presented in this verse as a *ṛṣi* and a son of Brahmā reflects a degree of assimilation into the Vedic world-view.⁷⁷⁸ As JACOBSEN suggests,⁷⁷⁹ the statement that Kapila’s discrimination ‘has come of its own accord’ seems to prefigure the classical Sāṃkhya view that Kapila was born with innate (*sāṃsiddhika*) knowledge.⁷⁸⁰ In other words, according to this conception, Kapila and his knowledge are part of a top-down process of manifestation, rather than a bottom-up pursuit of liberation (through individual ascetic practice and first-hand experience). These two dynamics apparent in the references to Kapila in the early literature seem to anticipate an apparent

⁷⁷⁴ See n. 761 above. BRONKHORST (2007, pp. 64-65), on the other hand, presents the Kapila and King Sagara episode as support for the view that Kapila was originally considered a demon opposed to the Brāhmaṇical tradition (cf. n. 766 above).

⁷⁷⁵ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 18.

⁷⁷⁶ *sanah sanatkujātaś ca sanakaḥ sasanandanaḥ /
sanatkumāraḥ kapilaḥ saptamaś ca sanātanaḥ //
saptaita mānasāḥ proktā ṛṣayo brahmaṇaḥ sutāḥ /
svayamāgatavijñānā nivṛttaḥ dharmam āsthitāḥ //* (MBh 12.327.64-65).

⁷⁷⁷ SK 2d; see §II.3.

⁷⁷⁸ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 112) suggest that ‘what might be called the upgrading of Kapila to the status of Hiraṇyagarbha or one or another mythological figure (Agni, Rudra, Śiva, and so forth) together with efforts to list Kapila, Āsuri, and other Sāṃkhya teachers in enumerations of the “great seers” in the epic and Purāṇic literature may be taken as further attempts to establish a proper lineage for the Sāṃkhya philosophy.’

⁷⁷⁹ JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 18-19.

⁷⁸⁰ Cf. nn. 453, 458, 462, 476 (§IV.8).

contradiction in classical Sāṃkhya between, on the one hand, the rejection of Vedic scripture and emphasis on a bottom-up inferential process, and on the other hand, the importance of Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the top-down dissemination of this doctrine.

The evidence of the YD alone, among the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, suggests a resolution to this contradiction. The YD-*kāra* makes an effort to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to acknowledge their authority (§V.1). In addition, he seems to emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine (§V.2). According to this conception, Kapila's initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine represents the manifestation of a universal, primordial Sāṃkhya *śāstra*. This original *śāstra* remains the primary point of reference for later Sāṃkhya teachers, assisting later generations in the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is attained, although some extraordinary individuals may also be able to attain this knowledge independently. The evidence of the YD thus suggests that the concept of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) holds more value in classical Sāṃkhya than has been generally assumed.⁷⁸¹

The complexity of the picture of Kapila's development presented by the early texts is echoed in a survey of his occurrences in the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries. Although, speaking generally, the commentators stress the significance of Kapila's original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine, and as BRONKHORST observes, 'Kapila's divine nature may [...] be taken as established for

⁷⁸¹ Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274: 'The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.' Similarly, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 29: 'Sāṃkhya had never denied reliable testimony (*āptavacana* or *śruti*) as a legitimate and important means of knowing, but Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning.'

classical Sāṃkhya’,⁷⁸² the commentators’ views on the precise origin and nature of Kapila vary.⁷⁸³ As discussed in §IV.8, the GBh, YD, MV, and TK agree that Kapila was born with innate (*sāṃsiddhika*) merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness.⁷⁸⁴ The SK itself states that Kapila transmitted his knowledge out of compassion (*anukampā*) to Āsuri, and that this knowledge was then passed down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa through a succession of disciples.⁷⁸⁵ Beyond these points of agreement, a distinct development can be traced in the commentaries, whereby Kapila’s status has changed over time.

Although the GBh specifies that only Kapila was born with innate *sāttvika bhāvas*, while ‘the four sons of Brahmā—Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra’ were endowed with *sāttvika bhāvas* ‘deriving from Materiality’ (*prākṛta*) at sixteen years of age,⁷⁸⁶ elsewhere Gauḍapāda groups Kapila among the sons of Brahmā and quotes a verse similar to the MBh passage mentioned above.⁷⁸⁷

In this world, there was a glorious son of Brahmā named Kapila, as here follows: ‘Sanaka, Sanandana, and the third, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu, and Pañcaśikha—These seven great ṛṣis have been declared the sons of Brahmā.’⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸² BRONKHORST (2007), p. 62. Similarly, WEZLER (1970, p. 257) observes that ‘the deification of Kapila, adequately testified in epic and purāṇic sources, was also a prevalent mythological view of the Sāṃkhya authors’ (‘die in epischen und puranischen Quellen hinlänglich bezeugte Deifizierung Kapila’s auch geltende mythologische Anschauung der Sāṃkhya-Autoren war’).

⁷⁸³ JACOBSEN (2008, pp. 32-33) observes: ‘Most commentaries agree that Kapila passed his teaching on to Āsuri, but they offer different versions of Kapila’s origin and nature. One gets the impression that each commentary had to add a new detail or an original interpretation to the body of knowledge regarding the nature and origin of Kapila as part of its general interpretative contribution. There is, in fact, a remarkable variety in the speculations about Kapila in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* commentaries.’

⁷⁸⁴ See nn. 453, 458, 462, 476 (§IV.8).

⁷⁸⁵ SK 70-71: ‘The sage bestowed this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion. Āsuri likewise [bestowed this knowledge] to Pañcaśikha, and by him the philosophical system was expanded. It was transmitted through a succession of disciples, and it has been condensed by the noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa in *āryā* [verses], having completely discerned the established truth.’ (*etat pavitram agryam munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau / āsurir api pañcaśikhāya tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantram // śiṣyaparamparayāgatam īśvarakṛṣṇena caitad āryābhiḥ / saṃkṣiptam āryamatinā samyag vijñāya siddhāntam //*).

⁷⁸⁶ See nn. 453, 455 (§IV.8).

⁷⁸⁷ JACOBSEN (2008, p. 18-19) notes this point of continuity between the MBh and GBh.

⁷⁸⁸ *iha bhagavān brahmasutaḥ kapilo nāma / tadyathā—
sanakaś ca sanandanaś ca tṛtīyaś ca sanātanaḥ /
āsurīḥ kapilaś caiva voḍhuḥ pañcaśikhas tathā /
ity ete brahmaṇaḥ putrāḥ sapta proktā maharṣayaḥ //* (GBh on SK 1, p. 35, ll. 13-17).

Āsuri and Pañcaśikha are well-known as early Sāṃkhya teachers. Their assimilation (and perhaps that of Voḍhu⁷⁸⁹) into this list of seven *ṛṣis* probably reflects an attempt to further legitimize the lineage of Sāṃkhya teachers within the framework of the Brāhmanical tradition. However, at no point does Gauḍapāda elevate Kapila above the ontological status of other *ṛṣis*, nor does he associate Kapila with any deity.

As discussed in §V.3-4, the YD elevates Kapila above the status of Brahmā's sons and grandsons, placing him on a par with Brahmā in terms of the circumstances of his birth. Both Kapila and Brahmā were manifested out of the favour (*anugraha*) of primordial Materiality at the time of the first creation, before the onset of the cycle of transmigration (*saṃsāra*).⁷⁹⁰ Moreover, as discussed in §IV.10, the YD is unique among the Sāṃkhya commentaries in its clear conception of the relationship between the paradigms of the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*. According to this relationship, Kapila is unique in being exempt from the need to attain the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) through one of the three primary attainments (*siddhis*), through which all other beings 'up to Brahmā' must attain Sāṃkhya knowledge.⁷⁹¹ This suggests that Kapila is also elevated above other *ṛṣis* (perhaps Brahmā's sons), who seem to be associated with the attainment of knowledge through reflection (*ūha*).⁷⁹² Kapila thus fulfills a unique soteriological role according to the YD. He appears to represent a direct manifestation of *prakṛti*'s soteriological tendency for the benefit of other beings (§V.4), though it is not clear whether he might be also considered an embodiment of *īśvara* (§V.3).

⁷⁸⁹ As far as I am aware, Voḍhu does not appear elsewhere either as a Sāṃkhya teacher or in the usual lists of seven *ṛṣis*.

⁷⁹⁰ See n. 693 (§V.3) and nn. 730, 735 (§V.4).

⁷⁹¹ See n. 509 (§IV.9) and n. 569 (§IV.10).

⁷⁹² See nn. 507, 508, 510 (§IV.9).

It is possible that the YD's view of Kapila's origin represents a deliberate attempt to elevate Kapila beyond his earlier status as one of Brahmā's sons, as attested by the GBh, although the YD does not otherwise seem to be aware of the views expressed by the GBh. Alternatively, given the commentator's apparent familiarity with the views of Sāṃkhya teachers prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, especially in connection with mythological subject matter,⁷⁹³ the evidence of the YD might reflect an earlier conception of the nature and role of Kapila.⁷⁹⁴ It is also possible that the YD's presentation of Kapila somehow anticipates his later elevation to the status of an incarnation of Viṣṇu in later Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts.

As mentioned in §V.3, VBh 1.25 presents Kapila as an incarnation of *īśvara*,⁷⁹⁵ while the MV refers to *īśvara* as 'the light of Kapila',⁷⁹⁶ and relates a mythological account of the birth of Kapila as an incarnation of the 'ancient *puruṣa*' (*purāṇapurūṣa*).⁷⁹⁷ The term *purāṇapurūṣa* is a common epithet of Viṣṇu. As JACOBSEN (2008) observes, this account of Kapila's birth is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK: 'The fact that Kapila was considered the son of Devahūti and Kardama is in accordance with the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* but this is not stated in the early Sāṃkhya commentaries.'⁷⁹⁸ JACOBSEN takes this fact, along with a reference by Māṭhara to Viṣṇu's incarnation as Kalki,⁷⁹⁹ as evidence of the text's late date,⁸⁰⁰ citing the dates for the text proposed by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) as 'anywhere from the ninth century onward'.⁸⁰¹ With regard to its

⁷⁹³ Cf. the YD's discussion of the views of Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vindhyavāsin on the *bhāvas* (§IV.8, nn. 465, 466) and OBERHAMMER (1961)'s discussion of the YD's quotations (arguably) from the *Śaṣṭitantra* (CHAPTER III).

⁷⁹⁴ This possibility might be supported by Vācaspati's attribution of the passage quoted by VBh 1.25 (see §V.3, n. 675) to Pañcaśikha.

⁷⁹⁵ See n. 675 (§V.3).

⁷⁹⁶ See n. 684 (§V.3).

⁷⁹⁷ See n. 686 (§V.3).

⁷⁹⁸ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.

⁷⁹⁹ *kalkī bhaviṣyati bhāvivastugrāhiṇī* / (MV on SK 33, p. 50, l. 4).

⁸⁰⁰ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.

⁸⁰¹ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 33; LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 291.

identification of Kapila with Viṣṇu, the MV differs most noticeably from the GBh, with which it otherwise generally agrees, as apparent in the discussion of these texts in CHAPTER IV.

As JACOBSEN also observes,⁸⁰² Vācaspati's TV, also a late text, similarly refers to Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in its commentary on VBh 1.25 :

It is taught that Kapila attained knowledge (*jñāna*) as he was being born, due simply to the favour (*anugraha*) of the great Lord (*maheśvara*). By the name Kapila he is known as a particular incarnation (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu.⁸⁰³

While in the YD Kapila's birth (and by extension the production of his knowledge) is said to be due to the *anugraha* of *pradhāna*,⁸⁰⁴ the TV suggests that this was due rather to the *anugraha* of Viṣṇu.

In the TK, Vācaspati echoes VBh 1.25 by referring to Kapila as 'the first knower' (*ādividvas*)⁸⁰⁵ but does not suggest that Kapila was an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Rather, the TK's discussion of the applicability of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) to Kapila suggests that Kapila's knowledge was the result not of any *anugraha*, but of his experience in past incarnations:

There is a possibility that at the beginning of an age (*kalpa*), Kapila, the first knower, has a remembrance of the revelation (*śruti*) learned during previous ages, just as one awakened from sleep has a [remembrance] of things learned on the previous day.⁸⁰⁶

This passage suggests that Kapila's inherent authoritative status is not the result of a soteriological inclination on the part of any deity (or of *pradhāna*, as in the YD), but rather the result of his own study of *śruti* in previous incarnations.

⁸⁰² JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 35-36.

⁸⁰³ *kapilasyāpi jāyamānasya maheśvarānugrahād eva jñānaprāptiḥ śrūyata iti / kapila nāma viṣṇor avatāra viśeṣaḥ prasiddhaḥ* / (TV on VBh 1.25, p. 78, ll. 22-23).

⁸⁰⁴ Cf. nn. 458, 459 (§IV.8); 693 (§V.3).

⁸⁰⁵ TK on SK 5, p. 27, l. 22 (see n. 806 below) and TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 3-4: *sargādāv ādividvān atrabhagavān kapilo mahāmūnir dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvāryasampannaḥprādurbabhūveti smaranti* /. WEZLER (1970, p. 259-260) notes these passages and suggests that the quotation in VBh 1.25 served the source of the application of the term *ādividvas* to Kapila.

⁸⁰⁶ *ādividuṣaś ca kapilasya kalpādaḥ kalpāntarādhītaśrutismaraṇasambhavaḥ, suptaprabuddhasyeva pūrvedyuravagatānām arthānām aparedyuh* / (TK on SK 5, p. 27, ll. 22-23).

While it is thus apparent that the view of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu was not firmly established by Vācaspati's time, the MV and TV testify that it was beginning to be acknowledged by Sāṃkhya authors. With regard to the reason for this development, JACOBSEN suggests: 'The fact that Kapila was accepted as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu in these texts probably means that the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth century.'⁸⁰⁷ Similarly, WEZLER (1970) suggests that while Kapila had occasionally been identified with Viṣṇu since the time of the MBh, the Sāṃkhya acceptance of this view must have been due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas upon the school.⁸⁰⁸

There is no evidence in the YD to suggest an identification of Kapila with Viṣṇu,⁸⁰⁹ although the commentator presents a similar paradigm for the production of Kapila and his knowledge—due to the *anugraha* of *pradhāna* rather than of Viṣṇu. We can probably say that the YD represents a transitional stage in the Sāṃkhya conception of the nature of Kapila. He has been given a key soteriological role in the Sāṃkhya system and has been elevated in status beyond other *ṛṣis*, but he has not yet come to be considered an incarnation of Viṣṇu and thereby ultimately to become secondary in importance to Viṣṇu himself. While the YD shows various signs of an effort to integrate both Sāṃkhya doctrine and the lineage of Sāṃkhya teachers into the framework of the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, it does not yet show signs of the influence of Vaiṣṇavism.

With regard to the possible influence of the YD upon the later classical Sāṃkhya texts, this appears to have been minimal. Although, as LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) observe,⁸¹⁰ Vācaspati appears to quote directly from the YD

⁸⁰⁷ JACOBSEN (2008), p. 36.

⁸⁰⁸ WEZLER (1970), p. 262.

⁸⁰⁹ Rather, as discussed in §V.3, all references to major deities seem to be to either Brahmā or Śiva.

⁸¹⁰ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 227-228.

on one occasion,⁸¹¹ he does not seem to make much use of the YD's views in his interpretation of the SK. The TK's interpretation of the *vīta* and *avīta* inferences, for example, testifies to a lack of understanding of their original significance as attested by the YD.⁸¹² Although the MV does not display any explicit familiarity with the YD's views, it does contain some statements reminiscent of these views. Māṭhara refers to those for whom 'the qualities [of things] are placed [directly] before the eyes' (*sākṣātkṛtadharman*) in his definition of authoritative individuals (*āpta*).⁸¹³ He also accepts five of the ten members (*avayava*) of inference accepted by the YD.⁸¹⁴ Like the YD (in the opening verses of the text), SK 73 (added to the text by the MV) refers to the SK as 'an image in a mirror' of an earlier *tantra*.⁸¹⁵ It is possible that the YD and MV were influenced by the same trends of interpretation in some respects, but Māṭhara does not appear to have been aware of the YD itself.

The YD's view that Kapila was born due to the *anugraha* of *prakṛti* is probably related to the evidently old conception of *prakṛti*'s ability to manifest itself in 'streams' (*srotas*, *abhiṣyanda*) flowing directly into the phenomenal sphere of experience (see §IV.8-10; V.4).⁸¹⁶ This view is apparent nowhere else in the classical Sāṃkhya texts. It is possible that the VBh's view that Kapila was born out of the *anugraha* of *īśvara* is somehow related to the YD's use of *anugraha*, and that Vācaspati's interpretation of the VBh passage represents an adaptation of this concept to the context of Vaiṣṇava soteriology. Otherwise, though, the YD's view of

⁸¹¹ TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 604, §V.2.

⁸¹² See nn. 334, 344, 345, 348, 349 (§IV.2).

⁸¹³ See n. 358 (§IV.3).

⁸¹⁴ See nn. 320, 322, 324 (§IV.2).

⁸¹⁵ See nn. 609, 610 (§V.2).

⁸¹⁶ The *ābhiṣyandika* form of the condition of *jñāna* is attributed to the early Sāṃkhya teacher Pañcādhikaraṇa (see §IV.8, n. 465), while the passage relating the *māhātmyaśarīra*'s production of streams (*srotas*) from *pradhāna* is attributed to a *śāstra* (see §IV.9, n. 484), perhaps to be identified as the *Śaṣṭitantra*, as argued by OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 135-138).

the origin of Kapila and his role in the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine seems to have been lost to later Sāṃkhya authors.

CHAPTER VI: Conclusion.

This study has demonstrated that, according to the YD, ordinary seekers of liberation are generally considered to be dependent upon the Sāṃkhya tradition initiated by the *ṛṣi* Kapila for the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*. The author of the YD appears to emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. According to this conception, Kapila's initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine represents the manifestation of a universal, primordial Sāṃkhya *śāstra*. This original *śāstra* remains the primary point of reference for later Sāṃkhya teachers, assisting later generations in the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is attained. Some extraordinary individuals may also be able to attain this knowledge independently, either as the result of yogic practice or through a faculty of reflection (*ūha*) attributed to *ṛṣis*. This fact does not contradict the authority of Kapila's original Sāṃkhya *śāstra* but rather affirms the universality of that *śāstra*.

The evidence of the YD thus suggests that the concept of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) holds more value in classical Sāṃkhya than has been generally assumed. The text's definition of *āptavacana* allows for the maintenance of the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers. Inference (*anumāna*), which is used to logically prove the existence of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*, is viewed by the author of the YD not as an independent means to Sāṃkhya knowledge, but rather as a formal tool for the exposition of Sāṃkhya *śāstra* to ordinary seekers.

The YD views Kapila as a direct manifestation of the soteriological tendency of primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*), produced at the beginning of the process of

creation, with innate knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*. Kapila serves as initiator of the Sāṃkhya tradition and as an exemplar to which later seekers aspire. He thus effects the favour (*anugraha*) of all embodied *puruṣas* on behalf of *prakṛti*.

The comparison of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries in CHAPTER IV has demonstrated that the evidence of the YD resolves several interpretative issues which remain obscure in the other commentaries. These include not only the role of *āptavacana* in relation to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, but also the relationship between the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), and the nature of the various modes of production of the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*). The discussions in CHAPTER V have shown that the YD represents a transitional stage in the conception of Kapila in the classical Sāṃkhya tradition. In the YD, Kapila has been given a key soteriological role in the Sāṃkhya system and has been elevated in status beyond other *ṛṣis* and even major deities, but he has not yet come to be identified as an incarnation (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu as attested in the later MV and TV.

The evidence presented in the course of this study suggests several avenues of further inquiry into the significance of the YD's views of Kapila and of the production and transmission of knowledge. The relation of these views to earlier, proto-Sāṃkhya and pre-classical Sāṃkhya views, especially as reconstructed from portions of the MBh and the YD's references to earlier Sāṃkhya authors, deserves a separate study.⁸¹⁷ For instance, it has been beyond the scope of this study to determine whether a connection exists between the YD's notion of the *anugraha* of *prakṛti* and the early Sāṃkhya concept of the *anugrahasarga*, which, OBERHAMMER

⁸¹⁷ On the work done by previous scholars on the reconstruction of early Sāṃkhya views, see n. 2 (CHAPTER I).

(1961) suggests, was introduced into Sāṃkhya in the *Śaṣṭitantra*.⁸¹⁸ The *anugrahasarga*, OBERHAMMER notes, also occurs in several Purāṇas.⁸¹⁹ An examination of this and other Sāṃkhya ideas found in the Purāṇas and other non-technical Sāṃkhya texts contemporary with the YD may serve to clarify the sources of the YD's portrayal of Kapila and other figures of cosmological prominence. Likewise, a consideration of the relation of the YD's views to later, post-classical Sāṃkhya texts might prove fruitful.

The apparent influence of the Grammarian (*vyākaraṇa*) tradition on the author of the YD could become the focus of a significant study.⁸²⁰ More generally, the evidence of the YD provides an insight into the process by which the disparate philosophical views of various schools have come to be integrated within the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition. In particular, the conclusions drawn in this study may contribute to our understanding of general assumptions in the tradition with regard to the nature of the knowledge of *ṛsis* and other supernormal forms of knowledge,⁸²¹ and with regard to the primordial origination of *śāstra*.⁸²² The manner in which these assumptions have influenced the YD's views provides a particularly striking case in point, given the generally assumed emphasis in Sāṃkhya upon logical thought rather than tradition.

⁸¹⁸ OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 163.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 152-156.

⁸²⁰ Cf. nn. 312 (§IV.1); 364 (§IV.3); 590 (§V.1); 616, 620 (§V.2) . MOTEGI (2006, p. 54) likewise suggests that this aspect of the YD deserves further study.

⁸²¹ See the reviews of WEZLER (2001) and AKLUJKAR (2009) in CHAPTER III.

⁸²² See the review of POLLOCK (1985) in CHAPTER III.

ABBREVIATIONS

References are made to the following editions, unless otherwise noted:

BDhS = *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* (2000)

GBh = *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* (1972)

MBh = *Mahābhārata* (1999)

MV = *Māṭharavṛtti* (1922)

NS = *Nyāyasūtra* (1986)

NSBh = *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (1986)

NU = *Nirukta* (1998)

SK = *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (1979)

SSV = *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*

ŚU = *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (1998)

SV = *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (1978)

SVS = *Suvarṇasaptati*

TK = *Tattvakaumudī* (2004)

TV = *Tattvavaiśārādī* (1971)

VBh = *Vyāsaabhāṣya* (1971)

VP = *Vākyapadīya* (1966)

VPV = *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* (1966)

VS = *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (1975)

YD = *Yuktidīpikā* (1998)

YS = *Yogasūtra* (1971)

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Kāśīhindūviśvavidyālayasya kalā-saṃkāye saṃskṛtavibhāge 'dhyāpakena
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